In which we briefly outline some of the philosophic underpinnings of ARCHNblogs critiques.
"(Unlike natural laws) norms and normative laws can be made and changed by man, more especially by a decision or convention to alter them...This decision can never be derived from facts (or from statements of facts), although they pertain to facts...Hence, the "critical dualism" is properly a dualism of facts and decisions....This dualism of facts and decisions is, I believe, fundamental. Facts as such have no meaning; they can gain it only through our decisions."
"It must, of course, be admitted that the view that norms are conventional or artifical indicates that there will be a certain element of arbitrariness involved, i.e. that there may be different systems of norms between which there is not much to choose...But artificiality by no means implies full arbitrariness. Mathematical calculi, for instance, or symphonies, or plays, are highly artificial, yet it does not follow that one calculus or symphony or play is just as good as any other. Man has created new worlds--of language, of music, of poetry, of science, and the most important of these is the world of the moral demands for equality, for freedom, and for helping the weak....Our comparison is only intended to show that the view that moral decisions rest with us does not imply that they are entirely arbitrary." - Karl Popper, Chapter 5, Nature and Convention, "The Open Society And Its Enemies"
4 comments:
Tangentially related comment:
I discovered Popper last year, and it was a much needed breath of fresh air. I recommend Popper for those Objectivists who believe in an objective reality and in the value of rationality, but find themselves disagreeing with Rand's conclusions.
With Objectivism, there is an emphasis on pride, achievement, and the moral judgment of others based on absolute true knowledge. The Popperian counterparts are intellectual modesty, problem-solving, and tolerance:
"[Rational Criticism] is a way of thinking, and even a way of living: a readiness to listen to critical arguments, to search for one's own mistakes, and to learn from them. It is, fundamentally, an attitude that I have tried to formulate (perhaps first in 1932) in the following two lines: 'I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth'."
During the last week's discussions on ObjectivistLiving, the subject of flaws in Objectivism came up tangentially (of all places on the thread titled "Barbara Branden's 50th anniversary tribute to "Atlas'"). A few of the "flaws" named by one poster, I think are sort of silly; some of the other flaws named I think actually are flaws but not very basic. (I won't give details at the moment, since doing so would deflect from my current point.) I got to thinking about my own list of flaws. The post above by an "Anonymous" triggered something major. It isn't that I haven't thought of this before, but I'm not sure if I've previously said it in quite this way:
I propose that the most encompassing flaw of Objectivism is false advertising. Although Objectivism claims to be a philosophy of reason, what it often is instead is a substitute (for supernaturalist dogma) absolutism. Rand defines "reason" as "the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses." This definition is empiricist-sounding. But in practice the way she arrives at much of what she says is by deduction from supposed axiomatic "first principles" combined with ex cathedra pronouncement. All the while she's proceeding thus, she makes reference to "the facts of reality" ("what are the facts of reality which give rise to...?"), thereby presenting an appearance of arriving at her conclusions by something approaching a scientific methodology. However, a prevalent clue to how foreign scientific methodology was to her way of thinking is her insistence on "certainty." Where in her published writings is there to be found such a sentiment as "maybe I'm wrong"? Every now and then in her journals she's tentative -- most of all in her diary entries analyzing her relationship with Nathaniel and speculating about his psychology. But even there, though she's tentative about some of the hypotheses she poses, she gives no sign of wondering if maybe she might somehow be contributing to their difficulties. More broadly, and across the board in the intellectual explorings recorded in her journals, she doesn't entertain the possibility of error in her own thinking. She doesn't display the (at least ideal, even if not always adopted) scientific attitude of perpetual searching for the falsifying case. But it's an important hallmark of "reason" as I think of "reason" constantly to be looking for one's own mistakes. Thus I would say that what Objectivism teaches as being the way of "reason" isn't that; instead, the attitude described by Popper (see the quote from Popper in the post above) is the way "reason" operates.
Ellen
Ellen,
I think I would ask the question in a slightly different way: Did Rand ever describe a position she disagreed with as simply a mistake instead of a combination mistake/evil idea?
Anon:
>I recommend Popper for those Objectivists who believe in an objective reality and in the value of rationality, but find themselves disagreeing with Rand's conclusions.
So do I, Anon.
Ellen:
>I propose that the most encompassing flaw of Objectivism is false advertising.
I agree. Almost nothing works as advertised.
>Where in her published writings is there to be found such a sentiment as "maybe I'm wrong"?
Offhand, I recall her being quite tentative in her essay about voluntary government funding in the VOS; but that was memorable for its rarity. Peikoff talks about being "self-critical" now and again, I think. But that's quite different from actually doing it.
But then it's rather hard to think self-critically when you've already proclaimed such an act is "using reason to destroy reason", undermining the efficacy of man's mind etc.
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