Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature

Leonard's Shitlist

2012-01-28T12:47:00.000-08:00

For fans of Objectivist Kremlinology everywhere, a bunch of little-known ARI enthusiasts have set up a new site, www.checkingpremises.org. Ostensibly and hilariously described "a tool to help each person decide independently", in practice it is simply The Official Leonard Peikoff Shitlist where the ancient enemies such as David Kelley, Libertarianism, and The Brandens can be ritually vilified, and all-new Enemies of Objectivism can be thrillingly unmasked by a some Junior Woodchucks waving a copy of "Fact And Value."

The latest Enemy of Objectivism is, like most Enemies of Objectivism, a former close associate and orthodox ARIan Diana Hsieh. In fact, the site seems to be really all about this latest schism; the entries on standard villains like the Brandens are meagre and have a pro-forma feel. Hsieh's an odd figure. She was first a Kelleyan Objectivist, then in a dramatic conversion flipped to the Ayn Rand Institute, issuing the required endless blistering denunciations of her former friends and colleagues in the process. Her orthodox enthusiasm later led her to a similarly overwrought denunciation of her former friend and colleague, Ayn Rand scholar Chris Sciabarra. Now the wheel has turned, and it is she who is getting the anathema treatment. As usual, the intellectual content of the charges is close to nil; Hsieh's offending discussions are often breathtakingly inane, like whether it's ethical to eat severely retarded children should the situation require it (FYI, she thinks it is. The correct answer is, of course, let me know when this is actually a pressing problem mankind faces, then we'll discuss it.). The real issue is not anything discernibly to do with philosophy, but instead the fact that she disagreed with, and even worse said Bad Things (such as accusing him of being "horribly ignorant" and "armchair philosophising") about the aging emperor of the ARI.

Of course, almost everyone bar the slavish have immediately twigged that this is simply a shallow, limply conceived hit site. Hsieh has responded at length here, naturally failing to observe the irony that she has been the source of plenty of similar excommunications in the past. But the notable series of schisms over the past few years I would speculate is really just a sign of palace politics, of frantic jockeying for position as Peikoff's frail health and grip on the organisation - and reality - continues to deteriorate. After all, there is some money to be had, some future roles to be played, and some prestige to be garnered, even if it is only within the hermetic world of the Objectivist subculture. And judging by her track record, Hsieh has never needed a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.

Hat tip: Neil Parille

Ayn Rand & Human Nature 18

2012-01-27T11:09:00.001-08:00

Psychopaths, vmPFC damage, and whim-worship. One of the central doctrines of Objectivism is the necessity of a "rational," "reason-based" morality. Human beings must follow their "rational" or "enlightened" self-interest. Emotions should not be used in moral judgments. That would amount to "whim-worship." According to Rand, people can and should follow "reason" at all times. To behave otherwise, to follow one's emotions instead of "reason," was tantamount to acting "like a zombie," without knowledge of the facts of reality. As Rand put it, "It means that a man acts in a state of temporary insanity."

Rand's view is in stark contrast with that of David Hume, who, in 1739, wrote that "reason is, and ought to only be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." We can only image vituperation with which Rand would have responded to Hume's statement. However, it is important to note that Hume is not merely asserting that reason ought to be the slave of the passions; he is also insisting that reason is the slave of the passions, and that it can't be otherwise. In the last twenty years, experimental psychology has been forced to admit that Hume's position comes much closer to the truth than Rand's. Psychologists have found that, although people can and often do reason about morality, they don't engage in reasoning in order to discover truth, but rather use reason to support their emotional intuitions. Moral reasonings serve strategic purposes such as managing one's reputation, building alliances, recruiting bystanders to support one's side in the conflict endemic to social life. [Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 46] Human beings act like "intuitive politicians striving to maintain appealing moral identities in front of multiple constituencies." [ibid, 75]

Now an Objectivist, when confronted with this evidence, might respond along the following lines: "Yes, maybe that's how people actually behave, but that is not how they ought to behave." But this line of reasoning fails to grasp the point at issue. People don't behave this way out of choice, but out of necessity. When it comes to morality, people can no more follow reason and ignore their emotions than they can spontaneously combust or sprouts wings and flap around the house.

There are but two very partial exceptions to this: (1) individuals suffering from brain damage to the ventromedial prefontal cortex (vmPFC), and (2) psychopaths.

(1) vmPFC damaged individuals. I have already noted the example of these individuals in previous posts throughout the years. Antonio Damasio brought their plight to the world's attention in his book Descartes' Error. These individuals don't experience emotions and therefore cannot follow their whims. Far from making them perfect Objectivists, this deficiency leads to moral incompetency.

(2) Psychopaths. As Jonathan Haidt explains:

Psychopaths do have some emotions.... But psychopaths don't show emotions that indicate that they care about other people. Psychopaths seem to live in a world of objects, some of which happen to walk around on two legs.... They feel no compassion, guilt, shame, or even embarrassment, which makes it easy for them to lie, and to hurt family, friends, and animals.

The ability to reason normally combined with a lack of moral emotions is a dangerous combination. Psychopaths learn to say whatever gets them what they want.... [ibid, 62]

While neither vmPFC damaged individuals nor psychopaths could serve as models for Objectivist morality, they do, in one respect, attain a moral goal close to Rand's heart: namely, they are much less affected by emotions (i.e., whim worship) than "normal" people when it comes to behavior and moral judgments. The vmPFC damaged folks come closest to the Randian ideal; psychopaths, however, are not that far behind (at least when it comes to moral decisions involving other people). The vmPFC folks apparently don't even experience whims. Yet far from making them Objectivists, it only makes them deeply dysfunctional. Psychopaths feel no empathy or consideration for others. Hence, they are completely free of all "altruistic" whims: yet far from being a step towards Ayn Rand and Objectivism, a lack of empathy leads to Ted Bundy and Charles Manson.

One thing to note right from the start: namely, that neither of these two conditions is a product of "premises." Damage to the vmPFC is not caused by bad premises, but by an injury to the head. And psychopathy is a genetically heritable condition, [ibid, 62] not the result of stale thinking which one's mind failed to revise!

Although Rand was not a psychopath, she nonetheless unwittingly aspired to an emotional life that comes closer to that attained by psychopaths than by normal people. In the first place, Rand seems to have disliked many of the emotions psychopaths are incapable of experiencing, such as guilt, shame, and embarrassment; and if Rand herself had ever experienced either guilt or shame, she kept this fact very much to herself. At the same time, Rand normally portrays guilt as a negative emotion, as something which should only be experienced by those who have committed moral infractions. Guilt was an emotion used by altruists to manipulate individuals for evil ends. "Guilt is altruism’s stock in trade," she wrote, "and the inducing of guilt is its only means of self-perpetuation." It is an emotion experienced by villains and failures, not by heroes and Objectivists.

Guilt and shame were emotions Rand wished to banish from herself and from her ideal man; which is a rather odd desideratum, considering that being free of guilt is a characteristic of psychopaths. Rand's ideal man constitutes a strange mixture: half psychopath, half moral visionary.

A guilt-free conscience was not the only ideal Rand aspired to that had the whiff of psychopathy about it. Rand also scorned excessive concern for what other people thought. Such concerns were sometimes regarded as a symptom of "social metaphysics" (defined by one Objectivist polemicist as "the privileging of others’ opinions over reality as the ultimate arbiter of truth and value"). Psychological evidence demonstrates that most human beings are (in the words of Jonathan Haidt) "obsessively concerned about what others think" of them. [ibid, 91] We are hardwired that way; and it would be a very miserable world if it weren't so. Who are the exceptions? Who are these great heroes who do not care about what other people think and are thereby free of the horrid taint of social metaphysics? Not Ayn Rand. The author of The Fountainhead did in fact care what others thought (at least part of the time). After all, if she didn't care what others thought, why did she demand strict unanimity of both thought and feeling among her acolytes? If she didn't care what others thought, why was she so upset at Whittaker Chamber's review of Atlas Shrugged, or Sidney Hook's review of For the New Intellectual? Those of Rand's admirers who insist that Rand didn't care about what others thought are doing her a disservice. For as it turns out, the only people who don't care about what other people think are psychopaths. And why would any of Rand's admirers insist that she exhibited a personality trait that is an exclusive property of psychopaths?

There is, however, a larger and more serious point to be drawn from the relation between psychopaths and a rational morality. The inability of psychopaths (and vmPFC damaged individuals as well) to experience certain emotions impairs ability to behave morally. This constitutes powerful evidence that emotions play a key role in ethical behavior. Rand doesn't appear to have understood the necessity of emotional motivation in moral behavior. Reason, at its best, is merely a tool; it is not a source of motivation or a controlling power. Hume turns out to be right: reason can can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey the emotions.

Ayn Rand & Human Nature 17

2012-01-18T11:41:00.000-08:00

Emotions as a form of Cognition. From Rand's writings, it is not always clear what role the emotions are supposed to play in her system. On the one hand, she asserts that emotions play no cognitive role. Indeed, given Rand's frequent condemnation of "whim worship," it's hard not to conclude that she distrusted emotions. She seems to have conceded, however, that, in the right circumstances, emotions can be a "means of enjoying life":

A rational man knows—or makes it a point to discover—the source of his emotions, the basic premises from which they come; if his premises are wrong, he corrects them. He never acts on emotions for which he cannot account, the meaning of which he does not understand. In appraising a situation, he knows why he reacts as he does and whether he is right. He has no inner conflicts, his mind and his emotions are integrated, his consciousness is in perfect harmony. His emotions are not his enemies, they are his means of enjoying life. But they are not his guide; the guide is his mind. This relationship cannot be reversed, however. If a man takes his emotions as the cause and his mind as their passive effect, if he is guided by his emotions and uses his mind only to rationalize or justify them somehow—then he is acting immorally, he is condemning himself to misery, failure, defeat, and he will achieve nothing but destruction—his own and that of others.

Rand's moral denunciation of allowing emotions to guide one's life is not helpful to getting at the truth of the matter. It reinforces an us verses them mentality which leads to stubborn retrenchment and a mind closed to new evidence. Rand's assertions that (1) it is possible for man to have no inner conflicts and (2) that following one's emotions will inevitably lead to misery, failure, defeat, and destruction are propositions about matters of fact. To test whether they are true, one needs to look at the relevant evidence. This evidence paints a much different picture of the role emotions as imagined by Rand and her disciples. Reason and emotions are not seperate faculties that can be "integrated" as Rand supposed. They are both cognitive processes working toward the same end. As Jonathan Haidt explains:

Emotions were long thought to be dumb and visceral, but beginning in the 1980s, scientists increasingly recognized that emotions were filled with cognition. Emotions occur in steps, the first of which is to appraise something that just happened based on whether it advanced or hindered your goals. These appraisals are a kind of information processing; they are cognitions.When an appraisal program detects particular input patterns, it launches a set of changes in your brain the prepares you to respond appropriately. For example, if you hear someone running up behind you on a dark street, your fear system detects a threat and triggers your sympathetic nervous system, firing up the fight-or-flight response, cranking up your heart rate, and widening your pupils to help you takin more information.

Emotions are not dumb. Damasio's [brain damaged] patients made terrible decisions because they were deprived of emotional input into their decision making. Emotions are a kind of information processing. Contrasting emotion with cognition [or "reason"] is therefore as pointless as contrasting rain with weather, or cars with vehicles. [44-45]

Not only are emotions cogntive, but many of them precede, and in general tend to predominate, over "reason," as the experimental evidence demonstrates. Jonathan Haidt has a metaphor to describe the relationship between conscious reasoning processes and automatic processes (such as emotion, intuition, etc.):

I call these two kinds of cognition the rider ... and the elephant. I chose an elephant rather than a horse because elephants are so much bigger -- and smarter -- than horses. Automatic processes run the human mind, just as they have been running animal minds for 400 million years, so they're very good at what they do, like software that has been improved through thousands of product cycles. When human beings evolved the capacity for language and reasoning at some point in the last million years, the brain did no rewire itself to hand over the reins to a new inexperienced charioteer. Rather, the rider (language-based reasoning) evolved because it did something useful for the elephant. [45]

Among the evidence Haidt puts forward on behalf of his hypothesis are the following considerations:

"Brains evaluate instantly and constantly." Hence emotional judgments always precede what can be determined via "reason."
"Social and political judgments depend heavily on quick intuitive flashes [rather than on reasoning]." A wealth of evidence backs this claim, including the near impossibility of changing someone's mind by refuting their political or moral convictions.
"Our bodily states sometimes influence our moral judgments. Bad smells and tastes can make people more judgmental (as can anything that makes people think about purity and cleanliness)."
"Psychopaths reason but don't feel (and are severely deficient morally.)" In other words, psychopaths are the exception to the rule that feelings precede and dominate over "reason"; yet look where this advantage has gotten them! The psychopath can't follow certain emotions because he is incapable of experiencing them. Far from leading to more "rational," Objectivist-like behavior, the lack of emotions leads to murder, rape, and sadism.
"Babies feel but don't reason." Which goes to demonstrate that in the majority of cases feelings precede reason and therefore cannot be the product of conscious premises (see my previous post).

Of this evidence the most fascinating, in the context of Rand's view of emotions, involves psychopaths, who reason but do not feel. I will explore the implications of this evidence in more detail in my next post.

Disorganizing Brains: New Book on Objectivism

2012-01-14T09:46:00.000-08:00

If all goes well, we will soon be graced with yet another tome on Objectivism: namely, Understanding Objectivism: A Guide to Learning Ayn Rand's Philosophy. This is yet another rehash of lectures: to be specific, a lecture series of the same name delivered by Leonard Peikoff in 1983 and sanitized for publication by no less an authority than the eminent Michael S. Berliner. Back in the halcyon days of Objectivism, just after Rand had passed from the scene and before things began to fall apart with the publication of Barbara Branden's The Passion of Ayn Rand, this lecture series was regarded as kind of holy grail among the Objectivist faithful. It was Peikoff's first major effort without the presence of Rand, who, during the seventies, had served as kind of philosophical training wheels to the future heir to her estate, and had kept a close eye on him during his most important lectures. There were some among the Objectivist cognoscenti who considered this lecture series Peikoff's very best effort. It undoubtedly is strong stuff, reputed to be among the highest-octane Objectivism one is likely to ever run across. Indeed, it's so strong that (to paraphrase Schopenhauer) it may in fact be capable of thoroughly and permanently disorganizing the brains of at least some who have listened to it. Consider, as evidence, the effect these lectures had on the mind of the self-proclaimed "Ultimate Philosopher." In terms of brains thoroughly and permanently disorganized by Rand, Peikoff, and Objectivism, it doesn't get any better (and hopefully not any worse) than what we find in the Ultimate Philosopher's review of Peikoff's "Understanding Objectivism":

One of the basic functions of Peikoff's later (post-1970s) lecture courses is to teach people methods of thinking (i.e., the how as distinguished from the what) about Objectivism as well as about any other subject. The essential core of Objectivist method - a responsible (context-appropriate) approach to checking premises - makes Objectivism itself essentially impervious to refutation. Like induction itself, you couldn't even attempt to refute it without implicitly accept and affirming it. Induction is the essence of rational, reality-oriented thought; Rand identified basic principles of inductive reasoning - the most notable achievement being her theory of concepts - and those basic principles are the very basic principles of Objectivism itself. Objectivism is the method of induction applied to the fundamental issues of man and his relationship to existence.

(I'll also note that Rand had the most perfectionistic thought processes for a philosopher since Aristotle. Same basic idea: check premises responsibly, spiral progression of knowledge, respecting the hierarchy of knowledge, etc. As perfectionism is essentially related to virtue in ethics, so it is in epistemology; Rand's definition of intellectual virtue is her way of establishing a Virtue Epistemology. [Hell, is there any other kind of sound epistemology?] The academic mainstream is, like, totally in the dark on this stuff - and why is that?)...

Cognitive clarity and efficiency are central aspects of successful functioning in life.... Familiarity with this course also makes for a good head start as our culture moves in the Randian direction in the coming years....

In the Utopia I envision for humanity's not-too-distant future, familiarity with Peikoff's courses or something of comparable caliber would be an essential qualification for university professors - hell, all university professors, and not just those in the Humanities. There's really no excuse for educators and intellectuals not to be familiar with this stuff.... Their minds might well be blown at just how insidiously, damagingly rationalistic (or emotionalistic, or otherwise dysfunctional) their thought processes were all along. Then they, too, will thank Rand for showing them the way.

The future enlightenment of humanity depends on it.

Ayn Rand Quote of the Day

2012-01-11T00:24:00.001-08:00

"The hallmark of such mentalities is the advocacy of some grand scale public goal, without regard to context, costs, or means. Out of context, such a goal can usually be shown to be desirable; it has to be public, because the costs are not to be earned, but to be expropriated; and a dense patch of venomous fog has to shroud the issue of means - because the means are to be human lives.

'Medicare' is an example of such a project. 'Isn't it desirable that the aged should have medical care in times of illness?' its advocates clamor. Considered out of context, the answer would be: yes, it is desirable. Who would have a reason to say no? And it is at this point that the mental processes of a collectivized brain are cut off; the rest is fog. Only the desire remains in his sight - it's for the good, isn't it? - it's not for myself, it's for others, it's for the public, for a helpless, ailing public...The fog hides such facts as the enslavement, and therefore, the destruction of medical science, the regimentation and disintegration of all medical practice, and the sacrifice of the professional integrity, the freedom, the careers, the lives of the very men who are to provide that 'desirable' goal - the doctors." - Collectivised Ethics, 1963

Ayn Rand & Human Nature 16

2011-12-30T09:39:00.000-08:00

Emotions as adaptive. Emotions are not tools of cognition, according to Rand. If this is true, why do people have emotions at all? What role do they play in human nature? Perhaps this is a question that is best left to those scientists who have gone to the trouble of studying the relevant empirical data, rather than relying merely on Rand's own ex cathedra say-so. David Desteno and Piercarlo Valdesolo provide a brief story illustrating the adaptive nature of emotions:

Consider the following example: you're walking thorugh the savannah with some of your family in search of a little breakfast. You come across a type of animal you've never seen before. It has dark brown fur with a white stripe down its spine. As you approach, it lunges at your merry band, sinking its teeth into your eldest daughter's neck and killing her. Now let's say we asked you what the probability is that the next animal with dark brown fur and a white stripe you see would be dangerous. You'd probably say 100 percent, and that's the most rational guess you could make since the single dark-furred, white-striped animal you've encountered proved to be dangerous.

Now let's say you accidentally happen upon another one of the these creatures. This time the animal sits there peacefully, even assuming the probability that the next animal with dark brown fur and a white stripe down its spine will be dangerous. Again we ask you, what is the probability that the next animal with dark brown fur and a white stripe down its spine will be dangerous. You'd probably pause. Rationally, your answer should be 50 percent, since as of this moment, one of two has proved dangerous. But your gut says something different. It's true that it is no longer reasonable to expect that all individuals of this species are dangerous, but on an intuitive level you know it's better to be safe than sorry. In your heightened emotional state, the cost of taking a longer path to avoid the brown and white critter is far less than the risk of losing another life. And in this case, your intuitive mind is right. While avoiding all animals with dark fur and white stripes would be an irrational calculation rooted in emotion (namely, fear), it is also an adaptive one.

Of course, this isn't just true in the jungle. In modern life too, listening to intuition and being more sensitive to the possibility of harm will serve you better on average than evaluating each individual situation rationally and objectively, particularly in situations that require rapid decisions for which you have incomplete information. [Out of Character, 188-189]

It's important to note that Desteno and Valdesolo are not simply stating in a preference. There is a large body of research supporting this view. Ironically, Ayn Rand might have been able to appreciate this truth, had she been paying more attention to the implications of one of her most important epistemological doctrines, unit-economy. In her short treatise on epistemology, Rand explains unit economy as follows:

Since consciousness is a specific faculty, it has a specific nature or identity and, therefore, its range is limited: it cannot perceive everything at once; since awareness, on all its levels, requires an active process, it cannot do everything at once. Whether the units with which one deals are percepts or concepts, the range of what man can hold in the focus of his conscious awareness at any given moment, is limited. The essence, therefore, of man’s incomparable cognitive power is the ability to reduce a vast amount of information to a minimal number of units—which is the task performed by his conceptual faculty. And the principle of unit-economy is one of that faculty’s essential guiding principles.

The very fact that human beings can only hold a small amount of information in consciuosness at a given moment makes reasoning about complex matters very difficult, if not impossible. Since the brain can only hold a few pieces of data within consciousness at a given time, complexity leads to cognitive over-load. Intuition is the cognitive faculty that enables individuals to make quick decisions concerning complex matters. Because these quick decisions aren't as accurate as slow, deliberate, peer-reviewed reasoning, it tends to err on the side of safety, as noted in the above example. Human beings are prewired to be extra cautious about potential sources of harm. That is why the infant child, having once burned his hand touching a flame, doesn't repeat the experiment a second time. He does not (as Objectivism implies) make some difficult calcuation involving the law of identity and its corollary, causality; he knows nothing nor is capable of understanding such abstruse constructs. Moreover, as any scientist would tell you, one experiment can hardly be consider decisive. The child avoids the flame because he instinctively (i.e., emotionally) understands: it's better to be safe than sorry.

According to social psychologist Jonathan Haidt:

Brains evaluate everything in terms of potential threat or benefit to the self, and the adjust behavior to get more of the good stuff and less of the bad. Animal brains make such appraisals thousands of times a day with no need for conscious reasoning, all in order to optimize the brain's answer to the fundamental problems of animal life: approach or avoid?...

In a landmark review article, [social psychologist Robert] Zajone urged psychologists to use a dual-process model in which affect or "feeling" is the first process. It has primacy both because it happens first (it is part of perception and is therefore extremely fast) and because it is more powerful (it is closely linked to motivation, and therefore it strongly influences behavior). The second process — thinking — is an evolutionarily newer ability, rooted in language and not closely related to motivation.... The thinking system is not equipped to lead — it simply doesn't have the power to make things happen — but it can be a useful advisor. [The Righteous Mind, 55-56]

Rand also believes in what could be described as a dual-process model involving conscious reasoning on the one hand and the subconscious on the other; but Rand reverses the primacy, making conscious reasoning the first process and subconscious evaluations the second process (hence Peikoff's assertion, spoken in Rand's presence: "There is nothing in the subconscious besides what you acquired by conscious means."). In the Randian model, the subconscious is "programmed" by the conscious mind. For Rand, the appraisals we all make thousands of time a day are "lightning-like estimates of the things around you, calculated according to your values." Where do these values come from? Ideas.

Your subconscious is like a computer—more complex a computer than men can build—and its main function is the integration of your ideas. Who programs it? Your conscious mind. If you default, if you don’t reach any firm convictions, your subconscious is programmed by chance—and you deliver yourself into the power of ideas you do not know you have accepted.... If your subconscious is programmed by chance, its output will have a corresponding character. You have probably heard the computer operators’ eloquent term “gigo”—which means: “Garbage in, garbage out.” The same formula applies to the relationship between a man’s thinking and his emotions.

The Randian model assumes that the subconsious is a blank slate: all its content derives from the conscious mind. If an individual focuses his mind and programs his subconscious with "rational" convictions, his emotions will tend to be rational. If, however, the individual fails to focus him mind and merely integrates whatever ideas he happens, by accident, to have been exposed to, his emotions will tend to be irrational and, if used as a guide to action, dangerous. Such an individual does not know whether his subconscious "is true or false, right or wrong, whether it’s set to lead him to success or destruction, whether it serves his goals or those of some evil, unknowable power. He is blind on two fronts: blind to the world around him and to his own inner world, unable to grasp reality or his own motives, and he is in chronic terror of both."

There are a number of very serious problems with Rand's view. To begin with, it is entirely inconsistent with evolution. As even Rand would probably have admitted, her model is not consistent with animal (i.e., non-human) cognition. Animals don't program their subconscious minds. Their brains make thousands of instant appraisals everyday. These appraisals are not based on conscious convictions integrated into their subconscious minds. Now according to evolution, humans evolved from animals. The human brain, therefore, evolved from the brains of lower animals. Hence, we would expect that a human brain would constitute a further development of the animal brain, rather than a complete re-write. In other words, the human power of conscious reasoning would be built upon, rather than replace, the animal brain. Otherwise, the human brain would in effect have to be redesigned by evolution from the ground up. But this is not how evolution works. If Rand were right about how the subconscious works, to maintain logical consistency, she would have to believe that the human brain was designed by some agent (e.g., God, space aliens, the flying spaghetti monster, etc.). Since she denies the existence of any such entitites, her view of the subconscious is logically insupportable.

The second problem with Rand's view is that it does not accord with the evidence. The brain simply does not work the way Rand claims it does, and there are hundreds, if not thousands, of experiments corroborating this fact. As Jonathan Haidt explains:

Psychologists used to assume that infant minds were blank slates.... But when development psychologists invented ways to look into infant minds, they found a great deal of writing already on that slate.

The trick was to see what surprises babies. Infants as young as two months old will look longer at an event that surprises them than an event they were expecting.... if the infant's mind comes already wired to interpret events in certain ways, than infants can be surprised with the world violates their expectations.

Using this trick, psychologists discovered that infants are born with some knowledge of physics and mechanics: they expect that objects will move according to Newton's laws of motion, and they get startled when psychologists show them scenes that should be physically impossible (such as a toy car seeming to pass through a solid object). [The Righteous Mind, 63]

Many more experiments could be made to corroborate this refutation of Rand's view. Emotions are not the results of programming by the conscious mind. They are, on the contrary, products of the cognitive unconscious, which is man's evolutionary inheritance from his mammalian ancestors. They are adapative, which means: they developed to meet specific needs of animals — namely, the necessity, in some situations, to make very quick judgments. They supplement, rather than contradict or oppose, man's rational faculty. Indeed, as we shall soon discover, man's rational faculty depends upon his emotions, and cannot function properly without them.

Ayn Rand & Human Nature 15

2011-12-12T10:59:00.000-08:00

Gratitude as social glue. In Out of Character, David Desteno and Piercarlo Valdesolo make the following research-inspired remarks about gratitude:

It seems that just as there are benefits to being fair and trustworthy, so too are there benefits to forging relationships with those we feel we can trust. It's obvious we admire individuals ... who seem honest and who honor responsibilities. These are people we want as partners and friends.When push comes to shove, we need someone who won't sell us down the river to turn a profit. As we've said before, social relationships are a two-way street. These potential partners also need to know the same about us. They need to know that our short-term interest won't always win, that we're in it to share both the profit and the perils. there needs to be some sort of social glue that binds people together.

We believed gratitude functions as just this type of glue. When those warm feelings of gratitude well up inside us, we feel so bounded to others -- at least for the moment -- that we become focused on our collective welfare and willing ... to make sacrifices for the collective good. [166-167]

In this passage the authors of Out of Character make points which Rand and her disciples, because of their strong ideological biases, seem incapable of appreciating. Rand had noticed that there was a sinister side to altruism that had escaped all but the most hard-headed. She then proceeded to denounce all rhetoric that even so much as suggested altruism with a Savonarola-like furor. But in her moral frenzy, Rand lost sight of all the nuances that constitute the reality most of us face in everyday life.

Since human beings are not in fact bundles of premises, as Rand surmised, but creatures with significant motivational baggage, they cannot be inspired to actions most conducive to their long-run well-being on self-interest alone. Long-term and short-term self-interest conflict, tugging the individual in contrary directions. Even worse, decisions are made against a backdrop of varying probabilities and outright uncertainties. Calculations have to be made, often based on little more than educated guesses, as to the probable behavior of other actors and the likely development of unique circumstances. The complexity of many the decisions individuals are forced to make on a day-to-day basis is far too great to be mastered through Randian "reason." The cognitive unconscious must be called in to service to grapple with the complexity. Emotional cues (i.e., messages from the cognitive unconscious) must be taken as part of the data from which decisions are made. Rand's ex cathedra assertion that "emotions are not tools of cognition" has been decisively refuted by the evidence. The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio found that those who, as a result of brain damage, were incapable of responding to emotional cues in decision making, became indecisive and dysfunctional.

There is an element of motivation in all knowledge which eluded Rand, who appeared (at least implicitly) to accept the out-moded view that rational knowledge is achieved through a kind of detached, emotion-free type of reasoning. Knowledge is fundamentally practical; it is gained to achieve a specific practical ends, determined by non-rational motivations. Rand wanted to believe that human motivations were merely the product of premises. Rational premises would lead to "rational" motivations. But this is a view that is both unsupported by the evidence and incoherent in its logic. Rand's view implicitly assumes the existence of unmotivated premises. But since all human action, including the action of thought, must be motivated, motivation would have to precede any acceptance of premises, which means there must have been motivations prior to any premises. Furthermore, anyone with any experience of infants knows that they are motivated long before they are capable of understanding, let alone thinking in terms of, language. Motivations tied to hunger, thirst, and sex are obviously innate; even Rand likely would have accepted this. So why can't motivations involving more complex emotions also have an innate component?

Once it is established that Rand's views on human nature and human motivation are incorrect, Rand's blithe assumptions about the potential rationality of human beings can be challenged and decisively refuted. The failure of Objectivist premises to lead to rationality even among Objectivists themselves demonstrates that individuals don't become rational merely by accepting the premises of rationality. The immaculate rationality preached by Rand is approached, if at all, only by a very few people, and never through Objectivist means. The vast majority of human beings have been and probably always will be influenced to a significant extent by sentiments and emotions. For that reason, if they are to be motivated to behave in a way that promotes happiness and a free and prosperous social order, it may be necessary to appeal to non-rational sentiments and motivational complexes.

Rand's ideal that human relationships be governed entirely by the "trader principle" is based on a mistaken view of human nature. It assumes, against a mountain of contrary evidence, that a rational, enlightened self-interest is in fact possible. But since most human beings are not in fact capable of pursing their interests fairly, impartially, rationally and justly (which is why the law does not allow anyone to be a judge in his own cause), it would appear that a rational outcome can only be approached by maintaining a tenuous balance between egoistic and social sentiments. Human beings need to be concerned for their own interests and welfare, but they also need to be concerned about the interests and welfare of others as well. Gratitude helps maintain this difficult balance. It renders individuals more magnanimous, less prone to nursing private resentments based on overly narcissistic, self-centered judgments. The individual who only attends to his own interests tends to be biased toward his own interests. When he doesn't get his own way, he will tend to become angry and resentful. Instead of focusing on his advantages, he will dwell on his disadvantages. He will become a wet nurse to his own grudges, which will make him ripe to be manipulated by power-hungry demagogues.

While Rand occasionally indulged in sentiments of gratitude toward America, Aristotle, and human achievement, the predominant tone of Objectivism is critical and disparaging. Very little pleased the author of Atlas Shrugged. She might admire the idea of America, but she had little nice to say of contemporary America. She may have admired human achievement in the abstract, but actual achievements often left her cold. She despised or ignored most of the noteworthy achievements of Western literature and Western thought. She does not come off, either in her life or in her philosophy, as a grateful person. The impression she left is that, other than perhaps Aristotle, she owed no intellectual debt to anyone. She often comes off as an angry person, at odds with the world. She had a mania for pronouncing moral judgment, despite the quite obvious fact that, except in rare circumstances, such pronouncements rarely have any beneficial effect, but, on the contrary, are more likely to foster feelings of ill-will and resentment.

The deficiency of gratitude within Objectivism finds its practical exemplification in the anger and contempt that marks the behavior of too many devotees of Rand's philosophy. In a 2006 lecture, Barbara Branden noted: "I find [rage] to be increasingly prevalent among Objectivists. We see everywhere—particularly on the Internet—the spectacle of supposed supporters of reason and free inquiry erupting in fury at the least provocation and hurling abuse at anyone who opposes—even questions—their convictions." Branden traced the origin of this rage back to misapplied premises in Objectivism; but it would be even more plausible to trace this anger back to Rand's own overwhelming disparaging tone and her concomitant mania for moral condemnation, all of which tend to foster sentiments of ingratitude and resentment toward the world at large and render people ungrateful for the advantages they in fact enjoy. In Objectivism, positive assessments are lavished on the purely theoretical. Man in theory is potentially rational and good, but most particular men are horrid mystics of some type or another; the universe in theory is benevolent, but the actual world we live in is an absolute mess teetering on the verge of an apocalypse; America in theory is a great country, but in practice it is almost a fascist state governed almost exclusively by politicians who are either stupid and/or evil. Given Objectivism's general dissatisfaction with the world (a dissatisfaction primarily fueled by allegiance to unrealizable ideals), no wonder Objectivists are so angry. Perfection is the cynic's standard; and the desire for unrealizable ideals only leads to frustration, rage, and ingratitude. It is an acid that dissolves social bonds and leaves the individual isolated from the community. Such isolation is hardly in the individuals "rational" or enlightened self-interest.

Ayn Rand & Human Nature 14

2011-11-23T08:55:00.001-08:00

Social Isolation and Compassion. Psychological research has found evidence that social isolation tends to numb a person's sense of compassion for others:

...in one interesting study, a group of researchers led by Roy Baumeister at Florida State University found that if you made people feel socially isolated..., it would decrease their sensitivity to the plight of those around them. To demonstrate this, they created a clever (though somewhat harsh) experiment. They had participants complete a bogus personality questionnaire and then told some of them that, based on the results, they were the type of person who most likely would not be able to develop meaningful relationships later in life and thus would end up alone....

Turned out that the people led to believe that they would become socially isolated did indeed care less about [others]. Not only that, it also made them less likely to engage in any prosocial behavior in general, and even made them less sensitive to emotional and physical pain. In short, it numbed them. It seems that when the possibility of developing beneficial long-term relationships is removed, either because the person in need doesn't appear to be the type of person who is worth your efforts (i.e., is dissimilar to you) or because you have reason to believe that you are unlovable and so your efforts would be fruitless, ... your impulse to care about the suffering of others switches off. If you can't count on anyone besides yourself, you might as well live only for yourself, right? [Desteno & Valdesolo, Out of Character, 147-148]

This research suggests that socially isolated individuals would be more receptive to the idea of living only for oneself. This could mean one of two things when related to Objectivism: (1) it could mean that Objectivism would appeal to social isolated individuals; and (2) that Objectivism has a built-in incentive to make people social isolated, since this will increase the chances that this individuals will accept and remain true to the Randian creed.

Let's first examine the appeal that Objectivism might have to the socially isolated. One issue that Objectivists tend to be naive about is the degree to which ideologies are, in a sense, self-selecting. That is to say, people tend to choose ideologies, not because of the acceptance of some premise or the logic of some argument, but because that ideology appeals to their needs, desires, and/or weaknesses. Generally speaking (there may be exceptions), people don't become Objectivists because they are convinced by Rand's premises or arguments; rather, there is something they find emotionally appealing in Objectivism, which leads them later to adopt a speculative allegiance to Rand's premises. Rand's philosophy strikes them as true and enlightening, despite the absence of sound argument and compelling evidence.

Now there may be any number of factors that draw individuals to Objectivism beyond social isolation. But it does not seem implausible to suggest that a socially isolated individual will more likely be drawn to Objectivsm than individuals who are better integrated into society.

However, it's also possible that the causation might flow in the other direction: that rather than being socially isolated to begin with, Objectivism may encourage people to become more socially isolated over time, which then reinforces their commitment to Objectivism. There are reasons to believe that this might be the case in some instances. In recent posts, I've been emphasizing the lack of social virtues in Objectivism. While Rand was not necessarily opposed to such values, her refusal to emphasize them (and sometime to write in a way that may suggest, to some readers, disparagement or indifference to them) could have a bad influence on those intensely drawn to her philosophy. I would also note that Objectivism doesn't always have the best record for providing social support to its members. The worst example of this on record involves Ellen Plasil, who was ostrasized by the Objectivism community (and ignored by the Objectivist elite) after she exposed the wrong-doing of "Objectivist" therapist Lonnie Leonard. But there are other examples of anti-social behavior, not only in the behavior of at least some Objectivists online, but even in the behavior of Objectivist elites, including Rand and Peikoff. Rand wound up breaking with nearly all of the original Objectivists who made up her inner circle in the fifties and sixties. And Peikoff has continued that tradition; indeed, he has even admitted to being "on terms of personal enmity" with "a few longtime [ARI] Board members." Why is it that at least some Objectivists struggle to get along even with other Objectivists? To be sure, getting along with other people can be a huge challenge. But that is precisely the reason why social values need to be emphasized. Those who understand and appreciate the limits of human nature realize the need for a kind of chivalry in human dealings. We're not always going to see eye to eye with those around us. People have different desires, tastes, emotions, sentiments, and values, so conflict is inevitable. But as long as we don't always assume that our own personal values represent some kind of gold standard applicable to everyone (despite innate differences in temperament and environmental differences in circumstances), it becomes much easier to tolerate differences in others. After all, we can't be at open war against everyone who thinks differently from ourselves. Freedom requires a certain degree of tolerance. It means allowing other people to think and act in ways that may go against our own deepest convictions. Being at open enmity not only with the world at large, but even with individuals in one's own clique, is hardly a wise way to live. It encourages precisely those elements in human nature that lead to social isolation and intolerance. It's not clear that a free society can exist among intolerant, socially isolated individuals.

Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature 13

2011-11-18T09:55:00.000-08:00

Gratitude and trust. Although honesty (and presumably trust) are explicit Objectivist virtues, Rand did not appear eager to put any great emphasis on a virtue which often serves as a foundation for trust. In any ethical system that presumes to be "rational," this is clearly a shortcoming, since, as psychological experiments have demonstrated, gratitude seems to stem from innate sources that are clearly in the need of rational direction. As Desteno and Valedsolo have pointed out:

...whether we are fair [to others] and pay back our debts stems more from automatic feelings than from reason. We can always justify why we don't have to pay back just yet, but we can't help feeling grateful. More important, we are wired in such a way that our gratitude can be misdirected, leading us to repay our debts to the wrong person. The danger of this, of course, is that if we're feeling grateful, we're liable to help anyone who requests it. In fact, it an be quite adaptive if it doesn't happen too often, as it encourages people to take the chance on a stranger with whom they might end up having a mutually beneficial relationship. In short, it's kind of like paying it forward, driven by emotion.

Still, this fact also makes us vulnerable to ploys of others. Think about it. When is the best time to ask someone for a favor or for money? When they're feeling grateful (even if it's to someone else). Ever wonder why sometimes those charities asking for donations stick a dollar in the envelope or give you a "gift" of stamps or stickers that you never asked for? As the results of our experiments suggest, these tactics work. So the next time you're feeling grateful and you're tempted to do someone a favor, take a minute to stop and think about whether or not the person asking you for the favor is someone who really deserves it.

That said, most of the time gratitude serves a bigger and more important function in life than just upholding quid pro quo. Gratitude doesn't only help us reap favors, acquire resources, or build wealth. It builds something that may be even more valuable over the long haul: loyalty and trust. [Out of Character, 163-164]

Although Rand may have been very concerned with how feelings of obligation might be exploited by individuals to manipulate others, her orientation is so driven by narrow ideological concerns that she misses all the important nuances of the situation. Moreover, her denial of innate propensities causes her to naively believe that most important social problems can be solved (or at least severely mitigated) by persuading individuals to accept rational premises. But since these innate propensities do in fact exist and do in fact exercise an influence on many, if not most, individuals, trying to resolve or cure them by propagating so-called "rational" premises is a waste of time. Innate propensities cannot be managed wisely if one refuses to acknowledge their existence.

Apologists for Rand are often quick to remind us that the founder of Objectivism is not responsible for her followers. Yet there is contradiction at the heart of this reminder. Rand insisted that individuals were the product of their premises. Their emotions, their aesthetic responses, their very personalities were mere expressions of whatever premises they had accepted, either through focused thought or unfocused irresponsibility. Rand further insisted that only she advocated the the right and proper premises. Her premises, if accepted, should lead to rational, efficacious behavior. Furthermore, Rand also insisted that only she had the right arguments for these "rational" premises; that most other arguments would only lead people to accept contrary premises. Now if Rand were correct about these assertions, one would expect to find a high level of rationality and efficacious behavior among those who accepted Rand's arguments and premises. But this is not what we do in fact find. Even among the Objectivist elite (i.e., those in whom we would expect to find the strongest evidence of the benefits of Rand's premises) we often find an astonishing degree of irrationality and counter-productive behavior. As one example, consider Leonard Peikoff's behavior during the McCaskey fiasco. One can hardly imagine a more blatant example of sheer irrationality than the admissions Peikoff made in a couple of emails detailing his disdain for McCaskey's scholarly objections to Harriman's regrettable treatise. Peikoff reveals himself as an individual beset by many of the worst propensities in human nature. Acceptance of Objectivist premises hardly helped in his case. If anything, they seemed to have made him worse.

So we are confronted with a basic contradiction: either Rand is wrong about the beneficial nature of Objectivist premises; or she is wrong to assume that human character, including human propensities, are entirely the product of such premises. Rand might, of course, be wrong on both accounts; but she can only be right, if she is right at all, on one. If human beings are the product of their premises and Objectivist premises are good, we should find this borne out in the behavior of actual Objectivists. This we do not find. Nor is it just Leonard Peikoff. According even to orthodox sources, nearly all the original Objectivists (i.e., those in Rand's inner circle), at some point became "corrupted." Leonard Peikoff claims this happened because these individuals lost interest in ideas. But why should this have happened? Hadn't these individuals, by Rand's own judgment, accepted Objectivism? And shouldn't this acceptance have led to emotional propensities which would have favored maintaining an interest in ideas? It simply makes no sense. If Rand was right, most of the Objectivists in her inner circle should not have eventually become "corrupted" (i.e., ceased to remain orthodox Objectivists in good standing with Rand).

The most plausible explanation for these anomalies is that Rand is wrong on all counts. Human beings are not the product of their premises. Therefore, getting them to "accept" the "proper" premises is useless. Regardless of whatever speculative allegiances an individual may entertain, the innate propensities influencing his judgment and behavior remain. They will shift and color his speculative allegiances in ways that Rand never anticipated. This consideration brings us back to the issue of gratitude and its absence among the explicitly promoted Objectivist virtues. Many people are turned off by Rand's insistence on the "virtue of selfishness." It is assumed, by Rand's apologists, that such people are influenced by altruistic premises absorbed from the prevailing culture. Yet this is not a very plausible explanation. Many of the very same people who are uncomfortable with Rand's emphasis on selfishness would be equally uncomfortable with the view that human beings must live unconditionally for others. In any case, one rarely hears appeals to the extreme kind of altruism advocated by Auguste Comte and denounced by Rand. Discomfort with selfishness, far from being motivated by an allegiance to extreme forms of altruism, is more commonly rooted in a mistrust of unconditional self-seeking. People notice that encouraging selfishness, far from leading to more rational and benevolent behavior, often leads, instead, to irrational, anti-social behavior. It matters little whether we insist that selfishness must be "rational" and "enlightened." Very few human beings are capable of such rationality and enlightenment. (For those who entertain any doubts on this score, see Pareto's Mind and Society, or any well-researched tome on behavioral economics.) Since the cognitive unconscious plays a much larger role in cognition and even decision-making then most people realize, even individuals sincerely committed to "rational" self-interest can easily be led astray. Those who, following Rand, deny the existence of innate propensities, have a vested interest in repressing whatever innate propensities may be influencing their own conduct. Repression sabotages, if not prevents, any attempt to deal with these innate propensities in a rational and wise manner. Instead, the repressive individual merely begins to concoct rationalizations which he uses to explain the contradiction between his innate proclivities and his speculative allegiances. Denying human nature merely leads to rationalization and casuistry on a grand scale.

Experience, if followed wisely, counsels that it is better to emphasize social virtues such as gratitude and empathy, rather than merely personal virtues such as pride and ambition. Human beings tend to be rather biased toward their interests and concerns. Worse, they are often not even consciously aware of these biases. Many people spend a great deal of time constructing narratives which justify both their behavior and their self-esteem. The human being, far from being a "rational" animal, could more accurately be described as a rationalizing animal. In other words, there is often no reason to encourage pride, ambition, and self-esteem, since the desire for these things is built in. But social virtues are not built-in to the same extent. Gratitude is often tied to short-term feelings which wax and wane and which do not have a specific target. Hence it may prove the wiser course to emphasize grateful behavior, rather than merely grateful feelings. And it won't do at all to merely emphasize virtues such as pride, self-esteem, or even justice and honesty. Trust is built, not on speculative commitments to a specific virtue, but on actual behavior; and behavior that exhibits gratitude is more likely to build trust than is the mere "acceptance" of the premise of honesty. Despite all the virtuous noise Objectivists make about honesty, they don't seem particularly honest in their philosophy or in their scholarship. Some of the things Rand wrote about Kant, Hume, Bertrand Russell, and Emerson can hardly qualify as honest. Objectivists seem to be driven to write and say dishonest things about philosophers and critics they don't like because they place far too much emphasis on virtues such as pride and self-esteem (which only serve to exacerbate tendencies toward pretension and self-aggrandizement) while ignoring virtues such as gratitude, empathy, and kindness toward others (which would render them less prone to judge everyone who disagrees with them so uncharitably).

Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature 12

2011-11-04T09:17:00.000-07:00

Objectivist Virtues and Compassion. The six primary Objectivist virtues are: rationality, honesty, integrity, productivity, pride, and justice. What is perhaps most interesting about this list is not the virtues that are included but those that are omitted. There is nothing about compassion, kindness, empathy, consideration for others, avoidance of cruelty, charity, good manners, etiquette or any of the so-called "social" virtues. This is not to suggest that Rand was opposed to these virtues, or regarded them as vices. She regarded charity, for example, as a "minor" virtue, and she was always eager to insist that altruism could not be equated with consideration for others. However, it is clear that these social virtues are not at the center of the Objectivist ethics, but are regarded by that system as lesser virtues which, when used as a facade for altruism, can easily become vicious.

Now recent psychological research has brought to light some interesting features of human nature in relation to compassion and cruelty:

A growing body of evidence suggests that an important factor underlying whether we show someone compassion or cruelty is the person's perceived similarity to us. It should take little introspection to realize we feel the pain of those with whom we seem to share some commonalities. Countless studies have demonstrated that we not only consistently show more compassion to those we deem "like us." ...

These psychological mechanisms were at work ... for the people who came out in droves to help the victims of 9/11, Katrina, and the Haitian earthquake -- the crises shifted their focus away from all their squabbles and differences and onto their shared identity as human beings. But once the worst was over and they slipped back into their "us/them" mentality, their compassion swiftly abated. It only takes a quick glance at the headlines to see that most conflicts -- be they national, political, religious, or personal -- often come down to this very simple and automatic "like us"/"not like us" split. [Out of Character, 127-128]

Among the many things this research suggests is that there exists within most human beings innate propensities in conflict with acquired propensities. In above example, the innate propensity involves a preference for people "like us," while the acquired propensity involves the belief that we shouldn't prefer individuals who are like us to individuals who are not, and that people should be judged on the content of their character and/or their accomplishments rather than their similarity to ourselves.

Now because Objectivism denies the existence of innate propensities, it has difficulty explaining the above conflict. On the one hand we find a prevailing meme in society that everyone should be treated equally and that is wrong to be prejudiced against people merely because they are different from us; and on the other, we frequently find people lapsing into behavior that contradicts this meme. If the propensities of human beings were merely the product of premises imbibed by the culture around them, as Objectivism assumes, how come we find continue to find propensities that go against the dominant cultural trends of the age? And why do we constantly come across examples of a conflict or contradiction between behavior on the one side and thought on the other?

The view that propensities are innate, but that people can act against them is far superior at explaining these contradictions between behavior and thought than anything found by or concocted through Objectivism. If these propensities are a vestige of the more animalistic side of our nature, which appears to be the case, then we would expect these animalistic vestiges to sometimes conflict with the more "rational" sides of our nature. Rand appears to have believed in a sharp division between human beings and all other animals. Animals, Rand suggested, have instincts; man is without instincts. Yet given that man is an animal and therefore (at least on non-theistic premises) must be a product of evolution, it is difficult to accept this belief. All the relevant evidence strongly testifies against the Randian view. Human beings from many different cultures still share a variety of propensities, even when their specific culture inveighs against them. The human being is clearly an animal, sharing the same organs and much of the same DNA with his furrier, four-legged brethren. Why would human beings share many of the same desires of animals, such as thirst, hunger, sex, yet not instincts? All social animals (human beings included) engage in status rivalries. The notion that such status-competition is an acquired propensity via the acceptance of some philosophical premise is just not plausible. If other social animals engage in status-competitions and if man is a social animal, the likelihood is man shares the same innate drive for preeminence that exists in animals, just as he shares a large percentage of his DNA with these very same critters.

Now if, as is likely, human beings are predisposed to treat people like themselves with more charity and compassion than people different from themselves, then one might argue that the non-instinctive, rational side of human nature should be called into action to mitigate whatever problems or issues arise as a result of this propensity. This is precisely where Rand's blank slate view of human nature demonstrates its lack of wisdom. The denial of innate propensities leads to the denial that countermeasures may be needed to mitigate the bad effects of the predisposition. Moral systems place compassion, charity, and kindness as primary virtues precisely because people are not always inclined to treat those who are different from themselves with compassion and charity. In light of this, Rand's failure to include any of the preeminent social values in her Objectivist catalogue of virtues, combined with her tendency to allow her fervent denunciations of altruism to create an aura of distrust for compassion and charity, demonstrates the degree which Rand simply didn't understand human nature or the moral needs of human beings living in a civilized social order.

Rand & Human Nature 11

2011-10-20T09:53:00.000-07:00

Innate biases against diversity. There exists in many people a desire to preserve various uniformities. Many individuals, perhaps most individuals, prefer individuals who are like themselves: who look like themselves, act like themselves, talk like themselves, and think like themselves.

A curious experiment by Jeremy Bailenson provides further evidence that this is so. The experiment, as described by Desteno and Valdesolo, went as follows:

In the weeks leading ... to the 2006 election, the researchers selected a randon sample of people all over the country to participate in a computer-based study. First, they were asked to upload a recent photograph of themselves.... Then, the week of the election, they were shown a picture of each candidate and asked to complete a questionaire asking them to indicate how they felt about the candidate on a host of measures. Now, they weren't given any other information about the candidates besides their pictures, yet they were asked to make judgments about how honest, moral, and kind the candidates appeared, as well as how the candidates made them feel, how likely they would be to vote for them, and the like. But there's a twist. Unbeknownst to the participants, the experimenters had used photoimaging software to morph participants' own photographs with the candidates' faces, using a ratio of 60 percent candidate to 40 percent participant, which was just subtle enough that the participants wouldn't be able to consciously detect the manipulation.... What was the point? Bailenson and colleagues wanted to know if making the candidates look more like the participants would be enough to change their judgments and preferences.

It was. Results showed that across the board, people had a stronger preference for the candidate whose photo was blended with theirs. No matter who the candidate was or what he stood for, the people rated the candidate whose picture had been morphed with their own as being more honest, moral, kind, and so forth --- and they indicated they would be more likely to vote for him.

Bailenson and his colleagues ran a second experiment, this time using more prominent politicians: namely, George Bush and John Kerry. The results reinforced their first experiment, with an important qualification:

Those who were strongly partisan one way or the other didn't budge from their opinions of the candidates..., but independents and undecideds (those whose votes, let's not forget, tend to swing presidential candidates one way or the other) showed a significant preference for the candidate whose photo had been morphed with their own. [Out of Character, 133-135]

What we find here is evidence strongly suggesting an innate tendency shared by many people which has real world affect on behavior. (Desteno and Valdesolo, in some of their own experiments, have shown how this tendency affects behavior. See Out of Character, 137-141.) This is the very sort of tendency denied by Rand. Yet ironically, it is a tendency that she might have been influenced by in her personal life and even in her philosophy.

One of the most curious aspects of Rand was how fervently she insisted on maintaining a strict uniformity, not merely on philosophical, moral, and political matters, but even on aesthetic matters. She wanted everyone to be like her; or at least she acted as if she did. Why is this? Why would fervent champion of individualism and thinking for oneself demand strict uniformity of thought and feeling among her own disciples? Is it possible that, subconsciously, Rand was afflicted by that very same tendency that caused people to prefer candidates who looked like themselves? Or is it more plausible that Rand wished to preserve uniformities for strictly intellectual or "rational" reasons? If so, what are those reasons? Rand seems to have placed great emphasis on an individual's sense of life. She wished the people around her to have the same "sense of life," and therefore, the same emotional reactions, as her. But how did she know that a similar sense of life leads to similar emotional reactions? Did she simply make up this idea based on her own private and thoroughly anecdotal experience? Or did she have empirical evidence compiled through extensive experimental research upon which to base it? How did she know that this sense of life even exists as she described it? Isn't it more likely that have people have multiple senses of life, depending on their mood? And if so, how useful is Rand's construct?

It's at least possible, and perhaps even plausible, that Rand, when she used her sense of life construct to justify preserving uniformity in emotional reactions among her disciples, was being unconsciously driven by that very same desire for conformity that characterizes so many social phenomena, from fashions to peer pressure. In other words, it is not in the least implausible to assume that Rand was a human being like the rest of us, afflicted with similar imperfections and shortcomings. Only, because her philosophy denies that these imperfections and shortcomings have an innate component, she was blind to their existence in herself, and therefore unable to effectively deal with them either as they affected her behavior or even her philosophy. In theory, she was a staunch individualist; but in practice she was a social totalitarian.

Rand & Human Nature 10

2011-10-14T10:41:00.001-07:00

Pride & Hubris. The Objectivist view of pride is actually much more conventional than Rand and her disciples make it out to be. Earned pride (i.e., pride based on "objective" accomplishment) is held as a virtue; unearned pride (i.e., pretensions to pride based on no real accomplishments) is considered mere arrogance or pretention.

These views are considered daring because they stand in opposition to Christian-inspired admonitions against the "sin" of pride. But fact is that such admonitions don't really exercise much influence on the attitudes and behavior of most people, whether they profess a theoretical attachment to Christian doctrine or not. Most people are proud of their accomplishments and proud of their country, regardless of theological attachments, just as most people abhor the false pride of pretension and hubris.

Objectivists begin to lose sight of reality on this issue when it comes to two main issues: (1) detecting hubris in themselves and (2) evaluating hubris in others.

One of the long standing problems in Objectivism is a tendency to frame issues in very simple, broad abstractions, to the detriment of any and all important details. It's all very well to say that pride should be based on real accomplishments. But how does one know that a specific instance of pride is or is not based on something genunine? Often, in the situations we confront in everyday life, we're not in a position to know such a thing. And what makes it even more difficult is most people are not very good at evaluating their own accomplishments or the accomplishments of other. Experimental psychology has found that most people engage, quite unwittingly, in spin about their personal accomplishments and their own moral worth, while being overly critical (or sometimes overly uncritical) toward other. Nor is such behavior necessarily at odds with self-interest, enlightened or otherwise. As Desteno and Valdesolo explain:

When we see someone who looks self-assured, we assume she is important; after all, why wouldn't we? There is no equivalent signal for hubris -- for if there were, it owuld have disappeared long ago, as it would only serve to solicit ridicule. So in a brief encounter with someone whom you know little, there is no way to tell if the pride and confidence he or she is expressing is justified. When a poser is strutting around looking important, we buy it. There is no way to know otherwise. And that's the point. By presenting the illusion of status and power, these people are positioning themselves to appear most attractive to potential colleagues and employers. Yes, it's an untenable tactic in the long run (like the emperor [with no clothes], they will eventually be found out), but in the short run it may provide an all-important advantage that helps them get back on their feet. The ... gamble may pay off.

Hubris, then, can function as a protective mechanism. It can help us preserve our social status and, to some extent, our self-worth. This is why we often overestimate our abilities, sometimes subconsciously, sometimes deliberately. It's why, for example, as work by Richard Gramzow has demonstrated, we tend to misremember how well we did on tests such as the SATs, but with the important caveat that our errors go in only one direction --- toward higher scores. Gramzow has also shown that ... people strategically present themselves in the workplace and other competitive settings to seem more accomplished and confident. What's most fascinating, however, is that this posing actually works to their benefit on many levels. Not only does it signal social value, as we've described above, but it has psychological and physiological benefits as well, such as helping people stay calm during potentially stressful interactions. In one study, Gramzow and his colleagues Greg Willard and Wendy Mendes had participants take part in an interview while a computer monitored their cardiac responses. Amazingly, the researchers found that those who exaggerated their abilities in the interview actually exhibited less physical stress and anxiety than those who didn't, and as a result, they had a more successful interaction with the interviewer. [Out of Character, 120-121]

Our inability to distinguish between pride and mere hubris has another side to it as well. Not only do we tend be poor at evaluating it in others because we don't have access to the necessary information, often we are blinded by egotistic biases. In a letter Peikoff briefly released justifying his behavior in the McCaskey scandal, Rand's self-appointed "intellectual heir" wrote: "I have, for years, long before Harriman’s book, condemned McCaskey morally: I regard him as an obnoxious braggart as a person, and a pretentious ignoramus as an intellectual." In other words, Peikoff is justified in evading rational discussion because his opponent is allegedly guilty of gross hubris. But on what basis does Peikoff judge McCaskey as a braggart and a prentious ignoramus? After all, Peikoff gives no evidence in support for his view. What is worse, Peikoff has a vested interest in regarding McCaskey in such a light, since, as is well known, McCaskey's objections to the Harriman book appear to be based on sound scholarship. In any case, Peikoff's behavior basically comes down to a desperate attempt to avoid any sort of peer review — the very sort of peer review that is essential for scientific advancement and empirical cleanliness. Keeping this in mind, it's difficult to credit Peikoff's accusations of hubris against McCaskey. In the light of everything that has been learned about pride and hubris from experimental psychology, the odds are that Peikoff's view of McCaskey is distorted by bias. If anyone is afflicted by hubris and a false estimate of his own abilities, it is Peikoff, who assumes he knows more about the history of science than an accredited scholar from Stanford.

Now if even Peikoff, the very paragon of Objectivist rationality, can be led down the primrose path of unwitting hubris, what hope is there for the rest of mankind? By evading important facts about human nature, Objectivists have difficulty lapsing into the very errors they preach against.

Rand & Human Nature 9

2011-10-06T13:17:00.000-07:00

Denial of Jealousy. From a naturalist point of view, it is difficult to escape the view that man is a product of an evolutionary process, and that this process plays an important part in the development of man's character. Since a species, if it is to survive, must both reproduce and care for its offspring, it is likely that the process of evolution will favor those individuals who have a strong predisposition to reproduce and bestow care upon their progeny. Hence the near universality of both sexual desire and jealousy.

In comparing Rand's view of human nature with what we find in the study of actual human beings, the astute observer can hardly fail to notice the degree to which Rand has stripped away everything she found annoying in man. In distinguishing all those elements that separated man from the animals, Rand, in effect, implicitly suggests that man is not essentially an animal. His animalistic characteristics are mere accidents. Man's essence is his "reason" and his volition. These elements supercede the natural or animalistic characteristics. Man has no "instincts" or innate predispositions, only such acquired dispositions as he imbibes from the people around him or his own thinking. Although it is unlikely that Rand would have ever (à la William Jennings Bryan) explicitly denied that man was a mammal, her philosophy, at times, seems to blissfully evade this palpable fact. Indeed, in some ways, this evasion is worse than an outright denial. Bryan, because of his belief in the myth of original sin, could at least be brought to recognize those actual characteristics which human beings share with animals. Rand, on the other hand, saw such characteristics (provided they were not merely physical) as defects acquired through evasion and lack of focus, rather than intregal aspects of a functioning animal.

We see this played out in the Objectivist view of jealousy, which is generally dismissive. Indeed, according to James Valliant, "Female jealousy, in the traditional sense, was alien to Rand." Valliant's view is entirely consisted with the Randian orthodoxy. Emotions can be entirely "rational," as long as the value premises behind the emotions are "rational." Of course, it would be the most dreadful heresy to suggest that Rand herself ever experienced an irrational emotion. In all of this, what is conspicuously missing is any sense of emotions as cues or incentives for behavior necessary for the propagation of the species; that, in other words, emotions exist, not to help create Rand's ideal men or provide incentives for enlightened self-interest, but to assist naturalistic goals which, in their absence, would lead to the extinction of the species. On naturalistic premises, the existence of the human species is not, nor could it ever be, the product of a rational decision, since prior to the existence of human beings, no rational thought existed. Therefore, if one wishes to be a naturalist (and this appears to be the case with Rand and her followers), one must accept those facts which are logically connected to the naturalist view.

Now under the naturalist view, jealousy is a very important emotion, necessary in the development and propagation of the species. As David Desteno and Piercarlo Valdesolo explain:

It's true that many people think of jealousy as a character flaw. But if we didn't feel jealous, we wouldn't have the kinds of stable relationships necessary to adequately protect and care for our offspring. It may not be a pleasant emotion, but sometimes it is a quite useful one, at least when experienced in mild doses. It can alert us to signs that our partner is being unfaithful or that someone is trying to steal him from us. It can also signal to our partners that we want to be in the relationship for the long term (otherwise it wouldn't be worth putting up a fight), and signal to us when they feel the same. [Out of Character, 90]

Regarding emotions as mere value premises, either accepted by default or chosen by a focused mind, renders it impossible to understand the natural and biological function of emotions within the human organism. Emotions are somatic markers or cues for predipositions and cognitive evalutions which promote the maintenance and continuance of the species. In their absence, we would no longer exist. While Rand might have been able to recognize the importance for emotions to survival, her inability to fully appreciate the mammalian side of human nature rendered her incapable of understanding the role of emotions in furthering the reproduction of the species.

Rand & Human Nature 8

2011-09-20T18:11:00.000-07:00

Jealousy. Although Rand did not have much to say about jealousy, apparently it was not an emotion well regarded by the founder of Objectivism. As Rand scholar Robert Campbell put it:

The Objectivist ethics does not look favorably on jealousy. The judgments that a jealous person makes of a rival are far from being models of epistemic objectivity, and jealous feelings are regarded as a sure sign of low self-esteem. In Ayn Rand’s fiction—most memorably, in Part II, Chapter IX of Atlas Shrugged—jealousy openly expressed is not just a badge of weakness but a near-guarantee of loss or rejection.

In the context of Rand's theory of emotions, jealousy must be regarded as a product of value premises, rather than an innate predisposition triggered by specific circumstances. Did Rand present any evidence that jealousy was an acquired rather than an innate predisposition? No, of course not. Does such evidence that exists on the question tend to support Rand's view? No, it does not.

Jealousy is very commonly observed, widespread emotion. It exists in all cultures and affects nearly everyone (though some people may be more prone to it than others). Experiments show that it can easily be triggered, even people who don't regard themselves as the "jealous type."

David Desteno and Piercarlo Valdesolo decided to test how easily jealousy can be triggered in individuals:

We orchestrated a complex social reaction that stimulated ... how jealousy naturally occurs in the real world: a relationship starts, it's threatened by a rival, and then it actually dissolves due to the rival.... Basically, the unknowing participant was being set up for the ultimate brush-off. Why would we put people through this? Because, harsh as it might sound, it is the most valid method of studying how jealousy works in everyday social interactions. [Out of Character, 85]

The initial experiment worked as follows. Carlo Valdesolo pretended to a be a participant in a psychological experiment which involved answering trivial questions. He pairs up with a female participant and immediately begins flirting with her. A little later, another female enters the room, allegedly to take part in the experiment. Carlo begins flirting with the new female "rival," until he suggests to her, "Why don't we pair up," leaving the other female participant, the true subject of the experiment, to stew in her own juices.

What was most interesting to us about [the results of the experiment] was that such a small slight could so drastically affect people's sense of self and emotional state. If you look at the author photo on the jacket of this book, you might be skeptical -- that guy made people jealous?... Yeah, that's right. And not just a little jealous, either. Some participants' faces quite literally dropped when Carlo threw them over for the other woman. Others let out audible gasps. One participant found the rejection so unbearable, she repeatedly shushed Carlo and the rival as they worked on their tasks, angrily sneering, "I can still hear you" when they continued to joke and giggle together on the other side of the room divider. All of which speaks to the power of jealousy and how quickly it can rear its ugly head to protect even the potential for a relationship. [86-87]

Valdesolo and Desteno next devised an additional experiment to test what it would take for a seemingly normal person to become jealous enough to actually inflict harm:

Here's where things got even more interesting. After participants got the brush-off from Carlo, ... they were told that there was one last part of the experiment to complete.... All participants had previously filled out a questionnaire on which they'd had to rate how much they liked of disliked certain flavors (e.g., sweet, sour, spicy). For the final phase of the experiment, our real participant was presented with a box that contained the taste preferences questionnaires of both the snubber (Carlo) and the rival, several foods chosen because they were supposedly the strongest versions of those flavors we could think of, ... and small plastic cups. We next told the participant that we needed the others in the study to actually taste the substances and rate their preferences, but that because we needed to be blind to who ate what before taking these assessments, we needed the participant to measure out "randomly" assigned substance for us. It was further made clear to the participant that she was free to dole out as much or as little of the substance as she felt was appropriate, and that the other two (the snubber and the rival) would have to consume every last drop.

Then we left the room and gave the participant some time to read the questionnaires (who could resist?) and prepare the samples. And when she read the questionnaires, what did she see? That these other two hated spicy food (naturally, we'd rigged the questionnaire to read this way), which was what she'd been randomly assigned to give them. So now she was faced with a difficult decision: how much extra-strong hot sauce did she want to give this sleazy, no-good jerk and his floozy? Turns out it wasn't that difficult a decision after all. The jealous participants loaded up the sample cups with more painful stuff, filling them with significantly more than those in the control condition did. As it turned out, how much hot sauce they poured was directly predicted by how jealous they felt. [88-89]

Now if the Objectivist theory of emotions were correct, we would not expect to see such a unanimity in the behavior of the jealous subjects. After all, jealousy is not an emotion that is well thought of. If emotions are integrated value premises, how does one explain the near unanimity of value a premise which tends to be despised in the culture? If jealousy is not innate, but a product of the culturally predominant philosophy, how does one explain the general disparagement of jealousy? In the light of the Objectivist view of emotions, isn't it odd that individuals should have one type of emotional reaction when they speak and think, and another when they act? These inconsistencies aren't noticed by Objectivists, because their views on these matters are determined, not by fact and logic, but merely by sentiment and Rand idolatry. Doctrines which trace all human emotions to culture and/or ideas cannot explain widespread inconsistencies between rhetoric and behavior. If there are no innate predispositions, it makes no sense at all for the culture to influence nearly everyone in one direction when it comes to voicing one's feelings and opinions, and the exact opposite direction when it comes to behavior and conduct.

Rand & Human Nature 7

2011-09-09T10:12:00.000-07:00

Love. Rand's most sophisticated theory of love appears in The Romantic Manifesto:

Love is a response to values. It is with a person’s sense of life that one falls in love—with that essential sum, that fundamental stand or way of facing existence, which is the essence of a personality. One falls in love with the embodiment of the values that formed a person’s character, which are reflected in his widest goals or smallest gestures, which create the style of his soul—the individual style of a unique, unrepeatable, irreplaceable consciousness. It is one’s own sense of life that acts as the selector, and responds to what it recognizes as one’s own basic values in the person of another. It is not a matter of professed convictions (though these are not irrelevant); it is a matter of much more profound, conscious and subconscious harmony.

Many errors and tragic disillusionments are possible in this process of emotional recognition, since a sense of life, by itself, is not a reliable cognitive guide. And if there are degrees of evil, then one of the most evil consequences of mysticism—in terms of human suffering—is the belief that love is a matter of “the heart,” not the mind, that love is an emotion independent of reason, that love is blind and impervious to the power of philosophy. Love is the expression of philosophy—of a subconscious philosophical sum—and, perhaps, no other aspect of human existence needs the conscious power of philosophy quite so desperately. When that power is called upon to verify and support an emotional appraisal, when love is a conscious integration of reason and emotion, of mind and values, then—and only then—it is the greatest reward of man’s life.

Because many men and women nowadays seek sexual partners who share common interests, Rand's account of love, at least on superficial acquaintence, may appear to have an aura of plausibility around it. However, Rand's theory of romantic love relies very heavily on her theory of emotions and her belief in a "conscious intregration of reason and emotion." Neither of these theories can boast a particularly strong accordance with reality. Since emotions are not automatized value judgments, but are rather at least partially the result of innate inclinations; and since, moreover, the perfect integration of "reason and emotion" is impossible due to the fact that the brain is made up of competing subsystems; and since, most importantly of all, men and women are innately different: all these facts stand in the way and prevent Rand's ideals about love from ever being fully realized. How love actually works in the real world is somewhat different than how Rand imagined (or perhaps desired) that it should work. Common interests may be a component in romantic love; but the notion that an individual falls in love primarily with a "sense of life" does not really accord either with common experience or scientific evidence.

Love, just like sex, has a biological foundation which Rand tends to ignore. As the David Desteno and Piercarlo Valdesolo, authors of Out of Character, contend:

...romantic love actually helps us solve an important evolutionary problem. How do you know your partner will remain committed to you and your children (and you will remain committed to her or him) in the face of constant temptation? How do you ensure he or she won't run off with the sexy tennis pro, leaving the kids vulnerable and unprovided for? Love, for lack of a better phrase, is the answer...

Several studies have found a reliable link between a man's level of testerone and mating effort; the higher the testerone, the more effort expended not only in finding a mate but also in competing with rivals for her affection. On the flip side, studies have also found that once a man is in a committed relationship, lower testerone is associated with monogamy. In one, Matthew McIntrye and colleagues measured the testerone levels of men in committed relationships and then had them report their interest in having sex with other women. As it turned out, those with higher testerone levels reported having more interest in playing the filed, while those with relatively lower levels were more comfortable with commitment... And because, as we've noted, women are so adept at (subconsciously) picking up subtle cues that signal high testerone, this can be a good marker of whether that guy across the room is Mr. Right or Mr. Right Now. [75-76]

Rand's "sense of life" construct can in some ways can be regarded as an attempt to explain, on the basis of her own philosophy, the "subtle cues" that trigger love interest. The problem is that individuals aren't really capable of having the sort of consistent sense of life that Rand takes to be an ideal, precisely because the mind doesn't work that way. Furthermore, the emotional system, precisely because it relies on a very complex interaction of partially innate predispositions and "acquired" dispositions, does not easily fit a simple category such as Rand's "benovelent" sense of life.

Yet this barely scratches the surface with what is wrong with Rand's approach on this issue. In practical terms, Rand's sense of life manifests itself as various emotional responses to works of art. Presumably, therefore, if one falls in love with a person's sense of life, one is falling in love with their emotional responses to works of art. We would expect, then, to find in long-term love relationships a very strong correlation in the aesthetic tastes and evaluations of the romantic couple. Such strong correlations are rarely found in common experience; nor has scientific research been able to find evidence of them. What we find, instead, is that couples in long-term relationships feel the same or similar about some things, and different about many others. The near complete unity in aesthetic evaluations envisioned by Rand is rare and unnecessary for love to flourish and last.

Rand's view of romantic love, due to its fanciful character, is potentially mischievous and destructive. It posits a false ideal which, if followed with intransigence, can lead to trouble. Since men and women are, in many ways, very different, it is unlikely that a given individual is will actually run across someone of the other gender complete (or even nearly complete) unanimity of professed and subconscious convictions. And those who insist on nothing less than a "conscious and subconscious harmony" with their love interest will probably spend their life alone, as such a person almost certainly doesn't exist.

Furthermore, there exists no evidence that an individual's sense of life is in fact indicative of monogamous inclinations. Yet, from a biological perspective, that would appear to be the functional basis of love. The world must be peopled. Sex and love appear to have arisen with the human psyche primarily for the purposes of reproduction. The fact that Rand completley ignores this side of the issue in her account of love tells us more about Rand herself than it does about the role love plays in the lives of most human beings.

American Psycho.

2011-09-05T00:23:00.000-07:00

T-1000 level Randroid Ed Cline has always been a creepy guy, but now he seems to be having psychotic episodes. In honour of the 10th anniversary of 9/11 he composes a genocidal revenge daydream, complete with a remarkable - not to mention salivating - equation of justice with cruelty. Here's a sample:

...But what ended what might have been continued rioting and dissension in Europe and elsewhere for years by immigrant Muslims was President Bush’s most courageous act. On October 6th, without warning, one Stealth bomber took off from the Enterprise in the Mediterranean, and another from Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. The first dropped a two-kiloton bomb on Mecca. The second dropped a two-kiloton bomb on Mohammad’s burial place in Medina. The Kaaba in Mecca and the Green Dome in Medina were rendered gaseous. Tens of thousands of pilgrims perished in the blasts.

More stunned than Westerners by the operation were Muslims. Their holy shrines were erased from existence in milliseconds. The expected wrath of Allah did not materialize. He had forsaken his chosen people. The sun did not rise in the West. The stars did not begin to vanish. The Five Pillars of Islam were rendered redundant, proven meaningless. The absence of supernatural retaliation and vengeful global punishment resulted in mass disorientation among Muslims, a species of trauma still being studied by top psychologists in major universities. Suicide rates among Muslims skyrocketed –suicides that did not include bombs detonated in public, but which were private affairs of family heads killing their own families before themselves.

Countless other Muslims simply ceased adhering to the faith. Once-faithful Muslims proclaimed their apostasy, preaching tearfully and angrily to sympathetic crowds about what a fraud Islam was. Women discarded their burqas and veils, and even burned them in the streets in demonstrations of freedom. Prayer rugs were turned into welcome mats or converted into scratching posts for cats. Mosques in Western nations were eventually abandoned by the dozens....

...And the American troops were welcomed with flowers. Yes folks, it's The Evil and The Stupid, together again.
Hat tip to Neil Parille.

Rand & Human Nature 6

2011-08-29T10:03:00.000-07:00

Sexual Attraction. Rand's views on sex constitute one of the most absurd doctrines in her philosophy -- so absurd, in fact, that many Objectivists ignore it:

The men who think that wealth comes from material resources and has no intellectual root or meaning, are the men who think—for the same reason—that sex is a physical capacity which functions independently of one’s mind, choice or code of values. They think that your body creates a desire and makes a choice for you just about in some such way as if iron ore transformed itself into railroad rails of its own volition. Love is blind, they say; sex is impervious to reason and mocks the power of all philosophers. But, in fact, a man’s sexual choice is the result and the sum of his fundamental convictions. Tell me what a man finds sexually attractive and I will tell you his entire philosophy of life. Show me the woman he sleeps with and I will tell you his valuation of himself.

While this doctrine may appear absurd in light of common experience, it is entirely consistent with Rand's general views of human psychology. If, like Rand, you believe that an individual's psychology is the product of his "choice or code of values," then of course his sex psychology must be a product of his "choice or code of values" as well. What is particularly interesting about this passage is the suggestion that desires are a product of choice. Rand had speculated that desires are a product of one's thinking (or choice) in her journal, but she generally kept a distance from that view in her public writings, opting instead to merely insist that emotions, rather than desires, are the product of value-premises. However, as Rand left no detailed account of her view of human nature, it's difficult to determine exactly what she thought, or how far she wished to extend her belief that value-premises and choice determined psychology. As usual for Rand, she opts for grand, sweeping rhetoric, mixed with scolding against unspecified dissenters.

Nonetheless, her insistence that emotions are produced by value-judgments, held "consciously or subconsciously," while controversial and almost certainly wrong, does not begin to reach the heights of absurdity of the belief that one's desires are produced by value-judgments. Yet it is precisely this belief that Rand flirts with in her "metaphysics of sex."

In the passage quoted above, Rand mocks the view that the "body creates a desire and makes choice," equating it with the view that a railroad makes itself of its own volition. But would Rand extend this criticism against the desire of sex to such desires as hunger or thirst? Hunger is every bit as much a desire as sex. Then why can't the same things be said of hunger that Rand says of sex? But when we substitute the word hunger for that of sex Rand's passage leaps from moderate to palpable absurdity in a single bound:

They think that your body creates a desire and makes a choice for you just about in some such way as if iron ore transformed itself into railroad rails of its own volition. Hunger is blind, they say; hunger is impervious to reason and mocks the power of all philosophers. But, in fact, a man’s hunger choices are the result and the sum of his fundamental convictions. Tell me what a man finds appetizing and I will tell you his entire philosophy of life. Show me the food he eats and I will tell you his valuation of himself.

These absurdities aren't noticed because Rand is reasoning on the basis, not of fact and logic, but of her own wishful thinking. Meanwhile, if we glance at some of the scientific research done in the field of sexual desire, we will quickly understand why Rand's views of sex are so easily ridiculed.

According to the best evidence compiled by experimental psychology, "the mind is attuned to an assortment of cues, usually registering below our level of consciousness, that have evolved over time to tip our decisions and direct us toward the most desirable mates." [Desteno & Valdesolo, Out of Character, 64]

Precisely because these cues operate below the threshold of consciousness, we are not aware of them, and while some of them are pretty obvious, some of them are rather odd. The most obvious cue is physical looks. Research demonstrates that these cues begin operating at a very early age, so that they cannot possibly be produced by "fundamental convictions." "Several experiments have revealed that even infants show a preference for faces that adults rated as attractive.... This evidence suggests that concepts of beauty not only are well agreed on but emerge very early and automatically." [ibid, 66] These concepts of beauty are rooted in intuitive cues about the relative health and fitness of potential sexual partners.

Just as we have evolved a taste for sweets because we have a biological need for glucose, we have evolved a taste for particular features of the body and face associate with evolutionary "health": we find certain physical features to be attractive in another person because they signal to us on an intuitive level that this is a person who would be relatively more successful in passing on healthy genes to future generations....

Study after study shows that we consistently rate people who have more symmetrical features as being more attractive. Why?... In fact, much research has shown that bilateral symmetry is a good predictor of reproductive success.

Mothers of more symmetrical infants, for example, have been found to suffer fewer infectious diseases during pregnancy. Of course, it's not symmetry in and of itself that makes the mother more resistant to infection, it's just that symmetry is a marker for better overall health....

Facial features signaling elevated hormone levels (which are also linked to health and fertility) are also generally interpreted as more attractive.... And in women, elevated estrogen levels are associated with such envious features as high cheekbones and an immaculate complexion....

The mind is loaded with [innate] mechanisms meant to ensure that our genes are passed on, and the urge to have sex with an attractive (and thus genetically fit) stranger is one of them. [ibid, 67-68]

A curious experiment demonstrates the degree to which sexual desire may be triggered by hormones and unconscious mechanisms (rather than by conscious convictions):

[R]esearchers brought women (some ovulating, some not) into a lab and asked them to smell a number of men's unwashed T-shirts and indicate which man's scent they preferred. Keep in mind they never saw these men; they simply sniffed their laundry. We know, it sounds a bit strange, but believe it or not, the ovulating women overwhelmingly preferred the smell of men who have more symmetrical features. They sniffed out the scent of genetic fitness, so to speak. In other words, women in the most fertile phase of their cycle preferred the scent of men whom they probably had more to gain, genetically speaking, by sneaking of into the laboratory closet. This interesting revelation that smell can trigger physical attraction has not been lost on the perfume industry, we might add. [ibid, 69-70]

Now it's important to remember that all these strange cues operate below the threshold of consciousness. That's why they seem so strange. But the research shows that such cues exist, regardless of whatever "conscious convictions" one might have accumulated that may be at odds with them.

Certainly we don't consciously scan the people at the bar to compare relative positioning of a potential mate's eyes and ears. Nor do we give each candidate a good long sniff to determine whether he or she is worthy of our fleeting affections. No, our minds do this work for us. Our intuitive mechanisms are so highly attuned to the subtle cues in our social and physical environments that they can direct our attention in a crowded room, if even for the briefest glance, and tip the scales that determine whether and with whom we may try to score, and at what cost. [ibid, 70-71]

Rand & Human Nature 5

2011-08-24T09:29:00.000-07:00

Incest Avoidance. The psychologist Jonathan Haidt often confronts participants in his lab experiments with the following scenario:

Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are travelling together in France on a summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. Was it okay for Mark and Julie to make love? [Out of Character, 41]

Almost everyone posed with this question answers with a resounding no. Yet when asked to explain their rationale for their answer, no logical answer can be provided. Since there are no objective consequences to this sort of incest, how can anyone, on rational grounds, possibly object to it?

Objections to incest clearly arise from strong innate predispositions against it. It is not a consequence of philosophical or moral premises imbibed in childhood. While the horror of incest may be rational in the sense that it helps prevent problems associated with inbreeding, the emotions one feels are not a consequence of such careful, thoroughly researched and peer reviewed scientific calculations. The science came only much later, long after the predispositions arose.

Rand claims that there is no such thing as an innate predisposition (or tendency), since that would contradict free will:

A free will saddled with a tendency is like a game with loaded dice. It forces man to struggle through the effort of playing, to bear responsibility and pay for the game, but the decision is weighted in favor of a tendency that he had no power to escape. If the tendency is of his choice, he cannot possess it at birth; if it is not of his choice, his will is not free.

This being the case, how would Rand explain the strong predisposition, nearly universal, against incest? Why does nearly everyone make the same choice about incest, but not the same choice regarding which political or economic system they prefer? Why does there exist a near universal horror of incest, but not a near universal horror of eating broccoli, or folk dancing, or socialism, or many of the other irrational follies of mankind?

Not only is Rand unable to adequately explain the predisposition against incest, she would fail at providing a moral rationale against it as well. Yes, she could, like everyone else, invoke the horrors of inbreeding. But if the participants used birth control (or were sterile), that reason no longer applies. So what other "rational" reason can be invoked? Could psychological objections be raised? But how can they be when one assumes that a person's psychology is a product of his premises? If psychological problems arise, why not just change the person's premises, thus adapted their psychology to specific conduct?

These difficulties aren't noticed because Rand never allowed herself to be challenged on such issues. Without effective criticism, human beings tend to slip into rationalization, which is the default form of thinking in ethics (and philosophy).

Rand & Human Nature 4

2011-08-17T10:44:00.001-07:00

The Trolley Problem. Experimental psychologists are fond of posing the following moral problem to their subjects:

A trolley is hurtling down a track towards five people. You are on a bridge under which it will pass, and you can stop it by dropping a heavy weight in front of it. As it happens, there is a very fat man next to you - your only way to stop the trolley is to push him over the bridge and onto the track, killing him to save five. Should you proceed?

Most people resist the idea of pushing the fat man over the bridge. If, however, the problem is reworked, so that the five people can be saved (at the cost of one life) merely by flipping switch, most people accept the necessity of sacrificing one life to save five. The question experimental psychologists are eager to answer is:

...why do countless studies reveal that when confronted with the otherwise equivalent version where you have to physically knock someone off the footbridge to save five others, the vast majority ... -- a staggering 90 percent -- believe it wrong to do so? Logically, it's the same trade-off in numbers saved and killed. The answer, however, has nothing to do with logic. It's much simpler: the two situations feel different. Take a moment to think of how it would feel to wrap your hands around the flesh of another living, breathing human as he teeters perilously at the edge of a high bridge, to see the fear in that person's eyes as he struggles fruitlessly to escape your grip. Assuming you don't have psychopathic tendencies and aren't smiling right now, that pit you feel in your gut when thinking about shoving the guy, even to save five others, results from intuitive systems ... screaming: "Don't do it!" For most of us, this impulse usually wins. [Desteno & Valdesolo, Out of Character, 46-47]

The focus here is not on how the Objectivist Ethics would try to solve (or dismiss as irrelevant) the trolley problem, but how Rand's blank slate view of human nature can be squared with the "staggering 90%" who believe it wrong to push a man onto the track to save 5 others, even though most think it right to sacrifice one to save five if it can be done by merely flipping a switch. Rand believe that man's "emotional mechanism" is blank at birth. So where do people get the content or "premise" that causes them to flinch from pushing the a human being to his death but not flinch when pulling a switch to achieve the same result? Where in Kant (or any moral philosopher) is there a premise that would enable a person to make such a distinction and, even more to the point, feel it? And what about the psychopath who smiles at the thought of pushing the man (but perhaps regrets killing one to save five)? How do you explain the psychopath's absence of emotion? What premise did he fail to imbibe?

When confronted by such experiments, Rand's view of emotions appears hopelessly inadequate. Yet it gets even worse as we the experiment deepens. It turns out that if you show clips from SNL videos immediately before presenting subjects with the Trolley problem, three times as many individuals choose to push the fat man onto the tracks than did before. How on earth are the results of that experiment supposed to be explained on the basis of Rand's theory of emotions?

Here's how Desteno and Valdesolo explain their experimental results:

Decades of research have shown that when we're experiencing an emotion, it can't help coloring all our actions and decisions -- even ones that have nothing to do with what we're feeling in the first place.... Simply put, we all unwittingly use our emotional states as information, or cues, to guide our decisions about what's likely to happen or what we should do. If we're feeling sad, we can't help feeling that depressing things must be just around the corner.

In the present case, those who watched the SNL skit were understandably feeling more buoyant and cheerful.... As a result, the visceral negative feelings that otherwise would have been triggered by the thought of pushing another to his death were momentarily blocked. With these gut feelings held at bay, it became easier to rationally weigh the consequences of the two scenarios and conclude, quite logically, that it is morally acceptable to sacrifice one life to save five others. [ibid, 45-46]

In short, it is very difficult to square the experimental evidence concerning the relationship of emotions to moral assessments with Rand's ex cathedra pronouncements declaring emotions to be caused by subconscious premises.

Hoisted From Comments: Anon69

2011-08-14T22:24:00.000-07:00

Commenter Anon69 makes the excellent point that by evading normal standards of criticism, Objectivism is "defenseless against rationalization":

In the final exam for the introduction to logic course I took in college, we were required to compare two passages, one from Descartes and one from Hume, and argue, first, that there was no difference in epistemelogical position between the two, second, that they manifested fundamentally different approaches to knowledge, and third, to give our own reasoned judgment of the matter. That is, we were to argue both sides of a position and then draw our own conclusion. More than weighing pros and cons, it meant striking forcefully against the position that I preferred. This was new to me, and I found that the benefit of that process was that it required me to neutralize my own feelings and tendencies in formulating the counterargument, which enabled me to proceed from a more dispassionate position than I otherwise could have.

Objectivist epistemology, as given in the rough-sketch ITOE or elsewhere, has no process or technique for such a critical examination of ideas, Rand's exhortation to "check your premises" notwithstanding. Objectivism is thus defenseless against rationalization. It sees no benefit from searching cross-examination. How could Objectivist epistemology justify such things as academic peer review or adversarial courtroom proceedings? It can't. In fact it survives by isolating itself from critique. When a process to take opposing argument seriously is eschewed, truth cannot be far behind.

For a philosophy supposedly devoted to reason, Objectivism's failure in this respect is breathtaking.

Rand & Human Nature 3

2011-08-08T09:56:00.001-07:00

Moral Philosophy = Rationalization. There are convincing and powerful reasons to believe that nearly all that passes for what might be called exhortive, "normative" ethical philosophy is almost certainly rationalization. The first strong hint that this might be the case was unconvered by Hume, who persuasively demonstrated that, logically speaking, it was invalid to derive an ought conclusion from two is premises. Hume further demonstrated the psychological impossibility of generating moral ends from "reason" alone; that in the absence of some desire, sentiment, or other natural and emotive need, no moral end could arise.

The second strong hint comes from George Santayana, who, in his demolishment of Moore's ethical philosophy (as limned by Russell) , noted that all arguments for morality committed the ad hominem fallacy:

That good is not an intrinsic or primary quality, but relative and adventitious, is clearly betrayed by Mr.Russell's own way of arguing, whenever he approaches some concrete ethical question. For instance, to show that the good is not pleasure, he can avowedly do nothing but appeal "to ethical judgments with which almost every one would agree." He repeats, in effect, Plato's argument about the life of the oyster, having pleasure with no knowledge. Imagine such mindless pleasure, as intense and prolonged as you please, and would you choose it? Is it your good? Here the British reader, like the blushing Greek youth, is expected to answer instinctively, No! It is an argumentum ad hominem (and there can be no other kind of argument in ethics); but the man who gives the required answer does so not because the answer is self-evident, which it is not, but because he is the required sort of man. He is shocked at the idea of resembling an oyster. Yet changeless pleasure, without memory or reflection, without the wearisome intermixture of arbitrary images, is just what the mystic, the voluptuary, and perhaps the oyster find to be good.

The third strong hint was noticed, among others, by Pareto when, in his mammoth work investigating the relation between conduct and belief, Trattato di sociologia generale, he noticed that most moral philosophies were devoid of specific ethical content. For this reason (among others), our conduct could not be governed by a moral philosophy, since the purpose of moral philosophy is not to provide guidance (how could it when little or no specific conduct can be deduced from it?), but to coddle and flatter human sentiments. (For Pareto's analysis of Kant's ethics, see here.)

Scientific experiments on human behavior only serve to reinforce Pareto's hypothesis. What they demonstrate is that human beings develop a sense for morality well before they are ever exposed, or could even understand, abstract moral philosophy. As Jean Piaget noted about justice, "The sense of justice, though naturally capable of being reinforced by precepts and practical examples of the adult, is largely independent of those influences, and requires nothing more of its development than the mutual respect and solidarity which holds among the children themselves." [Quoted by J. Q. Wilson in The Moral Sense, 58] So if children have a moral sense before they are exposed to philosophical morality, this suggests that the moral theory comes before the philosophy. Moral behavior and a sense for morality is noted even in toddlers.

When we apply these insights to the Objectivist ethics, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Rand's moral system, like the moral systems of so many other philosophers, consists almost entirely of the rationalization of moral ideals that existed well before any set of abstractions was built around them. The equivocations, ad hominem attacks, and intimidation tactics which Rand used to give her ethics persuasive force all provide additional evidence that it is sheer causistry, rather than sober elaboration of eternal truths about the human condition. Yet the strongest evidence of all consists in the rather surprising fact, unnoticed and evaded by most Objectivists, that Rand's ethical philosophy is devoid of specific content, and that no one could actually use it as a guide for behavior. As Nathaniel Branden noted, "The great, glaring gap in just about all ethical systems of which I have knowledge, even when many of the particular values and virtues they advocate may be laudable, is the absence of a technology to assist people in getting there, an effective means for acquiring these values and virtues, a realistic path people can follow.... Ayn Rand’s work [contains] an ethical philosophy with a great vision of human possibilities, but no technology to help people get there."

Lacking a "technology" means that no Objectivist, including Rand herself, actually follows the Objectivist morality. They do not follow it because it is just not possible: Rand's ethical system is far too general and abstract to apply to all the many unique situations the individual confronts in everyday life. Now if it is argued that the Objectivist ethics is not intended to be applicable to every situation or to cover every detail of human conduct, that, on the contrary, it merely covers the most important "essentials," such as whether one should be honest, rational, productive, and so on, even with these qualifications added to the analysis, serious doubts arise as to whether the Objectivist ethics offers any real, practical guidance: for all these virtues, although given out as "absolutes," are, as it turns out, merely "contextual" in nature, which means they are, in fact, not always applicable (it depends on the "context"). Unfortunately, Rand provided no technology for determining context. Other than a few vague hints, Rand and her disciples never bothered to explain how to distinguish those contexts in which such virtues as honesty, productivity, integrity, and rationality were absolutes from those contexts in which these fine virtues no longer applied. The huge amount of ambiguity which characterizes the Objectivist ethics renders it, for most practical purposes, inefficacious and useless. An enormous amount of futile argumentation and wasted scribbling could have been avoided if Rand had just told her followers, Behave in a way pleasing to me, because that, in the final analysis, is what the Objectivist ethics amounts to.

Now consider the irrationality of propagating an ethical system that doesn't give any real, practical guidance. How is that to be explained? Why would any philosopher, especially a philosopher who made so much virtuous noise on behalf of "reason," do such a thing? If Rand's ethics were intended (as Rand insisted) to provide a manual for survival, how come the manual doesn't come with any instructions? The most plausible explanation is that the Objectivist ethics is a rationalization of Rand's own moral preferences, many of which were the product of her own, private cognitive unconscious, which she misidentified with "reason" and objective truth. Any ethics, whether Objectivist, Kantian, utilitarian, etc. which provides little if any guidance in everyday life is almost certainly a product of rationalization. In the majority of cases, moral conduct primarily arieses, not from abstract principles, but from the "tacit" knowledge of the cognitive unconscious guided by an intuitive moral sense.

Rand & Human Nature 2

2011-07-26T10:33:00.000-07:00

Pervasiveness of Rationalization in Human Thought. Studies of unconscious brain processes (sometimes called "alien subroutines") reveals a curious phenomenon: the conscious mind often seeks to rationalize what emerges from the unconscious. As David Eagleman explains:

Not only do we run alien subroutines [i.e., unconscious processes]; we also justify them. We have ways of retrospectively telling stories about our actions as though the actions were always our [i.e., our conscious mind's] idea.... We are constantly fabricating and telling stories about the alien processes running under the hood.

To bring the sort of fabrication to light, we need only look at another experiment with split-brain patients.... In 1978, researchers Michael Gazzaniga and Joseph LeDoux flashed a picture of a chicken claw to the left hemisphere of a split-brain patient and a picture of a snowy scene to his right hemisphere. The patient was then asked to point at cards that represented what he had just seen. His right hand pointed to a card with a chicken, and his left hand pointed to a card with a snow shovel. The experimenters asked him why he pointed to a shovel. Recall that his left hemisphere (the one with the capacity for language), had information only about a chicken, and nothing else. But the left hemisphere, without missing a beat, fabricated a story: "Oh, that's simple. The chicken claw goes with the chicken, and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed." When one part of the brain makes a choice, other parts can quickly invent a story to explain why. If you show the command "Walk" to the right hemisphere (the one without language), the patient will get up and start walking. If you stop him and ask why he's leaving, his left hemisphere, cooking up an answer, will say something like "I was going to get a drink of water."

The chicken/shovel experiment led Gazzinga and LeDoux to conclude that the left hemisphere acts as an "interpreter," watching the actions and behaviors of the body and assigning a coherent narrative to these events. And the left hemisphere works this way even in normal, intact brains. Hidden programs drive actions, and the left hemisphere makes justifications. This idea of retrospective storytelling suggest that we come to know our own attitudes and emotions, at least partially, by inferring them from observations of our own behavior. As Gazzinga put it, "These findings all suggest that the interpretative mechanism of the left hemisphere is always hard at work, seeking the meaning of events. It is constantly looking for order and reason, even when there is none -- which leads it continually to make mistakes." [Incognito, 133-134]

Gazzinga and LeDoux's findings do not represent some sort of anomaly, applicable to only split-brain patients. Researchers continually run across subjects who are obviously inventing stories about something they know little about. Whether man is in fact a rational animal, as Rand and her disciples always insisted, is doubtful; but he is very much a rationalizing animal. However, this leads to a problem: if rationalization is pervasive in human thought, doesn't this suggest that all human thought, including the thought that rationalization is pervasive, is itself a rationalization? If rationalization is pervasive, how can one know the truth?

Human beings have developed a number of counter-measures to circumvent the strong tendency to rationalization. The most powerful of these counter-measures is openness to criticism. While the individual may not be very good at catching himself in that act of rationalization, he's often pretty shrewd when it comes to detecting it in others. Hence the development of institutions in science and scholarship that use peer review to arrive at truth. Our justice system has also developed institutions to wrestle with the problems of innate bias and rationalization. The old saw that no man should be a judge in his own cause reflects centuries of human experience concerning the question of whether people can be trusted to be objective about issues involving their own interest. Their objectivity is not only compromised by vested interests, but by the tendency to unwittingly rationalize.

While Rand may have been able to detect rationalization in others (which is not very hard), she appears to have been incapable of detecting it in herself. Indeed, the biographical evidence strongly suggests that Rand was intensely committed to a vision of herself that excluded the possibility of rationalization, bias, or any other form of "irrationality." Rand once boasted that she had never experienced an emotion that clashed with her reason for more than a day [Sciabarra, ARRR, 185-186] -- a boast which raises serious questions about Rand's own objectivity and the validity of her introspections. Since the human brain is not a unified system, the only way to explain Rand's claim is that she rationalized her emotions so that they fit the artificial, self-imposed narrative that she had constructed around her life. Rand appears to have been strongly invested in the notion that she, unlike many other people, knew how to think rationally, and this meant she was right and everyone who disagreed her was wrong (and perhaps evil as well). This frame of mind closed Rand off to effective criticism and shut up her mind in a series of self-reinforcing loops. Those most prone to rationalization are precisely those most invested in the belief that they are free of such intellectual vices. The most effective counter-measures to rationalization are humility about one's own mind and openness to criticism from others. Rand was strongly biased against either of these counter-measures, and hence enjoyed little chance of escaping from the mind's strong tendency toward telling stories.

Rand & Human Nature 1

2011-07-22T07:58:00.000-07:00

Internal Conflicts Ineradicable. Rand's vision of the rational man contained a rather odd feature: he experienced no internal conflicts.

An emotion is an automatic response, an automatic effect of man's value premises. An effect, not a cause. There is no necessary clash, no dichotomy between man's reason and his emotions -- provided he observes their proper relationship. A rational man knows -- or makes it a point to discover -- the source of his emotions, the basic premises from which they come; if his premises are wrong, he corrects them. He never acts on emotions for which he cannot account, the meaning of which he does not understand. In appraising a situation, he knows why he reacts as he does and whether he is right. He has no inner conflicts, his mind and his emotions are integrated, his consciousness is in perfect harmony. His emotions are not his enemies, they are his means of enjoying life.

Rand's contentions in this paragraph not only go against the vast experience of mankind, which has found inner conflicts to be rooted in the very warp and woof of human nature, but of scientific brain research as well. A growing body of evidence compiled by neuroscientists suggests that the brain is made up of competing subsystems:

Brains are like representative democracies. They are built of multiple, over-lapping experts who weigh in and compete over different choices. As Walt Whitman correctly surmised, we are large and we harbor multitudes within us. And those multitudes are locked in chronic battle.

There is an ongoing conversation among the different factions in your brain; each competing to control the single output channel of your behavior. As a result, you can accomplish the strange feats of arguing with yourself, and cajoling yourself to do something...

Because of these internal multitudes, biological creatures can be conflicted. The term conflicted could not be sensibly applied to an entity that has a single program. [Incognito, 107-108]

The most obvious manifestation of these built-in competing sub-systems involves the two hemispheres of the brain. Experiments with split-brain patients demonstrate that

the two hemispheres have somewhat different personalities and skills -- this includes their abilities to think abstractly, create stories, draw inferences, determine the source of memory, and make good choices in a gambling game. Roger Sperry, one of the neurobiologists who pioneered the split-brain studies, ... came to understand the brain as "two separate realms of conscious awareness; two sensing, perceiving, thinking and remembering systems." The two halves constitute a team of rivals: agents with the same goals but slightly different ways of going about it. [ibid, 124]

In other words, the conflicts that arise out of this arrangement are hard-wired into the brain: they can't be reprogrammed by changing or "correcting" basic premises (as if changing one's premises could alter the basic structure of the brain!). Rand, unwittingly, assumes that the brain is a single program that can be controlled by the consciousness. The Randian view does not accord with many facts uncovered by neuroscience research. "Everywhere we look we find overlapping systems that compete," writes neuroscientist David Eagleman.

This phenomenon of overlapping systems is most dramatically illustrated in what is known as "alien hand syndrome":

In alien hand syndrome, which can result from the split-brain surgeries we discussed a few pages ago, the two hands express conflicted desires. A patient's "alien" hand might pick up a cookie to put it in his mouth, while the normally behaving hand will grab it at the wrist to stop it. A struggle ensues. Or one hand will pick up a newspaper, and the other will slap it back down. Or one hand will zip up a jacket, and the other will unzip it. Some patients with alien hand syndrome have found that yelling "Stop!" will cause the other hemisphere (and the alien hand) to back down. But besides that little modicum of control, the hand is running on its own inaccessible programs, and that is why it's branded as alien -- because the conscious part of the patient seems to have no predictive power over it; it does not feel as though it's part of the patient's personality at all. A patient in this situation often says, "I swear I'm not doing this." [ibid, 131]

Why Rand Never Lost an Argument

2011-07-19T13:21:00.000-07:00

Sam Anderson, in a review of Anne Heller's biography of Rand, notes: "Eyewitnesses say that [Rand] never lost an argument." Given the poor quality of many of Rand's actual arguments, as one finds them embalmed in her writings, this is a bit of anamoly. The written evidence, such as it is, demonstrates no very great arguing skill on Rand's part. Quite the contrary, Rand, when she deigns to offer any sort of arguments at all, produces rather poor ones, afflicted with yawning gaps and blistering equivocations. How then could a philosopher who produced such wretched arguments in print be a veritable Hercules of disputation when relying, not on her pen, but on her tongue?

There are several factors which contribue to explaining this anamoly. Rand depended on at least five such factors to provide the varnish of irrefragibility over her otherwise hollow and empirically impoverished arguments. Those factors are:

Inability of individuals to evaluate the quality of arguments made on behalf of conclusions they agree with.
Intimidation tactics
Selection of debating opponents
Reliance on explicit articulation of views
Avoidance of empirical tests in favor of verbalism

(1) Cognitive science and experimental psychology have uncovered reams of evidence that people are not very good at evaluating arguments when they agree with the conclusions. A smoker, when challenged as to the dangers of his habit, will sometimes reply "Well, everybody dies" and believe, quite sincerely, that his verbalized rationale for smoking is both wise and irrefragible. Devotees of Ayn Rand sincerely believe that the Objectivist metaphysics, although based on little more than empty tautologies and other such empirically vacuous truisms, represents the very acme of logical soundness. People tend to believe what they want to believe, and then accept the "best" arguments easily at hand for those beliefs. Best, in this sense, is entirely relative. If only bad arguments are available, they will gravitate toward the best of the bad.

Most people become attracted to Objectivism when they are young and without experience either of the world or of philosophical arguments. Rand's Objectivist philosophy provides an intriguing set of rationalizations defending an extreme form of secular individualism and egoism coupled with common sense view of reality. A young person sympathetic with these positions will have difficulty evaluating the actual quality of the arguments Rand presents on behalf of her doctrines. Rand's passionate lip service on behalf of "reason," objectivity, and reality will further disarm whatever nascent critical thinking might still exist with new convert.

(2) For Rand, intimidation became central to maintaining her intellectual dominance over disciples. John Hospers noted of Rand:

I learned ... that it didn't pay to be confrontational with [Rand]. If I saw or suspected some inconsistency, I would point it out in calm and even tones, as if it were "no big deal." That way, she would often accept the correction and go on. To expose the inconsistency bluntly and nakedly would only infuriate her, and then there would be no more calm and even discussion that evening. I did not enjoy experiencing her fury; it was as if sunlight had suddenly been replaced by a thunderstorm. A freezing chill would then descend on the room, enough to make me shiver even in the warmth of summer. No, it wasn't worth it. So what, if a few fallacies went unreported? Better to resume the conversation on an even keel, continue a calm exchange of views, and spare oneself the wrath of the almighty, than which nothing is more fearful.

Alan Blumenthal noted:

Many of my patients used to tell me that they were terrified to ask questions because of the way Miss Rand might respond to them. They knew that the answer might be that the question revealed a bad psychoepistemology or an immoral value system. Or she might say "Can't you read? That's not what I said," In answer to an unfortunately phrased question like "Don't you think your characters are unrealistic?" she would say "I don't answer questions like that!" when she might have taken the opportunity to explain what is and is not required of fictional characters so the questioner might learn something.

And Robert Hessen:

I remember many occasions when Rand pounced, assuming that a question was motivated by hostility to her or her ideas, or that the questioner was intellectually dishonest or irrational, or had evil motives, or was her "enemy." The key, I believe, to Rand's reaction was an assumption that every question was unambiguously clear, so she never asked anyone to clarify or rephrase a question that appeared to be critical [of Rand]....

My earliest memory goes back to Ayn Rand's appearance at Yale University in February 1960. The morning after she gave a public lecture, she spoke to a small philosophy class and invited questions from the students. A young man asked if her brief characterization of Immanuel Kant's philosophy was accurate, and she exploded that she had not come here to be insulted. I was surprised at the heated tone of her response because he was not antagonistic to her and he had, as I watched him, no glimmer of malice or "gotcha" in his eyes.

Rand's anger helped shield her from effective criticism. It encouraged her disciples to be extra cautious when asking questions, which led to many important doctrines in Objectivism remaining unchallenged. This partially explains why there exists so many bad formulations and dubious assumptions in Rand's philosophy. Individuals tend to be rather poor at evaluating and criticizing their own beliefs. For this reason, criticism from others is essential for any philosophy that presumes to be rational. Indeed, criticism from others is central to rationality. That's why science and rational scholarship require peer review. Holding one's scholarship, one's research to the critical scrutiny of others makes it easier to ferret out the mistakes and errors that inevitably occur in the pursuit of knowledge. Rand's refusal to allow herself to be effectively challenged renders her system irrational and dogmatic. It also helps create the impression that she was Rand never lost an argument. After all, how could she have lost any arguments when she refused to allow herself to be challenged?

(3) Rand not only refused to engage in formal debates with other philosophers and intellectuals, she refused to have anything to do with the two groups which could have challenged her most effectively, namely, conservatives and liberatarians. She would not even allow herself to be in the same room with the William F. Buckley, the leading conservative intellectual of the fifties and sixties; and of course she would never have consented to appear on Buckley's debate show, Firing Line. Her disdain for libertarians is both notorious and perplexing. The reasons for her disdain (which include such trivial reasons as her dislike for the word libertarian) strike one as contrived and superficial, as if they were mere rationalizations. In any case, some of the best and most effective early criticism of Rand came from the liberatarian quarter. In November 1961 Bruce Goldberg published a review of Rand's For the New Intellectual in The New Individualist Review. After pointing out one contradiction after another and castigating Rand's misrepresentation of Western philosophy, Goldberg concludes:

It is not difficult to understand the attraction Ayn Rand has for the uninstructed. She appears, I suppose, to be the spokesman for freedom, for self-esteem, and other equally noble ideals. However, patient examination reveals her pronouncements to be but a shroud beneath which lies the corpse of illogic. Those who are concerned with discovering the principles of a sound social philosophy can read and study libertarian thought at its best. The ludicrously mistitled “philosophy of Ayn Rand” is a sham. To those who are travelling her road I can only suggest its abandonment—for that way madness lies.

Rand supposedly read this review (she dismissed it as "B.S."). Is it possible that at least part of her hostility toward libertarianism has its root in Goldberg's scathing criticism? In any case, Rand's hostility (and the subsequent Objectivism policy to avoid libertarians because, as Peikoff once put it, Libertarians are worse than communists) gave her a pretext for avoiding the very group which could offer the most well-informed criticism of her Objectivist philosophy. Libertarians tended to be far more knowledgable of Objectivism than other ideological groups. They could offer criticisms that came from a genuine knowledge of Rand's philosophy, rather than just a vague familiarity of it. Yet Rand kept her distance from them, as she kept her distance from conservative intellectuals. By doing so, Rand was able to protect herself from just the sort of intellectuals who could have conquered her in debate. Rand never lost an argument, not because she was a great debator, but because she never took on any challenging opponents.

(4) Many people do not know how to verbalize their basic beliefs. They have never bothered either to articulate their beliefs or find rationalizations for them. Consequently, if they are challenged to defend their beliefs, they do so very poorly, and are no match for someone who, like Rand, can articulate a set of doctrines. It should be obvious that it would not be possible for Rand to lose any argument against any individual lacking an articulable philosophy. Regardless of how poor Rand's actual arguments might be, the very fact that she could articulate her beliefs would give her a decisive advantage.

(5) In the absence of effective, empirical criticism, debates are determined by factors that have little, if anything to do with the truth. If a debate is not determined by empirical evidence, then it will be determined by other qualities that have nothing to do with the truth. Debates conducted without reference to effective empirical criticism become exercises in verbal facility, where the most aggressive, articulate, personable, and/or witty debator inevitably wins. Rand may not have always been particularly witty or personable; but she was always aggressive, determined, and articulate. She had verbal rationalizations for most of her beliefs; and when these failed, she could always throw a temper tantrum. Hence she came off as a formidable debator who "never lost an argument."

Rand & Aesthetics 20

2011-07-13T09:16:00.000-07:00

Art as "fuel." For Rand, one of the primary objectives of art was to serve as a kind of spiritual sustenance or "fuel":

Since a rational man’s ambition is unlimited, since his pursuit and achievement of values is a lifelong process—and the higher the values, the harder the struggle—he needs a moment, an hour or some period of time in which he can experience the sense of his completed task, the sense of living in a universe where his values have been successfully achieved. It is like a moment of rest, a moment to gain fuel to move farther. Art gives him that fuel; the pleasure of contemplating the objectified reality of one’s own sense of life is the pleasure of feeling what it would be like to live in one’s ideal world.

I suspect that this statement explains more about Rand's aesthetics than any of Rand's specific theories about art. Rand preferred art that gave her the pleasure of feeling like she was living in her own "ideal" world, populated by her own "ideal" men. While Rand appreciated some works of literature that did not serve as "fuel," she seems to have appreciated no music that fell short of her ideal and hardly any visual art.

Now while anyone may have as narrow (or as wide) aesthetic tastes as they please, in a philosopher of aesthetics, such prejudices are deeply problematic. How can a philosopher provide insights on aesthetics applicable to all (or at least most) individuals when their tastes are so confined within the narrow bounds of their own narcissistic agendas? By Rand's own account (related by Barbara Branden in Who is Ayn Rand? and The Passion of Ayn Rand), Rand was drawn to exciting tales of heroic men. The heroes of most literature simply didn't do anything for her. But the desire to find her ideal man portrayed in literature seems to have prevented Rand from developing appreciation for other virtues in literature. Worse, it inspired her with a scathing contempt for most literature and art which failed to serve as "fuel." Consider what she wrote about the three classics she despised most:

Don Quixote is a malevolent universe attack on all values as such. It belongs in the same class with two other books, which together make up the three books I hate most: Don Quixote, Anna Karenina, and Madame Bovary.They all have the same theme: Man should not aspire to values. Don Quixote is usually presented as a satire on phony romanticism, but it isn't. It's a satire on all romanticism. As for its literary category, it's a precursor of naturalism (though it isn't written naturalistically). But philosophically -- if you could call it philosophy -- it is plain evil.

And by implication, anyone who admires and enjoys these three novels is also evil. Rand was not content merely to state her own likes and dislikes, however narrow and prejudiced these might have been; but she also had to attack and disparage those whose tastes differed from her own.

In going through Rand's aesthetic judgments, one can't help noticing how often Rand conflates her personal tastes with objective truth. Her "Objectivist" philosophy is really the most subjective of philosophies. It's all about her: her tastes, her emotions, her wants, her needs, all writ large in platonic letters across the heavens. The standard of truth and morality in Objectivism is not "reason" or logic or fact; it is Ayn Rand herself. What Rand said is true is true, despite what all the great thinkers and scientists said before her. What Ayn Rand said is good or evil is good or evil, regardless of whatever natural needs may exist elsewhere in the universe. This explains, perhaps more than anything else, why Objectivsm so quickly degenerated into an Ayn Rand personality cult. Since Objectivism was defined as Rand's philosophy, since she was the ultimate and final arbiter of its dogma, points of disagreement, whenever they fell within the confines of Objectivist doctrine, could only be settled in relation to what Rand might say or think about it. Hence, Beethoven has a malevolent sense of life, not because most of his admirers find him malevolent, but because Rand did. Man is born tabula rasa, not because the facts, as compiled by science, demonstrate such a thing, but because Rand said so. Kant is the most evil man in history, not because he ever did or said anything particularly despicable, but because Rand said so. Rand claimed to found her philosophy on the axiom existence exists; but it is really founded on the (implicit) axiom that equates Rand's thoughts and judgments with objective truth.

Ayn Rand Gibberish of the Day.

2011-07-09T13:11:00.000-07:00

“Don’t be so sure—nobody can be certain of anything.” Bertrand Russell’s gibberish to the contrary notwithstanding, that pronouncement includes itself; therefore, one cannot be sure that one cannot be sure of anything. The pronouncement means that no knowledge of any kind is possible to man, i.e., that man is not conscious. Furthermore, if one tried to accept that catch phrase, one would find that its second part contradicts its first: if nobody can be certain of anything, then everybody can be certain of everything he pleases—since it cannot be refuted, and he can claim he is not certain he is certain (which is the purpose of that notion). - Ayn Rand, "Philosophical Detection", Philosophy: Who Needs It? p14

In the course of making a comment I was reminded of this typical Randian quote. I'd be interested in your views as to the quality of scholarship and argument on display here, given that she is alleged to be the greatest thinker of the past 2000 years. First of all, would Russell really disagree that the statement “Don’t be so sure—nobody can be certain of anything” includes itself? Second, Rand seems to be referring to Russell's work on the liar's paradox and the problems that can arise from self-reference; but "one cannot be sure that one cannot be sure of anything" doesn't seem to be such a paradox - in fact it seems consistent. (A problematic version would perhaps be "One can be sure that one cannot be sure of anything.") And of course this work led to important developments in both mathematics and logic, yet Rand describes it as "gibberish". Third, does it follow that "no knowledge of any kind is possible"? Fourth, does it follow from that that "man is not conscious"? Fifth, isn't the remaining passage pretty close to gibberish itself?

Rand & Aesthetics 19

2011-07-05T19:06:00.000-07:00

Photography. Ayn Rand, to the bewilderment of photographers everywhere, denies that photography is an art:

A certain type of confusion about the relationship between scientific discoveries and art, leads to a frequently asked question: Is photography an art? The answer is: No. It is a technical, not a creative skill. Art requires a selective re-creation. A camera cannot perform the basic task of painting: a visual conceptualization, i.e., the creation of a concrete in terms of abstract essentials. The selection of camera angles, lighting or lenses is merely a selection of the means to reproduce various aspects of the given, i.e., of an existing concrete. There is an artistic element in some photographs, which is the result of such selectivity as the photographer can exercise, and some of them can be very beautiful -- but the same artistic element (purposeful selectivity) is present in many utilitarian products: in the better kinds of furniture, dress design, automobiles, packaging, etc. The commercial work in ads (or posters or postage stamps) is frequently done by real artists and has greater esthetic value than many paintings, but utilitarian objects cannot be classified as works of art.

(If it is asked, at this point: But why, then, is a film director to be regarded as an artist? -- the answer is: It is the story that provides an abstract meaning which the film concretizes; without a story, a director is merely a pretentious photographer.) [RM, 74]

Beyond demonstrating her lack of specific knowledge about photography, this passage also shows the weakness of her theory of definitions. Much of Rand's argument against photography as art stems from her entirely arbitrary definition of art as "selective recreation." Of course, Rand would deny that her definitions are arbitrary; yet they are. Definitions merely define what people mean by the words they use. They are usually social conventions in that they arise from the attempts of many individuals to make their meanings understood by other people. There is no such thing as a right or wrong definitions: there are merely definitions excepted by most people and definitions accepted only by individuals or eccentric groups (e.g., Objectivist definitions). Generally speaking, it's best to follow standard usage in the use words; otherwise, the chances of being misunderstood will tend to increase, sometimes dramatically.

Rand wants to believe that art requires selective recreation. She tries to defend this point of view by emphasizing the importance of selecting only those concretes that are "abstract essentials." This touches upon another fallacious aspect of Rand's view definitions, words, and concepts: her essentialism. Since Rand never provided a convincing explanation of how to distinguish an "essential" from a non-essential abstraction, her essentialism merely becomes a cover for her arbitrary assertions. The essential is whatever Rand declares to be essential. Once Rand grants herself the exclusive right to determine what is essential, she can arbitrarily dismiss any type or genre of art as non-art on the grounds that it concretizes "non-essential" abstractions.

On purely philosophical grounds, therefore, Rand's assertion that photography is not art is insupportable. Yet, curiously enough, it's not even consistent with Rand's own definition. Rand's belief that art photography involves only an insignificant bit of selectivity demonstrates her ignorance of that particular art. It also demonstrates the dangers of making dogmatic assertions about subjects you don't know much about.

To be sure, Rand appears to have at least inkling that she might be in over her head. She does at least understand that there is some selectivity in photography. She mentions camera angles, lighting, and lenses, but what she fails to mention is the most important aspect of all: selection of subject. The most important aspect of any photograph is the subject, and this is most emphatically chosen. Indeed, photographers will go to a great deal of trouble to get the subject they want. I speak from my own experience as a photographer. Except in rare instances, spectacular photos don't just happen by accident. They take enormous amount of planning, of placing oneself in situations that are likely to yield find images. As an example, consider the following photograph, which I took about a month ago:

There was an enormous amount of "purposeful selectivity" that went into that photograph. It is a photo I had been thinking about for over a year. It required a great deal of planning and effort to bring off. There's only a brief time of the year where you get to this specific location (i.e., Discovery Point at Crater Lake) while snow is still present around the caldera; and there's no place to stay, except at an expensive, well-booked-in-advance lodge, within 25 miles. In other words, a picture like this doesn't just happen. You have to want it: which means, you have to select it, just as a painter or a sculptor selects his subject.

Rand acknowledges that photographers can exercise some selectivity, but not enough to make photography an art. Photography, she claims, is mostly a technique; but the same could be said of painting and sculpture. The main difference between painting and photography is the tools: one creates images with paint, brushes, and canvas, the other with a camera, lenses, and filters. Otherwise, they are merely two means of achieving the same end: creating two-dimensional images.

Consider the following two images. Which is the painting and which is the photograph?

They are actually both photographs. Nor has either photo, beyond some minor tweaking of exposure and contrast, been digitally manipulated. Rand would have us believe that such images may contain an "artistic element" but are otherwise not art. Wherefore so arbitrary a declaration about something she really doesn't know much about?

A Reading List For Open Minded Objectivists

2011-07-01T14:27:00.000-07:00

Regular Contributor Neil Parille reaches out to Objectivists whose Rand sycophancy is not at the meter busting level

If you’ve taken ARCHNblog’s “Are You A Rand Cultist?” test and are in the 1-6 range, there might be a chance that with some good reading material that you can get a better perspective on Rand. If you are in the 7-12 range some intensive deprogramming is necessary. I would never recommend kidnapping Randroids and locking them in rooms while deprogrammers try some reverse mind control, but as a public service I’ll provide links to books and on-line material that might help unclog the minds of otherwise rational Objectivists.*

For basic critiques of Objectivism, check out this blog's eponymous Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature. Nyquist subjects Objectivism’s central claims to empirical enquiry. Many of Rand’s assertions about society and human nature don’t measure up. For a different take on Objectivism, check out Scott Ryan’s Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality, a work that critiques Rand’s epistemology from a more traditional philosophic perspective.

For Rand’s theory of concept formation, see Bryan Register’s discussion of various problems in his 2000 Journal of Rand Studies essay. For a critique of essentialism, check out Karl Popper’s “Two Kinds of Definitions.” For a defense of essentialism, read David Oderberg’s Real Essentialism.

To see why professional philosophers don’t take Rand seriously, check out Bill Vallicella’s post here. For flaws in Rand’s style of argument, see my three-part series.

On religion, check out Nyquist’s series on Objectivism and religion. I exposed a few common Objectivist fallacies on religion. Stephen Parrish wrote a solid critique of Objectivism’s claim that A is A means God doesn’t exist. If you think the effect of religion on science has been entirely negative, check out Ronald Number’s Galileo Goes to Jail and Other Myths About Science and Religion. For a book that show that Middle Ages weren’t so dark, read Jean Gimpel’s Medieval Machine.

On aesthetics, see Nyquist’s on-going series.

On Rand’s theory of human nature and human psychology, read Nyquist’s series “Rand and Empirical Responsibility.”

On epistemology, I’d recommend William Alston’s The Reliability of Sense Perception. While Alston doesn’t discuss Objectivism, this book shows that this philosophical question is a bit more complicated than Rand thought.

On Rand’s philosophy of history, check out David Gordon’s withering critique of Peikoff’s The Ominous Parallels. David Ramsay Steele also has an excellent discussion of David Kelley’s less heated claims about Kant. I did a two-part critique of the Objectivist view of history here and here.

On ethics, perhaps the best work is Erick Mack’s brilliant discussion of Rand’s ethics in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies. Stephen Parrish wrote an informative review of Tara Smith’s Viable Values in JARS. Michael Huemer is excellent as well.

If you believe Kant is the most evil person in history, you might start with Kant’s Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, an accessible (by Kantian standards) work on ethics which surprisingly omits, among other things, blue prints for the gas chambers at Auschwitz. If you think Kant wanted to save traditional religion, you should consider reading (or pondering the title) of his classic Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Another interesting book by Kant is his Theory of the Heavens. If Kant was out to destroy the human mind, why did have an interest in science? Vallicella wrote blog post on Rand’s misunderstanding of Kant.

The one book I’d recommend by Rand is her Marginalia (comments she wrote in the books she read). Do her comments show a mind trying to understand ideas or refract them through an Objectivist prism? Michael Prescott wrote an excellent critique of Rand’s jottings on C. S. Lewis’ The Abolition of Man. If you think Rand was a brilliant social critic, read my discussion of Rand and the streaker at the Academy Awards. For the creepy side of Rand, see Prescott’s essay on Rand and child killer William Hickman.

For background to the ongoing war (as Rand’s followers see it) over the accuracy of the Branden accounts, see my critique of James Valliant’s The Passion of Ayn Rand’s Critics.

If you think the Ayn Rand Institute has done anything but harm Rand’s legacy, read the “Essay on Sources” in Jennifer Burns’ Goddess of the Market.

*I thank Michael Prescott for his suggestions.

Rand & Aesthetics 18

2011-06-27T12:47:00.000-07:00

Rand on rock music. While Rand was well known for being outspoken to the point of palpable rudeness, she could become, when she wanted to, as indirect and suggestive as the very worst of equivocators. Her assault on rock music begins with a series highly speculative, empirically impoverished remarks on what she calls "primitive" music:

The deadly monotony of primitive music -- the endless repetition of a few notes and of a rhythmic pattern that beats against the brain with the regularity of the ancient torture of water drops falling on a man's skull -- paralyzes cognitive processes, obliterates awareness and disintegrates the mind. Such music produces a state of sensory deprivation, which -- as modern scientists are beginning to discover -- is caused by the absence or the monotony of sense stimuli....

A man's psycho-epistemological method of functioning is developed and automatized in his early childhood; it is influenced by the dominant philosophy of the culture in which he grows up. If, explicitly and implicitly (through the general emotional attitude), a child grasps that the pursuit of knowledge, i.e., the independent work of his cognitive faculty, is important and required of him by his nature, he is likely to develop an active, independent mind. If he is taught passivity, blind obedience, fear and the futility of questioning or knowing, he is likely to grow up as a mentally helpless savage. But -- since once cannot destroy a human mind totally, as long as its possessor remains alive -- his brain's frustrated needs become a restless, incoherent, unintelligible groping that frightens him. Primitive music becomes his narcotic: it wipes out the groping, it reassures him and reinforces his lethargy, it offers him temporarily the sense of reality to which his stagnant stupor is appropriate....

Today, when the influence of Western Civilization is breaking up the static, tradition-bound culture of Japan, young Japanese composers are doing talented work in the Western style of music.

The products of America's anti-rational, anti-cognitive "Progressive" education, the "hippies," are reverting to the music and the drumbeat of the jungle. [RM, 62-24]

Note how Rand never explicitly equates primitive music with rock. She never even uses the phrase rock music. Instead she merely refers vaguely to the music "hippies are reverting to." Nor does she describe this "hippie" music as primitive, preferring to describe it as "the music and drumbeat of the jungle." Yet despite all of this indirectness, it is difficult not to conclude that Rand would regard rock music as a type of primitive music, and that what she says against this primitive sort of music is applicable to rock music. It's just a matter of connecting the dots: primitive music = the music and drumbeat of the jungle = "hippie" music = rock music.

Assuming that rock music is a type of primitive music, what can be said about Rand's analysis? Is rock music a narcotic for the lethargic? Does it provide the sense of reality appropriate to stagnant stupor? Does it paralyze cognitive processes, obliterate awareness, and disintegrate the mind? How does Rand know that so-called "primitive" music, whether of the jungle or "hippie" variety, exercises these cognitive effects? What evidence does she have that those who listen and like this music are "mentally helpless" savages?

Well, of course, Rand has no such evidence. There is absolutely no evidence that rock music, in and of itself, induces lethargy. Quite the contrary, it seems rather a kind of stimulant. And while rock music is not known for being particularly sophisticated, especially when compared to classical music, there is no compelling evidence that it paralyzes cognition or induces a state of "sensory deprivation."

There may be any number of plausible criticisms that could be essayed against at least some forms of rock, but what Rand has provided in her "Art and Cognition" essay is not one of them.

Friday Night Whim-Worshipping 2.

2011-06-24T02:22:00.000-07:00

Seeing commenter A was in the mood for something a little denser, we are happy to oblige. Update: Seemed a bit glitchy, so here's the second part.

Friday Night Whim-Worshipping

2011-06-23T22:10:00.000-07:00

Apropos of some of the comments threads, some modernist jazz.

Rand & Aesthetics 17

2011-06-21T08:21:00.000-07:00

Rand on "modern music." Ayn Rand's most extended published take on "modern music" appears in her "Art and Cognition" essay. It features all the usual Randian intellectual vices: tendency toward over-generalization, vagueness, lack of specific examples, and condemnation via implicit suggestion and innuendo:

A brief word about so-called modern music: no further research or scientific discoveries are required to know with full, objective certainty that it is not music. The proof lies in the fact that music is the product of periodic vibrations -- and therefore, the introduction of nonperiodic variations (such as the sounds of street traffic or of machine gears or of coughs and sneezes), i.e., of noise, into an allegedly musical composition eliminates it automatically from the realm of art and of consideration. But a word of warning in regard to the vocabulary of the perpetrators of such "innovation" is in order: they spout a great deal about the necessity of "conditioning" your ear to an appreciation of their "music." Their notion of conditioning is unlimited by reality and by the law of identity; man, in their view, is infinitely conditionable. But, in fact, you can condition a human ear to different types of music (it is not the ear, but the mind that you have to condition in such cases); you cannot condition it to hear noise as if it were music; it is not personal training or social conventions that make it impossible, but physiological nature, the identity, of the human ear and brain. [RM, 64]

Rand here suggests (without explicitly saying so) that one of the distinctive characteristics of "modern music" is that it lacks "nonperiodic variations" (e.g., sounds of traffic, coughing, etc.). Now the phrase "modern music," in common parlance, covers a wide range of styles, from "impressionists" such as Ravel and Debussy all the way to hard-core serialists like Boulez and Elliot Carter. Since Rand mentions no names, it's not clear whose music she is referring to as "modern." While it is true that, in the sixties and seventies, there existed a brief vogue to introduce taped noises into what were otherwise musical compositions, outside of John Cage, I don't know of any composer of any notoriety who attempted to put forward a musical composition that was made up entirely of "nonperiodic variations" (i.e., noise). This leads to another potential confusion. Is Rand suggesting that the introduction of any noise into a musical composition renders the whole composition, music and all, as "non-art"? Orchestras sometimes accompany the closing bars of Tchiakovsky's 1812 Overture with sounds of canon fire. Do these non-periodic vibrations render the 1812 Overture as non-art? Or how about a musical work that includes a narrator? Is Prokofiev's Peter and the Wolf non-art? What about compositions which use "non-pitched" percussion instruments, such as bass drum, castenets, cymbals, whips and snare drums? At least half (and probably more) of the orchestral repertoire uses such percussion. Is half the orchestral repertoire made up of works which must automatically be eliminated "from the realm of art and of consideration" because of the use of instruments that produce non-periodic vibrations?

In her haste to find a pretext for calling "modern" music non-art, Rand, in her carelessness, has once again presented a hollow argument. It may be annoying and even aesthetically viscious for avant-garde composers to introduce taped sounds of machine and street noises into their musical compositions. But that, in itself, doesn't render the musical portions of such compositions any less musical. Before one denounces a given aesthetic style, one at least has to take the trouble to understand that style. Otherwise, one comes off as prejudiced rather than insightful, as an aesthetic ignoramus rather than a knowledgable critic.

Notes On Cultism in The Logical Leap: Why Anonymous Objectivists Can't Read.

2011-06-17T14:11:00.000-07:00

In reply to this post, an Anon Rand fan writes:

I see that Daniel Barnes is still doing his dishonest blathering.

He writes: “On p26, Harriman claims that, using this unique Randian inductive method, from a single observation of paper burning in a fireplace, we can conclude that the statement "Fire burns paper" is "a universal truth".”

Other than Harriman writing "Fire burns paper" on p. 26, Barnes is a liar. Harriman uses "fire burns paper" to describe a child learning this generalization for the first time. He describes it as a “statement of a concrete observation”. He does not say it is a single instance nor present it as a universal truth or “Every S is P”. Children at that age don’t think in terms such as “some”, “every” or “all.” Eventually most children, even ones as stupid as Barnes, will learn there are exceptions, for example, paper that is water-soaked. This is such common knowledge there was no need for Harriman to say so, except to foil a dishonest critic like Barnes.

Here at the ARCHNblog we have become accustomed to being called liars, dishonest etc by boldly anonymous Randians. We are also equally accustomed to said Objectivists drying up and blowing away when challenged to provide proof of our supposed four-flushing malfeasances.

As I'm traveling and don't have the book handy, I've nonetheless googled it and found the passage I was referring to reproduced over at the Objectivist Living forum:

In utilizing concepts as his cognitive tools, [the first-level inducer] is thereby omitting the measurements of the particular causal connection he perceives. "Fire" relates the yellow-orange flames he perceives to all such, regardless of their varying measurements; the same applies to "paper" and the process of "burning." Hence the first statement of his concrete observation: "Fire burns paper." This statement is simply a conceptualization of the perceived data--which is what makes it a generalization.

Notice that when our first-level inducer identifies a perceived causal connection in words, he does not do it as a description of unique concretes, even though that is all he perceives; he at once states a universal truth.

- David Harriman, p26, The Logical Leap.

Readers can compare our Anon's claim with the actual passage themselves. But to me it's obvious not only that what Anon doesn't know about the problem of induction could be written in 6 point type over Fenway Park, but that these "New Intellectuals" seem to lack some basic reading skills.

Rand & Aesthetics 16

2011-06-16T08:49:00.000-07:00

Rand's aesthetic judgments about music. We get the full sense of the subjective and arbitrary character of Rand's aesthetics when we glance at Rand's pronouncements about specific composers. These pronouncements are often so thin and baseless that it their basis in sheer egotistic prejudice should be obvious.

On Beethoven:

I'll tell you what I hear in [Beethoven's] music as [in his] philosophy of life. With regard to Beethoven, I am profoundly opposed to his music,, specifically from the sense-of-life aspect. Esthetically, I can hear that he is a great musician. I have to acknowledge the skill with which he is presenting what he is presenting. But his music has what I call a malevolent universe. It is in essence the view that man is doomed, that he has no chance, that he cannot achieve his goals, that he cannot triumph on earth -- but must struggle just the same.... It's the belief that man must struggle even though he has no chance of winning, and that he must perish heroically. That is a malevolent view of man and of the universe, and that is what I hear in practically everything Beethoven has written.

There's already been a discussion on this site about the absurdity of Rand's assertions concerning Beethoven's alleged malevolence, so there's no need to go into great detail here. In any case, since few if any admirers of Beethoven find him to be malevolent, that should be enough to settle the question. Rand is merely trying to justify her dislike of a composer that even she has to admit is a "great musician."

On Wagner:

I think Wagner, unfortunately, is enormously vulgar, so that a sense-of-life appraisal is almost irrelevent. There is a certain musical value in some of his compositions. I would not classify him as particularly great. His melodies, which are the element by which I principally judge a composer, are, are enormously lacking in originality or inventiveness. If you strip them of all their trimming, his melodies are, with rare exceptions, street-organ or circus music. What Wagner makes his reputation on is precisely the trimmings -- the technical, alleged virtuosity of his orchestrations, with a dozen leitmotifs all mixed together, amounting to nothing. It is not a profound view of life. It is the view of a manipulator, of somebody who is playing on the fringes, but does not really have much to say.

This passage proves, more than any other, that when it comes to serious music, Rand was in way over her head. Classical musicians (i.e., those who are in the best position to judge) generally regard Wagner as one of the greatest composers. They would look upon Rand's criticisms of Wagner as ignorant and deeply prejudiced. Rand's avowal that she principally judges composer by their melodies would inspire deep contempt (the most important element in serious music tends to be harmony, not melody). Her assertion that most of Wagner's melodies are "street-organ" and "circus" music would yield howls of derision. And what is this comment about Wagner's "alleged virtuousity of orchestration": since when is Rand an expert on orchestration?This is, to be entirely frank, very embarrassing stuff; and the fact that Rand seems entirely oblivious as to how foolish she is coming off only makes it that much more cringe worthy.

On Gilbert and Sullivan:

I can't stand them.... I am positively allergic to their operattas, both to the content and to the music, but particularly the music. The content is often very clever and witty, but the sense of life projected is so satirically anti-man, that there isn't a redeeming feature anywhere. It is as if Gilbert and Sullivan were laughing at everything about man. And therefore, the sound of their music makes me uncomfortable.

The odd thing here is that, even though the (alleged) "laughing at man" is entirely the product of Gilbert, that Rand objects "particularly" to Sullivan's music. If she knew nothing of Gilbert's librettos, would she still have objected to Sullivan's music?

Rand is also known to have referred to Mozart as "pre-music" and to have regarded an acquaintance who admired Richard Strauss as someone with whom she could never be "soul mates." One shudders to think what Rand would have thought of Debussy, Elgar, Mahler, and countless others of whom she was too ignorant to disparage.

Rand & Aesthetics 15

2011-06-13T10:44:00.000-07:00

Rand's theory of music. Rand's views on music reveal far more about her basic modus operandi than they do about music. Her theory explaining the "nature of man's response music" is unique in with Objectivism in that Rand recognized it as being a mere hypothesis. Yet even this very recognition is fraught with difficulties. It has that character (so prominent amongst Rand's philosophy) of manifesting a heads-I-win,-tails-you-lose dynamic. For Rand's basic, default attitude toward music was: I am right, but I can't prove it. In other words, we are supposed to give her credit for acknowledging she couldn't prove her theory, yet she did not consider herself obliged to admit she might be wrong. She really does seem to be trying to have it both ways.

Given that her "hypothesis" about music appears no better or worse than any of her other theories, it is difficult to explain why she would consider it a mere hypothesis. Rand's theories of concepts and value are also mere hypotheses. Her attempts to "prove" or "validate" them are no more convincing than her hypothesis about music. So why did she recognize the hypothetical character of her theory of music while ignoring the fact that the rest of her philosophy was also hypothetical?

Oddly enough, her theory of music at least attempts to make use of scientific evidence (which cannot be said of most of her other theories). To be sure, the scientific evidence she references is very old: namely, Helmholtz's 1863 Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen als physiologische Grundlage für die Theorie der Musik (On the Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music),

She presents her hypothesis as follows:

From the standpoint of psycho-epistemology, I can offer a hypothesis on the nature of man’s response to music, but I urge the reader to remember that it is only a hypothesis . . .

One may listen to noise for an hour, a day or a year, and it remains just noise. But musical tones heard in a certain kind of succession produce a different result—the human ear and brain integrate them into a new cognitive experience, into what may be called an auditory entity: a melody. The integration is a physiological process; it is performed unconsciously and automatically. Man is aware of the process only by means of its results.

Helmholtz has demonstrated that the essence of musical perception is mathematical: the consonance or dissonance of harmonies depends on the ratios of the frequencies of their tones. The brain can integrate a ratio of one to two, for instance, but not of eight to nine. . . .

The psycho-epistemological meaning of a given composition lies in the kind of work it demands of a listener’s ear and brain.

A composition may demand the active alertness needed to resolve complex mathematical relationships—or it may deaden the brain by means of monotonous simplicity. It may demand a process of building an integrated sum—or it may break up the process of integration into an arbitrary series of random bits—or it may obliterate the process by a jumble of sounds mathematically-physiologically impossible to integrate, and thus turn into noise.

The listener becomes aware of this process in the form of a sense of efficacy, or of strain, or of boredom, or of frustration. His reaction is determined by his psycho-epistemological sense of life—i.e., by the level of cognitive functioning on which he feels at home.

Even as a hypothesis, this is pretty wretched stuff. It is not even consistent with Rand's own pronouncements about music.

According to Rand's hypothesis, the "psycho-epistemological sense of life" evoked by music depends on the ability to resolve the complex mathematical relationships of musical tones. What this suggests is, first of all, that musical response depends on the level of an individual's cognitive functioning. Since cognitive functionality presumably differs from one individual to another, this means that musical values are relative, rather than objective (i.e., they are relative to the individual's level of cognitive functioning). Although Rand does not explain how music conveys either a benevolent or malevolent sense of life, the unstated implication is that it has something to do with the ability to resolve complex mathematical relationships and to the process of building an integrated sum. This would suggest that an individual with a benevolent sense of life would respond to music which, given his level of cognitive functioning, demanded his full capacity at resolving complex mathematical relationships and building integrated sums. In other words, music which he would perceive as having a benevolent sense of life would be just the sort of music that most he found most challenging to process and resolve. This ability would differ from person to person. An individual with a low level of cognitive functioning might find a popular song challenging and therefore "benevolent." The same individual would, however, be frustrated in his attempt process and resolve a Beethoven string quartet, which he would therefore regard as "malevolent." A person with a higher level of cognitive functioning, on the other hand, would find the popular song boring, and therefore "malevolent," but the Beethoven quartet challenging and therefore "benevolent."

As Rand was never very good at ferreting out the more problematic implications of her theories, she failed to notice these implications in her hypothesis about music. If she had noticed them, it's hard to believe that she would have presented this theory, even if only as hypothesis. In any case, it should be obvious that this hypothesis is not consistent with her own aesthetic judgments about music. Rand believed (although she could not prove) that Sergei Rachmaninoff was "objectively" the greatest of composers. If, however, one's response to music depends on one's the level of cognitive functioning, than the objectivity of musical values, as I have already noted, is no longer warranted. Even relative to a specific level of cognitive functioning, Rand's judgment is problematic. After all, is Rachmaninoff any more complex than Arensky, Cui, Balakirev, Medtner, Miakovsky, and any number of composers who wrote in a similar style, yet who are generally regarded as his inferior? Since the complexity of many of the works of these composers is about on par with Rachmaninoff's best works, there doesn't seem to be any reason to prefer one over the others. Rand's hypothesis doesn't actually provide a basis for musical values or judgments about music. So even as a hypothesis, it's a complete failure.

There is further problem with Rand's hypothesis. What on earth does Rand mean by the phrase "mathematically-physiologically impossible to integrate." Presumably, she is referring to "dissonant" modern music, particularly the atonal music of Schoenberg and the high modernists. However, it should be noted that nearly all serious music contains dissonances (i.e., chords that are "mathematically-physiologically impossible to integrate"), and that Rand's implied criticism of modern music could be applied to classical music en toto. Dissonances are essential in developing drama, tension, and resolution in serious music. Such dissonances are resolved, not by integrating their notes (which is, after all, "physiologically impossible"), but by juxtaposing them with consonant chords. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence to support the notion that listening to physiologically unresolvable chords or melodies necessarily leads to frustration or boredom, as is suggested in Rand's hypothesis. Experiments have demonstrated that prolonged exposure to atonal music develops the ability to listen to music without expecting harmonic resolution.

Notes On Cultism In the Logical Leap 3: The Stupid, It Burns!

2011-06-11T16:31:00.000-07:00

I was expecting The Logical Leap: Induction In Physics to be really, really terrible, and I have not been disappointed. Just to get a good handle on how it serves as a dutiful cultic delivery vehicle for Rand's immaculate conceptions I've had to go back to the ITOE, and it takes a while to extract any clarity from that shambles. I'll type that up soon. But to sum up TLL, where it does not merely consist of warmed over Randian tripe, is basically an exercise in philosophic Calvinball with Harriman straining to retrofit the giants of Enlightenment science into Team Objectivism. Of course, this would be a complete intellectual embarrassment if not for the fact that such Objectivists have no shame.

As for the Harrikoffrand arguments themselves, that will have to be a separate, eyerolling post. Suffice to say for now that we might judge how good they are by the quality of their conclusions, so I now present an example of the amazing power of Objectivist "induction". On p26, Harriman claims that, using this unique Randian inductive method, from a single observation of paper burning in a fireplace, we can conclude that the statement "Fire burns paper" is "a universal truth".

Yes, it really is only the f*cking stupid that's burning here.

The Gift That Keeps On Giving

2011-06-08T19:54:00.000-07:00

Yes, it's Atlas Shrugged Pt 2.

Estimated budget of Pt 1: $20m

Current domestic gross of Pt 1: $4.6m (via Boxofficemojo.com)

A "Necessary Connection"?

2011-06-07T20:50:00.000-07:00

At bottom, Objectivist epistemology is based on a fundamental fallacy which leads at first to verbalism and then to an authoritarian turn. This fallacy, often difficult to unpack, is clearly expressed here (my italics):

"And, lastly, I suggest that you try to project what would have happened if, instead of Annie Sullivan, a sadist had taken charge of Helen Keller’s education. A sadist would spell “water” into Helen’s palm, while making her touch water, stones, flowers and dogs interchangeably; he would teach her that water is called “water” today, but “milk” tomorrow; he would endeavor to convey to her that there is no necessary connection between names and things, that the signals in her palm are a game of arbitrary conventions and that she’d better obey him without trying to understand."

- Ayn Rand, “Kant Versus Sullivan,” Philosophy: Who Needs It p90.

A truly remarkable thing to write, and to think.

Rand & Aesthetics 14

2011-06-06T10:32:00.000-07:00

Style and "psycho-epistemology." With her over-emphasis on selectivity, her sense of life construct, and her invidious distinction between Romanticism and Naturalism, Rand has plenty of tools to criticize aesthetic tastes she didn't approve of (i.e., nearly any taste she did not share). She had yet one tool her aesthetics that she could make use of to flog art she despised: namely, style as it relates to "psycho-epistemology." According to Rand:

The subject of an art work expresses a view of man’s existence, while the style expresses a view of man’s consciousness. The subject reveals an artist’s metaphysics, the style reveals his psycho-epistemology . . . .

An artist’s style is the product of his own psycho-epistemology—and, by implication, a projection of his view of man’s consciousness, of its efficacy or impotence, of its proper method and level of functioning.

Predominantly (though not exclusively), a man whose normal mental state is a state of full focus, will create and respond to a style of radiant clarity and ruthless precision—a style that projects sharp outlines, cleanliness, purpose, an intransigent commitment to full awareness and clear-cut identity—a level of awareness appropriate to a universe where A is A, where everything is open to man’s consciousness and demands its constant functioning.

A man who is moved by the fog of his feelings and spends most of his time out of focus will create and respond to a style of blurred, "mysterious" murk, where outlines dissolve and entities flow into one another, where words connote anything and denote nothing, where colors float without objects, and objects float without weight—a level of awareness appropriate to a universe where A can be any non-A one chooses, where nothing can be known with certainty and nothing much is demanded of one’s consciousness.

With this weapon in her aesthetic arsenal, Rand can make some startling pronouncements about various styles of painting:

Style is the most complex element of art, the most revealing and, often, the most baffling psychologically. The terrible inner conflicts from which artists suffer as much as (or, perhaps, more than) other men are magnified in their work. As an example: Salvador Dali, whose style projects the luminous clarity of a rational psycho-epistemology, while most (though not all) of his subjects project an irrational and revoltingly evil metaphysics. A similar, but less offensive, conflict may be seen in the paintings of Vermeer, who combines a brilliant clarity of style with the bleak metaphysics of Naturalism. At the other extreme of the stylistic continuum, observe the deliberate blurring and visual distortions of the so-called "painterly" school, from Rembrandt on down—down to the rebellion against consciousness, expressed by a phenomenon such as Cubism which seeks specifically to disintegrate man’s consciousness by painting objects as man does not perceive them (from several perspectives at once).

Much of the psychological bafflement Rand confesses to arises out of her definition of art. It's from Rand's own insistence that art is a "selective recreation of reality" that so many of her invidious conclusions about art, particularly modern art, arise. After all, on what basis does Rand justify her conclusion that individuals who respond to "blurred mysterious murk" (presumably this is Impressionist and non-representional art) spend most of their time "out of focus." What evidence does she have to support so implausible a contention?

Art is not merely a selective recreation of reality. It is the creation of something that leads to an aesthetic experience. Nor is there any evidence that an artist's style necessarily reveals the degree to which his mind is in or out of focus. Impressionist painting was driven, in part, by the desire to paint, not in a studio, but outdoors. This encouraged painters to adopt quicker methods of composition, in which the painstaking attention to detail was replaced by bold strokes and emphasis on color. The Impressionists were generalists seeking to capture the "essentials" of a scene: just what Rand claimed to do in her philosophy; only the Impressionists had a much greater excuse than Rand, as they were merely trying to convey light and beauty, not information or philosophical truth.

I suspect that one of the main draws of Rand's aesthetics is that it provides an uncompromising condemnation of "modern" art. Such modernism, Rand implies, is a "rebellion against consciousness." Cubism, in particular, "seeks specifically to disintegrate man's consciousness by painting objects as man does not perceive them." Oh really? How does Rand know such a thing? Using the same logic, couldn't something very similar be said about emoticons and smilies? or stick figure illustrations? or any graphical representation that isn't absolutley photographic in its representation? While there is absolutely nothing wrong in deploring modern art, if one wishes to criticize it, one must do better than this.

Rand & Aesthetics 13

2011-06-01T10:58:00.000-07:00

Style in literature. Rand's remarks on literary style begin rather innocuous and vague, but quickly take on more sinister connotations once she applies them as tools of criticism:

A literary style has two fundamental elements (each subsuming a large number of lesser categories): the "choice of content" and the "choice of words." By "choice of content" I mean those aspects of a given passage (whether description, narrative or dialogue) which a writer chooses to communicate (and which involve the consideration of what to include or to omit). By "choice of words" I mean the particular words and sentence structures a writer uses to communicate them.

For instance, when a writer describes a beautiful woman, his stylistic "choice of content" will determine whether he mentions (or stresses) her face or body or manner of moving or facial expression, etc.; whether the details he includes are essential and significant or accidental and irrelevant; whether he presents them in terms of facts or of evaluations; etc. His "choice of words" will convey the emotional implications or connotations, the value-slanting, of the particular content he has chosen to communicate. (He will achieve a different effect if he describes a woman as "slender" or "thin" or "svelte" or "lanky," etc.)

None of this is particularly objectionable or particularly insightful. The main criticism that could be essayed against it is that, in the hands of a malicious critic, the importance of a writer's style could be exaggerated and used as a pretext to malign great works of literature. Many of the greatest novelists were not particularly adept stylists. These include such writers as Stendhal, Dostoevsky, Dickens, Melville, Dreiser, and Faulkner, among others.

Rand proceeds to trot out two passage allegedly describing New York, one written by Mickey Spillane, the other by Thomas Wolfe. I say allegedly because the Wolfe passage is not really a description of New York, but rather, a description of the emotions stirred up within Wolfe's protagonist by the sight of New York. Rand, ignoring this distinction, concludes: "Wolfe's style is emotion-orientated and addressed to a subjective psycho-epistemology: he expects the reader to accept emotions divorced from facts, and to accept them second-hand."

The key term here is "subjective psycho-epistemology." In Objectivism, the term subjective has the same moral connotations as the term Satan has for a Christian fundamentalist. It is indicative of the deepest, most unregenerate evil. By claiming that Wolfe's works are "addressed" to a "subjective psycho-epistemology," Rand is suggesting that admirers of his work are afflicted with this very same subjectivism, and are perhaps deserving of psychological counseling, if not outright moral condemnation. Does Rand have any grounds for ascribing subjectivism (in the disparaging sense of the word) to Wolfe's admirers?

No, she doesn't. Wolfe presents a target-rich environment for the critic, because he was an immensely talented writer who often, alas, had nothing of any great importance to say. The best he could achieve was to write very eloquently (sometimes over-eloquently) of his own trivial thoughts, emotions, and experiences. Since many young people share or can relate to Wolfe's thoughts, emotions, and experiences, they are drawn to the grandiloquent poetry in which he expresses them. There is nothing in any of this to draw the sinister conclusion that Wolfe appeals to those afflicted with subjective psycho-epistemologies. All literature, to the extent that it appeals to emotions (and what literature doesn't appeal to the emotions?), appeals to the "subjective."

Rand takes her principle to even more questionable extremes when she writes:

Style is not an end in itself, it is only a means to an end—the means of telling a story. The writer who develops a beautiful style, but has nothing to say, represents a kind of arrested esthetic development; he is like a pianist who acquires a brilliant technique by playing finger-exercises, but never gives a concert.

The typical literary product of such writers—and of their imitators, who possess no style—are so-called "mood-studies," popular among today’s literati, which are little pieces conveying nothing but a certain mood. Such pieces are not an art-form, they are merely finger-exercises that never develop into art.

While Rand is correct that style is not an end in itself, this doesn't mean that "mood-studies" are not an art-form. What is a lyric poem, but a "mood study"? Why shouldn't a lyric poem (or a lyrical short story) not be a work of art? We once again are confronted with an example of Rand making sweeping pronouncements about issues she doesn't know much about and hasn't thought through.

Who Makes The Randroids? Inside an ARI Weekend Workshop.

2011-05-30T17:51:00.000-07:00

Our ARCHNblog mole "Mr A" goes undercover at an Ayn Rand Institute weekend student workshop.

Once a year, the Clemson Institute for the Study of Capitalism hosts a free conference for college students on "The Moral Foundations of Capitalism" and the greatest book ever written in defense of it...oops, I forgot, Atlas Shrugged isn't primarily about capitalism, but hey, it STILL made the best defense of capitalism in the history of the world!

This three day (impressively) all-expenses paid event has been running for a few years in association with the Ayn Rand Institute and funded by an anonymous businessman. I had applied for the conference back when I was still mostly an Objectivist, but I've gone through an apostasy since then. As the inner workings of the Objectivist movement rarely get exposed to the mainstream, I volunteered to go undercover for the ARCHNblog to see how the Orthodox Objectivism movement works from the inside.

The conference began with many assurances by its organizer, Dr. Bradley Thomson. "We have some of the best professors in the country" he told us, and "if the conference consists of everyone nodding at Dr. [Eric] Daniels, it would be really boring". A typical Objectivist assurance that rational debate is welcome and encouraged. So how did it measure up? Well, let's find out.

The students at the conference were between about 20 and 22 years old, about 60/40 male/female and ran the cultist gamut. Some were genuinely free thinkers. Some were new to Objectivism and hopefully can yet be saved. At least one, a friend of mine, is the rare rationally convinced hardcore Objectivist. But the ones that are the easiest to make fun of are, of course, the full-fledged ideologues (I knew I was in for it when I found out that one girl had an Ayn Rand tattoo). One, while arguing that abortion is permissible in the third trimester, added this classic Objectivist line to his argument: A is A. A is A entails that abortion is moral? Call the press! The pro-lifers have been officially refuted. And absolutely hilarious was the debate between a Randroid and an ideological anarchist (Editor: did the anarchist call the Randroid a "statist"?? They really hate that!). If only we had a dogmatic libertarian, we could have had the cultist right trifecta!

Each of the three days began with Dr. Daniel's discussion of various philosophers' analyses of capitalism, such as Marx and J. S. Mill. This was probably the best part of the conference - no moralizing or shenanigans, just an informative account of how capitalism. Next was Craig Biddle's discussion of the Objectivist Ethics. Not much new; anyone who has read enough Rand should know it inside and out. I must mention a question someone asked Mr. Biddle: is it justifiable to violate someone's rights if it can be demonstrated to be in their self-interest (for example, forcibly preventing a mentally ill person from mutilating himself). Surprisingly (well, to me, anyway) his answer was, unequivocally and without stuttering, no. Apparently rights are categorical imperatives not to be touched ever--except, of course, in metaphysical emergencies (i.e. a shipwrecked man can eat off of the trees on a private island if he can't find the owner). So much for need not being a claim on property. (And what if the owner said no? Oh, ok, I'll just starve to death then...)

And another remarkable statement: Mr. Biddle told several students that morally we would be justified in overthrowing our government because it is more powerful than the one the Founders overthrew (he does not advocate it because it would be unpractical - but then what happened to Rand's claim that the moral is the practical?) What I didn't get around to asking him is if this meant the Oklahoma City bombing was morally justified, even if not "practical"? I suspect, though, that the answer would be yes. Scary! (Whatever happened to the strike, anyways?)

Next was the worst part of the conference: the Bible - I mean Atlas Shrugged - study. Painful! This one Randroid, who I will call Randy, informed us he had read the book twelve times. Only twelve? A TRUE Objectivist should have read it at least 50 times by his age! In our discussions, he used the word contradiction more times than I think I've heard it in my lifetime. And he noted that the section labels of the book were very informative (yeah, A is A sums up part three perfectly; Galt must say it a dozen times, after all). I tried to reason with him later - big mistake. I quickly grew angry at him, and then he told me, "Well, anger is a result of some sort of injustice". Which of course just made me even more annoyed.

To be fair, I don't think that most students were as enamored of the book as he was, but still there was an air of fawning about the sessions. The professors helped guide the discussions but otherwise generally stayed out of the way. Interesting to note that the handful of times I criticized Objectivism or Atlas, they were sure to 'correct' me. Not brusquely or rudely, but nonetheless the message was that we were supposed to believe what Rand said (in the group think model, they would be the "mind guards"). The real question in all of this is: what does a literary analysis of Atlas has to do with defending capitalism anyways? One would think it doesn't really matter, in the context of politics, how well the book was written. In fact, if we're talking about capitalism, why not cover Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal? Indeed, the book wasn't mentioned that often outside the study. I think it's another sad example of Objectivists sneaking in a lot of unwarranted claims amidst several valid ones: once they established that Atlas was a divine book, independent to all relation to the rest of the conference (and reality), the students would be more likely to believe that leftist politicians hate the good for being the good and that emotions come directly from values.

Fourth was the famous libertarian economist Richard Ebeling. Even though he is a professional Misean, Ebeling regards Rand has his "greatest intellectual influence", hence no doubt his presence here. He has plenty of jokes and a booming, powerful voice, which combined with his outstanding knowledge of economics made him the best speaker at the conference. Unfortunately, his topics were pretty standard fare for those well versed in libertarianism: communism is evil, the welfare state is pretty darn bad too, we need to go back to a commodity standard, and the Fed was the prime mover behind America's Great Recession. Again, not much new here. And particularly troublesome is some of his libertarian claims: that macroeconomics is some evil invention by Keynes and that (of course!) there is no such thing as "society"(Editor: Shurely shome mishtake. By that logic, there's no such thing as "government" either). But it is not my intention to disparage Dr. Ebeling. He handled one of the book readings very professionally and clearly is extremely knowledgeable about economics, whatever his libertarian eccentricities.

And finally, everyone's favourite Rand cultist, Dr. Andrew Bernstein. Thankfully, he spoke about his specialty, early capitalist history, and thus made a credible presentation, although again, those who have read one of his books would already have known everything he presented. I would feel bad about making fun of Dr. Bernstein, who really is a kind man, but for the sake of public safety I must warn people about his cult-like tendencies (at least he said David Kelly isn't evil; he's just not really an Objectivist). So I will leave out the jokes here and simply observe that when someone asked him about whether intellectual property law should be abolished, he began to hem and haw, make a vague reference to Hank Rearden and invoke the slippery slope fallacy: if we lose some rights, then we'll lose them all (Mr. Biddle also said something to the same effect at a later time).

And almost predictably, at the conference's conclusion, Craig Biddle encouraged the students to spread the Word of Rand and the glories of laissez-faire. "Rational proselytizing" was the way he put it. Sounded like an oxymoron to me. And er, whatever happened to respect for dissent? It's as if it was assumed that we would come to agree with them once they corrected our unObjectivist ideas (like the book studies).
So what is the net sum of this potpourri of ideas, quackery, and economics? Some good, I'm sure, but a dangerous potential for evil. I had been a libertarian and Objectivist fanatic for long enough to be familiar with most of the ideas presented in Clemson, but my roommate, who is new to the movement, said he learned a lot, so there's a good chance that many students picked up on a lot of radical right ideas. And there's nothing inherently wrong with that. The trouble is that there were almost no caveats. Dr. Thomson's encouragement to free thinking aside, Rand's ideas were presented as the truth, without any warnings that they were controversial. No problem for a disillusioned cultist like me, but a dangerous trap for those Objectivist newcomers. For if Rand is presented as The Voice of Reason (as Leonard Peikoff literally did in one of his anthology titles), followers begin to trust what she said. For after all, how could someone so committed to 'reason' and the independent mind steer them wrong? And that's when they accept notions like "man is a being of self-made soul" uncritically, but still say it as if Rand had proved it with a library of psychological research.

Just as revealed texts are said to be valid whatever is going on in the world (see creationists clinging to the Bible in spite of all evidence to the contrary, and 'reasoning' that the evidence just so happens to prove them right), the implicit assumption was that "The Voice of Reason" had the answers and that, would you look at that, all the evidence supports Rand's claims. Not that you really need to look at the evidence anyways, because A is A, capitalism is capitalism, and lassiez-faire is the best ever. Period. Who can argue with that reasoning?

And even the claims that had nothing to do with capitalism were defended; for example, Dr. Bernstein plugged an essay he wrote defending The Fountainhead's rape scene. Come on, if there was one thing, ONE THING an Objectivist could distance themselves from...

And that's when you get young intellectuals getting Ayn Rand tattoos. All too often, as Robert A. Heinlein once said, man is not a rational animal, he is a rationalizing animal. And what's been 'proved' with 'reason' usually turns out to be some arbitrary claim by Rand. As Dr. Eric Daniels said: "To understand political economy, you need to understand man".

Sadly, man is perhaps what Objectivism understands the least.

- "Mr A"

Rand & Aesthetics 12

2011-05-26T10:29:00.000-07:00

Plot-theme. Rand introduces yet another poorly thought out aesthetic construct. She explains "plot-theme" as follows:

A cardinal principle of good fiction [is]: the theme and the plot of a novel must be integrated—as thoroughly integrated as mind and body or thought and action in a rational view of man.The link between the theme and the events of a novel is an element which I call the plot-theme. It is the first step of the translation of an abstract theme into a story, without which the construction of a plot would be impossible. A "plot-theme" is the central conflict or "situation" of a story—a conflict in terms of action, corresponding to the theme and complex enough to create a purposeful progression of events.

The theme of a novel is the core of its abstract meaning—the plot-theme is the core of its events. Where is the incoherency in this idea? It stems from how Rand utilizes it in her criticism of novels she doesn't like. Consider what she says about Dreiser's An American Tragedy:

A related, though somewhat different, example of a bad novel is An American Tragedy by Theodore Dreiser. Here, the author attempts to give significance to a trite story by tacking on a theme which is not related to or demonstrated by its events. The events deal with an age old subject: the romantic problem of a rotten little weakling who murders his pregnant sweetheart, a working girl, in order ... to marry a rich heiress. The alleged theme, according to the author's assertion, is: "The evil of capitalism."

Rand here commits the error of confusing the author's intended theme with the actual theme manifested in the author's story. In other words, Dreiser's alleged theme is entirely irrelevant to the merit (or lack of merit) of An American Tragedy. Even if that novel fails to demonstrate the evils of capitalism, that in itself wouldn't make it a "bad novel." The integration of theme and plot is entirely irrelevant. Every plot will have a theme, regardless of the author's intentions. Since every story has a theme, integration of theme and plot is a built in feature. It works regardless of what the author intended. Indeed, the author's intentions are of no consequence whatsoever; what is important is the final result. A novel cannot be judged because it turned out different from what the author originally intended. If Dreiser had never claimed that the theme of An American Tragedy was "The evil of capitalism," none of us would be any the wiser and Rand could not have used the work as an example of a bad novel that misintegrates the theme and the plot.

Do They Just Make This Stuff Up?

2011-05-25T18:51:00.000-07:00

We here at the ARCHNblog have long said that Rand's arguments are so intensely confused even her devotees are unable to extract coherent positions from them. Take the case of her "intellectual heir" Leonard Peikoff. After triggering doctrinal firestorms over denying Muslims property rights, voting Democrat, and nuking Iran under the doctrine of collective responsibility, he's now come out in favour of compulsory jury duty. And what is his Objectivist argument for initiating force against free citizens, something expressly forbidden by Objectivism? Amy Peikoff summarises it simply: it is just, well, "something you agree to when you agree to live under the government."

Uh-huh. Rather like taxation.

Ayn Rand & Aesthetics 11

2011-05-23T17:57:00.000-07:00

Plot and character. When asked to name the three most important elements in fiction, Rand replied, "Plot, plot, plot." For Rand, a plot "is a purposeful progression of logically connected events leading to the resolution of a climax" and explicated this statement as follows:

The word “purposeful” in this definition has two applications: it applies to the author and to the characters of a novel. It demands that the author devise a logical structure of events, a sequence in which every major event is connected with, determined by and proceeds from the preceding events of the story—a sequence in which nothing is irrelevant, arbitrary or accidental, so that the logic of the events leads inevitably to a final resolution.

Rand's emphasis on "logical" sequence of events is problematic. No sequence of events is ever "logical." Logic applies to arguments, to propositions. There may exist, for example, a logical sequence of propositions. A sequence of events may be causally connected, but they cannot, on the face of it, be connected by logic. One event is never deduced from another. Rand here is confusing logic with inevitability.

But why is this sort of inevitability of events so important? Rand explains: 

A chronicle, real or invented, may possess certain values; but these values are primarily informative—historical or sociological or psychological—not primarily esthetic or literary; they are only partly literary. Since art is a selective re-creation and since events are the building blocks of a novel, a writer who fails to exercise selectivity in regard to events defaults on the most important aspect of his art.

However, all this merely begs the question, leaving us as ignorant as we were before. Why must only inevitable events be regarded "esthetic and literary," whereas non-inevitable events are merely "informative." Rand has failed to provide a compelling argument for the importance of plot in fiction. Are there compelling arguments for other elements? In a word, yes.

Consider, as an alternative view, what H. L. Mencken had to say of the novel:

In brief, a first-rate novel is always a character sketch. It may be more than that, but at bottom it is always a character sketch, or, if the author is genuinely of the imperial line, a whole series of them…

The moral of all this is not lost upon the more competent minority of novelists among us. It was not necessary to preach it to Miss Cather when she set out to write "My Antonia,"… nor to Sinclair Lewis when he was at work on "Babbitt." All such novelists see the character first and the story afterword. What is the story of "Babbitt"? Who remembers? Who, indeed, remembers the story of "The Three Musketeers"? But D'Artagnan and his friends live brilliantly, and so, too, will George F. Babbitt live brilliantly — at all events, until Kiwanis cease to trouble, and his type ceases to be real. Most of the younger American novelists, alas, seem to draw no profit from such examples. It is their aim, apparently, to shock mankind with the vivacity of their virtuosity and the heterodoxy of their ideas, and so they fill their novels with gaudy writing and banal propaganda, and convert their characters into sticks. I am, at times, immensely amused and sometimes I am instructed, but I seldom carry away anything to remember. When I do so, it is not an idea, but a person. Like everyone else, I have a long memory for persons. But ideas come and go. [Prejudices 5, "Essay on Pedagogy"]

Now whether Mencken is right, he at least give a compelling argument for his position: namely, interesting characters are more memorable than stories or plots. And if one examines the novels that are remembered and read generations after they are written, they are all character sketches of some sort or another. They may be a great deal more than that; but few novels survive merely on plot alone.

Rand's view makes every element of narrative fiction subservient to plot:

The plot of a novel serves the same function as the steel skeleton of a skyscraper: it determines the use, placement and distribution of all the other elements. Matters such as number of characters, background, descriptions, conversations, introspective passages, etc. have to be determined by what the plot can carry, i.e., have to be integrated with the events and contribute to the progression of the story.

In practice, this sort of outlook turns characters into mere plot devices. The practical consequence of the sort of plot-driven fiction would be novels populated by unmemorable one-dimensional stick figures. Such novels may survive, as Rand's own Atlas Shrugged has thus far survived, for it's value as an instrument of propaganda; but as literature, it will be scorned and (probably) forgotten. Even as propaganda, it's value is close to nil, because only those who already agree with the message are likely to read and appreciate it. If Rand had really wanted to get her message out and achieve something beyond merely preaching to the choir, she would have striven for Atlas to be character-driven, rather than a plot driven, book. Then, assuming it was well done, intelligent people would have read it, even if they didn't agree with its message. One of the distinguishing characteristics of great literature is that intelligent people will read it even if they don't agree with author's view. Consider, as one example, the novels of Tolstoy. Many people can read and enjoy War and Peace and Anna Karenina without agreeing, or even respecting, Tolstoy's rather eccentric political and social views.

Saving The Appearances 2: Notes on Cultism in "The Logical Leap"

2011-05-21T17:45:00.000-07:00

If "The Logical Leap" is a Rand-cult book, we should expect it to conform strictly to the Prime Directive of cultism: that the Ayn Rand is the greatest individual that ever lived. Rand-cult books like James Valliant's "The Passion of Ayn Rand's Critics" are written to promote the moral supremacy of Ayn Rand; "The Logical Leap" to promote her intellectual and philosophical supremacy.

However just as the insurmountable conflicts between the Prime Directive and reality forced Valliant's book into sycophantic absurdity, this case presents enormous problems for the true believer. For unlike the problem of universals, or the "is/ought" problem, which Rand claimed to have solved (even though it seems that she neither solved, nor even understood them), with the problem of induction she is on record as stating she had not solved it, and had not even begun to do so.

Even worse, the problem of induction was posed by one of the chief villains of Objectivist mythology, David Hume, which in turn inspired the philosophy of the Ultimate Objectivist Villain - "the most evil man who ever lived", as Rand described him - Immanuel Kant. How could the greatest philosopher of all time not have an answer to the two most evil philosophers of all time? How could Rand, who prided herself above all on her supposedly epochal "epistemological" achievements, blank out on this decisive epistemological question? Hence the problem of induction has been a ticking time bomb under Objectivism for the last 40 years.

From the cultist point of view, there is really only one way to defuse the situation: it has to be shown that Rand's work already somehow contains the solution to the problem of induction - that, being the Greatest Philosopher of All Time, she solved it even though she didn't solve it. Hey, she did it without even trying! Now, Rand's Theory of Concept Formation, expressed in a handful pages of vague jargon within the mere 90 odd pages that she contributes to the Introduction To Objectivist Epistemology is the obvious candidate for such a claim, even though this meisterwerk is originally only supposed to solve the problem of universals. It's also critical that her acolytes are not seen to make any distinctive contribution themselves - to do otherwise, to imply that there was anything fundamental that Rand did not ultimately anticipate, that they are anything more than passive vessels communicating the guru's supreme vision is to violate the Prime Directive.

Therefore we can expect two things from The Logical Leap:

1) At some point Rand's Theory of Concept Formation will be presented as the direct and fully sufficient answer to the problem of induction

2) Neither Harriman, the ostensible author of the book, nor Peikoff his "collaborator" will have any directly identifiable contribution to any important part of the problem's solution.

Of course considerable effort behind the scenes will be required to "save the appearances" of Rand's greatness. Fortunately Harriman and Peikoff have the basic cult tools discussed previously to help engineer this: 1) the "thought terminating cliches" of Objectivist jargon 2) the sharply divided world of the Objectivist founding mythology and 3) their own idolatrous and and naiively uncritical attitude to Rand's ideology. In my next post we'll see how this all comes together.

Saving the Appearances: Notes on Cultism In "The Logical Leap"

2011-05-20T23:13:00.000-07:00

Before we look at the highly cultic nature of "The Logical Leap", I'd better explain some of the mechanisms a typical cult uses to function.

Based on his experiences with survivors of Chinese Communist re-education programs, in the early 60s psychologist Dr Robert J. Clifton developed what he called the "Eight Criteria For Thought Reform" - a set of methods for moulding individuals to fit a given ideology. He soon realised that these programs closely resembled those of the plethora of different cults from the Children of God to EST to Scientology that sprang up in America during the '60s counterculture revolution.

Almost all of the eight have some relevance to Objectivism. However, the three key ones for the purposes of this discussion are as follows:

LOADING THE LANGUAGE
• The language of the totalist environment is characterized by the thought-terminating cliche (thought-stoppers)
• Repetitiously centered on all-encompassing jargon - "The language of non-thought"
• Words are given new meanings -- the outside world does not use the words or phrases in the same way -- it becomes a "group" word or phrase

THE DEMAND FOR PURITY
• The world becomes sharply divided into the pure and the impure, the absolutely good (the group/ideology) and the absolutely evil (everything outside the group)

SACRED SCIENCE
• The totalist milieu maintains an aura of sacredness around its basic doctrine or ideology, holding it as an ultimate moral vision for the ordering of human existence
• Questioning or criticizing those basic assumptions is prohibited
• A reverence is demanded for the ideology/doctrine, the originators of the ideology/doctrine, the present bearers of the ideology/doctrine

To the first mechanism, Objectivism has a well-established obfuscatory jargon which puts a myriad of very effective "thought-terminating cliches" in the hands of its followers. The second standard mechanism, also known as "black and white thinking", is also part of Rand's standard operating procedure. Finally, Objectivism offers an "ultimate moral vision for the ordering of human existence". Naturally this entails ultimate reverence for the creator of this ultimate morality. Hence Job #1 for official Objectivism, as with most cults, is always and everywhere the premise that Ayn Rand was, as one adherent put it to Newsweek back in the 1960s, "the greatest individual that has ever lived."

These three criteria explain a lot about Objectivism in general, and "The Logical Leap" in particular. Their demands set up all kinds of strange tensions in their adherents, giving Objectivist writing a distinctive apparatchik and even robotic flavour and shrouding even the simplest issues in esoteric confusion. Like Mediaeval astronomers obsessed with "saving the appearances", they have to produce ever more convoluted epicycles to maintain their sacred beliefs. For example, the first question one asks on encountering TLL is: who is actually responsible for this damn book in the first place? The front cover says: "David Harriman with an Introduction by Leonard Peikoff". The back cover, however, leads with "A groundbreaking solution to the problem of induction, based on Ayn Rand's theory of concepts." It then claims the book is

"inspired by and expanding on a series of lectures by Leonard Peikoff...Ayn Rand presented her revolutionary theory of concepts in her book Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. As Dr. Peikoff subsequently explored inductive reasoning, he sought out David Harriman...for his expert knowledge of the scientific discovery process...Here, Harriman presents the result of a collaboration between scientist and philosopher."

Say what? If this is a "collaboration" why does Peikoff only get a credit for the introduction? This confusion is intensified by Harriman's preface, which goes even further:

"This book is the result of a collaboration between myself and Leonard Peikoff....I was excited by his breakthrough discoveries...so I decided to write this book which is a full presentation of his theory as it applies to physical science...the original philosophic ideas belong to Dr Peikoff..."

In fact Harriman also claims how a whole chapter is taken ""nearly verbatim" from his lectures, and that Peikoff exercised "line-by-line scrutiny" and "taught me how to write this book." OK: so it's Peikoff's breakthrough discoveries, his theory, and even his lectures that the book is presenting. Um, but didn't the blurb say the "groundbreaking solution" was based on Ayn Rand's theory of concepts? Turning to Peikoff's Introduction, we find that yes:

"The theory developed here is based on Ayn Rand's theory of concepts...Although she did not provide the solution, she did provide the key to it....This book represents the first major application of Ayn Rand's epistemology to a field other than philosophy. "

So what we seem to have here is not really a book by David Harriman at all, but rather David providing an "illustration" of Peikoff's "original philosophic ideas"; which in turn can hardly be very original as Peikoff himself declares them merely an "application of Ayn Rand's epistemology"!

What we're seeing here is, of course, merely the cultic tensions playing themselves out and twisting everyone into knots. If Job #1 is always and everywhere the premise that Ayn Rand is the greatest philosopher that ever lived, this sets up the problem of authorship: for her mere acolytes cannot possibly have solved major problems of philosophy that she failed without betraying this prime directive. The appearances must be saved. Hence her ultimate authorship must be somehow asserted - even of those solutions she "hadn't worked on...enough to even begin to formulate".

But this in itself produces other tensions. What if Peikoff has got it wrong? What if "the first major application of Ayn Rand's epistemology" is not a triumph but an embarrassment? What then? And in fact it seems that Peikoff has had some kind of crisis of confidence over his theory, leading to a major internal schism. After all, he's been claiming he has this "breakthrough" solution for years now yet has dragged his feet over publishing it, and now is presenting it via a third party as a "collaboration" rather than risk putting out simply, say, "Leonard Peikoff's Solution To The Problem of Induction". So now we have plausible deniability. But on the other hand if the solution turns out to be right then it's almost worse - the pupil trumping the master using the master's own tools. Given Peikoff's remarkable feat of self-abnegation in his Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, where he presents himself as the entirely passive vessel for Rand's epochal doctrine, this must have been unthinkable. Ah, the lot of the cultist apparatchik is perpetual anxiety. And we haven't even got to Chapter 1.

Inside The Cultist Mind: 2

2011-05-19T19:57:00.000-07:00

So anyway, I finally got around to getting a copy of David Harriman's "The Logical Leap: Induction In Physics". I've been in no hurry because, not unlike Atlas Shrugged: The Movie, everything I'd read about it pointed towards it being a typical Objectivist trainwreck.

I've started into it and already it is clear the book has nothing to add to the well-known problem of induction. Nothing, nada, zip, nil, zero, nah-thing. I will be amazed if I can encounter in it a single argument that has not been made, and debunked, at at least 70 years before and more like 150 - the only detectable difference being that this old wine will have been rebottled in Rand's obscurantist Objectivist jargon. Hence reviewing it solely for the purpose of examining Harriman's alleged arguments, though I will touch on these, seems even beyond my considerable tolerance for thankless tasks.

However, what is interesting is not what the book says, but the way Harriman says it. My initial impression of "The Logical Leap" is that, like James Valliant's "The Passion of Ayn Rand's Critics", it's an epic fail in everything it sets out to do, either as argument, or history, or both. But what makes Valliant's demented tome indispensable is precisely its idiocies; with "TPARC" Valliant unwitting gives us, with MRI-like clarity, a fascinating look inside the Rand-cultist's mind. "The Logical Leap" appears to offer us the more of the same. Harriman already has impeccable Rand-cultist form, being busted secretly rewriting Rand's personal notes to make them more Galt-like. The Logical Leap's shamelessly apparatchik stylings have also proved too much for some of the less doctrinaire Objectivist types, prompting a major Objectischism on its publication. Whether Harriman is as full scale a weirdo (here, here) as Valliant remains to be seen.

So I'm going to propose, unless anyone really wants any different, that I write more about how this book functions as a piece of apparatchik propaganda - and even cultist idolatry - rather than seriously examine its long-debunked, vacant and jargon-encrusted arguments. I'll also probably do this as a series of notes as I proceed rather than do a full blown review. It'll be more fun that way.

I hope.

Rand and Aesthetics 10

2011-05-17T17:53:00.000-07:00

Naturalistic Romanticism. Rand introduces one other category of hybrid Romanticism in addition to Byronism, as explained in the following passage from The Romantic Manifesto:

Going farther down, one can observe the breakup of Romanticism, the contradictions that proceed from a premise held subconsciously. On this level, there emerges a class of writers whose basic premise, in effect, is that man possesses volition in regard to existence, but not to consciousness, i.e., in regard to his physical actions, but not in regard to his own character. The distinguishing characteristic of this class is: stories of unusual events enacted by conventional characters. The stories are abstract projections, involving actions one does not observe in "real life," the characters are commonplace concretes. The stories are Romantic, the characters Naturalistic. Such novels seldom have plots (since value-conflicts are not their motivational principle), but they do have a form resembling a plot: a coherent, imaginative, often suspenseful story held together by some one central goal or undertaking of the characters.

The contradictions in such a combination of elements are obvious; they lead to a total breach between action and characterization, leaving the action unmotivated and the characters unintelligible. The reader is left to feel: "These people couldn't do these things!"

With its emphasis on sheer physical action and neglect of human psychology, this class of novels stands on the borderline between serious and popular culture. No top-rank novelists belong to this category; the better known ones are writers of science fiction, such as H. G. Wells or Jules Verne. (Occasionally, a good writer of the Naturalistic school, with a repressed element of Romanticism, attemps a novel on an abstract them that requires a Romantic approach; the result falls into this category. For example, Sinclair Lewis's It Can't Happen Here.) It is obvious why the novels of this category are enormously unconvincing. And, no matter how skillfully or suspensefully their action is presented, they always have an unsatisfying, uninspiring quality.

The arbitrary nature of Rand's aesthetic constructs is rather carelessly on display in this passage. What she is basically saying (though she is shrewd enough not to put it so simply) is that if a novelist sub-consciuosly believes that people have free-will in regards to existence but not in regards to consciousness, they will produce novels which will project "abstract" stories combined with "conventional" characters!

Rand's slipshod analysis raises many questions without answering a single one. What on earth does she mean by stories with "abstract projections"? How does one distinguish such stories from those with "non-abstract" projections? What, precisely, is an action "one does not observe in real life"? Does she mean impossible actions? Or merely improbable actions? What is this nonsense about free will in regards to one's own character? What evidence does Rand have to support the implausible contention that human beings choose their own character? And what is she suggesting when she implies that novels belonging to this category don't have plots because "value-conflicts are not their motivational principle." Isn't a plot merely "a purposeful progression of logically connected events leading to the resolution of a climax." Isn't such a progression possible without value conflicts? (Incidentally, how does Rand know that there are no value conflicts in the science fiction of Verne and Wells? Has she read all such literature?) And what evidence can Rand provide for her implausible conjecture that an author who combines exciting narratives with conventional characters believes "sub-consciously" that human beings have free will in regards to existence but have no free will in regard to consciousness? How could anybody believe, whether sub-consciously or in any other way, in such an absurdity? And how does Rand know they believe such things? Implausible conjectures require ample and detailed evidence. Yet Rand provides no evidence at all for her belief. We are expected to accept it on her say-so alone. Why should we do so?

Rand's aesthetic categories are vague, arbitrary, empirically dubious, logically incoherent, and useless. The primary controlling principle behind them seem to be Rand's own personal tastes. They are a kind of philosophical window dressing sloppily pasted over her preferences for exciting, plot-driven stories of grand-scale heroes engaged in value conflicts. Since Rand realized that some narratives might have grand-scale characters without exciting plots, she contrived her category of Byronic Romanticism. For narratives with exciting stories but conventional characters, she devised this second, nameless category.

Rand could have saved a great deal of futile labor if she had just wrote: "I prefer novels and plays with grand-scale heroes and exciting plots." For that's really what her distinction between Romanticism and Naturalism amounts to in the end.

What I Learned From Parodying "Atlas Shrugged"

2011-05-16T15:58:00.000-07:00

Ellis Weiner, author of the excellent parody Atlas Slugged: AGAIN neatly skewers the novel's, and the movement's, epic pretensions.

"It was like shooting fish in a barrel, yes." says Weiner, "But somebody has to shoot them."

Rand and Aesthetics 9

2011-05-12T08:47:00.000-07:00

"Byronic" Romanticism. With Rand's division of free will into two parts, one pertaining to consciousness and the other to existence, she proceeds to develop a second category of Romanticism:

There are Romanticists whose basic premise, in effect, is that man possesses volition in regard to consciousness, but not to existence, i.e., in regard to his own character and choice of values, but not in regard to the possibility of achieving his goals in the physical world. The distinguishing characteristics of such writers are grand-scale themes and characters, no plots and an overwhelming sense of tragedy, the sense of a “malevolent universe.” The chief exponents of this category were poets. The leading one is Byron, whose name has been attached to this particular, “Byronic,” view of existence: its essence is the belief that man must lead a heroic life and fight for his values even though he is doomed to defeat by a malevolent fate over which he has no control.

The problem with this category is (1) the vagueness of its terms, and (2) lack of specific examples. Because of these two issues, it's difficult to determine where this category is applicable. Keep in mind that, initially, Rand claimed that Romanticism could be distinguished from Naturalism through the literary device of a plot. But here we have a type of Romaticism that is plotless. So how does one distinguish Byronic Romanticism from Naturalism?

The Byronic Romantics, Rand tells us, adopt grand-scale themes and characters. Yet so does Shakespeare in his tragedies. Why is Shakespeare not a Byronic Romantic? Rand's attempt to use the issue of volition-orientation to analyze literature again demonstrates the futility of viewing narrative works through this particular prism. Except in extreme cases (e.g., Zola for instance, who is explicit in his determinism), the issue of volition versus determinism is not applicable to literature. Most serious novelists and dramatists seek to create characters and narratives that are believable. Whether their characters are "grand-scale" or not, they are nonetheless drawn in the hope of being compelling and believable manifestations of human nature. And why should any believable representation of human nature be equated with determinism?

Curiously, Rand's equation of "journalistic" descriptions of human beings with "Naturalism" implies that a scrupulously realistic portrayal of human nature supports determinism. Why should this be so? Most likely, Rand would have tried to circumvent this troublesome implication by drawing on her selectivity principle. Yet this merely demonstrates the poverty of Rand's selectivity principle. If you are determined to over-interpret a work of art, you can read anything into it that you like. But in criticism and aesthetics, the purpose is not to over-interpret works of literature, but to appreciate and enjoy them.

When analyzed carefully, most of Rand's aesthetic categories become entirely unconvincing. Under Rand's conceptual schema, there is (generaly speaking) no way really to distinguish between Romantic and Naturalist literature, beyond recourse to Rand's own statements about a handful of specific authors. We know that Dostoevksy and Conrad are Romantics, because Rand said they are. And we know that Shakespeare and Balzac are Naturalists for the same reason. But if Rand had said nothing about these authors, would we have been able to place them "correctly" in her contrived categories? And what about all those authors Rand never mentions? What of Thomas Hardy, Jane Austen, the Bronte sisters, Dickens, Fielding, Richardson, D. H. Lawrence, George Eliot, Henry James, Mark Twain? English literature is particularly difficult to place in Rand's categories, because it tends to be so moralistic, and moralism implies volition. Yet "grand-scale" characters are not especially pentiful within the confines of the English novel.

In discussing Byronism, Rand is able to provide only one example -- that of Byron himself. She notes that "the chief exponents of this category were poets," yet refuses to name any of these poets other than the aforementioned Byron. This is a typical failing throughout Rand's philosophical writings: a failure to provide specific examples so that her readers could better evaluate her contentions. This failure suggests one of three possibilities:

(1) Rand was not familiar enough with those authors to evaluate them (meaning she hadn't read them)
(2) Those authors don't fit into her categories, so she ignored them
(3) Combination of one and two

If (1) is true, then we have to question whether Rand is even qualified to make aesthetic pronouncements on literature; and if (2) is true, then we have to question the utility of her categorizations (since if they are not applicable to most literature, what good are they?). In any case, Rand's attempt to devise aesthetic categories based on volition through which to evaluate literature are so poorly thought out that it raises suspicions of the whole thing being a ruse by which Rand could justify her personal tastes in serious literature. For, as it turns out, Rand's favorite serious authors and serious novels all turn out to be among the most consistent exemplars of Romanticism!

Rand and Aesthetics 8

2011-05-05T12:04:00.000-07:00

Volition, consciousness, and existence. Rand's contention that Romanticism is a "volition-orientated" school of art offers a curious distinction which, if applied consistently, demonstrates the bankruptcy of Rand's aesthetic categories. Those who assumed that volition applies to will or decisions are in for a bit of shock. According to Rand, volition applies, rather, to consciousness and existence:

The faculty of volition operates in regard to the two fundamental aspects of man’s life: consciousness and existence, i.e., his psychological action and his existential action, i.e., the formation of his own character and the course of action he pursues in the physical world. Therefore, in a literary work, both the characterizations and the events are to be created by the author, according to his view of the role of values in human psychology and existence (and according to the code of values he holds to be right). His characters are abstract projections, not reproductions of concretes; they are invented conceptually, not copied reportorially from the particular individuals he might have observed. The specific characters of particular individuals are merely the evidence of their particular value-choices and have no wider metaphysical significance (except as material for the study of the general principles of human psychology); they do not exhaust man’s characterological potential.

Note how Rand here connects Romanticism with her theory of human nature. For Rand, volition as applied to consciousness means (among other things) "the formation of his [a man's] own character." Man, Rand contended, is a being of "self-made soul"; it is the volitional nature of consciousness that makes him so. Romanticism, therefore, being a volition-orientated school of art, must (by implication at least) portray men as having self-made souls.

Rand's notion of volition as applicable to existence is more in line with her view of the "efficacy of reason" and her benevolent universe premise. All these conceptions are deeply problematic and, at best, only half-truths.

Rand's conviction that individuals form their own character is empirically false. Rand presents no compelling evidence in its favor; and there exists plenty of scientific evidence against it. Hence Randian Romanticism is contary to the facts of reality. Curiously enough, Rand herself nearly acknowledges as much when she criticizes "Naturalist" authors for merely providing "journalistic" characters based on the observation of "particular individuals" (i.e., real people). She even goes so far as to admit that the Naturalist authors may present insights concerning human psychology. This seems almost like an unwitting acknowledgement that, on the issue of human nature, so-called "Naturalist" authors like Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Balzac, etc. were factually correct, despite their clear rejection of Rand's own peculiar view that "man is a being of self-made soul."

Now if we are to rely upon science and experience to guide us in these matters, it must be admitted that "free will," to the extent that exists at all, is hemmed in all sides by the biological limitations of the human brain. Neuroscientists have discovered that the brain is made up of competing systems. Unity is achieved (if at all), presumably, by some kind of vague and amorphous controlling agent, which we identify with ourselves; but it is not clear that this "agent," whatever it may be, enjoys complete control or even has a will of its own. In any case, the old dichtomy of free will versus determinism may have outlived its usefulness. As Nietszche suggested over a hundred years ago, the question is not so much between free will and unfree will, as between strong wills and weak wills.

Once the evidence of science is weighed in the balance, it would seem that free will, at best, applies only to decisions based on reflection. Even here, the conception is problematic. But applying it further is not justified on empirical grounds. For this reason, Rand's assumption that volition is applicable to "consciousness and existence" is, at best, misleading, and at worse, palpably absurd. How can a volition which struggles to control its own impulses be applicable to both consciousness and existence? The most the individual can hope to control is his own decisions (and even that hope may prove illusory). Much that is applicable to both consciousness and existence is well beyond any sort of volitional choice. We don't choose our characters or the emotions and impulses that afflict us on all sides; and our choices, in terms of "existence," are very limited, hemmed in on the one side by physical necessity and on the other by the choices and actions of other individuals.

Ultimately, Rand's claim that volition is applicable to both consciousness and existence is merely an eccentric way of formulating her theory of human nature and the benevolent universe premise. However, it is deeply questionable whether the first of these assumptions is applicable to literature, and the second of any great importance. Is there any literature that portrays human beings as men of self-made souls? Does even Rand's own novels portray them as such? Curiously, Rand does not profer us a glimpse into the formative stages of Roark or Galt, where we can see them quite literally forming their own souls! Yet, if the deeper implications of Rand's own aesthetic theories are to be credited, the only difference between John Galt and James Taggart are a handful of fundamental choices. Galt could easily, had he volitionally chosen different values, become James Taggart, while Taggart could easily have become John Galt. (One wonders, if their choices had been different, would their physical attributes also change?). Nor is it clear how the category of volition as applied to existence is supposed to reveal anything insightful or even true about fundamental views of a novel's author. Doesn't Kira's death, at the end of We the Living, imply that Rand's protagonist exercises no volition over her existence and that therefore Rand is a determinist (at least in regards to volition being applicable to existence)? Meanwhile, in Jane Austen's novels, the protagonists never fail to achieve their ambition of ensnaring the victim of their romantic fancies. Does this mean that Jane Austen believed in the applicability of volition to existence? Or did she merely wish to write novels with a happy ending (happy, that is, from the feminine point of view)?

Atlas Shrugged Part 2 Trailer

2011-05-04T12:51:00.000-07:00

Classic.

(thanks bizdiets! tovarich in comments)

Can Objectivism Be Criticised?

2011-05-04T02:08:00.000-07:00

Apparently not. Neil Parille plumbs the latest depths of Objectivist apparatchik stupidity so you don't have to.

Recently, on Diana Hsieh’s podcast, a listener asked Hsieh and her co-host Greg Perkins a question about criticisms of Objectivism and their opinion of Scott Ryan’s 2003 work, Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality. Hsieh holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Colorado. Both Hsieh and Perkins are (or were) supporters of the Ayn Rand Institute.
Hsieh said she hasn’t read Ryan’s book. Perkins said that with “no exception” all the criticisms he had read of Objectivism are either “blatantly dishonest” or “based on a misunderstanding.” Perkins went on to say that he read parts of the book and concluded that Ryan was not dishonest but rather, you guessed it, didn’t understand Objectivism.

Hsieh said that criticisms of a philosophy have limited value. What is most important is whether a philosophy corresponds to the “facts of reality” and whether its principles fit with “my experience.” She did make the point that, regardless of what one thinks about established philosophies such as Kantianism and Utilitarianism, there are certain legitimate criticisms that provide a good jumping off point for discussion. On the other hand, she maintains, Objectivism hasn’t been around long enough for good critiques to develop. She then agreed with Perkins that none of Rand’s critics understand Objectivism well enough to critique it.

This is a rather striking assertion. Objectivism has been a complete philosophy since at least 1968, when the essays making up Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology were published. In the forty-three years following Objectivism has been studied by numerous supporters, sympathizers and critics. Many of these people have Ph.D.s in philosophy. Is it really the case that no one other than a philosopher associated with the ARI understands Objectivism well-enough to comment on it? Rand’s supporters always tell us (as Leonard Peikoff put it) that Rand was the greatest “salesman” philosophy ever knew. She wrote in a clear language understandable to the common man. Yet at the same time her writings are apparently so difficult to understand that not even professional philosophers can understand them. Which is it? I’d also add that it’s not as if Rand wrote a tremendous amount of pure philosophy. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology is 163 pages. The Virtue of Selfishness is 144 pages. The Romantic Manifesto is 187 pages. Throw in Galt’s Speech and the non-dated pieces in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal and it’s not more than 800 pages. Compare this to the vast corpus of John Dewey (thirty seven volumes in the collected works) and Bertrand Russell, two writers on which Rand opined without reading more than a small fraction of their relevant work. Most of Rand’s critics have probably read her key essays several times over, so if they don’t understand them maybe it’s because Rand isn’t as clear as her acolytes claim.

That being said, I think it’s the case that two of the earliest critiques of Objectivism by philosophers, William O’Neill’s With Charity Toward None (1971) and John Robbins’ Answer to Ayn Rand (1974), did not always show the best understanding of Objectivism. However, things got much better with 1986’s The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand, a collection of essays edited by Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen. All of the essays were written by professional philosophers, some of whom are well-known such as Antony Flew and Wallace Matson. In 1999 the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies began publishing, providing a forum for scholars of diverse perspectives to dialogue on Rand’s philosophy and related matters. In 2002 Greg Nyquist published Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature. In 2003 Scott Ryan published Objectivism and the Corruption of Rationality: A Critique of Ayn Rand’s Epistemology. While neither is a professional philosopher, both are well read in philosophy and, in their own ways, expand on the various critiques others have made.

I won’t summarize all the criticisms of Objectivism, but I think there are a number of stock objections put forward by more than one philosopher that are reasonable based on any “objective” reading of Rand’s philosophy
.
1. Theory of Concepts. This has been one of the most commented on aspects of Objectivism, in part because it is supposedly Rand’s greatest breakthrough. Just some of the objections: Rand presents no evidence that her theory is true; Rand provides no evidence to support her speculations about how the mind of children and animals work; Rand confuses the problems of universals with the different question of abstraction and concept formation; Rand’s theory of measurement omission cannot explain how certain abstract concepts such as “justice” are formed, nor can it explain the formation of mathematical or logical concepts.

2. Epistemology. Rand’s epistemology doesn’t seem all that well developed. However a standard critique is that Rand’s use of the stolen concept fallacy may show that skepticism is self-refuting; it does not show that the senses are generally reliable or provide us with the means of determining when our judgments about the external world are accurate. (As at least a couple of critics have mentioned, Rand herself became irate when informed by Joan Blumenthal that the tree she thought she saw outside her hospital window was really an IV pole.)

3. Ethics. This has gathered a lot of attention as well since it may be the most novel part of Objectivism. The standard critique is that Rand switches between life as the standard of value and a certain kind of life (rational and non-parasitic) as the standard. Rand is thus able to ignore obvious counterexamples such as the rational parasite who lives off the independence and intelligence of others. It also leads Objectivists to the rather odd conclusion that certain people who are apparently alive and well are “not really living” or even “dead.”

4. Politics. Perhaps the most common objection is that Rand’s advocacy of selfishness cannot provide a foundation for respecting the rights of others. There are various other criticisms such as whether voluntary contributions are sufficient to fund even a minimal state and why anarcho-capitalism is not more consistent with Rand’s politics than limited government.

5. Religion. Here the standard objection is that Rand (and most of her followers) don’t understand religion and theistic arguments well enough to critique them. Rand’s positive arguments for naturalism are weak, e.g., “existence exists” doesn’t preclude the existence of God or gods.

There is, I think, a more fundamental problem. Although Objectivists tell us how stunningly original Rand was, most of her ideas and even the way she defends them are quite similar to other thinkers and schools of philosophy. For example, as Harry Binswanger once admitted, “Objectivism is a version of empiricism.” As such it is subject to the standard criticisms of empiricism, in particular the difficulty of explaining necessity, mathematics and logic without the aid of a priori knowledge. Another example is Rand’s belief that man’s mind is tabula rasa, which makes it subject to various objections from evolutionary psychology.

As I final point, in light of all the schisms, excommunications and denunciations in Objectivism since 1968 it’s not clear who really does understand Objectivism. Recently Leonard Peikoff denounced historian of science John McCaskey over the application of Rand’s theory of concept formation to the problem of induction and its role in the history of science. Travis Norsen, who holds a Ph.D. in physics, came to McCaskey’s defense. If an Objectivist historian of science and an Objectivist physicist can’t get issues right in their own field whereas Leonard Peikoff (who has expertise in neither) can, what’s the hope for the rest of us? Indeed Peikoff has in recent years said that Objectivists who believe Moslems have a right to build an Islamic community center containing a Mosque in New York City or were considering voting Republican or abstaining in 2006 don’t understand Objectivism. Apparently Hsieh doesn’t understand Objectivism because she dissented over the Mosque issue and at least partially sided with McCaskey. Peikoff slammed Hsieh in a statement he since removed from his website.

I would mention that Hsieh and Perkins are a little extreme even by orthodox Objectivist standards here. As readers of ARCHN blog might recall, ARI scholar Onkar Ghate debated philosopher Michael Huemer a couple of years ago over Rand’s ethics. Last year saw the publication of a first volume in a series of papers arising out of Ayn Rand Society meetings. The first volume, edited by orthodox Objectivist Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox contains essays by non-Objectivists Paul Bloomfield, Christine Swanton, Helen Cullyer and Lester Hunt. ARI associated scholars Tara Smith and Darryl Wright engage in friendly dialogue with their essays.

Hsieh and Perkins ended with amusing comment that the Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature blog was really "horrible" and “verges on the not so honest.” But how could a critic of The Truth be anything other than dishonest or stupid anyway?

Rand & Aesthetics 7

2011-04-29T10:14:00.000-07:00

"Volition" in art. With her selectivity principle well in hand, Rand proceeds to make yet another invidious distinction:

An artist recreates those aspects of reality which represent his fundamental view of man and of existence. In forming a view of man’s nature, a fundamental question one must answer is whether man possesses the faculty of volition—because one’s conclusions and evaluations in regard to all the characteristics, requirements and actions of man depend on the answer.

Their opposite answers to this question constitute the respective basic premises of two broad categories of art: Romanticism, which recognizes the existence of man’s volition—and Naturalism, which denies it.

Rand's belief that one can infer the artists "fundamental view of man and of existence" reaches its most elaborate development in her Romanticism/Naturalism dichotomy. Like so many of her aesthetic concepts, it is, at best, based on a few half (or even quarter) truths, which are exaggerated way out of proportion. Some of Rand's favorite authors (i.e., those whom she regarded as Romanticists) explicitly believed in free will (e.g., Schiller, Hugo, Dostoevsky), while some of the authors Rand deplored (i.e., those whom she regarded as Naturalists) either believed in determinism or were skeptical about free will (e.g., Tolstoy, Zola, Dreiser). What impact any of this has on the actual literary productions of these authors is somewhat debatable. While there may be a few exceptions (Zola comes to mind), you really have to engage in a great deal of over-interpretation to read determinism or free will into the novels of most serious authors. Generally speaking, most great literature attempts to portray human beings realistically, which means: under the influence of various passions, desires, and sentiments. Some characters may appear to have more self-initiative and therefore could be considered as exemplars of "free will"; others characters may be more passive or impulsive, and therefore could be considered exemplars of "determinism." However, there is nothing mandatory or even insightful in such interpretations. The fact that an author portrays a passive character does not necessarily give us any insight into his "fundamental view" of man. In real life, one finds both active and passive individuals. If one wishes to present a wide variety of human character (and this is what many serious authors wish to achieve), one needs to portray both types.

For the most part, it is simply not true that an author's view on volition can be inferred from his work. This can be confirmed by a glance at Rand's own purported method of distinguishing Romanticists from Naturalists. Rand contended that the distinguishing feature separating works of Romanticism from works of Naturalism is the feature of a plot:

If man possesses volition, then the crucial aspect of his life is his choice of values—if he chooses values, then he must act to gain and/or keep them—if so, then he must set his goals and engage in purposeful action to achieve them. The literary form expressing the essence of such action is the plot.

A plot is a purposeful progression of logically connected events leading to the resolution of a climax.

The word “purposeful” in this definition has two applications: it applies to the author and to the characters of a novel. It demands that the author devise a logical structure of events, a sequence in which every major event is connected with, determined by and proceeds from the preceding events of the story—a sequence in which nothing is irrelevant, arbitrary or accidental, so that the logic of the events leads inevitably to a final resolution.

Such a sequence cannot be constructed unless the main characters of the novel are engaged in the pursuit of some purpose—unless they are motivated by some goals that direct their actions. In real life, only a process of final causation—i.e., the process of choosing a goal, then taking the steps to achieve it—can give logical continuity, coherence and meaning to a man’s actions. Only men striving to achieve a purpose can move through a meaningful series of events.

Contrary to the prevalent literary doctrines of today, it is realism that demands a plot structure in a novel. All human actions are goal-directed, consciously or subconsciously; purposelessness is contrary to man’s nature: it is a state of neurosis. Therefore, if one is to present man as he is—as he is metaphysically, by his nature, in reality—one has to present him in goal-directed action.

Is it really true, as Rand contends, that the use of plot determines whether an author believes in volition? No, it is not true. Rand's argument doesn't even make sense on its own terms, let alone anyone else's. She describes a plot as "a logical structure of events, a sequence in which every major event is connected with, determined by and proceeds from the preceding events of the story." The language Rand uses to describe a plot quite literally drips with determinism. After all, how can a logical sequence of events in which every event is "connected" and "determined" by previous events entail free will? Yes, I know, Rand insists that the events are driven by the goal-directed behavior of the story's characters. But even with this condition, Rand's concept of plot still smacks of determinism, suggesting the sort of characters who never waver from their goals, as if once a choice is made, one cannot change one's mind and adopt a different route. If free will involves, not merely the choosing a goal, but enjoying the ability to change one's goals in midstream, then her theory about plots be linked to volition breaks down. Indeed, when looked at more critically, there is no necessary connection between plots and volition: it's all a rationalization on Rand's part to justify her preference for narratives with suspenseful stories.

Just as a plotless narrative may be entirely consistent with free will (since the logical sequence of events can be broken by characters changing their minds), so a narrative with a strict plot may be entirely consistent with determinism. Coleridge regarded Oedipus Rex as one of "the three most perfect plots ever planned." And indeed, there is in Oedipus a perfect logical sequence of events in which every major event is connected, determined, and proceeds from the preceding events in the story. Yet Oedipus positively drips with determinism. Other examples plots being used to enhance sense of deterministic fatalism are Shakespeare's MacBeth and Thomas Hardy's Tess of the d'Ubervilles.

However (and this a very important point) even though Sophocles, Shakespeare, and Hardy wrote "fatalistic" narratives, this is hardly proof positive that they were determinists. Perhaps they were, perhaps not. Their choice of subject matter is not decisive in this respect. Sophocles and Shakespeare simply dramatized whatever stories happened to be commonly available. There is no reason to assume that the decision to dramatize a "fatalistic" narrative indicates either a conscious or subconscious commitment to determinism. Shakespeare also dramatized non-fatalistic plays (like most of the comedies). A few of his plays imply a stronger commitment to free will than one finds even in Rand's Atlas Shrugged. After all, in Atlas, all the villians stick to their villianous guns, as if they are all villians by necessity, rather than by choice. (I realize that Rand did not intend that her villians should be regarded as determined, but if we apply her own selectivity principle to them, what is to prevent us, logically speaking, from hoisting her on her own philosophical petard?) In Shakespeare, one finds villians changing their ways and becoming virtuous, all suggesting belief in free will. Henry IV, Measure for Measure, and The Winter's Tale are examples of this process in action. So does that prove that Shakespeare believed in volition? No, not necessarily. What it proves is that one cannot establish an author's philosophy from his choice of subject matter. There may be any number of reasons an author chooses a particular subject matter, some of which may have nothing to do with the author's core beliefs. Many authors are primarily attempting to earn a living. At bottom, Shakespeare was a businessman seeking to please to play-going public. Unlike Rand, he was not using literature to propound his own personal philosophy. Indeed, to this day, we don't have any great familiarity with Shakespeare's personal beliefs. Which of his plays comes closest to portraying his "fundamental views of man and existence" are a complete mystery (and, in the final analysis, unimportant). Each of Shakespeare's plays is a world unto itself, and many of them seem to portary vastly different "fundamental views." The world of King Lear is in many respects very different from the world of Henry V, and both diverge sharply from Comedy of Errors and The Tempest. The same can be said of the works of most great writers. There is far more between heaven and hell that can be limned in any mere philosophical system: and great literature, by being multi-faceted and portraying the whole range of existence (rather than just selecting a tiny swathe of it) seeks to illustrate this great truth.

From The ARCHNVaults: Atlas Debunked

2011-04-26T09:53:00.000-07:00

Given discussion of Atlas Shrugged's actual sales in comments, and the fact that the usual fake talking points about the so-called Library of Congress "study" are being circulated in conjunction with the movie, it's probably timely to re-run this.

Here's an excerpt from Jessica Ann Salmonson's takedown of this zombie Randian fib, linked to above:

"On UseNet, a lass posting by the name of Sue offered the following heartfelt statement as though it were a fact, in defense of Ayn Rand:

'No less a body than the Library of Congress conducted a study a number of years ago & found that Atlas Shrugged was second only to the Bible in terms of the number of people greatly influenced by it.'

That assertion is of course nonsense, but it's surprising how many credulous naifs believe in the urban folk tale about the Library of Congress having undertaken such a survey or study proving Ayn Rand the #2 author in the universe. It has been repeated on UseNet & the World Wide Web thousands of times, without anyone being able to cite the specific study, because there was none, but by weight of repeating a legend, increasing numbers of naifs begin to assume it must be true..."

Go ahead and read the whole thing.

The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies: Now Online

2011-04-26T00:12:00.000-07:00

The most - in fact, the only - open-minded Randian academic periodical now has its archives fully accessible.

As a sample, Eric Mack runs a ruler over Rand's ethics.

(Hat tip, Neil Parille)

Atlas Sweats

2011-04-23T14:16:00.000-07:00

While on Friday the Atlas Shrugged movie expanded from 299 to 425 theatres, helping to boost its overall gross a little, its crucial per-cinema returns fell by more than 70% - the most pronounced second Friday drop I could see in my quick skim of the Boxofficemojo charts. This is not a good sign for producers, and another indicator that the movie is simply running out of base. Quick, send round another mass email!

Rand and Aesthetics 6

2011-04-20T10:30:00.000-07:00

Selectivity in art. In Rand's aesthetics, there is a strong tendency to over-interpret artistic works, reading into them all kinds of intentions and "metaphysical" value judgments that exist only in Rand's imagination. We see this quite distinctly in Rand's ascription of a "malevolent" sense of life to many works of art she did not care for. If an artistic production was either too dark or conflicted, Rand assumed it expressed the artist's fatalistic sense of life. For Rand, art is a "selective re-creation" in which the artist chooses to portray what he regards as most "fundamental" and important:

By a selective re-creation, art isolates and integrates those aspects of reality which represent man’s fundamental view of himself and existence. Out of the countless number of concretes—of single, disorganized and (seemingly)contradictory attributes, actions and entities—an artist isolates the things which he regards as metaphysically essential and integrates them into a single new concrete that represents an embodied abstraction. [RM, 19–20]

Armed with this corrosive principle, Rand could invent all kinds of pretexts for disliking a given work of art -- pretexts which carry her far beyond her invidious distinction between malevolent and benevolent senses of life. Consider, as one example, Rand's remarks about a painting of a beautiful woman with a cold sore:

If one saw, in real life, a beautiful woman wearing an exquisite evening gown, with a cold sore on her lips, the blemish would mean nothing but a minor affliction, and one would ignore it. But a painting of such a woman would be a corrupt, obscenely vicious attack on man, on beauty, on all values—and one would experience a feeling of immense disgust and indignation at the artist. (There are also those who would feel something like approval and who would belong to the same moral category as the artist.)

Another example involves Rembrandt's painting of a side of beef:

That particular painting may be taken as a symbol of everything I am opposed to in art and in literature. At the age of seven, I could not understand why anyone would wish to paint or to admire pictures of dead fish, garbage cans or fat peasant women with triple chins. Today, I understand the psychological causes of such esthetic phenomena—and the more I understand, the more I oppose them.

Rand's "psychological causes" are mere rationalizations. Rand was far too ignorant about human nature, psychology and art to present any plausible insights on why other people might enjoy a work of art she deplored. Per usual with Rand, she merely rationalizes her own private tastes and preferences, which she regarded, with her typical hyper-narcisism, as the infallible criterion of the good, the beautiful, and the true. But what evidence did Rand ever present that paintings of cold sores constitute a "corrupt, obscenely vicious attack on man," or that people who admire such art are some sort of moral lepers? Why must a painting of a side of beef, or a dead fish, or fat peasant woman be regarded as corrupt or malevolent or obscene? Such paintings may have seemed so to Rand, but on what grounds did she assume that everyone must share her rather limited and excessively opinionated aesthetic reactions? What if the purpose of such art is to find beauty in simple things? What if the corruption existed, not in those who respond to Rembrandt's side of beef, but in Rand herself and her exceedingly narrow aesthetic tastes and her mania for condemning people with different views and tastes from herself?

Rand tended to admire only that art which projected a vision of man and existence she shared. Given that Rand's own view of man was, in many respects, false (a product, not of careful, scientific fact finding and experiment, but of her own wishful thinking), her attempts to use her own aesthetic judgments as a means of judging the psychology of (1) the artist, (2) other people's aesthetic reactions, should be taken with the utmost suspicion. Rand's aesthetic psychologizing is egotistic and malicious. It doesn't take into account that other people may have very different aesthetic values from herself, and may be capable of aesthetic appreciations which go well beyond Rand's excessively narrow ken. Rand, for example, seems to have experienced little if any appreciation for beauty of form. Indeed, she had no formal theory of beauty whatsoever, and never wrote or said anything substantial on the subject; all of which which seems a huge oversight for a theoretician of aesthetics.

There may be any number of reasons why someone may enjoy an artistic reproduction of a side of beef that has nothing to do with Rand's malicious psychologizing. There may be beauty in the colors, the shape, and the form of the beef, and in the entire composition. There is, after all, such a thing as art for art's sake, beauty for the sake of beauty. While there is nothing wrong in disliking such art, Rand does go beyond the pale of common decency and good manners when she begins judging (and, in this instance, morally judging) those who favor such art. Rand's emphasis on selectivity in art merely serves to encourage a deplorable tendency to over-interepret aesthetic works, rather than just enjoying them for what they are. Works of art do not have to be seen as complicated exemplifications of metaphysical value judgments. They may be nothing more than the expression of form and beauty. Rembrandt's side of beef does not have to be seen as corrupt or viscious attack on values; it may be little more than an attempt to demonstrate how something as seemingly insignificant as a side of beef may be shot through with subtle beauty.

“To The Movie Theatre, Go…Er, Not So Fast…”

2011-04-18T19:01:00.000-07:00

Regular ARCHNblog commenter Laj Ogunshola delivers his verdict on the new Atlas Shrugged movie.

Atlas Shrugged Pt. 1 is, first and foremost, a movie made for fans of the novel. I tried to imagine how I would put together a coherent narrative of the events I saw on the movie-screen without some familiarity with the source material and I could not for the life of me. Apart from dates and times, which often appeared after this or that major event, usually the disappearance of some executive, there is little help putting together the movie’s events from the screen itself. Character development is a foregone luxury in this movie, which is problematic in part because much of the core of Rand’s novel is introspective and deals with philosophical ideas.

Given the popularity of source novel for the movie’s script, I think this tactic was probably best for commercial reasons given the limited budget – after all, there are enough fans out there to enjoy the movie and at the screening I attended, there was a wide age range of people with a significant number of older folk (there is a significant libertarian population where I live). Most people, including many movie reviewers, have filled in the gaps themselves.

The movie is probably the most rushed movie that I have seen in recent memory and the corner cutting to fit the budget shows. It was overly scored in many places and lines like “This is the consequence of your policies”, “I’m cultivating a society that honors individual achievement” and others containing the word “premise” are all over the place in the movie’s dialogue. One of the opening scenes had two sets of dialogue running over each other and I wondered which I was supposed to be following. While there are some nice panoramic screenshots, some are superfluous (I’m thinking especially of a shot of the forest without the train while the train is running during its most critical test). There might be more to this than meets the eye and I would figure out if I was willing to part with more money to see the movie again, but I’ll pass.

Into the group I call “fans” for which this move was made, I would place two people: hardcore Objectivists and people who find a fountain of inspiration in Randian individualism and economics as exemplified by the novel (I’m thinking primarily of some libertarians). The movie makes no serious compromises with Ayn Rand’s philosophical vision and the world which Dagny Taggert, Hank Rearden, and John Galt inhabit, while ridiculous to most human beings who deal with everyday failure and personal limitations, is presented in its purest form to date. This will please many Objectivists and may turn off many people who are looking for entertainment. Libertarians will generally find much to laud in the anti-government stance of the movie.

There is a lot of Objectivist/libertarian Superman porn (no, I’m not referring to the PG-13 sex) on display here, and I think people who haven’t dealt extensively with Objectivists will miss this. Not often do Objectivist values get portrayed without dilution on screen and despite the limited budget and consequently compromised production values, this is the purest portrayal of Objectivism on the movie screen to date, even worse than the Fountainhead movie. Here is a short list of things that would excite anyone who expected a compromised version of the novel: businessmen telling off government officials without compromise, Rearden declaring he loves making money out loud, seeing the Objectivist heroes win rhetorical debates with incompetent villains on the basis of simple logic, and watching incompetent businessmen utilize the government as if that was their exclusive means of making money. In other words, there is no serious attempt to dumb down or revise Ayn Rand for the masses, though I can’t remember the word “Reason” being used in the movie (that might have been the compromise). The movie takes ideas as seriously as Rand does, which is more than most people do, but not seriously enough to realize that ideas need to be tested and criticized seriously to appreciate their limitations.

Heroes in this movie deal with conflicts, both external and internal, but not with struggle or growth. Because Dagny and Hank are so certain that their plans will succeed, there is really no drama surrounding the climactic event in the movie.

Lots of the action in Rand’s novels takes place in introspection and is not adequately conveyed , the most prominent example being Rearden’s conflict between supporting his family and being true to his selfish values. Yes, you know there is something wrong, but you don’t feel that Hank is burdened by it, something that comes across more clearly as Rand voices his thoughts in the novel. For a philosophy grounded so strongly in free will, the movie presents no one with difficult choices – people aren’t choosing so much as they are being puppets on the grand Objectivist philosophical stage.

What I think might make the movie work for some people who are not serious fans of Ayn Rand is that you know that the actors are trying to make something compelling, and that helps you overlook some of the technical flaws. Taylor Schilling (as Dagny Taggart) and Grant Bowler (as Hank Rearden) do decent work infusing life into the cardboard characters they have been given. In many other movies with problems like those found in Atlas Shrugged Pt. 1, the actors mail it in, but it is definitely not the case here and I believe that is what saves the movie from being as bad as it could be.

Finally, the movie holds out some hope that some of the details missing in part one will be satisfactorily resolved in a sequel. As a critic of Objectivism and its bombastic adherents bereft of significant achievements, I would bet the under on satisfactory resolution, but I think the hope for such resolution is part of the reason why people show more sympathy towards the movie than it might deserve on pure merit alone. There is a semblance of a decent story here and I think Rand’s plot comes through even when the production fails. Rand was good at plots, even if the characters she created were philosophical puppets. Moreover, there are some mysteries - affairs, sex, disappearances – which you might just want to see solved.

So what’s my overall verdict? I did watch the movie from beginning to end, and I did laugh at some of the jokes (and some of the camp too). So my personal view is mildly favorable. The positive Objectivist response to the movie will be driven primarily by its lack of compromise, but as a technical achievement, the less said of the movie, the better. I believe that this movie will also encourage efforts at developing a theatre version of the novel. The producers of this movie have cleared the way, and now others will be measured by this achievement.

As an entertainment experience, I didn’t feel moved by anything, to be frank. I watched Hanna two days before and ran through the gamut of emotions for a movie that was to some degree as cartoonish as Atlas, though far better done. Atlas Shrugged, I experienced a little intellectually, enjoyed some of its humor, but felt next to nothing for anyone on the screen, even after Dagny’s final scream. I might get my girlfriend to watch it at some point to get the viewpoint of someone who hasn’t read the book, but don’t hold your breath on this one. There is some contemporary relevance which might help the movie’s cause but my guess is if you can’t read/like the book, don’t expect to get much out of the movie. Anyone who wants to wait for this movie to come out on Netflix or TV will likely get a superior experience watching this in the comfort of their living room.

By the way, the movie’s producers want you to know this:

“This movie was created with the permission but not the promotion of the Estate of Ayn Rand.”

Enjoy!

Also, regular commenter Michael Prescott gives the movie a thumbs-up in comments.

Monday Night Whim-Worshipping

2011-04-18T03:07:00.000-07:00

Atlas Shrugged Opening "Disappointing"

2011-04-18T01:52:00.000-07:00

Box Office Mojo tells it like it is.

John Galt Revealed.

2011-04-17T18:37:00.000-07:00

He must get really, really tired of that one.

Rand and Aesthetics 5

2011-04-11T13:15:00.000-07:00

The Tragic Vision (or sense) of Life. By declaring that people tend either toward a benevolent or malevolent sense of life, Rand implied that these two options exhaust the category. However, there is a third option that trascends Rand's rather simplistic and invidious dichotomy: the tragic vision (or sense) of life. Thomas Sowell defines this sense of life as "a vision in which the inherent flaws of human beings are the fundamental problem and social contrivances are simply imperfect means of trying to cope with that problem." Sowell continues:

In the tragic vision, barbarism is always waiting in the wings and civilization is simply "a thin crust over a volcano." This vision has few solutions to offer and many painful trade-offs to ponder... This constrained vision is thus a tragic vision-- not in the sense of believing that life must always be sad and gloomy, for much happiness and fulfillment are possible within a constrained world, but tragic in limitations that cannot be overcome merely by compassion, commitment, or other virtues [such as Rand's "reason"] which those with [utopian visions] attribute to themselves.

I suspect that Rand herself, if she had been confronted with Sowell's tragic vision, would have merely conflated it with her malevolent universe premise, which would have given her a convenient rationalization for dismissing it out of hand. In any case, Rand's view of human nature and human cognition are incompatible with the tragic vision. And when Rand complains about certain works of art expressing a "malevolent sense of life," what she is often complaining about is merely that they express Sowell's tragic vision. She did not like art that expresses this vision for the simple reason that she did not share it. According to Rand's "benevolent universe premise","pain, suffering, failure do not have metaphysical significance—they do not reveal the nature of reality." [Leonard Peikoff, The Philosophy of Objectivism, Lecture 8] As one of the heroes of Atlas Shrugged puts it:

We do not think that tragedy is our natural state. We do not live in chronic dread of disaster. We do not expect disaster until we have specific reason to expect it, and when we encounter it, we are free to fight it. It is not happiness, but suffering, that we consider unnatural. It is not success but calamity that we regard as the abnormal exception in human life.

The tragic vision holds a more nuanced view. While it does not embrace the opposite conclusion (i.e., that only suffering has metaphysical significance), it recognizes the existence and importance of suffering, tragedy, and death. Moreover, by recognizing the significance of tragedy in life it encourages taking the precautions necessary to mitigate the sufferings and travails implicated in existence. Rand, with her benevolent universe premise, seems to err on the side of over-optimism, rather than prudence and caution.

Yet this Rand's tendency toward over-optimism is not the worst of it. At bottom, Rand's benevolent-malevolent dichotomy ignores one of the most important functions of serious art: namely, its ability to sublimate and generate wisdom concerning the difficult aspects of existence. Serious art does not focus or dwell on tragedy because it regards human beings as essentially doomed; no, it tackles these subjects to help individuals come to grips with them. By sublimating tragedy, it makes it more bearable. The fact is, the Objectivist view of suffering as "metaphysically insignificant" is egregiously superficial. Tragedy touches everyone. It is omnipresent in the form of human mortality, which implicates all of us. Tragedy, as a source of pain and suffering, forms as an essential part of the human experience as does happiness and success. To declare suffering and tragedy as being metaphysically insignificant is to mischaracterize the human experience.

Aristotle claimed that the tragic dramas of Aeschylus and Sophocles served as a "purge." That's part of the effect. In experiencing tragic art, one enters into the same emotional world of those afflicted with tragedy without experiencing the full horror of it. Rand might question, Why would anyone want to do such a thing? To which I would respond: It's part of the maturation process involved in becoming a thoroughly civilized human being. By transforming tragedy into an aesthetic experience, the artist makes the inevitable suffering of life easier to bear. It's all about reconciliation to the inevitable rather than glorification of "malevolence." Rand experienced tragedy and suffering in her own life when she broke with Nathaniel Branden. How did she respond to that? Did she behave as a dignified, civilized human being? Or as a vindictive, emotionally distraught, unhinged, malevolent harridan? Rand's inability to face suffering in art is mirrored by the immaturity with which she faced it in her own life.

The composer Josef Suk provides a particularly eloquent and moving example of tragic art in his Asrael Symphony. Suk originally planned the work as a memorial to his teacher and father-in-law, the famous composer Antonin Dvorak. But while composing the symphony, Suk's wife died. While struggling with intense depression, Suk completed the work. The conclusion of the symphony coincides with Suk's acceptance of his wife's death, and his subsequent emergence from depression. He portrays this, musically, by transforming the tragic theme of the last movement into the major scale, thus embuing the closing pages of the work into a paen of acceptance and even affirmation; proving, once again, that tragic art is not the indulgence in malevolent fatalism that Rand would make of it. Tragic art is not pessimistic or fatalistic, but simply realistic. It attempts, as Milton attempted in Paradise Lost, "to justify the ways of God [or reality] to men;" and by doing so, to make those ways more bearable. In accepting the difficult aspects of existence, it demonstrates its essential affirmative stance. Affirmation of human existence is not achieved by evading the unpleasant bits. True affirmation accepts human existence in its entirety, including the inevitable tragedy and suffering. It does not dwell or exalt in these things, but by sublimating them, reconciles the individual to them.

Atlas Sucks

2011-04-10T18:18:00.000-07:00

P. J. O'Rourke pans the new Atlas Shrugged movie in the WSJ. And he's sympathetic to Rand.

The Hollywood Reporter calls it "flubbed, underproduced."

More as it comes to hand.

Rand's Ethics Applied: A Case Study

2011-04-08T11:52:00.000-07:00

The daughter - poignantly named Alyssa - of an Ayn Rand devotee tells her story of her father's real life application of Rand's ethical system.

(Hat tip: Laj in comments)

Rand and Aesthetics 4

2011-03-29T09:48:00.000-07:00

Malevolent sense of life. For Objectivists, a malevolent sense of life stems from an acceptance of the malevolent universe premise (MUP), which Rand defined as "the theory that man, by his very nature, is helpless and doomed—that success, happiness, achievement are impossible to him—that emergencies, disasters, catastrophes are the norm of his life and that his primary goal is to combat them." Objectivism contends that the MUP ultimatly derives from mistaken (perhaps even evil) philosophical premises:

If you hold the wrong ideas on any fundamental philosophic issue, that will undercut or destroy the benevolent universe premise . . . . For example, any departure in metaphysics from the view that this world in which we live is reality, the full, final, absolute reality—any such departure will necessarily undercut a man’s confidence in his ability to deal with the world, and thus will inject the malevolent-universe element. The same applies in epistemology: if you conclude in any form that reason is not valid, then man has no tool of achieving values; so defeat and tragedy are unavoidable. This is true also of ethics. If men hold values incompatible with life—such as self-sacrifice and altruism—obviously they can’t achieve such values; they will soon come to feel that evil is potent, whereas they are doomed to misery, suffering, failure. It is irrational codes of ethics above all else that feed the malevolent-universe attitude in people and lead to the syndrome eloquently expressed by the philosopher Schopenhauer: “Whatever one may say, the happiest moment of the happy man is the moment of his falling asleep, and the unhappiest moment of the unhappy that of his waking. Human life must be some kind of mistake.” [Peikoff, Lectures on Objectivism]

By linking the MUP with metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical errors, Rand and her disciples have a powerful tool by which to flog those with differing aesthetic tastes. It turns out (by implication at least) that if you enjoy "malevolent" art (and for Rand, most art is malevolent) you are guilty of holding vicious philosophical premises (probably the result of not focusing your mind). There are any number of problems with the Objectivist conception of a malevolent sense of life. In the first place, how does Rand and Peikoff know that this malevolence stems from non-Objectivist philosophy? What compelling evidence do they have? Peikoff provides Schopenhauer as an example; but Schopenhauer did not believe that "reason" is invalid, nor was he an advocate of "altruism." Schopenhauer's metaphysics, by all accounts, seems to have been derived from his pessimism, rather than the other way (i.e., his metaphysics is merely a rationalization of his pessimism). The conviction that "man, by his very nature, is helpless and doomed" is actually not held by very many people. It's a view that most often comes to people when in despair or in a bad mood. It is not a normal way of looking at things. Human beings are hardwired to hope for better things down the road. There is no compelling evidence that pessimism stems from Plato and Kant. A more common attitude among mankind is what might be called the tragic sense of life. But this is entirely different complex of beliefs, attitudes, and insights than is encaspulated in Rand's malevolent sense of life. Those differences I will elucidate in my next post.

Rand and Aesthetics 3

2011-03-22T12:04:00.000-07:00

Rand's "Sense of Life" as an argument ad hominem. All ethical arguments, according to the philosopher George Santayana, ultimately resolve into an argument ad hominem. "There can be no other kind of argument in ethics," Santayana warns us. Aesthetic arguments often suffer from the same problem, particularly when they are either used as the pretence for baseless psychological speculation or moral condemnation. In Rand, we find evidence of both. She could not accept that people had different aesthetic tastes than her own. Her tastes were not only "objectively" better, but those with contrary tastes were lesser people. Worse, in her public philosophy, Rand tended to be rather coy and ambigious about all of this, as if to give herself plenty of wiggle room so that she could deny that she meant any offense. But her scorn for contrary tastes is palpable, even if it isn't always explicit. And in her private life, she didn't always hold back her scorn. People, she declared, who did not share her sense of life were psychologically incompatible with herself.

Her favorite argument ad hominem on behalf of her aesthetic tastes (and against those contrary to her own) involves her idea of the "sense of life." When Rand sought to rationalize her her various like and dislikes in the aesthetic realm, she most often reached for her sense of life construct. She had a mania for using it in a rather sweeping way against entire the aesthetic productions of specific composers, artistics, and writers. For example, in one of her more infamous ex cathedra declarations, she claimed that Beethoven's music was "malevolent." Not, mind you, for any specific works, but (at least by implication) for Beethoven's entire ouvre, including the "Ode to Joy" setting in the 9th symphony. To be sure, it's absurd to regard any of Beethoven's ouvre as "malevolent," and Rand's sweeping assessment demonstrates, if anything, the Dunning–Kruger effect, a cognitive bias in which clueless people adopt conclusions about things they are incapable of understanding. The bottom line is that Rand didn't like Beethoven because she didn't understand Beethoven, and she resented that those who appreciated what was beyond her ken. Hence the canard about "malevolence."

But Rand was not content to disparage artists and composers she did not care for or understand as malevolent, she also had to go after those who dared to understand and appreciate what she could not. Here's how she rationalized it:

It is the artist’s sense of life that controls and integrates his work, directing the innumerable choices he has to make, from the choice of subject to the subtlest details of style. It is the viewer’s or reader’s sense of life that responds to a work of art by a complex, yet automatic reaction of acceptance and approval, or rejection and condemnation.

This does not mean that a sense of life is a valid criterion of esthetic merit, either for the artist or the viewer. A sense of life is not infallible. But a sense of life is the source of art, the psychological mechanism which enables man to create a realm such as art.

The emotion involved in art is not an emotion in the ordinary meaning of the term. It is experienced more as a “sense” or a “feel,” but it has two characteristics pertaining to emotions: it is automatically immediate and it has an intense, profoundly personal (yet undefined) value-meaning to the individual experiencing it. The value involved is life, and the words naming the emotion are: “This is what life means to me.”

Regardless of the nature or content of an artist’s metaphysical views, what an art work expresses, fundamentally, under all of its lesser aspects is: “This is life as I see it.” The essential meaning of a viewer’s or reader’s response, under all of its lesser elements, is: “This is (or is not) life as I see it.”

Although Rand denies that a sense of life can be used as a "valid" criterion of aesthetic merit, this does not prevent her from using it in ad hominem attacks against art she regarded with contempt. It was not on aesthetic grounds that Rand disliked Beethoven's music, but for purely emotional reasons. Now it is important to understand that, while Rand may have regarded emotions in general with a suspicion that sometimes borders on paranoia, she did not experience that same level of distrust in regards her own emotions. Since her emotions were based on "correct" premises, they were regarded as always being entirely appropriate. And so, if Rand failed to respond emotionally to a work of art (or even worse, responded negatively), then there had to be something wrong with that work of art, irrespective of its aesthetic merits. And if someone experienced a different emotional assessment to a work of art, that demonstrated, by implication at least, that this individual's emotions were not based on "correct" premises -- that there was, in short, something seriously wrong with that person.

If a person enjoys so-called "malevolent" art, this implies they have a "malevolent" sense of life. What might that be? In my next post, I'll examine that strange conception.

Rand and Aesthetics 2

2011-03-16T09:52:00.000-07:00

Sense of Life 1. This is in many ways the most troublesome of Rand's aesthetic conceptions, precisely because it is the least implausible, particularly those inclined to accept Rand's judgments. Rand defines the notion as follows:

A sense of life is a pre-conceptual equivalent of metaphysics, an emotional, subconsciously integrated appraisal of man and of existence. It sets the nature of a man’s emotional responses and the essence of his character.

Elsewhere, Rand writes:

It is only those values which he regards or grows to regard as “important,” those which represent his implicit view of reality, that remain in a man’s subconscious and form his sense of life.
“It is important to understand things”—“It is important to obey my parents”—“It is important to act on my own”—“It is important to please other people”—“It is important to fight for what I want”—“It is important not to make enemies”—“My life is important”—“Who am I to stick my neck out?” Man is a being of self-made soul—and it is of such conclusions that the stuff of his soul is made. (By “soul” I mean
“consciousness.”) The integrated sum of a man’s basic values is his sense of life.

Rand's term "sense of life" is roughly equivalent to such terms as character and personality. Rand's sense of life is, in effect, the general drift or tendencies of the individuals emotional reactions. Two important conclusions can be drawn from the Randian conception:

A. That the "content" of a man's sense of life (i.e., his specific reactions) are not determined or even influenced by innate tendencies, but are the consequence of integrated (or "misintegrated") value judgments.

B. People tend to have either a "benevolent" or "malevolent" sense of life; or, if they seem to have parts of both, this is a result of contradictory basic premises.

The first conclusion states what should be fairly obvious: Rand's conception of an individual's sense of life is merely her view of human nature applied to the issue of aesthetic judgment. An individual's reaction to a work of art is thoroughly emotional; and this emotion, for Rand, is "automatic effect of man’s value premises." The second conclusion is one of those hidden premises in Objectivism, one implicit in the philosophy, rather than one explicitly endorsed by Rand or her chief disciples. Rand tends to break down sense of life emotional reactions into two predominant types: (1) A "benevolent" sense of life; and (2) a "malevolent" sense of life. If an individual does not easily into either category, that can only be as a result of contradictions in the basic premises that make up his character.

I have written enough posts on this blog about Rand's theory of human nature to establish that it her view of man is factually incorrect. The character or personality of the individual is not a mere product of his basic premises, ethical or otherwise. So Rand's assumption that an individual's sense of life is, in effect, his own responsibility is empirically insupportable. Moreover, it has the unfortunate effect of reducing all arguments about aesthetic judgments to an argument ad hominem (more on this in my next post).

What about conclusion B? Well, the falsity of conclusion A causes serious problems for conclusion B. Here's the chief problem: Rand tends to categorize aesthetic reactions as being either benevolent or malevolent. Yet in real life, aesthetic reactions tend to be far more complex and even nuanced than can be adequately summed up in just two words. Nor does this complexity result from mixed or contradictory premises, as is suggested in Objecitivism: it doesn't result from premises at all, but from much more complex sources, which may include innate proclivities, influences from peers, reactions to traumatic events, and independent conscious judgments. There is no support in experimental psychology for the view that emotions arise either solely or even primarily from consciously chosen (or accepted) value judgments.

Rand's conception of a sense of life is, in its overall tenor, merely an attempt to integrate her view human nature with her aesthetics. It also serves as a convenient rationale for attacking those who have aesthetic reactions that varied with Rand's own. In my next post, I will examine how Rand uses her sense of life notion to denigrate those who dared to have different aesthetic tastes from her own.

Rand and Aesthetics 1

2011-03-09T10:29:00.000-08:00

Intro. Aesthetics, if it aspires to be in the least rational, sane, and just, must seek to explain, rather than judge, personal responses to works of art. When aesthetics seeks to justify a specific set of preferences, it degenerates into mere special pleading and rationalization.

Rand's foremost consideration in her aesthetics was to judge. She belonged to what I call the malicious school of aesthetic criticism: it was not enough for Rand merely to glorify her own preferences, she also had to denigrate the preferences of those with different aesthetic tastes. Her entire aesthetics seems orientated toward disparagement. And for Rand, there was plenty to disparage. She appears to have disliked most of what passed for art. Her remarks on specific works of art are nearly always, in some respect, negative. Rand simply did not care for most of what passes for great art in Western Civilization. People who don't like most art usually don't make best aestheticians. Combine that with a mania for judging (particularly for malicious, narcissistic judging), and you have a recipe for philosophical malfeasance on a grand scale. The Objectivist aesthetics is largely a rationalization of Rand's own aesthetic prejudices and hatreds. Rand's actual doctrine is littered with overly vague generalizations, historical inaccuracies, false attributions, and a congenital incapacity to understand any work of art she failed to respond to. Despite all her high talk about reason and objectivity, her aesthetics remains rooted in her own blatantly subjective feelings. Given how different her emotional reactions were from those of most educated people, one wonders what business she had dabbling in aesthetics.

Rand's aesthetic tastes largely revolve around six main prejudices: (1) prejudice in favor of Rand's "ideal" man, i.e., the man who has "no inner conflicts," whose "mind and his emotions are integrated," and whose "consciousness is in perfect harmony"; (2) discomfort with tragedy; (3) mania for realistic description or literal representation; (4) strong preference for plot over character in literature; (4) indifference to most forms of beauty, particularly beauty of nature; (6) indiference, sometimes even hostility, to most aesthetic forms. These six prejudices make up the bulk of what could be called Rand's "real" aestethics. Her official aesthetics, though inspired by these prejudices, takes on a different aspect, as we shall see in the ensuing posts.

Atlas Shrugged Latest:

2011-03-04T18:42:00.000-08:00

Here's The Daily Caller's John Aglialoro interview in full, including the bizarroworld possibility of a musical adaption of the third part.

Meanwhile the word of mouth suggesting a stinker continues to grow - as does the reported budget, now up to $20m - with Filmstage giving it a C- and describing the film as "incomprehensible gibberish" that is "neither compelling nor entertaining".

Rand and Empirical Responsibility 15

2011-03-04T09:17:00.000-08:00

“Man’s survival requires that those who think be free of the interference of those who don’t.” I will assume that Rand doesn't mean this literally, for it would be absurd to believe that people who don't think could interfere with people who do. After all, who doesn't think at least on some level? The severely mentally retarded? The severely brain damaged? I suspect what Rand meant to say is, Man's survival requires that those who think well be free of the interference of those who don't think well. In the face of the evidence, this is clearly an exaggeration. Men who think poorly have been interfering with their betters for centuries, and yet somehow the human race has managed to survive. Rand provides no evidence to the contrary because no such evidence exists.

“All the evils, abuses, and iniquities, popularly ascribed to businessmen and to capitalism, were not caused by an unregulated economy or by a free market, but by government intervention into the economy.” Well, at least Rand tried to provide a little evidence for this one in her article praising Vanderbilt and James Hill. Unfortunately, the little evidence she provided is one sided and riddled with confirmation bias. Moreover, a broad sweeping statement such as Rand's requires more than just a little evidence. What about the evils of 14 hour work days? What about the evils of child labor? Yes, I know, Rand argues these things were necessary in the constitution of things, and that the only possible alternative would have been starvation for the workers and/or children involved; but they were an evil nonetheless, nor were they an evil caused by government interference.

“A ‘mixed economy’ is a society in the process of committing suicide.” What does it mean to say "in the process of committing suicide"? The vagueness of the expression makes Rand's statement impossible to either confirm or deny on the basis of evidence. All societies throughout human history have had some form of what Rand would call a "mixed economy." And all nations, except those currently prevailing, have at some point collapsed or metamorphized into something else. Nor does there exist any necessary connection between freedom and longevity. Athens was freer than Sparta; yet Athens' period of freedom was relatively brief; Sparta flourished for seven centuries. History is full of examples of less free societies outlasting, even conquering, more free ones. Nor is there any reason to believe that an "unmixed" economy, assuming such a phenomenon even capable (per impossible) of existing, would not at some point face the tolling bells.

Trains=Collectivism

2011-03-01T14:19:00.000-08:00

According George Will, anyway, who writes:

...the real reason for progressives’ passion for trains is their goal of diminishing Americans’ individualism in order to make them more amenable to collectivism.

Gee, who knew? Ironically, this is just the kind of phoney, hilarious psychologising Rand specialised in. (Via Krugman)

Watch Another So-Bad-It’s-Fun Clip From Atlas Shrugged: The Movie

2011-03-01T13:24:00.000-08:00

Watch Another So-Bad-It’s-Fun Clip From Atlas Shrugged: The Movie

This also in from New York Magazine's entertainment section. And yes, it's pretty bad alright. It reminds me of the immortal Libby Gelman Waxner's line: it's like this movie was designed by NASA to see how long people could last in space without entertainment.

Atlas Shrugged Movie: Actually Really Bad After All

2011-03-01T13:05:00.000-08:00

More in line with expectations, Comingsoon.net rates the movie 2/10, describing it as a "laughable failure" and "wholly unappealing".

Stay tuned.

Atlas Shrugged Movie in Actually Quite Good Shock.

2011-02-25T20:11:00.001-08:00

At least according to Matt Welch at Reason online. In ARCHNblog comments, Michael Prescott points us to another favorable review. With a budget of around ~~$10m~~ $15m - ~~twice~~ three times that originally reported and ~~around~~ twice that of a hit Coen brothers movie like Fargo - it looks like it may well be better than its thin trailer promised.

Now to the real drama: will the Ayn Rand Institute even acknowledge the movie's existence? Their front page column Ayn Rand In The Culture, and even the link that features press releases about "Atlas Shrugged" somehow has failed to notice it.

Rand and Empirical Responsibility 14

2011-02-24T10:03:00.000-08:00

“Self-esteem is reliance on one’s power to think.” It's not clear whether this is meant as a definition or as a statement of fact. Objectivists often confuse the one with the other. A definition merely defines how a term is used. One may define one's terms as one pleases, but once a definition is granted, one needs to stay consistent to the usuage. If Rand's statement was meant as a definition, she is guilty of equivocation; for she does not always stick to that particular usage.

Self-esteem, in Rand and other writers, generally means esteeming one's self. Whether such esteem is based on a reliance of one's power to think is an assertion about matters of fact that requires evidence. Such evidence that is commonly available suggests that there is little relation between personal achievement (whether in thinking or in other areas) and self-esteem. American school children test highest for self-esteem and yet rank among the bottom in academic achievement. Criminals also test remarkably high for self-esteem, although their powers of thought are often sub-mediocre. Sometimes it is precisely who think well of themselves who lack the motivation necessary to become powerful thinkers. Why should they? They think themselves great as it is. Why bother with self-improvement if you already think you're great? On the other hand, there are those whose very lack of self-esteem serves as a motivator for self-improvement.

“Only a rationally selfish man, a man of self-esteem, is capable of love.” This statement packs three assertions, any one of which could easily be dismissed on empirical grounds. It assumes that, in order to be capable of love, one must be (1) rational, (2) selfish and (3) a man of self-esteem. Does Rand provide any evidence of these assertions? No. Indeed, they are hardly plausible. If Rand's view was true, we would have to conclude that most people are incapable of love. Would any sane person actually believe such a thing?

“Humility is not a recognition of one’s failings, but a rejection of morality.” So are humble people immoral (or amoral)? Again, we are confronted by a grossly implausible statement asserted without a jot of evidence to support it. Worse, Rand seems to be trying to redefine humility without making it entirely clear that she is doing so. Rand's tendency to redefine terms, not merely for herself, but for others, constitutes an egregious intellectual vice. She is, in effect, putting words in other people mouths and then condemning them on that basis. If she wishes to redefine humility, then she should do so in forthright terms, with a complete understanding that her usuage of the word has nothing to do with how the word is used in common discourse. And when chooses to use her redefined term in some controversial statement about matters of fact, she needs to back up her statement with factual evidence. Redefinition does not constitute proof.

Rand and Empirical Responsibility 13

2011-02-15T10:49:00.000-08:00

“[Intellectual appeasement] is an attempt to apologize for his intellectual concerns and to escape from the loneliness of a thinker by professing that his thinking is dedicated to some social-altruistic goal.” Rand, despite her cluelessness about human nature, nevertheless couldn't help tossing off wildly speculative remarks about the more obscure motivations of the human animal. Where she comes up with some of this stuff is anyone's guess. How, for example, does she know that intellectual appeasement is merely an attempt to apologize for being concerned about intellectual matters? Where would she get such a notion? Where on earth does she come up with the idea that intellectual appeasement involves an "escape from loneliness"? What evidence does she have that such is the case?

Even as a mere conjecture or hypothesis, Rand's remark is not very plausible; yet she emits it as if it were a palpable certainty. On the face of it, Rand is merely indulging in psychological speculation about matters she knows little, if anything, about. The causes of intellectual appeasement, whatever they might be, probably vary from one individual to another. Whether loneliness or self-contempt is the main cause can only be determined (if it can be determined at all) on a case by case basis. In the meantime, a more plausible explanation for intellectual appeasement is to note that most intellectuals, being accustomed to a mode of living that eschews violence, simply either don't have or have never developed any special aptitude for violence, and are therefore prone to cowardice and appeasement.

“Tribalism is … a logical consequence of modern philosophy.” This is a specific application of Rand's theory of history. The trouble with such statements is that, because they are so broad and sweeping, they can neither be corroborated or refuted by empirical evidence. They are merely highly speculative hypotheses, and the question is whether they are plausible in relation to such facts that are known.

Rand makes no attempt to bring any kind of facts in to support her statement, beyond what she gleans from her distorted view of modern philosophy. Despite Rand's tendency to blur distinctions between views that she disagrees with, it would be mistake to regard so-called "modern" philosophy as a mere homogenuous mass. Modern philosophy includes many different positions, often virulently at odds with other positions. It is implausible to suppose that so many disparate views could all lead to tribalism.

But even more to the point is to reflect on the fact that tribalism, historically, has been the default position for the human race. For hundreds of thousands of years, human beings have existed in tribes; whereas the extended order leading to freedom and civilization only began to develop very recently, in the last ten thousands years or so. Since modern philosophy did not exist during mankind's long tutelage in the hunter-gatherer stage of development, it can't be regarded as a cause of whatever form of tribalism may have been prevalent during those tedious millenia. Indeed, it is far more plausible to suppose that tribalism is a hard-wired feature of human nature, prominent in many human beings, and only weaker or non-existent within the exceptional few. After all, we find its dominance, not only throughout mankind's history, but even in the present, in much of the 3rd world and even among 1st world minorities and ethnic groups. Most of the people in these groups are utterly innocent of so-called "modern" philosophy and would probably be incapable of understanding it were it introduced to them. Whatever strains of tribalism may be found in this or that species of modern philosophy probably has its roots in human psychological tendencies. Philosophy, as Nietzsche noticed more than hundred years ago and which cognitive science and experimental psychology continues to corroborate, often degenerates into a mere rationalization of the the desires, sentiments, and interests that afflict various strains of human nature. In the face of everything we know, Rand's conviction that the causation runs the other way, so that philosophy determines human nature, is rather implausible.

The Unsocial Network

2011-02-12T13:48:00.000-08:00

The trailer for Atlas Shrugged Part 1 is up. It feels roughly like a two hour version of the opening narration in Star Wars Episode One - taxation of trade routes is in dispute! - set to stock photography.

For a bit of fun, here's Hank Rearden (Grant Bowler) in a previous role:

Would John Galt Collect Social Security?

2011-02-03T22:30:00.000-08:00

Everyone's been having fun with the story of Rand and her husband collecting Social Security benefits (at least US$52,000 worth it seems) as well as ~~possibly~~ very likely Medicare. Reason provides an evenhanded summary along with the standard Randian defense that it's ok so long as the recipient "regards it as restitution and opposes all forms of welfare statism."

It's a predictable libertarians-have-to-drive-on-state-highways line of argument (ie it's ok so long as you complain vociferously about statist tyranny while you're driving) and at first glance seems to be straightforward. But I think a subtlety here is being overlooked that undermines this angle.

Freelance writer Patia Stephens, who seems to have picked up on this story first, quotes the original interview by the ARI's Scott McConnell (now in the "100 Voices: An Oral History of Ayn Rand" volume) with New York social worker Evva Joan Pryor from whence this story emerged. Let's go to the tape:

“She [Rand] was coming to a point in her life where she was going to receive the very thing she didn’t like, which was Medicare and Social Security,” Pryor told McConnell. “I remember telling her that this was going to be difficult. For me to do my job she had to recognize that there were exceptions to her theory. So that started our political discussions. From there on – with gusto – we argued all the time.

“The initial argument was on greed,” Pryor continued. “She had to see that there was such a thing as greed in this world. Doctors could cost an awful lot more money than books earn, and she could be totally wiped out by medical bills if she didn’t watch it. Since she had worked her entire life, and had paid into Social Security, she had a right to it. She didn’t feel that an individual should take help.”

McConnell asked: “And did she agree with you about Medicare and Social Security?”

Pryor replied: “After several meetings and arguments, she gave me her power of attorney to deal with all matters having to do with health and Social Security. Whether she agreed or not is not the issue, she saw the necessity for both her and Frank. She was never involved other than to sign the power of attorney; I did the rest.”

The interesting point here is that far from having a clear conscience on the issue, as her defenders try to portray, Rand in fact is obviously conflicted, and only acquiesces after several meetings and arguments - and even then tries to distance herself from the decision by giving power of attorney to the social worker to apply for the government benefits, rather than simply doing it herself. Why this extreme reluctance, when she supposedly had provided her own philosophical get-out-of-jail-clause? I think that Rand sensed that her line of argument was in fact rather weak. After all, if she had simply paid for her own private medical insurance, or had sufficiently saved for her own retirement, she could have set a powerful example of uncompromising self-reliance in reality, and into old age (an area her virile fictional heroes never get to experience). Further, libertarian heroines such as her former mentor Isabel Paterson and Rose Wilder Lane set just such examples themselves, both declining to enrol in what they considered fundamentally immoral programs. Yet here was Rand, taking the government handouts. Rand well understood the power of symbolism; perhaps it was this image that stuck in her craw. There are many things she could have done with that regular social welfare cheque that could have put a PR thumb in the eye of statist authority - for example, announcing she'd fund The Objectivist with it, or donating it an anti-tax foundation or similar prank. Surely this is the kind of thing Howard Roark or John Galt would have done, rather than give a social worker power of attorney to quietly accept it for them.

Further, given her advocation of life-long self-responsibility, of thinking outside of the "range of the moment" to the long-term consequences of one's actions, it is puzzling how, given her undoubtedly considerable means she might now find herself needing to take this less than ideal option. Is it simply because, like so many people late in life, she found she'd ended up in a situation she didn't quite expect? And if so, how is the average income earner supposed to allow for their future circumstances any better?

In the end, Rand was an elderly woman of frail health with no family to support her, the fearful burden of a husband suffering from dementia, and facing a future that their means might not be sufficient for. In other words, she was the very person government programs such as Medicare and Social Security was designed for. Equally naturally, she looked at the options and took the money. The only question is why she would still consider the fact that option even existed to be ultimately evil.

Rand and Empirical Responsibility 12

2011-02-03T09:56:00.000-08:00

“The process of forming a concept is not complete until its constituent units have been integrated into a single mental unit by means of a specific word.” This assertion reflects Rand's bias against tacit knowledge. Rand was always mistrustful of anything that smacked of "just knowing." She shared the rationalist's contempt for non-explicated knowledge. The problem with this attitude is that does not square with what is known as the "cognitive unconscious," which plays a much larger role in cognition than Rand could have ever imagined. Hence the pressing need for Objectivists to come up with a large body of compelling, scientifically validated evidence to back Rand's extraordinary assertion about the necessity of words for the "completion" of a concept. The fact is, there are far more meanings (i.e., concepts) than there are words to stand for them. To declare that these unworded meanings are incomplete is sheer prejudice. Indeed, Rand herself seems to have thought better of it; for her notion of "implicit concept" contradicts her view that concepts require explicit words.

“The battle of human history is fought and determined by those who are predominantly consistent, those who … are committed to and motivated by their chosen psycho-epistemology and its corollary view of existence.” Leonard Peikoff, Rand's most orthodox disciple, has attempted to provide evidence for this view in his book Ominous Parallels. Unfortunately, that book cannot be taken very seriously. It suffers from an extreme case of confirmation bias. It has eyes for only that evidence which supports Rand's view, while ignoring the large body of evidence that goes against it. Worse, it even distorts and mauls such evidence that is brought forth to support the Objectivist position.

Consider, as one example, Peikoff's treatment of Kant, who is regarded, by both Rand and Peikoff, as a "predominantly consistent" advocate of all that they deplore. This, however, is not a very compelling position, for a whole host of reasons. In the first place, hardly anyone outside of Objectivism regards Rand's view of Kant as fair or accurate. But even if it were, questions arise over Kant's supposed consistency. Kant, for example, believed in the ideality of time, space, and causality; which means, if he had been "predominantly consistent", he would have been forced to regard all multiple and successive experiences as purely mental and imaginary. Nonetheless, Kant had no difficulty squaring these bizarre speculative allegiances with his work on astronomy and in his comforting postulates about immortality. Kant was also one of the principle figures of the so-called "Enlightenment," and gave voice to many things esteemed by Rand and her disciples. This aspect of Kant, while acknowledged by Peikoff, is dismissed as "inessential" and inconsequential. Why so? Even on Objectivist assumptions, Kant's advocacy of Enlightenment ideals must be regarded as a deep and abiding inconsistency.

“Only three brief periods of history were culturally dominated by a philosophy of reason: ancient Greece, the Renaissance, the nineteenth century.” This statement is so vague it's not clear its empirically testable. But to the extent that any meaning can be drawn from it, it is largely false. If by "reason" we mean something logical, we find the same examples of illogic and non-logic governing all periods of history. The human being is not a logical animal, but a sentimental animal. Ancient Greece, for example, was still rife with superstition; and Plato, Socrates, and even Aristotle, despite all their fine words about "reason," were hardly shining exemplars of scientific thinking. The Renaissance was the age of Luther and Savronola; it featured a revival of interest in the mysticism of Plato. The 19th Century, on the other hand, was "philosophically" dominated, in Germany, England, and America, by the horrors of neo-Hegelianism (although this so-called domination played hardly any influence outside of academia).

The assault on man’s conceptual faculty has been accelerating since Kant, widening the breach between man’s mind and reality. Given the immense progress made in science and medicine made since the 18th century, this is a grossly implausible view. In the 18th century, doctors bled people. Men rode around on horses. Plows were drawn by ox or mules. The majority of people in the West believed in the literal truth of Genesis. Anti-semitism and various forms of racism were rife. Blacks were bought in Africa and sold to colonists in the New World. It's not clear, given everything that has been learned in the interval, how anyone with even a rudimentary of history can believe that the breach between man's mind and reality has been "widening" since the 18th century.