tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post6810107803370060514..comments2024-03-27T05:47:21.295-07:00Comments on Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature: Objectivism & Politics, Part 14Daniel Barneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06359277853862225286noreply@blogger.comBlogger61125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-21702703977637575442020-03-03T19:20:14.529-08:002020-03-03T19:20:14.529-08:00Historian Carl L. Becker in History of Political P...Historian Carl L. Becker in History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776 (1909) formulated the Progressive interpretation of the American Revolution. He said there were two revolutions: one against Britain to obtain home rule, and the other to determine who should rule at home.<br /><br />Charles A. Beard:<br />An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913). In this book he claimed that the Constitution had been formulated by interest groups whose motivations were just as much personal financial ones as they were political ones.<br />maxhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00656136425753297294noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-29784831258862582302009-06-23T20:38:50.770-07:002009-06-23T20:38:50.770-07:00Xtra Laj: I think we're in agreement about wha...<b>Xtra Laj: I think we're in agreement about what the is-ought problem is. Hume says that, as you say, "A conclusion with an 'ought' requires a premise with an 'ought.'" The issue here is that, ultimately, you can't get below some ultimate "ought" to get to an "is"; reason, as he says, is a slave to the passions. Reason can help attain the aims of your passions, but you can't really even judge whether the aims of those passions are good ones to pursue. Your oughts, then, are necessarily and ultimately arbitrary.<br /><br />That's the central crux of the problem Rand was trying to solve, and I do think that that is accurate to what Hume was saying and to Rand's quotation about it. Tell me if I'm missing your point still, but I don't think I am.</b><br /><br />Yes, you are missing my point. You've gone beyond the is-ought problem to claiming that Hume (or the is-ought distinction) implied/implies that morality is arbitrary. The "is-ought" distinction (sometimes called the fact-value distinction) is very different from claiming that morality is "arbitrary", whatever you mean by "arbitrary". You can accept the is-ought distinction and still claim the derivation of an objective morality is possible (see Michael Huemer). You can make an argument against the is-ought distinction and reject it and think that objective morality is impossible (I don't think Hilary Putnam falls into this class, but he does make direct philosophical arguments against the is-ought distinction). What you should not do is claim you have solved or avoided it when you never took time to explain it. You might accept Rand's version of the distinction, but it is her version and is ultimately misleading if taken as representative of the true distinction.<br /><br />If you read ethics mostly as philosophers looking for reasons to justify how they feel, you'll find ethics far more easy to understand and the principles guiding the philosopher easier to discern. As much as I disagree with Rand's ethics, she has every right to draw whatever conclusions she wants to. I just find it unfortunate that her arguments are technically shoddy yet command so much admiration from people who do not understand how difficult philosophy can be.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-29050182413109785112009-06-23T14:17:47.663-07:002009-06-23T14:17:47.663-07:00RandalV:
>I spent far too much time on this blo...RandalV:<br />>I spent far too much time on this blog Saturday and am trying to leave in some kind of satisfying way so I can get back to my life.<br /><br />Well, we're glad to give you something to wrestle with...;-)<br /><br />>Rand's view of morality really comes down to a very simple syllogism. 1) Man's life has particular requirements. 2) Socrates is a man who wants to live. 3) Socrates' life has particular requirements.<br /><br />Sadly this misses the whole point of the problem. You may not be aware of this, but the problem of the derivation of values from facts is a subset of the problem of deriving <i>decisions</i> from facts (because of course we <i>decide</i> to adopt a value). Thus from a <i>specific fact</i> (an "is") we have to derive a <i>specific decision</i> (an "ought"). For example: from the fact that it is raining, what decision should I make? You can't just say "man must make a particular decision" as an answer, because the whole problem is what that decision ought to be. Thus, things like "because of what a man <i>is</i>, this determines what he <i>ought</i> to do" aren't actually solutions - or "meta"solutions - but are instead merely verbalist evasions of the problem.<br /><br />>The general reaction I have reading this blog is that there is >something< fundamentally different in how I am approaching these subjects from how you are.<br /><br />Now I agree with you. But I respectfully put it to you that it is <i>us</i> that have the more objective approach than you do. Objectivism spends a good deal of effort subverting the two fundamental tools humans use to communicate: <i>language</i> and <i>logic.</i> In language it replaces ordinary parlance and common meanings with obscure jargon, buzzwords and specialised meanings, thus creating a dense thicket for outsiders to penetrate. Secondly, and less well known, it appeals to a supposedly "improved" version of standard bivalent logic (see Harry Binswanger <a href="http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2009/02/one-fallacy-of-objectivism-.html?cid=6a010535ce1cf6970c011278db954b28a4#comment-6a010535ce1cf6970c011278db954b28a4" rel="nofollow">here</a>) which apparently overcomes such problems of standard logic such as the invalidity of induction. But it is never demonstrated how this "improved" logic <i>actually works</i> - usually Rand's definition of "non-contradictory identification" is offered, as if a mere definition was a demonstration!<br /><br />We should now ask what these follies accomplish. No doubt Rand thought she was somehow helping solve real problems by creating this shell game, but in effect by removing the standard tools for objective criticism, developed by people over millenia, all she and her followers have done is create a kind of walled garden of thought, increasingly impenetrable to outsiders and increasingly intellectually limiting to insiders, despite the romantic rhetoric played at high volume to keep them interested. If you invent your own language, and your own logic, it is a hardly surprising that you end up in your own "world".<br /><br />That's <i>our</i> explanation for the "fundamental difference" you rightly identify between our two approaches. Now, it may turn out that you are right: that a popular romantic novelist with a clever mind and a flair for inspirational language was in fact the greatest philosopher of the past two thousand years, solved all the major philosophical problems since Aristotle, and provided the only certain way for mankind's future survival and glory. Or it may be, as we suggest, that despite the originality of Rand's viewpoint, and some of the grains of truth therein, this is for the most part a grand illusion.<br /><br />In the end only you can decide.<br /><br />Thanks for the debate!<br /><br />- DanielDaniel Barneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06359277853862225286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-64559891950398613072009-06-22T13:38:06.197-07:002009-06-22T13:38:06.197-07:00Randall: "And I don't know of any famous ...Randall: "And I don't know of any famous lobbying from that era, at very least in comparison to the lobby-fest of today."<br /><br />Well, of course, nothing's on the scale today; but I don't think that's relevant to the point at issue. In some ways, the corruption was just as bad in the early 19th century as it was now: it just didn't involve as much wealth (because the society as a whole was much poorer). But bribery and graft existed even then. Daniel Webster, for example, took bribes and sold diplomatic-related offices. President Jackson, in 1829, introduced the "spoils system" in relation to government jobs. It was only the weakness of the federal government that makes it all seem rather quaint in comparison to what we have today. Moreover, let's not forget what was happening in the states and municipal governments.<br /><br />The larger point is that it really doesn't matter that it might be limited under laissez-faire: the fact that it would exist at all, even if scaled back in comparison to what we have to do, means that inevitably the laws on behalf of laissez-faire would be undermined and circumvented. If you examine 19th century America, what is most revealing is the increase of lobbying over the decades, as, partly from the efforts of lobbying, the government gets bigger and stronger, so that the lobbying becomes a self-reinforcing process.gregnyquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13653516868316854941noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-73528680791982124732009-06-22T09:09:26.064-07:002009-06-22T09:09:26.064-07:00PS Thank you for the discussion, everyone.PS Thank you for the discussion, everyone.RandalVhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17459367488479830354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-24968439401980226422009-06-22T09:07:38.322-07:002009-06-22T09:07:38.322-07:00Anon69 wrote:
Cavewight, your point is well-taken,...Anon69 wrote:<br /><i>Cavewight, your point is well-taken, but then, if intelligence mojo isn't part of the concept "man" in the Objectivist view, then neither is the concept of rights for the common man as distinct from that of the elite. They're the same rights. So it would not be correct to say that "[Objectivism's] political theory is not designed around the rights of the common man, but the rights of the genius, the creator, the first-rater."</i><br /><br />My earlier response disappeared. So I'll just write a shorter response. I was not saying that Galt has more rights than Willers, but only that Rand centered her political theory around the idea that the cream (the men of the mind who represent the best among men) can and should rise to the top.Cavewighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00898771057884872416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-72948813443931897992009-06-22T08:16:39.811-07:002009-06-22T08:16:39.811-07:00On to specific reactions, and you all get the last...On to specific reactions, and you all get the last word, as hard as it's going to be for me not to respond:<br /><br />Daniel: I'm not sure what you're considering as a "valid logical form," but Rand's view of morality really comes down to a very simple syllogism. 1) Man's life has particular requirements. 2) Socrates is a man who wants to live. 3) Socrates' life has particular requirements. Then ethics proceeds by identifying what are the actual observed requirements of human life (values) and what are the characteristic actions required to attain them (virtues). You may disagree with the premises, and you seem to find the existence of pre-moral choice illogical in itself. Don't know what to tell you, as I disagree.<br /><br />Xtra Laj: I think we're in agreement about what the is-ought problem is. Hume says that, as you say, "A conclusion with an 'ought' requires a premise with an 'ought.'" The issue here is that, ultimately, you can't get below some ultimate "ought" to get to an "is"; reason, as he says, is a slave to the passions. Reason can help attain the aims of your passions, but you can't really even judge whether the aims of those passions are good ones to pursue. Your oughts, then, are necessarily and ultimately arbitrary. <br /><br />That's the central crux of the problem Rand was trying to solve, and I do think that that is accurate to what Hume was saying and to Rand's quotation about it. Tell me if I'm missing your point still, but I don't think I am. <br /><br />Greg: So I think you do recognize that >Objectivists< would say that they advise formulating and applying principles based on consequence. However, in your opinion, since their principles do not actually reflect reality and often come into conflict with it, Objectivists end up ignoring consequences in practice in order to retain their moral system? If that's the case, then the issue between us here is really just whether Objectivism accurately identifies reality. On this score, we obviously disagree in our assessment.<br /><br />As to the issue of the mixed economy and lobbying, you are correct that there has never been a pure laissez-faire economy. This does make it difficult to sort out the cause of various behaviors, and here is where degrees of freedom matter. Early 19th century probably does most qualify as having a separation of state and economy, though it had its obvious drawbacks. And, based on my understanding of history, I do see there a correlation between lobbying and the growth of government involvement in the economy. Your example of lobbying then was restricted to relatively minor attempts, such as writing a letter to the president. And I don't know of any famous lobbying from that era, at very least in comparison to the lobby-fest of today. That doesn't mean that lobbying didn't happen, but I do think it was relatively minor. If you wanted to succeed in America, that was not where you spent your time.<br /><br />Today, in contrast, the government really does have nearly unlimited powers over which companies succeed or fail, what resources are available to them, etc; powers to be manipulated by private interests. The vast majority of anti-trust legislation today is started by a company's competitors (I think it was around 90%); we live in a time when companies >need< huge lobbying arms just so that they can protect themselves from competitors' huge lobbying arms. I don't think I will be able to convince you that lobbying requires government control of the economy, but at very least, I think that you might be able to admit that there is a significant correlation. And that makes sense: as psychology and your own introspection can show, action requires belief that your action has a chance of having an effect. <br /><br />Again, the last word is yours, though I will read the responses.<br /><br />Regards,<br />RandalRandalVhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17459367488479830354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-309434206894306392009-06-22T08:16:20.184-07:002009-06-22T08:16:20.184-07:00Hi all,
I spent far too much time on this blog Sa...Hi all,<br /><br />I spent far too much time on this blog Saturday and am trying to leave in some kind of satisfying way so I can get back to my life. Otherwise, I can spend all day wrestling to the ground the myriad specifics in your arguments, and I take a long time formulating my responses.<br /><br />I will make some general comments about the blog in general and then try to give last thoughts on the specific issues raised. This might be unsatisfying, as none of us are going to end having convinced the other, but I really must move on. Hopefully, I've raised some food for thought.<br /><br />The general reaction I have reading this blog is that there is >something< fundamentally different in how I am approaching these subjects from how you are. I don't know if it's a methodological issue (though I suspect it is) or a difference of some kind of fundamental premise (and I have a first idea about what that would be), but it is systematic and comes out everywhere. Both are probably happening here.<br /><br />The two most common things I've seen are: 1) mischaracterizations of Rand's ideas and 2) accusations of vagueness in places that are practically ostensive to me. As an example of the latter, take the post Daniel pointed me to where Greg addresses Rand's identification of the standard of value. Greg criticizes her for what he sees as an equivocation among various concepts including "survival," "one's own life," "man's survival qua man," "survival of a rational being," and "happiness." There >are< a lot of concepts here, but a large part of Rand's ethical system concerns how these all relate to the same phenomenon. It's like one is talking about water and then refer to it elsewhere as a liquid or H2O. If you hadn't really pulled apart each concept, then it would seem like different phenomena are being thrown around scattershot.<br /><br />Greg, forgive me if this seems patronizing (as I >am< potentially criticizing your methods here), but it reads like you are criticizing Rand prematurely. You've certainly read a lot of her, so I don't think it would be fair to call you uninformed, and you've certainly reacted quite a bit. But what comes through on the page is an undigested view of her work--reaction and criticism without full grasp. <br /><br />It's a really difficult philosophy, all the more difficult for the ways in which it does not seem difficult (ie that it's presented first in fiction, that Rand is concise in explanation). It took me six years of dilligent thought to fully grasp and compare her thought to what I'd concluded on my own and to my philosophic studies. And that was six years with the benefit of the writings of Leonard Peikoff, who took 30 years to grasp it, plus access to Onkar Ghate, who is unparalleled in the ability to untangle confusions. None of this is obvious, and it would be a mistake to assume that when things seems confusing that Rand's position is itself confused.<br /><br />That said, I don't know your process, and I am just drawing conclusions from the output. I believe that we also disagree on some fundamental issue that is informing everything else (probably the nature of human nature), though I'm not sure how that would lead to the things I'm criticizing in your argument style. Now, you can dismiss me as naive or caught up in Rand's masterful sophistry or whatnot, or you can take the criticism seriously. Up to you. And again, these are my observations, and I accept my limitations in regards to knowing what's going on in your mind.RandalVhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17459367488479830354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-33388640424085646862009-06-21T21:56:35.904-07:002009-06-21T21:56:35.904-07:00Cavewight, your point is well-taken, but then, if ...Cavewight, your point is well-taken, but then, if intelligence mojo <i>isn't</i> part of the concept "man" in the Objectivist view, then neither is the concept of rights for the common man as distinct from that of the elite. They're the same rights. So it would not be correct to say that "[Objectivism's] political theory is not designed around the rights of the common man, but the rights of the genius, the creator, the first-rater."Anon69noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-2371514192618935902009-06-21T21:11:48.066-07:002009-06-21T21:11:48.066-07:00Anon69 wrote:
What you refer to the elite is, to t...Anon69 wrote:<br /><i>What you refer to the elite is, to the Objectivist, merely "qua man". In other words, the roots of this are not socio-political but epistemological - the Objectivist would defend the "elite" as merely being what all men are (in a "properly formed" concept of man), minus the epistemologically irrelevant and non-essential Eddie Willer-ish flaws of individual units.</i><br /><br />I don't see Eddie Willers as flawed. He was a virtuous although average (i.e., non-heroic) man. Rand used Willers to depict the role of the average man in her ideal society. How Willers acted represents how every average man should behave. The flaw lies in those average men who don't behave like Eddie Willers. We can't all be creative geniuses, but we can all be virtuous. <br /><br />So this wraps back around to the issue of the "qua man." I don't see the "qua man" as representing the heroic in man, not necessarily, but only the rational being in man. "Qua man" means "qua rational being" by substitution. Rand accepted Aristotle's definition of man as a "rational animal." <br /><br />This is not to say that all men are rational, but only that the defining characteristic of "man" is rationality. In this respect, Eddie Willers is just as rational as John Galt, only not as intelligent as Galt. (Willers would never have understood Galt's reason for going on strike, otherwise I'm sure he would have been asked. A striker is required to go on strike with full consciousness of the philosophical implications, consequences, etc., and apparently Willers wouldn't have had the intellectual mojo to grasp it.)Cavewighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00898771057884872416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-11415987014409629122009-06-21T20:53:20.149-07:002009-06-21T20:53:20.149-07:00Anon69,
I'm not quite sure if you're agre...Anon69,<br /><br />I'm not quite sure if you're agreeing or disagreeing with me in the latter part of your post. Rand's goals were socio-political. She vowed in her 20s to save the world from Christianity, then transformed that goal into saving it from altruism (which she regarded as a more fundamental issue than Christianity). The cure for these kinds of ills, she believed, was philosophy. <br /><br />But at a certain point in her development she came to believe that the problem of evil (e.g., altruism) was basically psychological, after all, she had tried logic and reasoning with people (socialists, liberals...), to no effect. <br /><br />This is where epistemology comes into play. The root of their evil is not what they believe, but how they came to believe it, i.e., how their irrational thinking drove them to draw certain conclusions.Cavewighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00898771057884872416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-21657052142402080562009-06-21T15:31:06.709-07:002009-06-21T15:31:06.709-07:00Cavewight, Anon69,
Your comments are right on poi...Cavewight, Anon69,<br /><br />Your comments are right on point and in some ways, I would extend them generally to libertarianism. Libertarianism like to think of their concept of justice as "fair", rather than think in terms of the kinds of winners and losers it selects. Why would winners (those better off) under the current system want to give up their status so they can compete in a "fair" playing ground when they lwill most likely lose some aspects of makes them winners? Because they want to be fair?<br /><br />Grow up!Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-12151141659622572522009-06-21T13:31:32.483-07:002009-06-21T13:31:32.483-07:00Cavewight, I agree with you, but I think the criti...Cavewight, I agree with you, but I think the critique needs to go further. What you refer to the elite is, to the Objectivist, merely "qua man". In other words, the roots of this are not socio-political but epistemological - the Objectivist would defend the "elite" as merely being what all men are (in a "properly formed" concept of man), minus the epistemologically irrelevant and non-essential Eddie Willer-ish flaws of individual units. This is where Rand tries to hide - in a silly, childish epistemology that is blantantly used to disregard inconvenient facts. It's one more reason I could never be an Objectivist.Anon69noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-34808063046163086362009-06-21T10:59:36.336-07:002009-06-21T10:59:36.336-07:00Greg said...
"You may get through today's...Greg said...<br /><i>"You may get through today's emergency, but you do so at the cost of a healthy medical profession tomorrow."<br /><br />But what if you won't live until tomorrow if you don't get medical care today?</i><br /><br />This debate helps me see through the myth of Objectivist selfishness. Its political theory is not designed around the rights of the common man, but the rights of the genius, the creator, the first-rater. It is designed so that the "cream rises to the top." It is designed to further elitism.<br /><br />You argue that it is in one's best interest to have the government pay for health care if one can't afford it. That's true. However, it misses the Objectivist view which is that the health of this individual doesn't matter to the elite. He is only a replaceable drone. If he dies from his health problems, then another Eddie Willers will come along to take his place. It should be an <i>honor</i> for him to die of thirst and exposure alongside a dead train in the middle of nowhere, because the train was built by productive genius without which Eddie would be nothing. <br /><br />The only reason to promote selfishness is to aid the elite in society. One could at best argue in favor of the common man that it is in his selfish best interests to further the selfish best interests of the elite. <br /><br />And while Eddie Willers, dying alongside a train, does nothing to further those interests, it seems to have been a worthy sacrifice, pleasing to the eyes of the goddess Rand.Cavewighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00898771057884872416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-1801140160905983492009-06-20T21:50:45.063-07:002009-06-20T21:50:45.063-07:00I said: "Consequences are of little importanc...I said: "Consequences are of little importance in determining the rationality of interest."<br /><br />Randal replies: "That's not accurate to the Objectivist view and more than a little unfair."<br /><br />I don't think it's unfair in the context of where I said it. Objectivist claim to regard consequences as important, but they ignore whatever consequences are embarrassing to their political principles. The political principles come first, and dictate what the consequences must be, rather than the consequences determining what the principle are supposed to be. The fact is, if person cannot afford their own medical care, it is in their interest to get the state to pay for it. Regardless of one's position on socialized medicine, I don't think one can deny this conclusion without being guilty of ignoring the consequences of the situation. <br /><br />"You may get through today's emergency, but you do so at the cost of a healthy medical profession tomorrow."<br /><br />But what if you won't live until tomorrow if you don't get medical care today?<br /><br />"The issue is not that 'sooner or later, this will lead to a complete despoiling of the productive classes, resulting in impoverishment for every one.' Rather, it's that you are hurting things you value >right now.< Why would you want to do that?<br /><br />I'm sorry, I just don't find this convincing. The best argument for Rand's position is the danger of killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The "hurting things you value right now" argument is pure sophistry. It mischaracterizes the actual reality people face. In the real world, the individual does not know to what degree his receiving free health care is going to affect the health system. But he does know what's going to happen if he doesn't get free health care: he's going to die. When comparing a certain outcome that completely affects him with an uncertain outcome that may or may not affect him, which one should he choose, if he is guided only by "rational" self-interest?<br /><br />The fact of the matter is that there is not enough health care to go around. That's the dark truth denied by most people in the debate. So some people are going to go without. In other words, on any system, there will be a de facto rationing. Under the free market, the rationing is done by the price system. If you have sufficient funds, you get medical care. If you don't, you're screwed. Under socialism, it's rationed by bureaucrats and legislative regulations. If you have no political pull or aren't covered by the regulations, you're screwed. While it is undoubtedly true that less people will go without medical care under a free market system, that's not any consolation for those who lack sufficient funds. From their point of view, it is in their interest to support an alternate arrangement of dividing the medical spoils. So here are the real consequences ignored by Rand and her followers: there exist in society real conflicts of interest. To deny them is to be guilty of regarding consequences as having little importance in relation to ideological principles.gregnyquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13653516868316854941noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-83904599956490614462009-06-20T19:24:01.669-07:002009-06-20T19:24:01.669-07:00Daniel,
I think the problem is more serious than ...Daniel,<br /><br />I think the problem is more serious than that. I will write at length because I want Randal to really understand why Rand's approach to scholarship is something to be wary of, despite his claims that he thinks Rand considered all the evidence before arriving at her positions and was just writing out her conclusions.<br /><br />Because Rand was not in the habit of citing primary sources or engaging other thinkers carefully, you would never understand the true nature of the is-ought problem by reading say, the main essay in the Virtue of Selfishness where she misleading describes the is-ought problem in the following way:<br /><br />"In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality, The fact that a living entity <i>is</i> determines what it <i>ought</i> to do. So much for the issue of the relationship between <i>is</i> and <i>ought</i>." (emphasis in original)<br /><br />Now, having read that, you can forgive a person ignorant of the vast field of philosophy, whose first acquaintance with serious philosophy is Rand, who assumes that the "is-ought" problem is about some silly philosophers who say that facts have no bearing on morality and you can't derive an objective morality from facts about human nature - to be fair, some people might see this as the main thrust of the is-ought problem, but it is not. Let's look at the original Hume quote from his Treatise:<br /><br />"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."<br /><br />All Hume was saying was that he had noticed how people switch language from facts to obligations and that he felt that the statements had a very different characteristic that a keen mind should use to understand how moral arguments work. His insight was built into "is-ought" problem of philosophy by other philosophers, which I have stated as simply being that "every moral argument/conclusion must have moral premises". Whether the moral premises are supposedly facts or not does not change the fact that they are moral. An conclusion with an "ought" requires a premise with an "ought".<br /><br />Of course, Hume went on to write other things about morality that obviously would offend an Objectivist ("reason being a slave of passions", a statement best understood as seeing reason as a tool to fulfill human drives, drives which are not given by reason, but which are determined by the nature of the human beings in general and the individual in particular). But anyone who reads Hume will find him eminently lucid and reasonable as a writer.<br /><br />When Rand encourages confused ignorance about one of history's greatest minds with her shoddy scholarship, people should be raking her writing over coals, not praising her for solving the "is-ought" problem.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-91653699931254504362009-06-20T16:37:05.906-07:002009-06-20T16:37:05.906-07:00RandalV:
>I think that Rand addresses the is-ou...RandalV:<br />>I think that Rand addresses the is-ought gap very convincingly, including in regards to politics. See OPAR for more information.<br /><br />Hi RandalV<br /><br />We have a <a href="http://aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com/search/label/Ethics%2FMorality" rel="nofollow">massive series of posts</a> regarding Rand's ethics, including the "is/ought" gap which you may refer to at your leisure.<br /><br />But as the "is/ought" problem is a logical problem, so its solution should therefore be able to be expressed in a logically valid form.<br /><br /><i>Yet neither Rand, nor any of her followers have ever produced a logical expression of her alleged solution.</i> There is no such formulation existing in any Objectivist literature anywhere. It simply <i>does not exist</i>. Further, while you found Rand's solution "convincing" I also believe you will not be able to express what that solution is in a valid logical form either. <br /><br />I believe you have been swayed by the power of her rhetorical style, which is indeed very "convincing". But the point of logic is to reveal fallacies that superficially seem persuasive. The simple fact is that if it is impossible to express Rand's solution to a logical problem in a valid logical form, this means that she hasn't really solved it at all.Daniel Barneshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06359277853862225286noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-55467264128477209152009-06-20T14:25:53.031-07:002009-06-20T14:25:53.031-07:00RandalV,
I think your appeal to skepticism has so...RandalV,<br /><br />I think your appeal to skepticism has some weight, but I hope you are similarly generous with scholars with whom you disagree. <br /><br />I am applying to Rand the same standards I would expect from any serious scholar who claimed to have finally solved philosophical problems that often have no single solution that commands universal assent.<br /><br />If in a scientific context, she had proclaimed her solution, then all that would have been necessary, no matter how sloppy her scholarship, would have been to replicate her experiments. But in philosophy, arguing against a position without stating who held that position is just bad form. In philosophy, the arguments and reference material matter even more than in science for evaluating the quality of the arguments and conclusions reached. For me to criticize a philosophical position without citing some particular exponent's work and explaining, usually in the best possible light, how what he/she wrote ties into my argument is just poor scholarship.<br /><br />Yes, I am in part referring to anecdotes. But what about this essay from Gary Merrill about the one book she did consider a serious work of philosophy? Did you factor it in when considering Rand's ability to consider evidence in detail? In gne<br /><br />http://www.geocities.com/amosapient/merrill.html<br /><br /> <b>As regards is/ought, I think what I said to Cavewight would apply here as well.</b><br /><br />First of all, I have shown that Rand did not avoid the is-ought gap because her moral premise was something like "life ought to be preserved once you choose to live". So I'm not sure how your response to Cavewight addressed that.<br /><br />In Objectivism, there are many equivocations about how to interpret "man's life". In one context, it is survival. It then switches to flourishing ("man qua man"). Then it switches to humanity and no longer remains the life of the individual who is alive (regarding others as ends in themselves). The first two essays I provided showed the typical problems. The problem is not that one cannot base moral decisions on how they affect one's life, one's family, God, or any fact or fiction. The question is whether this gives you an objective morality (a morality that is binding for all individuals). For me, the answer is clearly no - moral law is not like physical law. You can violate moral laws including many of Rand's dicta by disobeying them and even furthering your survival in the process. But as in all philosophical disputes, I do not deceive myself that others must agree unless their views have an empirical basis that can be constructively discussed.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-33690081820958890492009-06-20T13:17:58.658-07:002009-06-20T13:17:58.658-07:00PS The last word is yours, if you'd like it.PS The last word is yours, if you'd like it.RandalVhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17459367488479830354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-83662176118818727712009-06-20T13:17:06.588-07:002009-06-20T13:17:06.588-07:00Xtra: It looks like we're both ready to leave ...Xtra: It looks like we're both ready to leave this conversation, so I'll just end by saying that you are seeing Rand's confident, certain conclusions in print, not her thought process leading up to them. I agree that an "empiricist tries to consider both the evidence for an against his position and exposes his position to criticism through peer review and engagement of opponents." But unless you are referring to Rand's journals or anecdotes about her, I'm not sure where'd you be getting the idea that she didn't do these things. All evidence says to me that she did.<br /><br />On a personal note, the same applies to me. You don't have the evidence to evaluate my epistemic standards as "very low." <br /><br />As regards is/ought, I think what I said to Cavewight would apply here as well.RandalVhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17459367488479830354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-76992579666108865092009-06-20T12:31:15.961-07:002009-06-20T12:31:15.961-07:00RandaIV: I think that there >are< fundamenta...<b>RandaIV: I think that there >are< fundamental disagreements here, and sometimes they come out (as, for example, the is-ought gap). But I do often find that this blog argues against straw men versions of her arguments (ie that consequences are of little importance to rationality for her; that's just not accurate).</b><br /><br />I think that Greg's statement, when read with the rest of the post, makes plenty of sense. When taken in isolation and read literally, it is a caricature of *anyone's* position. What Greg meant was that Rand habitually disregarded the consequences which did not fit into her ideal, but which by and large motivate many people in the world today. The idea that her desired consequences were more "rational" than those of others was so obvious to her that she saw little point in actually seeing if these consequences were really rational (whatever that might mean for consequences) or for the most part self-serving.<br /><br /><b> Rand's explicit approach is to start with observation and proceed by means of identification of similarities and difference. Her major in college was history, and you see evidence throughout her journals of starting with a messy empirical phenomenon. You may disagree with her conclusions about what she saw, but it's just not fair or true to call her non-empirical.</b><br /><br />You must have very low standards for what qualifies as empirical then or even a messy empirical phenomenon. At the very least, an empiricist tries to consider both the evidence for an against his position and exposes his position to criticism through peer review and engagement of opponents. Rand for the most part considers only the evidence that supports her position and usually presents that which is against it in the most insulting terms. I can't remember ever getting a good sense of what, in the best possible light, motivated a flawed thinker by reading Rand. Her writings are huge monuments to errors of insular thinking and confirmation bias.<br /><br /><b><br />As to the is/ought problem: What exactly do you take as her attempt to answer it? Again, you may disagree with her argument, but you haven't stated it yet.</b><br /><br />I find arguments over ethical positions for the most part a waste of time and avoid inviting them. For me, it is more interesting to discuss anything in the context of specified/specific evidence than to engage in long discussions. If you want a criticism of Rand's argument, here is one before OPAR:<br /><br />http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_4.pdf<br /><br />Here is a criticism of Tara Smith's <b>Viable Values</b>:<br /><br />http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/stephen_parrish/viable-values.shtml<br /><br />Now, to satiate your desire for my understanding of Rand's solution to the "is-ought" gap, I'll present my quick summary of it.<br /><br /><i><br />Rand argues that there is an inescapable basis of value: man's life (with much equivocation between different meanings of the phrase "man's life"). It is the inescapable basis of this value that makes her ethics objective and this is how she escapes the is-ought gap. Virtues further it, vices hinder it.<br /><br />Cavewight has pointed out one problem with this conditional basis of a supposedly objective morality, a problem also highlighted by O'Neill and Parrish in the articles I referenced. But I'll take a more simple position. She has claimed life is good and ought to be preserved. This is a moral premise. How does this impact the is-ought gap? It's almost like she didn't understand the first point about the gap. For a discussion on the nature of the is/ought gap and why Objectivism misconceives itself as a solution to it, Huemer's section in "Why I'm not an Objectivist" is excellent, even if I do not agree with how he characterizes morality in general:<br /><br />http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/rand.htm#3.3<br /></i><br /><br />QED.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-68856670137582252832009-06-20T09:05:54.019-07:002009-06-20T09:05:54.019-07:00Cavewight: I'm not sure why "life" i...Cavewight: I'm not sure why "life" isn't a satisfying fundamental to you. <br /><br />Morality in Objectivism is an if-then thing: if you want to live, then what is matters to you and prescribes some courses of action. If not, then why would it? It's really just to say that if there >is< an angry lion behind you, then the man who wants to live >ought< to run.RandalVhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17459367488479830354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-67274954331183330842009-06-20T08:45:31.565-07:002009-06-20T08:45:31.565-07:00Xtra:
"What you consider "mischaracteri...Xtra:<br /><br />"What you consider "mischaracterization" is simply a strong difference in how best to approach human nature"<br /><br />I think that there >are< fundamental disagreements here, and sometimes they come out (as, for example, the is-ought gap). But I do often find that this blog argues against straw men versions of her arguments (ie that consequences are of little importance to rationality for her; that's just not accurate). <br /><br />"You seem to be a strong supporter of Rand's views which like to analyze human nature as it should be, rather than hewing more closely to human nature as it is,"<br /><br />Yeah, I'm seeing this sort of comment throughout the blog and the comments, and it's just not accurate. Rand's explicit approach is to start with observation and proceed by means of identification of similarities and difference. Her major in college was history, and you see evidence throughout her journals of starting with a messy empirical phenomenon. You may disagree with her conclusions about what she saw, but it's just not fair or true to call her non-empirical.<br /><br />As to the is/ought problem: What exactly do you take as her attempt to answer it? Again, you may disagree with her argument, but you haven't stated it yet.RandalVhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17459367488479830354noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-3143277267178245082009-06-20T08:35:09.513-07:002009-06-20T08:35:09.513-07:00(Cross-posted to my blog.)
That "is" de...(Cross-posted to my blog.)<br /><br />That "is" defines "ought," or "The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do," is clearly circular. Rand confuses this situation with her theory of moral choice which leaves the "ought" to choice and not to "is." This is the problem of pre-moral choice which has stymied Objectivist ethics for decades now. <br /><br />If an ought is defined by an is, then how is this up to pre-moral choice? How can any choices be pre-moral? "Choosing life as your standard of value is a pre-moral choice. It cannot be judged as right or wrong; but once chosen, it is the role of morality to help man to live the best life possible." <a href="" rel="nofollow">"http://importanceofphilosophy.com/Ethics_LifeAsMoralStandard.html"></a><br /><br />So it appears that Objectivism has not bridged the is-ought gap as long as there is at least one a-moral choice ("it cannot be judged as right or wrong"), the so-called "pre-moral choice."<br /><br />"You have no choice about the necessity to integrate your observations, your experiences, your knowledge into abstract ideas, i.e., into principles." OPAR, 1. However true that may be, Objectivism has not bridged the gap enabling them to integrate facts of reality into moral prescriptions. We may have no choice then to integrate them, but the "how" of this is left up in the air. Objectivism therefore leaves man with no philosophical guidance to make the correct pre-moral choice, only highly romantic novels to convince his mind through escapist literature.Cavewighthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00898771057884872416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-6944285817322527922009-06-20T07:47:57.546-07:002009-06-20T07:47:57.546-07:00RandaIV,
What you consider "mischaracterizat...RandaIV,<br /><br />What you consider "mischaracterization" is simply a strong difference in how best to approach human nature. You seem to be a strong supporter of Rand's views which like to analyze human nature as it should be, rather than hewing more closely to human nature as it is, which is what is often done by conservative philosophers and empirical psychologists (behavioral geneticists).<br /><br />I think that we all have a copy of OPAR and OPAR leaves the "is-ought" gap in pristine condition. The "is-ought" gap cam be stated as "moral arguments/conclusion require at least one moral premise" and I think Rand uses moral premises in all her moral arguments. So how does she dispute it convincingly?<br /><br />She takes to a limited degree, an approach that certain moral premises seem indisputable, but the fact that others do dispute some of these premises should be taken a bit more seriously than Rand and OPAR do.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.com