tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post1781077406248607210..comments2024-03-27T05:47:21.295-07:00Comments on Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature: Objectivism & Politics, Part 11Daniel Barneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06359277853862225286noreply@blogger.comBlogger179125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-78921822435797872552020-08-01T05:01:55.732-07:002020-08-01T05:01:55.732-07:00This is the best place for the servicing of your S...This is the best place for the servicing of your <a href="https://clearions.wordpress.com/2020/07/28/effluent-treatment-plant-working-process/" rel="nofollow">Swimming pool filtration plant</a>, the team available here is well experienced and also the services are very much budget friendly. <br />Thamos Liamhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04706967129650480198noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-72230872730578419282009-06-10T18:10:20.572-07:002009-06-10T18:10:20.572-07:00No, there's no confusion here.
Who decides an...No, there's no confusion here.<br /><br />Who decides and using what standard what is good and bad as in "good in itself" as in good-will?<br /><br /><br />If not morality?Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-85545790445486004702009-06-09T20:50:22.416-07:002009-06-09T20:50:22.416-07:00Red,
I see the confusion here. The "good in ...Red,<br /><br />I see the confusion here. The "good in itself" is the good-will. If there is another "good in itself" for morality, then it has to be as transcendental as the will. <br /><br />For example, the concept "life," which is transcendental according to Kant, could arguably serve such a function.Cavewighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00898771057884872416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-58077335327257655642009-06-09T17:41:36.525-07:002009-06-09T17:41:36.525-07:00___________________________________
Red wrote:
Th...___________________________________<br /><br />Red wrote:<br />This then leads to an end that is different from the good in itself as defined by Kant.<br /><br />What would be the possibility then?<br /><br />I don't know, but it would have to be transcendental to the moral topic. - cavewight on 6/04/2009 01:27:00 PM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Cavewight, now, you're contradciting yourself here.<br /><br />Here you're talking about a moral end that is supposed to be good.<br /><br />It cannot be transcendental to the notion of good or evil.<br /><br />6/08/2009 10:47:00 PMRed Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-59536401023234277682009-06-09T01:06:10.424-07:002009-06-09T01:06:10.424-07:00"It all depends on the complexity of the subj..."It all depends on the complexity of the subject. With billiard balls striking each other on the table, one can focus exclusively on the balls, because all the other factors (such as the incline of the table, the texture of the surface, etc.) are assumed to be constant. But in mind/brain interaction, there are a great many other factors, none of which are clearly observed or even understood, particularly if we assume the sort of doltish mechanism prevalent among materialists."<br /><br />Greg,<br /><br />What are these other factors, none of which are clearly observed or even understood? And if they are not clearly observed or understood, how do you know the exist and have any impact on what is going on? And given your response, how should we view the "doltish mechanism" from these materialists who are trying to work with what they can understand and observe to generate great insights into the functioning of the brain/mind?<br /><br />The billiard ball example is pretty self-serving. Why do you not lodge such criticisms at astronomy or weather forecasting, both complicated fields that should fall victim to your objections if consistently applied as well?Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-30313311561063689622009-06-09T00:49:04.843-07:002009-06-09T00:49:04.843-07:00Michael,
Since the empirical core of what your th...Michael,<br /><br />Since the empirical core of what your theory contributes is based on parapsychology, and I haven't reviewed the evidence for parapsychology, then there is no meaningful way to distinguish it from contemporary identity-theory inspired neuroscience. What you have to show is what you expect your theory to explain that current neuroscience does not.<br /><br />Your theory is for the most part a version of dualism and I think that most of the criticisms of dualism clearly apply to it. The method of interaction between consciousness and the brain is taken for granted and none is presented (an empirical theory would need to be distinguishable from contemporary neuroscience) and not just accommodate it.<br /><br />If parapsychology has any value, it will eventually be embraced by mainstream science. Posing the question of mind vs. matter as a chicken and the egg problem is IMO another example of the limits of speculative reasoning. Just as in the free will vs. determinism problem, there are paradoxes here that people try to answer in a rationalistic fashion rather than by looking at actual experiments. I think that by focusing on the questions we can actually answer and seeing whose theory actually drives people to investigate those questions, we get a better idea of what is at stake in this debate.<br /><br />Any dualism that is fully acquainted with the evidence of experimental science into the correlations between mind and body (including the fact that mental injuries can affect morality) is good enough for me. But I always have this lurking suspicion that most people who are dualists haven't even looked at things like synaesthesia and asked how they would come up with a theory to explain this that rivals the ideas generated by materialist neuroscientists.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-12904120843554569852009-06-08T23:19:16.273-07:002009-06-08T23:19:16.273-07:00___________________________________
As for extern...___________________________________<br /><br />As for external morality, a proper political system, according to Kant, supports the freedom of the people while attempting to direct it toward a certain moral end using a judicious system of laws and punishments. - cavewight on 6/03/2009 08:42:00 PM<br />===================================<br /><br />So who decides what should be the certain moral end you're talking about above? - Red Grant on 6/03/2009 10:01:00 PM<br />===================================<br />In at least one modern case, the answer turns out to be Karl Marx. In the case of the US, the answer turns out to be the Founders. - cavewight on 6/04/2009 06:26:00 AM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />So political establishment decides what is moral according to you, and Kant?<br /><br />Doesn't that contradict what you referred to as Kantian moral system?<br /><br />According to you, Kantian moral system , the political establishment supports the freedom of the people while directing them to a certain moral end, but if the<br />political establishment itself decided what should be that certain moral end, then they can define whatever they want as that certain moral end and use the system of law and punishment to detract the freedom of the will toward that certain end.<br /><br />Of course, that means Kant as you have described contradicted himself?<br /><br />6/04/2009 07:45:00 AMRed Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-34581822848684222872009-06-08T23:15:09.670-07:002009-06-08T23:15:09.670-07:00___________________________________
Furthermore, ...___________________________________<br /><br />Furthermore, does this mean you believe Kant decided what is good in universally, objectively, valid sense? - Red Grant<br />===================================<br /><br />Kant decided, but then he left room for rational debate by declaring his end in itself a mere postulate of practical reason. - Cavewight on 6/04/2009 01:27:00 PM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Another example of contradiction from you.<br /><br /><br />You said external morality came from primitive gods.<br /><br /><br />___________________________________<br /><br />I just think that if we were in Hammurabi's day, then the answer would be simple: Hammurabi sets the rules we live by, and he got the rules from some Babylonian deity.<br /><br />These days, the rules are set by either the Church or the PC crowd. <br /><br />But this answer is not interesting. The question is: where do they come from in the first place? They evolved from some simple, primitive code allegedly coming to man from deities. That is my external answer. - cavewight on 6/03/2009 07:15:00 PM<br />___________________________________Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-24856498522320251292009-06-08T23:10:17.268-07:002009-06-08T23:10:17.268-07:00___________________________________
An end that w...___________________________________<br /><br />An end that would be not so good, even bad end as defined by Kant? - Red Grant<br />===================================<br /><br />No, as I said, a moral end in itself must be intrinsically good. Kant then only postulated the good-will as being that intrinsic good. But as a mere postulate, it is therefore debatable. It's not that he didn't argue for it, but someone could eventually argue for yet another postulated end in itself. Kant left room for debate. - cavewight on 6/04/2009 01:27:00 PM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Cavewight, you're being a sophist now.<br /><br />You're saying, moral end in itself must be intrinstically good.<br /><br />___________________________________<br /><br />Now you may ask, who determines this good in itself? Kant determined it, open-endedly. First he argued for the existence of an intrinsic end in itself, then he argued for the good-will as that end. Then he stated that it may be possible to find a different end in itself, but that the need for an intrinsic end in general is not debatable. - cavewight on 6/04/2009 12:02:00 PM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br />So Kant defined good-will (whatever he meant by it) as the moral end.<br /><br />Yet, Kant also believe another (per your statemetns)different end (that is, other than what Kant defined as good) could be the moral end.<br /><br />If that's the case, then what is universally, objectively, good according to Kant?<br /><br />If Kant cannot define what it is, only arguing for its existence, then here you don't have a moral system.<br /><br />You only have Kant's personal opinion that there is open-ended absolute morality. And it could be something other than what Kant argued for as good.<br /><br /><br /><br />Talk about oxymoron!Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-15692563713718701692009-06-08T22:47:52.698-07:002009-06-08T22:47:52.698-07:00___________________________________
Red wrote:
Th...___________________________________<br /><br />Red wrote:<br />This then leads to an end that is different from the good in itself as defined by Kant.<br /><br />What would be the possibility then?<br /><br />I don't know, but it would have to be transcendental to the moral topic. - cavewight on 6/04/2009 01:27:00 PM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Cavewight, now, you're contradciting yourself here.<br /><br />Here you're talking about a moral end that is supposed to be good.<br /><br />It cannot be transcendental to the notion of good or evil.Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-84414885792598802862009-06-08T22:35:03.904-07:002009-06-08T22:35:03.904-07:00___________________________________
Red wrote:
So...___________________________________<br /><br />Red wrote:<br />So you disagree with Kant when it comes to what is an external morality.<br /><br />Not at all. I used the word "evolved" in the material you quoted, so I am not saying we are living in a Hammurabi-like era. - cavewight on 6/04/2009 01:19:00 PM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br />Now, cavewight, you're trying to change the original subject at issue. I never said you said we were living in a Hammurabi-like era.<br /><br />My question was, "Who decides what is moral?".<br /><br />Your answer was the external morality came allegedely came from some form of primitive gods.<br /><br />And then you claim Kant decide what is proper political system that gives external morality.<br /><br /><br />So you disagree with Kant as for the origin of external morality.Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-41691942371391164242009-06-06T16:03:44.950-07:002009-06-06T16:03:44.950-07:00Laj: "Why does your objection apply specifica...Laj: "Why does your objection apply specifically to the mind/body problem and not just about everything known to man?"<br /><br />It all depends on the complexity of the subject. With billiard balls striking each other on the table, one can focus exclusively on the balls, because all the other factors (such as the incline of the table, the texture of the surface, etc.) are assumed to be constant. But in mind/brain interaction, there are a great many other factors, none of which are clearly observed or even understood, particularly if we assume the sort of doltish mechanism prevalent among materialists.gregnyquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13653516868316854941noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-69890737260292912132009-06-05T09:56:56.384-07:002009-06-05T09:56:56.384-07:00Laj: "the evidence for brain states influenci...Laj: "the evidence for brain states influencing mental states is far stronger"<br /><br />Of course brain states influence mental states. This was well known even in William James' time. (If a guy got a railroad spike through his noggin and lived, his behavior would be affected.) <br /><br />The point of the transmission theory is that even though brain states influence mental states, it doesn't follow that brain states give rise to consciousness. The TV set analogy is an attempt to explain this.<br /><br />Perhaps a better analogy is the Mars Rover. If some Martian were watching the Rover move around, he might assume the Rover had a mind of its own. In fact, however, it obeys a signal sent from Earth. If the Rover is damaged, it may not pick up the signal anymore, or it may not pick it up as clearly, or it may have trouble carrying out the signal's instructions. The Rover's "brain states" influence its "mental state" - i.e., its built-in circuitry influences its ability to receive, decode, and utilize the signal. <br /><br />Moreover, the Rover is also sending back data to Earth, and these data influence the future instructions that are sent. If the Rover beams back a picture of a cactus, you can bet the Earthbound controllers are going to instruct the Rover to mosey on over and take a closer look. On the other hand, if the Rover beams back a picture of a bottomless pit, the Earthbound signalers will tell it, "Stay away from that pit!" <br /><br />So there is interaction between the two; it's not a one-way street. <br /><br />Furthermore, the Rover presumably has some sort of firmware built into it that can operate even in the absence of a signal from Earth. I would assume that, like the Roomba vacuum cleaner, it can detect a precipice and automatically back away. So some of the Rover's behavior may be the result of built-in mechanisms not dependent on an external command. Similarly, I wouldn't doubt that <i>some</i> human behavior is the result of reflexes and instincts. <br /><br />It's a complicated interplay, which we certainly don't understand. Will we ever understand it fully? Maybe not; as Greg suggests, it may be impossible for the mind to fully encompass itself. <br /><br />In any event, the correlations of neuroscience cannot address the chicken-and-egg question of which came first, mind or brain. (Or did they arise together, as neutral monism would have it?) <br /><br />You might say there's no point in considering such a complicated theory when it's more parsimonious to assume that the brain generates the mind. This would be true if there were no evidence to the contrary. In my opinion, however, there is a great deal of evidence <br />to the contrary - evidence for ESP, life after death, etc. Obviously this evidence is controversial. But if you believe, as I do, that much of it is legitimate, then the transmission theory or something like it begins to look like the best explanation. <br /><br />It doesn't matter, incidentally, if the evidence of neuroscience is "stronger" than the evidence of parapsychology. It's not a competition. The evidence of neuroscience can peacefully coexist with the evidence of parapsychology if something like the transmission theory is correct. Conflict comes in only when some neuroscientists start <i>interpreting</i> their evidence in line with materialist presuppositions. But then we don't have a disagreement of evidence; we have a disagreement of worldviews. <br /><br />BTW, I owe the Mars Rover analogy to <i>The Biology of Belief</i> by Bruce Lipton, though I've expanded it somewhat.Michael Prescotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12963295565160636175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-66969588822287970192009-06-04T14:32:21.723-07:002009-06-04T14:32:21.723-07:00Red wrote:
So if anyone accuses of you of contradi...Red wrote:<br /><i>So if anyone accuses of you of contradiction, then it would be not due to you being a moral relativist, but due to you claiming morality is relative in one instance, but claiming it is not on the other instance.</i><br /><br />In this two quotes there is a distinction between a moral code and a moral theory. For the latter, I should better have expressed it as a meta-morals, that which stands a priori to all moral code in general.Cavewighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00898771057884872416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-57332722869094767002009-06-04T13:27:21.426-07:002009-06-04T13:27:21.426-07:00Red wrote:
This then leads to an end that is diffe...Red wrote:<br /><i>This then leads to an end that is different from the good in itself as defined by Kant.<br /><br />What would be the possibility then?</i><br /><br />I don't know, but it would have to be transcendental to the moral topic.<br /><br /><i>An end that would be not so good, even bad end as defined by Kant?</i><br /><br />No, as I said, a moral end in itself must be intrinsically good. Kant then only postulated the good-will as being that intrinsic good. But as a mere postulate, it is therefore debatable. It's not that he didn't argue for it, but someone could eventually argue for yet another postulated end in itself. Kant left room for debate.<br /><br />That is why I sincerely question the knowledge of those who claim that Kant dictated the rules of morality. Nobody who dictates leaves any room for question. The very basis of Kantian morality is left open for debate. <br /><br /><i>Furthermore, does this mean you believe Kant decided what is good in universally, objectively, valid sense?</i><br /><br />Kant decided, but then he left room for rational debate by declaring his end in itself a mere postulate of practical reason.Cavewighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00898771057884872416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-19948436192186799152009-06-04T13:19:13.096-07:002009-06-04T13:19:13.096-07:00Red wrote:
So you disagree with Kant when it comes...Red wrote:<br /><i>So you disagree with Kant when it comes to what is an external morality.</i><br /><br />Not at all. I used the word "evolved" in the material you quoted, so I am not saying we are living in a Hammurabi-like era. Moving from a dictatorship form of government (ancient kingdoms) to a republican form of government today required an evolution in political thought.<br /><br />But then there may always be some dictatorial element involved in government, so the Constitution was designed to limit this element.Cavewighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00898771057884872416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-27384681298685001682009-06-04T13:18:07.169-07:002009-06-04T13:18:07.169-07:00___________________________________
Now you may a...___________________________________<br /><br />Now you may ask, who determines this good in itself? Kant determined it, open-endedly. First he argued for the existence of an intrinsic end in itself, then he argued for the good-will as that end. Then he stated that it may be possible to find a different end in itself, but that the need for an intrinsic end in general is not debatable. - cavewight on 6/04/2009 12:02:00 PM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Okay, so now you're saying for a moral system to be proper it has to meet the criteria set by Kant?<br /><br /><br />But didn't Kant already contradict himself as paraphrased by you previously as I have consequently shown?<br /><br /><br />Besides, according to you, Kant argued for an open end, which could be different from the concept of good in itself as defined by Kant per your paraphrase of Kant.<br /><br />This then leads to an end that is different from the good in itself as defined by Kant.<br /><br />What would be the possibility then?<br /><br />An end that would be not so good, even bad end as defined by Kant?<br /><br /><br />Furthermore, does this mean you believe Kant decided what is good in universally, objectively, valid sense?Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-20728132392526953852009-06-04T13:09:15.245-07:002009-06-04T13:09:15.245-07:00___________________________________
As for extern...___________________________________<br /><br />As for external morality, a proper political system, according to Kant, supports the freedom of the people while attempting to direct it toward a certain moral end using a judicious system of laws and punishments. - cavewight on 6/03/2009 08:42:00 PM<br />===================================<br /><br />So who decides what should be the certain moral end you're talking about above? - Red Grant on 6/03/2009 10:01:00 PM<br />===================================<br />In at least one modern case, the answer turns out to be Karl Marx. In the case of the US, the answer turns out to be the Founders. - cavewight on 6/04/2009 06:26:00 AM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />So political establishment decides what is moral according to you, and Kant?<br /><br />Doesn't that contradict what you referred to as Kantian moral system?<br /><br />According to you, Kantian moral system , the political establishment supports the freedom of the people while directing them to a certain moral end, but if the<br />political establishment itself decided what should be that certain moral end, then they can define whatever they want as that certain moral end and use the system of law and punishment to detract the freedom of the will toward that certain end.<br /><br />Of course, that means Kant as you have described contradicted himself?<br /><br />6/04/2009 07:45:00 AMRed Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-45767438344519461792009-06-04T13:06:25.193-07:002009-06-04T13:06:25.193-07:00___________________________________
I don't k...___________________________________<br /><br />I don't know why you focus so much on the question of who decides what morality for you. - cavewight on 6/04/2009 12:02:00 PM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Hold a second, I never asked you who decides what is moral for me.<br /><br />I asked you who decides what is moral in your statements above in this thread because you pepper your statements with moral code/systems, and when I asked you further who decides what is moral in your statemnents, you started giving contradicitory definition of morality either per you or per Kant as paraphrased by you.<br /><br /><br />I'll recap below:<br /><br /><br />___________________________________<br /><br />I just think that if we were in Hammurabi's day, then the answer would be simple: Hammurabi sets the rules we live by, and he got the rules from some Babylonian deity.<br /><br />These days, the rules are set by either the Church or the PC crowd. <br /><br />But this answer is not interesting. The question is: where do they come from in the first place? They evolved from some simple, primitive code allegedly coming to man from deities. That is my external answer. - cavewight on 6/03/2009 07:15:00 PM<br />-----------------------------------<br />As for external morality, a proper political system, according to Kant, supports the freedom of the people while attempting to direct it toward a certain moral end using a judicious system of laws and punishments. - cavewight on 6/03/2009 08:42:00 PM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />So you disagree with Kant when it comes to what is an external morality.Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-70976754870727580942009-06-04T12:02:05.593-07:002009-06-04T12:02:05.593-07:00Red wrote:
So political establishment decides what...Red wrote:<br /><i>So political establishment decides what is moral according to you, and Kant?</i><br /><br />I don't know why you focus so much on the question of who decides what morality <i>for you</i>. A college professor decides to follow the external morality of the PC crowd because he desires to keep his job, and because he doesn't like the idea of submitting to PC training. This decision might be based on inclination or on moral reasoning. Either way, it is his decision, not theirs.<br /><br />Back in Hammurabi's day, people followed his external code because they did not want to be drowned in the river as punishment.<br /><br />This is so obvious it is hardly worthy of philosophical mention. <br /><br />The question is: what does this really have to do with morality which involves exerting the will toward an end which is good in itself, intrinsically, and not good merely because it serves this or that extrinsic end? But what then is a good in itself? There is only one, and that is the development of the good-will.<br /><br />Now you may ask, who determines this good in itself? Kant determined it, open-endedly. First he argued for the existence of an intrinsic end in itself, then he argued for the good-will as that end. Then he stated that it may be possible to find a different end in itself, but that the need for an intrinsic end in general is not debatable.Cavewighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00898771057884872416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-60770599566464592052009-06-04T10:56:29.340-07:002009-06-04T10:56:29.340-07:00Michael,
If I am free to do so, I'll probably...Michael,<br /><br />If I am free to do so, I'll probably respond more fully sometime on Sunday. I think Greg brought out one of my problems with your application of "correlation isn't causality" in the particular instance of brain states vs. mental states - it's just a denial of the obvious. What you probably meant was that it's not necessarily true that all mental states are a result of brain states - it's quite possible for some brain states to be a result of mental states.<br /><br />I know you're very interested in parapsychology and that might explain your respect for James' transmission theory. It's not the thing that I can debate seriously without having looked at the evidence for it, but I think that if you find parapsychology convincing, then the evidence for brain states influencing mental states is far stronger and should not be even resisted by yourself. Even transmission theory would admit that as the body gets weaker, there are limitations on what the mind's abilities are. But there is even more evidence from neuroscience about the limits of self-awareness, the discrete nature of consciousness (as opposed to the continuous analog nature that we all assume) etc. that can show that the manifest image of the mind isn't always scientifically defensible.<br /><br />Cheers.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-47043986584205798612009-06-04T09:37:05.135-07:002009-06-04T09:37:05.135-07:00___________________________________
As for me, I ...___________________________________<br /><br />As for me, I am inclined to agree with your statements above with qualification that (as I see it right now) there are external moralities (in terms as you have explained more or less) that are not necessarily the same.<br /><br />1. the external morality the society claims to believe in, but may not necessarily believes in, <br />1a)but still practices<br /><br />1b)but still pretends to practice, <br /><br />1c)does not practice<br /><br />2. the external morality the society thinks and/or wants to think it believes in, but may not necessarily believes in.<br /><br />2a)but still practices<br /><br />2b)still pretends to practice<br /><br />2c)does not practice<br /><br /><br /><br />3. the external morality the society actually believes in, but may neither necessarily claims to believe in nor necessarily thinks it believes in.<br /><br />and practices.<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Btw. Laj, Jay, my statements above are basically paraphrasing of Pareto from "Mind and Society".<br /><br /><br />Did Hume ever mentioned something even close?Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-16653463707593880282009-06-04T09:28:32.723-07:002009-06-04T09:28:32.723-07:00___________________________________
would say &q...___________________________________<br /><br /> would say "the perfect is the enemy of the good." - Michael Prescott<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br />Sorry for interjection, but I thought "Perfect/Best is the enemy of good enough.".<br /><br />Different meaning, you know.Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-20669336165415184102009-06-04T09:03:12.513-07:002009-06-04T09:03:12.513-07:00Laj: "At the risk of sounding redundant, how ...Laj: "At the risk of sounding redundant, how do you tell the difference between correlation and causation? Could you be very specific about it?"<br /><br />I thought I answered this when I wrote:<br /><br />"Distinguishing a cause-and-effect relationship from a coincidence always involves induction, which is not as well understood as deduction; inevitably there will be gray areas and room for doubt. But broadly speaking, if we can establish a logical connection between event A and event B, showing how the former is likely to give rise to the latter, we have grounds to suspect causality. For instance, if event A is 'it rained today' and event B is 'the swimming pool overflowed,' it is not too hard to work out a logical connection between these two events. (Rain means more water in the pool, more water in the pool means the water level will rise, a rising water level may lead to an overflow.)<br /><br />"On the other hand, since there is no logical connection between the Super Bowl and the stock market, we would naturally assign that correlation [the stock market going up when the NFC team wins] to coincidence - always leaving open the possibility that some causal link could be discovered in the future." <br /><br />If you want some mathematically precise way of distinguishing the two ... well, there isn't one. Induction doesn't lend itself to mathematical precision the way deduction does.<br /><br />Still, there is obviously a distinction between correlation and causality, and we draw this distinction all the time. <br /><br />I think in this case, and in the case of the Golden Rule, you're looking for a degree of precision that's not attainable in general principles pertaining to human affairs. Then when you can't find it, you conclude that the principles in question are worthless or invalid - that there is no value to the Golden Rule, or there is no way to distinguish between correlation and causality. <br /><br />I would say "the perfect is the enemy of the good." Common-sense approaches are useful and generally valid, even if not infallible or mathematically precise. <br /><br />"The street is wet because it rained" is self-evidently more plausible than "the street is wet because my favorite song just came on the radio."Michael Prescotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12963295565160636175noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-74120174737607534072009-06-04T08:08:54.324-07:002009-06-04T08:08:54.324-07:00___________________________________
Red wrote:
Bu...___________________________________<br /><br />Red wrote:<br />But based on your statements from 6/03/2009 07:15:00 PM, you are, in essence, saying the internal moral codes are relative to where they come from.<br /><br />That is not usually what is meant by the term "relative" in this context.<br />Moral relativism, as I understand it, states that every code of morality is good relative to the social context it derives from. There is, therefore, no absolute right or wrong but only that which a social group decrees. Since there is no absolute right or wrong, there is no way to judge moral codes outside one's own, and so the proper moral response to those codes must be toleration.<br /><br />So as you can see, moral relativism violates its own principle by asserting that toleration is an absolute good. It asserts that there is only external morality, that all morality is therefore a heteronomous relative social product - while at the same time implying that there is one good that is not a relative social product, that of toleration. <br /><br />Therefore, I am not the one contradicting himself, moral relativism is the self-contradiction here, and I am in no way propounding any such nonsense. - cavewight on 6/04/2009 06:35:00 AM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Easy, I have never said you were a moral relativist or proponent of one, at least not in a witting sense.<br /><br />I was simply saying the internal moral codes as you have referred to in one stance depend on wherever they had come from.<br /><br />Therefore, the internal moral codes as you referred to at least in one instance are relative to wherever they come from.<br /><br />Of course, that doesn't mean necessarily you think all moral codes deserve equal respect.<br /><br /><br /><br />Just to refresh your memory....<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />___________________________________<br /><br />Many moral codes can serve this purpose, I'll admit, as long as the internal order does not conflict with the external, social order.<br /><br />Or vice versa, of course. These internal codes come from various places, parents, church, one's own reflecting on values, or, as the Randroids like to call it, by "social osmosis." - cavewight on 6/03/2009 07:15:00 PM<br />-----------------------------------<br />No, I don't think internal morality is relative. Even an atheist morality (Objectivism) has its version of "God, Freedom, and Immortality." - cavewight on 6/03/2009 08:42:00 PM<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />So if anyone accuses of you of contradiction, then it would be not due to you being a moral relativist, but due to you claiming morality is relative in one instance, but claiming it is not on the other instance.Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.com