tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post8348424501904142780..comments2024-03-17T04:17:49.429-07:00Comments on Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature: The Shorter ARCHN: IntroductionDaniel Barneshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06359277853862225286noreply@blogger.comBlogger60125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-44864231794026022102009-12-03T12:03:03.503-08:002009-12-03T12:03:03.503-08:00Xtra Laj: "The experience of happiness is not...Xtra Laj: "The experience of happiness is not apart from the material states in the brain but is the material states in the brain. This is the identity-materialism that is currently most commonly held amongst materialist philosophers. They would argue that this is very different from epiphenomenalism, which claims that the brain states and the mental states are different things, but brain states cause the mental states but the mental states have no use."<br /><br />You hit the nail on the head.Dragonflynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-92152185556667061362009-12-03T11:58:22.915-08:002009-12-03T11:58:22.915-08:00Greg: "Our normal experience testifies that c...Greg: "Our normal experience testifies that consciousness makes a difference: that the conscious person, the awake person, is significantly different from the unconscious person."<br /><br />That is in no way an argument against the physical basis of consciousness.<br /><br />"The problem with materialism/physicalism is that it logically implies that consciousness is epiphenomenal and inefficacious, and that view strikes me as untenable."<br /><br />I'm not quite sure what you mean by "epiphenomenal" and "inefficacious", but the fact that consciousness and thinking are in fact physical phenomena ensures that they can be quite efficacious, just as the software in a computer can be efficacious thanks to the hardware in which it is embedded. That the physical description is much less practical than the more abstract, intentional description is not relevant in that regard. These are merely two descriptions at different levels of abstraction of the <i>same</i> physical phenomenon.<br /><br />"If human beings can be reduced to the subject matter of physics, then it doesn't seem so objectionable to try to describe human behavior in equations, as econometricians do."<br /><br />That's a strawman argument. That human beings are in principle reducible to physical phenomena, doesn't mean that a description in terms of physical interactions is the best way to describe their activities. That is the error that Dennett - himself a reductionist - calls "greedy reductionism". That econometricians think that they can gain scientific prestige by trying to emulate the hard sciences by using a lot of mathematics is <i>their</i> error, it is an example of what Feynman calls "cargo cult science", imitating the real thing, thinking that that <i>is</i> the real thing. That is not to say that <i>all</i> mathematical equations about people are necessarily wrong, we should only keep in mind that people and their interactions have so many facets and are so complex, that we can only use approximate, statistical equations about larger aggregates of people, not forgetting the error margins.Dragonflynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-88519182384228433552009-12-03T09:15:14.369-08:002009-12-03T09:15:14.369-08:00___________________________________
What I am see...___________________________________<br /><br />What I am seeking is a theory that takes account of all the relevant facts, not just those facts that are easily explicable by scientific methods. - Greg<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br />Relevant to whom?<br /><br /><br />___________________________________<br /><br />But it also serves as a powerful inducement to just the sort of scientistic prejudices that I have been opposed to since I was first introduced to their baneful effects as an economics major in college. - Greg<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br />I was a mechanical engineering major, and I personally have very little respect for most economists, but still I agree with your assessment above.<br /><br /><br /><br />___________________________________<br /><br />Physicalism is not a scientific theory; it is a vision of things. But is it a true or apt vision? It may be a true or apt vision of purely physical things; and it may have much to add to our knowledge of human things; but it cannot act as a complete substitute for humanistic knowledge. - Greg<br />___________________________________<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Indeed.Red Granthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08066324554026925595noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-28999140455442525382009-12-02T16:15:48.910-08:002009-12-02T16:15:48.910-08:00The problem with materialism/physicalism is that i...<i>The problem with materialism/physicalism is that it logically implies that consciousness is epiphenomenal and inefficacious, and that view strikes me as untenable.</i><br /><br />That's not the way I understand the argument. I understand the argument as saying as the current conception of consciousness is wrong - it is not apart from material states in the brain, but it is the same as the material states in the brain. The experience of happiness is not apart from the material states in the brain but is the material states in the brain. This is the identity-materialism that is currently most commonly held amongst materialist philosophers. They would argue that this is very different from epiphenomenalism, which claims that the brain states and the mental states are different things, but brain states cause the mental states but the mental states have no use.<br /><br />And since no one has shown that *internal experiences* are open to anyone other than those who experience them, my point is that it is best to see how far the physicalist can go, no matter how much you disagree with him, rather than claim he is ignoring precisely what he is perpetually trying to explain. First of all the agenda is to explain how the operation of complex structure is the result of the behavior of simpler structures. The next part is to always explain reported experiences (precisely what you say they are trying to ignore) as being very well, ideally perfectly correlated, with material states in the brain. If the materialists fail in this regard, and I have shown one empirical manner in which they may fail - can they insert memories into a mind by physically rearranging brain cells - there will be no problem ceding the ground to dualism. But the outright dismissal of dualism is no different to me from the outright dismissal of materialism, with materialism as currently conceived having the edge that it actually provides a fruitful research agenda, something which dualism does not.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-32671588203435289072009-12-02T15:43:57.160-08:002009-12-02T15:43:57.160-08:00Laj: "What for me was most telling was that y...Laj: "What for me was most telling was that you never even touched upon the question of whether and how you were willing to grant animals so form of consciousness. That usually smacks of ideologically motivated 'human exceptionalism'."<br /><br />Because of a typo, I'm not sure what you're trying to say. In any case, I'm not sure it matters, because I don't think the issue of animal consciousness is all that important in this question. What I am seeking is a theory that takes account of all the relevant facts, not just those facts that are easily explicable by scientific methods. The problem with materialism/physicalism is that it logically implies that consciousness is epiphenomenal and inefficacious, and that view strikes me as untenable. But it also serves as a powerful inducement to just the sort of scientistic prejudices that I have been opposed to since I was first introduced to their baneful effects as an economics major in college. If human beings can be reduced to the subject matter of physics, then it doesn't seem so objectionable to try to describe human behavior in equations, as econometricians do. Physicalism is not a scientific theory; it is a vision of things. But is it a true or apt vision? It may be a true or apt vision of purely physical things; and it may have much to add to our knowledge of human things; but it cannot act as a complete substitute for humanistic knowledge.<br /><br />Physicalism (or materialism) is merely the extreme opposite of idealism. Now neither of these theories adequately represent the facts as confronted by sentient intelligence. Both misuse Occam's Razor to shave off those aspects of reality that are inconvenient to the unity of their visions. Only interactionism can do full justice to both the facts elucidated by science and the facts as they appear to us from normal experience.gregnyquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13653516868316854941noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-90291079435990610292009-12-02T14:55:25.139-08:002009-12-02T14:55:25.139-08:00Dragonfly: "Common sense point of view? Accor...Dragonfly: "Common sense point of view? According to common sense a particle cannot be a wave at the same time, and according to common sense time is always the same for everyone, so that for example one of a twin pair cannot become 10 (or 100, 1000) years older than the other one. Yet science has shown that common sense has been wrong: these things are possible. "<br /><br />There is a kind of latent positivism in all this that needs to be aired out. Different domains of experience require different cognitive strategies. Common sense is merely habitual reflections on normal experience. Neither quantum mechanics nor relativity deal with normal experience; so it is not surprising that common sense breaks down when applied to those domains of experience. But to argue that common sense is an untrustworthy guide to normal experience because it is an untrustworthy guide to relativity theory or quantum theory is to lapse into serious confusion. Our normal experience testifies that consciousness makes a difference: that the conscious person, the awake person, is significantly different from the unconscious person. Now unless there is very compelling evidence on the other side, there is no reason not to accept the obvious conclusions of our normal experience.<br /><br />"...but they [biology and chemistry] are reducible to physics, that is, every result of these sciences can in principle be reduced to fundamental physical properties..."<br /><br />Merely because biology and chemistry is reducible to physics, doesn't prove psychology is also so reducible. This is scientism, not science. It is a metaphysical theory wearing the garb of science and trying to pass itself off as science.gregnyquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13653516868316854941noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-41043932864923177022009-11-28T00:01:39.810-08:002009-11-28T00:01:39.810-08:00. For increasingly complex systems the sciences ch...<i>. For increasingly complex systems the sciences chemistry and biology do the same, but they are in fact extensions of physics that study certain aggregates of elementary physical objects, that use their own language, but they are reducible to physics, that is, every result of these sciences can in principle be reduced to fundamental physical properties. - Dragonfly</i><br /><br />Exactly. As David Armstrong describes it in his book, <i>The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction</i>, which I highly recommend, even though it is billed as an introductory work, Dennett's trick is that a complex organ like the brain is made of simpler organs/machines/cells etc. so what you have to see if how the smaller systems give rise to the function of the larger system. And as the systems get dumber and dumber, you get to the micro-level of atoms.<br /><br />Now, this may have problems, but I think that they aren't obvious to me on the basis of arguments about the dualism between mind and matter. The claim that mind is something apart from matter to the extent that they cannot both be two sides of the same coin - our internal experiences are simply the results of brain states - isn't so obviously wrong to me, even if it can be wrong, as I will admit without any problem. It's quite possible that internal experiences are something that all physical things possess or that only human beings possess, but it is not clear how to empirically show this. I prefer to take Dennett's approach of using reports of internal experiences as data to be explained until some incredible problem comes up with this approach.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-82319574785466163942009-11-27T21:37:45.152-08:002009-11-27T21:37:45.152-08:00I doubt that such an experiment is possible. - Gre...<i>I doubt that such an experiment is possible. - Greg </i><br /><br />The instant you admit that such an experiment is impossible, then all that is left is to raise arguments of plausibility and imagination against each other. If there isn't even an experiment that confers more plausibility to one viewpoint vs. another, we are in trouble here.<br /><br />The "problem" so to speak with consciousness is that it is an "internal" experience. We are certain of our own consciousness, infer that of others from our own experiences, but do no see or experience the consciousness of others directly.<br /><br />What for me was most telling was that you never even touched upon the question of whether and how you were willing to grant animals so form of consciousness. That usually smacks of ideologically motivated "human exceptionalism".<br /><br />Physicalism, at least, seems plausible because we can correlate many differences in ability with physical phenomena. The argument is that our physical composition gives us abilities that flies lack.<br /><br />I think that there are quite a few experiments that could put physicalism in question. Could two virtually identical physical states yield different thoughts or reports of internal experience? That's the kind of thing that would falsify physicalism for me. But we have to try and do better than relying on philosophical arguments. Otherwise, we will simply be debating things without understanding what their real implications are.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-40421159167222664572009-11-27T11:41:47.202-08:002009-11-27T11:41:47.202-08:00Greg: "As if the view that everything has a p...Greg: "As if the view that everything has a physical cause is not also "strange" and "dogmatic"! "<br /><br />Physics is the science that studies nature in all its aspects. For increasingly complex systems the sciences chemistry and biology do the same, but they are in fact extensions of physics that study certain aggregates of elementary physical objects, that use their own language, but they are <i>reducible</i> to physics, that is, every result of these sciences can in principle be reduced to fundamental physical properties. That this is often not <i>practical</i> (for example describing a biological entity in terms of interactions between elementary particles) doesn't change the underlying principle. In Dennett's terms: being a reductionist doesn't mean that one should be a <i>greedy</i> reductionist. Now man is a biological entity that is the result of a long, blind algorithmic process of evolution, so there isn't any reason to believe that <i>any</i> characteristic of man, including his consciousness, is not <i>in principle</i> reducible to physical properties. It would violate the basic principle of natural science. <br /><br />"Whose invoking "mystical" influences? Or is any non-physical influence by definition "mystical." How about: "we just don't know"? "<br /><br />Aha, but "we don't know" is not the same as "I know that physics cannot explain that". The latter is a kind of hubris that I often see in non-scientists, like those Objectivists who tell us that quantum mechanics is corrupt and that Einstein's theories are rationalistic. The less they know, the more certain they are. Of course there are many things we don't know yet, but that doesn't mean that we still can learn a lot. The difference between science and philosophy (in the current meaning) is that science delivers the goods, it <i>works</i>.Dragonflynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-35010378169602658612009-11-27T11:39:43.636-08:002009-11-27T11:39:43.636-08:00Greg: "The belief that material objects exist...Greg: "The belief that material objects exist independent of our perception of them is not a scientific belief." <br /><br />It is the hypothesis that forms the basis of science. The alternative is solipsism, which in principle still would allow us to do all the scientific experiments and construct theories, while maintaining that these are not evidence of an external reality, but that would be a very artifical enterprise. The results would all look like a duck, walk like a duck and quack like a duck, the duck being external reality, so that it is easier to say that it <i>is</i> a duck.<br /><br />"From a common sense point of view, I would merely suggest that computers will never be able to think because computers will never be conscious (or, even more critically, self-conscious)"<br /><br />Common sense point of view? According to common sense a particle cannot be a wave at the same time, and according to common sense time is always the same for everyone, so that for example one of a twin pair cannot become 10 (or 100, 1000) years older than the other one. Yet science has shown that common sense has been wrong: these things <i>are</i> possible. <br /><br />"And what it seems to explain, how much of that is due to what cognitive scientists call the "Eliza" effect, after the AI psychologist Eliza who, if you interact with her superficially (which I have), can almost seem human, but when you look deeper, you find is made up of trivial canned responses designed to create the illusion of personhood."<br /><br />That is the same kind of argument as pointing to a fireworks rocket and saying "and with <i>that</i> we should be able to go to the moon and explore the planets of the solar system?!" Common sense tells us that this would be impossible!Dragonflynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-81916167307074311522009-11-26T12:11:12.270-08:002009-11-26T12:11:12.270-08:00Dragonfly: "What a strange dogmatic statement...Dragonfly: "What a strange dogmatic statement. How do you know that a 'mechanistic' (I'd say 'physical') explanation cannot be found? Is that just a feeling? It sounds to me like a yearn for mysticism and for the 'god of the gaps' idea: 'what we cannot explain now can only explained by some supernatural god.'"<br /><br />As if the view that everything has a physical cause is not also "strange" and "dogmatic"! In any case, this materialism or physicalism is hardly "scientific," but is merely an interpretation of scientific evidence—an interpretaton, moreover, which stands in the teeth of obvious facts, such as that human beings are self-conscious and that this fact makes a difference in how people behave and what they do. The only way for the physicalist to get around this is to assume that the experience of consciousness mattering is either an illusion or a pretension. But what evidence is there for this assumption? Because the brain affects consciousness? But that fact hardly constitutes conclusive evidence unless one assumes that causation must flow in only one direction (i.e., from the physical). Since. however, that's the very point at issue, it hardly seems appropriate to make use of it in the interpretation of the evidence.<br /><br />You bring up the "god of gaps": is that what this is really about? We must be physicalists else all those horrid theologians will fill non-physicalist gaps with nonsense? But this is mere tilting at windmills. Since we will never be omniscient, there will always be gaps in which nonsense can be poured. Nothing to be done for it: just part of the human condition.<br /><br />"But that is no reason to invoke some unphysical, mystical influences."<br /><br />Whose invoking "mystical" influences? Or is any non-physical influence by definition "mystical." How about: "we just don't know"? Our brains seem to have evolved to understand and comprehend certain aspects of reality better than others. Physical and mechanistic systems appear more comprehensible than the sub-molecular or the mental. But does that mean we should use the physical as our template for understanding the mental and the sub-molecular?gregnyquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13653516868316854941noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-85452046144326615792009-11-26T11:26:59.614-08:002009-11-26T11:26:59.614-08:00"...disputing that we can be computers, given..."...disputing that we can be computers, given the amount of human behavior that can be explained by information processing " <br /><br />How much really can it explain? And what it <em>seems</em> to explain, how much of that is due to what cognitive scientists call the "Eliza" effect, after the AI psychologist Eliza who, if you interact with her superficially (which I have), can almost seem human, but when you look deeper, you find is made up of trivial canned responses designed to create the illusion of personhood. <br /><br />It is unlikely that the question of materialism versus interactionism can be settled scientifically. The evidence brought forth in favor of materialism has been interpreted to fit that thesis. There are compelling reasons (brought forth by Popper and Lovejoy, among others) for doubting this interpretation.gregnyquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13653516868316854941noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-42699419428607615652009-11-26T11:26:41.813-08:002009-11-26T11:26:41.813-08:00Laj: "I think that the issue will be best res...Laj: "I think that the issue will be best resolved by describing the kind of experiment or behavior that you think computers will never replicate and watching whether science will ever meet that standard."<br /><br />I doubt that such an experiment is possible. Science may constitute the most objective form of knowledge, and therefore the best way of solving differences of opinion between two individuals. But it's not necessarily the deepest or most relevant or, in all contexts, the most useful form of knowledge. The belief that material objects exist independent of our perception of them is not a scientific belief; but this doesn't make our realist convictions more uncertain and conjectural than scientific ones.<br /><br />"I still meet people everyday who tell me that addiction is about willpower and for that reason, refuse to deal with the evidence of drugs being used to inhibit the production of certain hormones or to close of certain receptors and thereby reduce/eliminate cravings."<br /><br />I don't think there's necessarily a contradiction between willpower and physiologically based cravings. The only difference is that science understands the cravings much better than it understands willpower. But does that mean there's no such thing as willpower? I had a neighbor who quit heroin without any assistance, pharmalogical or otherwise, on his own "willpower." Why did he succeed at it while others can't seem to? I don't know—but science doesn't know either. And I wouldn't be surprised if science never knows.<br /><br />"Refusing to accept materialist metaphysics is neither here nor there. Refusing to accept experimental evidence because you think or know it implies materialist metaphysics is another story."<br /><br />What evidence have I refused to accept? I would merely contend that materialist metaphysics (or "physicalism") is not warrented by the evidence, that if followed consistently, it leads to an epiphenomenal view of consciousness, which I have come to view as an implausible position.<br /><br />"And I think that the one empirical distinction I can think of is that you think that there are certain things that computers will never be able to do: 'creativity, self-initiative etc.' Since just about all these actions are directed towards ends that we can categorize, just like those of computers, it is part of the reason why the intelligent design paradigm is so compelling."<br /><br />Perhaps—but I have to admit that I don't always find intelligent design all that compelling. I suspect those of that persuasion are too eager to read design into nature, just as (or so I would contend) the physicalists are too eager to read physicalism into nature. From a common sense point of view, I would merely suggest that computers will never be able to think because computers will never be conscious (or, even more critically, self-conscious), and consciousness does matter: nature wouldn't have breeded it into us if it didn't matter. Mozart could compose the Jupiter symphony in part because, in conscious reflection, he could distinguish between "inspired" music and "uninspired" music. Self-reflection, self-criticism, judgment—there is a quality in these things that science cannot explain. I can't prove that the Jupiter symphony is more profound than a Saleri overture. But does that mean I'm hairsplitting or speaking unscientific, unempirical nonsense?gregnyquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13653516868316854941noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-43930128794205708332009-11-25T09:46:26.290-08:002009-11-25T09:46:26.290-08:00emotions are biologically reactionary, compounded,...emotions are biologically reactionary, compounded, often, with physical sensations. emotions aren't part of a rational decision making process, hence are not cognitive nor sentient. emotions are "instinct." this simplification process that you've complained about is also the primary facet of physics and of mathematics, which has led to many empirically concrete advancements. isaac newton simplified the way we perceive the universe through his principia. he did not add more complexity.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-30979074242331945532009-11-25T05:30:39.971-08:002009-11-25T05:30:39.971-08:00Greg,
That was actually Dragonfly's statement...Greg,<br /><br />That was actually Dragonfly's statement. I don't see any reason to disagree with it though, but on the other hand, I think that the issue will be best resolved by describing the kind of experiment or behavior that you think computers will never replicate and watching whether science will ever meet that standard. I gave up on dealing seriously with the hairsplitting of philosophical distinctions and favored personal explanations a while ago.<br /><br />I still meet people everyday who tell me that addiction is about willpower and for that reason, refuse to deal with the evidence of drugs being used to inhibit the production of certain hormones or to close of certain receptors and thereby reduce/eliminate cravings. Refusing to accept materialist metaphysics is neither here nor there. Refusing to accept experimental evidence because you think or know it implies materialist metaphysics is another story.<br /><br />The only way I would seriously argue this was if I was a researcher and your view was one which prevented me from getting funds for research. I just think that there is no reason to think that emotions and learning are inconsistent with a complex mechanical behavior that utilizes information to produce responses. <br /><br />To make your view consistent, we would have to grant something like what you are talking about to all animals or even living things if we subscribe to evolutionary theory or like Rand, look for that magical spark that separates men from animals (like Dragonfly or Dennett, "the god of the gaps"). Again, I have no argument here as long as there is some empirical distinction to be made between how I see this things and how you do. And I think that the one empirical distinction I can think of is that you think that there are certain things that computers will never be able to do: "creativity, self-initiative etc." Since just about all these actions are directed towards ends that we can categorize, just like those of computers, it is part of the reason why the intelligent design paradigm is so compelling. We could be computers designed to meet a certain purpose. We could be computers that evolved from simpler structures. But the bottom line is that disputing that we can be computers, given the amount of human behavior that can be explained by information processing paradigms and the great number of correlations between human behaviors and materialist explanations, is something that should be given fair hearing and whose dispute should rest on evidence, not a summary dismissal of the issue.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-87038357242461586412009-11-25T05:30:39.972-08:002009-11-25T05:30:39.972-08:00This comment has been removed by the author.Xtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-54623143482945394982009-11-25T02:55:45.088-08:002009-11-25T02:55:45.088-08:00Greg: "Emotions are more the responses of avo...Greg: "Emotions are more the responses of avoidance or "I want": they are sentient; and no purely mechanistic explanation of sentience can ever adequately account for it."<br /><br />What a strange dogmatic statement. How do you know that a "mechanistic" (I'd say "physical") explanation cannot be found? Is that just a feeling? It sounds to me like a yearn for mysticism and for the "god of the gaps" idea: "what we cannot explain <i>now</i> can only explained by some supernatural god".<br /><br />There is no reason to think that "consciousness, self-initiative, creativity, motives, intention" cannot be explained by physical means. It is the extreme complexity of the systems with that behavior that makes it so difficult to disentangle the underlying mechanisms and as far as we know now it could take many decades before we get a real understanding. But that is no reason to invoke some unphysical, mystical influences. We no longer think that sun, moon, lightning, thunder etc. are gods or caused by gods, for these <i>relatively</i> simple systems we've found physical explanations that suffice. <br /><br />Human beings are the result of a purely mechanical evolution in the course of billions of years beginning with the most primitive organisms. Using the principle of Occam's razor, there is no reason to assume unphysical, mystical factors that "somehow" influence the organisms to make them intelligent and creative.Dragonflynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-27659079628396785732009-11-24T17:12:05.464-08:002009-11-24T17:12:05.464-08:00Laj: "Of course such 'emotions' are s...Laj: "Of course such 'emotions' are still very simple compared to the complex emotions of a human being, but the notion of 'I must avoid that' can be seen as a toy version of the emotion 'fear'and the evaluation of the results of an action can be described in terms of 'pain' and 'pleasure.'"<br /><br />I'm sorry, but I don't find this terribly convincing. I don't regard emotions merely as programmed responses; nor human emotions as merely an immensely complicated stimulus response mechanism. Emotions are more the responses of avoidance or "I want": they are sentient; and no purely mechanistic explanation of sentience can ever adequately account for it. While I admire the science of materialists like Pinker, I don't have much use for their metaphysics, which seems to me at war with such obvious facts as consciousness, self-initiative, creativity, motives, intention, and the existence of what Popper calls "World 3 objects." The view that everything in the universe can be reduced to matter seems to me simply be the fallacy of monism; as such, it is not different, and on no higher intellectual plane, than Thales view that all is water or Hegel's that the rational is real or Rand's the reality is logical. These views stem, at least in part, from the all-too-human conviction that reality is ultimately explicable--a view which itself is inexplicable and implausible. I see reality as diverse, pluralistic, mysterious, and, at its core, inexplicable. The human mind, which, in its attempt to grasp reality, tries to simplify it as much as possible, squeezing it into fewer and fewer principles, despite whatever wisdom and good sense might say to the contrary, rebels against all this complexity and diversity which confronts it from the external world and tries to explain it away.gregnyquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13653516868316854941noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-65420457039936373422009-11-24T02:59:00.626-08:002009-11-24T02:59:00.626-08:00Dragonfly,
I agree. Usually, people who think th...Dragonfly,<br /><br />I agree. Usually, people who think that the computer as mind analogy is too simplistic have a very simplistic view of computers. If you consider the human body to be physical in nature, you already have one such computer. I don't see any reason at the current time not to consider emotions as a kind of information since pain depends on nervous (neural) stimulation. I followed the "computer chess champion" prediction as a player and the approach taken to designing a computer champion has been considered to be very different from what human beings do, but the truth is that no one really knows what human beings do. It's quite possible that simplifying/underestimating the amount of hardware required to replicate complex judgment hindered any attempt at a serious solution.<br /><br />There might be some objection to this that I'm missing, but I think that even if the objection is serious, it is likely to be inconclusive in the absence of more and more knowledge. It's a kind of promissory materialism, but a three decades ago, predicting that computers would be able to beat strong human players at chess and seeing them lose was a form of promissory materialism.<br /><br />Xtra Laj (XL)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-9260076898068689462009-11-23T16:45:03.765-08:002009-11-23T16:45:03.765-08:00Humans weight or reinforce associations based on i...Humans weight or reinforce associations based on intensity and repetition of experience. Although computers may performing a similar weighting function, it is not a given that they do so. Every human being as a consequence of the brain's wiring automatically intensifies memory associations by repeated use (conversely allowing connections to weaken with disuse). As described in the book "Lateral Thinking" the human mind is essentially a pattern-reinforcing mechanism. A broader observation along these same lines is that the human mind is fundamentally analog, while the computer is fundamentally digital.Anon69noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-85961125531317412502009-11-23T13:56:08.609-08:002009-11-23T13:56:08.609-08:00@Greg: the notion of computer and emotions are not...@Greg: the notion of computer and emotions are not mutually exclusive. So far we have little or no use for emotions in computers as we're not advanced enough yet in our programming. But a primitive version may play a role in robots that must make decisions on their own in a variable environment. Of course such "emotions" are still very simple compared to the complex emotions of a human being, but the notion of "I must avoid that" can be seen as a toy version of the emotion "fear", and the evaluation of the results of an action can be described in terms of "pain" and "pleasure. Sure, we're still far removed from our human range of emotions, but the difference with the systems of insects is probably not so great anymore. We try to get there faster than the billions of years that evolution needed, but you can't expect results within a very short time.<br /><br />Already during the time of the first computers there were people who thought that in a few years a computer would beat the world champion chess. In fact it took many decades before that really happened (while some people maintained that it would never be possible). So we shouldn't be overly optimistic about our time scheme (a similar story can be found in the history and predictions of space travel), but there are no principal objections to the possibility.Dragonflynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-51596470608494873562009-11-23T13:07:35.089-08:002009-11-23T13:07:35.089-08:00"In general, I am surprised and amused that o..."In general, I am surprised and amused that on this blog, a blog so explicitly dedicated to reality based and oriented thinking, human brain itself is not treated as what it is: a computer part of a gene reproduction plant. "<br /><br />Whether the human brain is a computer depends on how you define "computer." While the brain obviously has computer-like characteristics, human beings and computers "proper" are hardly identical. Human beings are volitional, telelogical, emotive, whereas computers are just inanimate mechanisms. <br /><br />My own view is that Pinker overstates the analogy between computers and the mind. In this, he does come closer to Rand than I do (i.e., they both tend toward a mechanistic model of thinking, though Rand's view imports a number of crude, rationalistic, pre-scientific Aristotlean notions). My views come closer to those of Damasio, who sees emotion as a critical aspect of thought (which Rand, of course, would vehmently reject). Since Damasio is a respected neuroscientist, his views can hardly be dismissed as not being reality based or reality orientated.gregnyquisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13653516868316854941noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-5245416102018679732009-11-23T10:56:02.721-08:002009-11-23T10:56:02.721-08:00Boris, with regard to volition you might read my p...Boris, with regard to volition you might read my post here: http://tinyurl.com/y9xdzyzDragonflynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-59271757221010691542009-11-23T09:34:11.950-08:002009-11-23T09:34:11.950-08:00Boris,
Criticism of Rand on this blog takes many ...Boris,<br /><br />Criticism of Rand on this blog takes many different angles. As Daniel pointed out, on *some* points, it is not so much the substance Rand's claims being criticized as it is Rand's method of arriving at them and the resistance of Objectivists to openly analyzing and testing those claims that this blog takes issue with.<br /><br />Whatever Rand had intuited correctly is not that different from what many philosophers and empirical psychologists have intuited correctly. There are many interesting works on consciousness that predate Rand and tackle questions about child/human cognition empirically.<br /><br />And on many of the testable details, she is just speculating and some of her devotees have not critically tested such speculation, the finer points of which Daniel has made many insightful criticisms. No one here has claimed that the core theory of similarity and difference is incorrect and I doubt that anyone here would do so without citing some expert or the other, since none of us here are practicing cognitive scientists/experts. Moreover, Pinker made some criticisms of neural networks if they take a blank slate form without innate predispositions.<br /><br />The approach that the bloggers here take is to go as far as they can with the empirical evidence. On things that are not easy to confirm or repute with empirical evidence, there is a lot of room for disagreement. While I think my view of these issues might be closer to yours, I don't consider either Dan or Greg to believe that mind or soul are not aspects of a physical knowable reality if that means that they reject the empirical evidence for physical causes of human behavior. <br /><br />Moreover, the idea that every aspect of reality must be knowable or physical is a claim that is not empirically testable, so what should really be done, in my view, is to carefully review the evidence and show how it supports or weakens this or that view of how reality works. <br /><br />It's one thing for a neuroscientist to be a dualist, but to be a dualist and deny the debilitating effects of brain damage because it leaves the "soul" intact is a bit much. But to argue that there are experiments that might support dualism that do not have convincing materialist explanations is another story altogether and has some plausibility. Let's try to use these lines of argument at the empirical level to make our case and not start at the philosophical levels where things are hard to understand.<br /><br />Therefore, if you have some issue with some particular claim of Dan or Greg made against Rand and you have some empirical evidence that contradicts it, that would be helpful. If you don't agree with their overall philosophy, I doubt I agree with their overall philosophy too (though it's all in the details), so I look at the empirical evidence and make my case from that.<br /><br />XLXtra Lajhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17166565583455141813noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-29196034.post-16140354503608137162009-11-23T08:00:30.498-08:002009-11-23T08:00:30.498-08:00XL,
My original point was that once you strip off...XL,<br /><br />My original point was that once you strip off some of the "heroic" language as well as put the notions of free will and volition into context, Rand might have intuited a conception of cognition that is not that far from the essence of the "pattern remembering and matching computer built by evolution" conception of the brain the best of evolutionary cognitive science has to offer.<br /><br />Of course, she had some things patently wrong, or, to be generous, described sloppily, such as practically equating the use of logic is rationality / reason and association of rationality with conscious functions of the brain only. <br /><br />I wasn’t expecting to find consensus on this topic, but did expect a blog ostensibly pre-occupied with an empirical understanding of reality, to view everything about humans, including mind and soul (whatever we mean by that) to be just aspects of knowable physical reality. And we certainly know enough about the brain to call it a “computer” – an information processing device – and moreover, a specific type of a computer: a neural network. Much remains to be learned about what pre-programming we come with, if and how it can be altered, the interactions between pre-programmed parts and parts that learn. But I don’t see how the basic concept can be in dispute, anymore than evolution can be, unless one introduces God.<br /><br />- Boris GendelevAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com