You must understand that there are two ways of contending, by Law, and by force: The first is proper to men; the second to beasts; but because many times the first is insufficient, recourse must be had to the second…. Seeing, therefore, it is of such importance to a Prince to take upon him the nature and disposition of a beast, of all the whole flock, he ought to imitate the Lion and the Fox; for the Lion is in danger of toils and snares, and the Fox of the Wolf: so that he must be a Fox to find the snares, and a Lion to fright away the Wolves…
Machiavelli’s archetype of the fox (roughly) corresponds to Pareto’s combination-instinct residue; while the archetype of the lion (roughly) corresponds to Pareto’s group-persistence residue. What Pareto adds to Machiavelli’s archetypes (besides more accurate delineation of the archetypes) is an important insight alluded to in the last post. Machiavelli’s ideal is that the Prince combine the cunning of the fox with the strength (i.e., the ability and willingness to use force) of the lion. “But such a happy combination occurs only for a few individuals,” notes Pareto. “In the majority of cases people who rely on their wits are or become less fitted to use violence, and vice versa.” In other words, people (particularly rulers) tend to be either lions or foxes.
Pareto developed this theory from his extensive knowledge of history. Particularly influential was the conflict between Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War. Athens is a typical example of a state governed by foxes, while Sparta is a typical example of a state governed largely by lions. The cultural and political elite of Athens were remarkably individualistic and innovative; indeed, it was these attributes that helped make this city state the cradle of Western civilization—the birthplace of European literature, philosophy, and political theory. Sparta, on the other hand, was a cultural backwater. Innovation in Sparta was a crime. The individual counted for very little, his initiative strangled in a web of custom and religion. Yet in the Peloponnesian war, Sparta conquered Athens.
Pareto’s view of “instinct-combination” and “group-persistence” residues was partly devised to try to explain how a sophisticated, cultured, individualistic “advanced” society like Athens could ever lose a war to a “tribalistic,” uncultured, “primitive” society such as Sparta (or Macedonia and Rome, which also conquered Athens). It seems rather counter-intuitive that the more advanced polity should ever lose to the less advanced. Yet history is replete with examples of the less advanced conquering the more advanced in war. Here’s merely a short list thrown together at the spur of the moment:
- Sparta over Athens
- Macedonia over Athens
- Rome over Athens
- Rome over Carthage
- Barbarians over Rome
- Mongols over China
- England over France (100 years war)
- Spain, Austria, France over Renaissance Italy
- Roundheads over Cavaliers (English Civil War)
- French Revolutionists over Old Regime
- Prussia over France (Franco-Prussian War)
The fact that there are many counter examples in the other direction is of no relevance to the point at issue. After all, one would expect the more advanced nation to prevail in nearly all cases. What is surprising (and in need of explanation) is how the less advanced ever prevails.
How would Objectivism explain the victory of the less advanced over the more advanced nation, of the lion over the fox? Objectivism would probably attribute it to bad philosophical ideas in the fox. Yet this is not convincing, because in most cases, the less advanced nation, governed by lions (i.e., group-persistence residues) will cherish even worse philosophical notions. The ideas predominant in Periclean Athens, whatever flaws or “contradictions” they may have exhibited, were clearly superior to the “tribalistic” and “superstitious” notions prevailing in Sparta. Athens was much more individualistic and “rational” (at least in its philosophy) than Sparta. So how did Sparta defeat Athens?
Pareto gives a couple reasons:
It is plain enough that what was lacking in Athens was such a balance between the combination instincts and the residues of group-persistence that while the combination-instincts encouraged adventure, the group-persistences would supplement them with perseverance and firmness of resolve required for success in the schemes imagined...
Athens had generals of the greatest ability at that time, but she could neither keep them nor take advantage of them…. Where sentiments of group-persistence are not very strong, people readily surrender to the momentary impulse without giving adequate thought to the future, forgetting the larger interests of the community under the sway of uncontrolled appetites. The Athenians cared little for their generals. They tormented them, persecuted them, condemned them, lost them through fault of their own. The lessons taught by past experience are of no avail for the future, there being no sense of group-persistence.
A third prominent reason for Sparta’s victory over Athens is the individualism prevailing in Athens (an indication of a weakening of group-persistences) eroded discipline and the stability of command (as is evinced by how the Athenians treated their generals). Discipline, hierarchy, willingness to serve a leader are qualities advantageous in battle (and which are strengthened by group-persistence sentiments).
A fourth prominent reason for Sparta’s victory stems from the courage and staunchness in battle provided by group-persistence residues. While the Athenians were capable of displaying courage in battle, no one fought as bravely or as with as much determination as the Spartans, who placed honor above all other considerations, including those of self-preservation. Pareto repeatedly identified group-persistence residues with the willingness and the ability to use violence. Where group-persistence residues are intense, people have a “living” faith: that is, they have ideals they are willing to die for (rather than just argue about).
In Pareto’s vision of human nature, rationality doesn’t have much to do with conduct, “for human beings are guided primarily by sentiment.” Therefore, in order to motivate human beings to defend their country and avoid the disastrous effects of pursuing self-interest in a non-rational way, some type of sentiment is required to spur “human beings to the required activities.” In this respect, “the chief utility of the sentiments of group-persistence is the resistance they offer to harmful inclinations of individual interest and to the impetuous sweep of passions.” But the very utility provided by group-persistence residues is itself problematic, since the group-persistence residues have produce other effects that Objectivists (among others) will deplore. These other effects be the subject of my next post.
7 comments:
Greg,
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A fourth prominent reason for Sparta’s victory stems from the courage and staunchness in battle provided by group-persistence residues. While the Athenians were capable of displaying courage in battle, no one fought as bravely or as with as much determination as the Spartans, who placed honor above all other considerations, including those of self-preservation. Pareto repeatedly identified group-persistence residues with the willingness and the ability to use violence. Where group-persistence residues are intense, people have a “living” faith: that is, they have ideals they are willing to die for (rather than just argue about).
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There's probably a lot of that group-persistence residue in Islamic states right now, unfortunately, Especially among the most extreme groups like the Taliban. A lot of our Jihadist enemies seem utterly eager to die. Remember 9/11 and Look at all suicide bomber attacks that happen in Israel day after day. Its frightening how some people hate us so much and are eager to die for an Insane cause.
What role do you think group persistence residue plays in the Islamic Jihadist mind set?
Damien,
You're right: Islamic states suffer from an over-abundance of ultra-intense group-persistence residues. It's both their greatest strength and their greatest weakness. It's their strength because it gives many of them the courage to fight and even to die for their cause (which is to destroy the West). It's their greatest weakness because those same group-persistence sentiments have turned their societies into nauseating tyrannies that crush innovation and initiative and allow some of the worst sort of human beings to lord it over everyone else. I don't believe any of these Islamic societies, including Iran, would pose a threat to the West if it were not for countries like Russia and China helping them develop WMD technology. On their own, such nations can't develop the kind of scientific culture necessary to build and develop WMD technology on their own. They need help from the outside, from countries that aren't so choked and strangled by group-persistence sentiments.
Greg,
One question is, why are Russia and China helping them? What exactly do they think they'll get out of it? Is it the money, or is it a case of their governments thinking that the enemy of my enemy is my friend mentality? I don't think Russia or China particularly like the United states. Could that be their motivation?
I do not believe that this reading of Machiavelli or of politics in general is correct.
The Fox I have always believed is the ability to get what you want through stealth or at least without open violence Whereas Lion is the ability to get what you want through the open use of force.
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Furthermore Machiavelli was as (or even more) concerned with internal enemies of regimes as he was with external enemies of regimes, and therefore what he recommends has as much to do with Propaganda versus Crackdowns on dissidents As it does with Intel and Diplomacy versus Open Warfare. Machiavelli's dichotomy is really more akin to the modern debate on soft power versus hard power.
Second, You're use of the word advanced seems wrong and looking at your list, possibly meaningless.
Take for instance conflicts 9 (Roundheads over Cavaliers (English Civil War)) and 10 (French Revolutionists over Old Regime). Roundheads and Cavaliers (as well as French Radicals versus the Bourbon Kings) come from the same cultural mileau, and as such cannot be considered more or less advanced than each other with respect to philosophical (and far more important when fighting) technical knowledge.
Furthermore Conflicts 1-4,7,and 11 concern international belligerents with similar technological capabilities, as well as similar cultural institutions. Historians still have not figured out 5 (But note that when the Western Roman Empire fell for good both Romans and Barbarians were Christians, and Barbarians were commonly hired to fill out Western Roman Armies).
While conflict 6 proves the point it proves it trivially; the Mongols had a lower technological base overall, but their tactics were better (Horse Archers that were able to shoot and move simultaneously can conquer a whole lot). So while China had better technology overall, the Mongols had a particular technology that the Chinese lacked.
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Oh By the way, the Spartans won the Peloponnesian war because they won the battle of Aegospotami. For the entire conflict the Athenian navy was larger and simply better than the Spartan one. The Athenians built their navy in order to be able to manage far flung colonies. All of the Spartan possessions were on the Peloponnesian peninsula, with Sparta, so they never needed a navy to get anywhere. The Athenian nation was also more dependent on trade, particularly from the Black Ssea area, in order to feed the people of Athens, Sparta was not. Sparta decided to build a navy to counteract Athenian military advantage and to be able to support members of the Peloponnesian league that happened to be islands. Sparta never did manage to support any islands, but they were in a situation where they had a navy they could lose, but if they managed to beat Athens's fleet, they would be able to send people straight to Attica unopposed.
If Sparta had lost the battle of Aegospotami, and lost their navy, Sparta would have been hurt, but Athens would still have to beat Sparta on land to defeat them. Spartans were Greeks, they weren't supermen. They were beatable, Athens would probably have tried to throw money at the problem via mercenaries. If Athens went down it probably would have been some fool thing in Ionia that did Athens in.
Athens made a lot of enemies due to their management of the Dalian league; Especially How they were stealing money (some of which was used to pay for the Parthenon), How they bankrupted almost every city in the alliance, and they meddling in the affairs of other cities in the league right before the war started.
Wells: "The Fox I have always believed is the ability to get what you want through stealth or at least without open violence Whereas Lion is the ability to get what you want through the open use of force."
Why is this inconsistent with what Pareto says? Pareto simply adds a number of complimentary characteristics to these two archetypes. His is merely a much more sophisticated treatment of Machiavelli's original conception, including applying these characteristics in degrees.
"Furthermore Machiavelli was as (or even more) concerned with internal enemies of regimes as he was with external enemies of regimes"
Again, I don't see how this is inconsistent with Pareto's point. After all, the roundheads and the French revolutionaries started out as "internal" enemies.
"Second, You're use of the word advanced seems wrong and looking at your list, possibly meaningless."
It's not meaningless, but merely vague, which it has to be, because I'm packing a lot of meaning into a brief post. Pareto spins out his theories in a book that contains 2 million words, so if you want more details, check Pareto. Also keep in mind: I'm not offering this a the complete explanation of everything, but merely as a highlight of an important factor (among other factors) in determining the social order.
Now I'm using "advanced" to mean not merely technology, but other elements as well, such as culture and the general level of intellect. To suggest, for example, that the Roundheads and the Cavaliers were culturally equal because they both came out of the same cultural millieu is simply not to get it. The roundheads, as a group, were not as cultured or sophisticated as the Cavaliers. The roundheads looked down on many aspects of culture as something heathen. They closed the theaters and descreated the religious art of Anglican churches. (And please, let's not hear anything about Milton, who was a rather atypical member of that faction.) As for the French revolutionaries—well, we have to keep in mind, it's question of degrees, not of kind. Initially, the leaders of the revolution weren't any different that the leaders of the monarchy. But that soon changed. The revolution came under the leadership of an entirely different type of individual, who would generally have been regarded as "less" civilized than the defenders of the Old Regime. Niether were these harsher revolutionaries, despite their fondness for the gospel of Jean-Jacques, unconditional admirers of intellectual ability, as they wound up throwing into prison, and even executing, some of the leading pro-revolution intellectuals of the period.
But it's important not to lose sight of the larger point of all this, which is: individuals who are particularly good at using force tend (which means this is a generalization: it's not universally true!) not to be as "advanced" or "civilized" or as good at using one's intelligence as those who are not as good at using force. What Pareto is suggesting is that lion is good at force because he's strongly attatched to his "prejudices." Those prejudices may be religious, nationalistic, tribalistic, or ideological: whatever they are, hardly matters at this level of analysis. But these very prejudices, precisely because they persist, are stumbling blocks to the innovative use of intelligence (which Machiavelli's fox requries to apply his tricks of chicanery). So in nations where group-persistence sentiments dominante among the populace and the elite, we tend to find less culture, less trade, less wealth, less freedom, less individualism, because Pareto's group-persistences get in the way and retard the development of these fruits of civilization. The application of force requires discipline, resolution, the willingness to die for one's ideals. These are all charateristics that require faith, intolerance, even a kind of insensibility that sometimes can verge on stupidity. Hence the difficulty of combining the characteristics of the fox and the lion in the same person.
Damien: "One question is, why are Russia and China helping them? What exactly do they think they'll get out of it?"
The ruling elite of Russia is largely made up individuals who cut their teeth, during the cold war, when America was the enemy and the efforts of the Soviet Union were concentrated on world domination. Hence, deep seated prejudices against America remain. The Russian elite would therefore like to see America, if not destroyed, at least humbled.
China is more complicated, as their elite seems a bit more heterogenuos than Russia's. Even so, there are many hardliners who still, thanks both to their communist background and to Chinese nationalism, regard America as the enemy. There are even some within the Chinese elite who believe America needs to be destroyed to make room for excess Chinese population.
The fact that there are many counter examples in the other direction is of no relevance to the point at issue. After all, one would expect the more advanced nation to prevail in nearly all cases. What is surprising (and in need of explanation) is how the less advanced ever prevails.
If you look more closely at wars ancient and modern, the winners threw the most soldiers at the enemy.
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