Saturday, October 24, 2009

Objectivism & Politics, Part 31

Politics of Human Nature 15: Sociology of the Intellectual. In the essay “For the New Intellectual,” we find Rand insisting that “the need for intellectual leadership was never as great as now.” Where is this “intellectual” leadership to come from? Rand imagines a “New Intellectual” who “will be the man who lives up to the exact meaning of his title: a man who is guided by his intellect.” The “New Intellectual,” Rand promises, will end “the rule of Attila and the Witch Doctor.” How will intellectuals do this? According to Rand, they have to do a number of things, such as: (1) Adopt a philosophy of “reason”; (2) reunite and become a champion of businessmen; (3) understand the nature and the function of the free market; (4) discover the theory and the actual history of capitalism; (5) prove and accept two principles: a.”that emotions are not tools of cognition”; and b. “that no man has the right to initiate the use of physical force against others.” [FNI, 59-64]

Now anyone who understands human motivation will recognize immediately that Rand’s views about the power of intellectuals are little more than wishful thinking. For the purposes of this post, however, I’m not interested in analyzing that side of Rand’s view. I would prefer, instead, to focus on Rand’s assumption that any significant number of intellectuals can be expected to do the things Rand wants them to do. Those of us who understand the “sociology of the intellectual,” as Joseph Schumpeter described it, regard intellectuals as one of the very last groups in society which we would wish to trust our fortunes to. "Beware intellectuals," warned historian Paul Johnson in his incendiary exposé, Intellectuals (Harper Perennial, 1990). "Not only should they be kept well away from the levers of power, they should also be objects of particular suspicion when they seek to offer collective advice."

Let us now examine the “sociology of the intellectual,” as limned by Joseph Schumpeter:

Intellectuals are in fact people who wield the power of the spoken and the written word, and one of the touches that distinguish them from other people who do the same is the absence of direct responsibility for practical affairs. This touch in general accounts for another—the absence of first-hand knowledge of them which only actual experience can give. The critical attitude, arising no less from the intellectual’s situation as an onlooker—in most cases also as an outsider—than from the fact that his main chance of asserting himself lies in his actual or potential nuisance value, should add a third touch.

Note particularly Schumpeter’s remark about “absence of direct responsibility.” When discussing intellectuals, this is critical in several senses. As I have stated in previous posts (for example, here), there are some domains of knowledge that can only be mastered by intensive experience. Intellectuals often have little, if any, appreciation for this fact. They often think they can attain mastery in a subject merely through reading or rationalistic speculation (i.e., “reason”), when, as a matter of fact, nothing less than experience will do. And since most intellectuals lack the requisite experience, they are not in a position, nor are they in the least qualified, to judge on matters relating to politics, social policy, and economics.

But there is another potentially serious problem: what happens when society produces too many intellectuals? What happens to all the intellectuals who cannot earn a living through their intellectual skills? As Schumpeter explains:

The man who has gone through a college or university easily becomes psychically unemployable in manual occupations without necessarily acquiring employability in, say, professional work. His failure to do so may be due either to lack of natural ability—perfectly compatible with passing academic tests—or to inadequate teaching; and both cases will, absolutely and relatively, occur more frequently as ever larger numbers are drafted into higher education and as the required amount of teaching increase irrespective of how many teachers and scholars nature chooses to turn out. The results of neglecting this and acting on the theory that schools, colleges, and universities are just a matter of money, are too obvious to insist upon….

All those who are unemployable or unsatisfactorily employed or unemployable drift into the vocations in which standards are least definite or in which aptitudes and acquirements of a different order count. They swell the host of intellectuals in the strict sense of the term whose numbers hence increase disproportionately. They enter it in a thoroughly discontented frame of mind. Discontent breeds resentment. And it often rationalizes itself into social criticism which as we have seen before is in any case the intellectual spectator’s typical attitude toward men, classes, and institutions… Well, here we have numbers; a well-defined group situation of proletarian hue; and a group interest shaping a group attitude that will much more realistically account for hostility to the capitalist order than could the theory—itself a rationalization in the psychological sense—according to which the intellectual’s righteous indignation about the wrongs of capitalism simply represents the logical inference from outrageous facts and which is no better than the theory of lovers that their feelings represent nothing but the logical inference from the virtues of the beloved. [Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 147-153]

There are other considerations that also have to be broached. If you examine the works of intellectuals through history, the results are not always terribly edifying. Indeed, the more an individual devotes himself exclusively to an intellectual life, the greater the chances that he will champion ideas based on irresponsible speculation and wishful thinking. Plato, one of the earliest men to devote himself almost exclusively to intellectual pursuits, is typical in this respect. We also see something along these lines in the Pythagorean cult, in the mania for abstruse theology among the Christians, in the pre-Kantian rationalist philosophers (particularly Leibniz and Wolff), in the idealist and Hegelian philosophers, and in the deconstructionists. Whole forests have been destroyed to promulgate views contrary to good sense and the facts of life.

Rand wished to place the lion’s share of the blame for all this rationalistic wishful thinking on Plato and Kant. Yet even if it were true that Plato and Kant are the primary culprits, we would still have to ask ourselves why so many intellectuals are attracted to rationalistic, wishful thinking. Could it be that the very type of individual most attracted to an intellectual life is, generally speaking, also the type of individual most alienated towards reality? Or could it be that the intellectual life tends to attract weak people, who look at a life of irresponsible speculation as a convenient escape from the rigors of a more active existence? Realism about the world requires strength; yet strength cannot be acquired merely by thinking. Strength is not, as the logic of Objectivism implies, a product of an individual’s premise. Changing a person’s premises will not transform the coward into a hero. The life of the mind may prove a poor and shoddy breeding ground for developing strong individuals. Perhaps only the exceptional individual can develop both strength and intellect, so that the number of strong, reality-orientated intellectuals will be too small to count in any significant way. If so, then Rand’s hopes for a new intellectual appear doomed from the start. The intellectual, by his lack of experience and practical responsibilty, by his unemployability and rationalized resentment, and by his tendency toward weakness and wishful thinking, will tend, by the very nature of his vocation, to entertain an intractable bias against capitalism; and no amount of arguments or premises can alter this fact.

42 comments:

Anonymous said...

Yeah well nobody better bring up the Founders College debacle as I have it on good authority, well from a leading UK objectivist, that no ARI intellectualls were involved in the college. Probably explains why it lasted longer than we thought.

Anonymous said...

Beware Paul Johnson!

An arch hypocrite, fan of General Franco and spanking fetishist.
Keep him away from levers of power and always distrust his advice.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Johnson_(writer)

Anonymous said...

Right, so if we must distrust the intellectuals and/or the new intellectauls, who should we let near the levers of power and/or trust when they offer advice on collective action?

Daniel Barnes said...

Anon:
>I have it on good authority, well from a leading UK objectivist, that no ARI intellectualls were involved in the college.

Hi Anon,

The ARI's direct role in Founders is, as usual, shrouded in mystery, but its influence is undeniable. Read our official ARCHNblog more-than-you-ever wanted-to-know analyses of the Founders debacle - including the fact that the preliminary drama curriculum parrots Leonard Peikoff's own course - and draw your own conclusions.

Anonymous said...

Thanks Daniel, I was being a bit sarcastic there, I mean typical objectivist behaviour, when the ship goes down it was nothing to do with them, yet you can guess their attitude if the Founders college had been a success. A case of them trumpeting there I told you the new intellectuals could make it work.

No wonder their role is shrouded in mystery, so that they could emerge from the train wreck unharmed and claim the credit when it was a success.

Xtra Laj said...

Yeah well nobody better bring up the Founders College debacle as I have it on good authority, well from a leading UK objectivist, that no ARI intellectualls were involved in the college. Probably explains why it lasted longer than we thought.

It's pretty easy to prove that no Objectivists were involved in Founders College using Objectivist logic (not to be confused with formal logic or intelligent thinking).

If an Objectivist intellectual had been involved, The College would have been a resounding success. The College was not a resounding success. So Objectivist intellectuals were not involved.

Michael Sutcliffe said...

Strength is not, as the logic of Objectivism implies, a product of an individual’s premise. Changing a person’s premises will not transform the coward into a hero.

For someone that spends so much of his time accusing Rand of having an unrealistic view of human nature, you continue to amaze me every time I drop by with your apparently 'accurate' perspective.

Confucius said, 'if I have a clear conscious, dare I face an enemy of 10,000 men'. Moral resolve and personal conviction that what they're doing is right has empowered mild-mannered individuals throughout history to achieve remarkable feats of courage and great achievement against the odds. If you can't see this fact then I'm sure you can be helped. A person in a position of uncertainty, living by a moral code built on a shaky premise, can never be certain if any risk or course of action he may choose is worth it. Hence he is unable to summon the drive to achieve great deeds. By changing this situation and building his life on a solid moral premise - solid eventually must end up meaning rational - he can summon this drive.

Anonymous said...

A dogmatic assertion, but where is the proof for any of this? What does it all mean anyway? Are there people out there who wake up in the morning and say “I’m in a position of uncertainty, living on a moral code built on a shaky premise so I can never try to achieve great deeds” Also, how do we define all of this? Great deeds? Shaky premise? Uncertainty? Courage? Great achievement? Ultimately all this ends up meaning is that only objectivists can achieve ‘great deeds’ but where are these objectivists that have achieved great things?

Dragonfly said...

Xtra Laj: "If an Objectivist intellectual had been involved, The College would have been a resounding success. The College was not a resounding success. So Objectivist intellectuals were not involved."

Yup, that is an example of the True Scotsman argument. Perhaps we should rename that the True Objectivist argument?

Anonymous said...

Or a writer, who is an objectivist, has written a book, which gets greats reviews...erm...stay with me on this one! Then the objectivists shout about it from the roof tops, the same writer writes a book which gets bad reviews...it's a case of what do the critics know, blah-blah-blah, new intellectuals can think for themselves and make up thier won minds. True, by you can't have it both ways.

gregnyquist said...

Michael Sutcliffe:

Confucius said, 'if I have a clear conscious, dare I face an enemy of 10,000 men'

Well, if Confucius says, then that settles it! But that is all one needs to face such daunting numbers, why do all militaries in the world insist on subjecting their troops to rigorous boot camp/training, when all they needed to do is give everyone a "clear conscious" or change their premises à la Rand?

Moral resolve and personal conviction that what they're doing is right has empowered mild-mannered individuals throughout history to achieve remarkable feats of courage and great achievement against the odds. If you can't see this fact then I'm sure you can be helped.

I don't see how this contradicts anything I've written. If a so-called "mild-mannered" individual is nonetheless strong (for "mild-mannered" does not necessarily equal "weak"!), then moral resolve and personal conviction may help him use his strength for good. But if he is weak, no amount of moral conviction will help him in any great crisis.

A person in a position of uncertainty, living by a moral code built on a shaky premise, can never be certain if any risk or course of action he may choose is worth it.

What is this "moral code built on a shaky premise"? Do you mean one that doesn't accord with Objectivism? But there is no evidence that so-called moral codes based on non-Objectivist premises necessarily lead to "uncertainty." Islamic fundamentalists aren't plagued by uncertainty. Neither are religious fanatics of other persuasions; or fanatical communists; or fanatical Nazis. In reality, there exists little accordance between the shakiness of a moral premise and the certainty of those who hold it. Indeed, if anything, the shakier the premise, the more certain the holder of it!

Anonymous said...

Well said Greg, you put it better than I did.

You obviously have more experience of pricking the bubble of objectivist bombastic & dogmatic assertions.

What he wrote was just the usual twaddle, dressed up with a few tricky phrases to baffle the rest of us.

Of course what he means in that any moral code that is not based on objectivism is built on shaky grounds, yet he cannot answer why the rest of the non-objectivist population, has within it individuals who are capable of great deeds and the objectivist world has not. Perhaps the latter spend too much time debating what is a great deed than carrying them out.

Daniel Barnes said...

Greg:
>Indeed, if anything, the shakier the premise, the more certain the holder of it!

Lol, eminently quotable...

Michael Sutcliffe said...

Are you sure you're not descending to the level of Piekoff and Branden, willing to take any position or bend any rule of logic in order to win your argument? I mean, like them, you've invested a lot of time and effort into building and defending your position. Maybe it's time to step back, take a deep breath and ask 'am I just trying to 'win' at any cost, or do I really want the truth here'? It's just a thought.

why do all militaries in the world insist on subjecting their troops to rigorous boot camp/training, when all they needed to do is give everyone a "clear conscious" or change their premises à la Rand?

Well, Greg, let me tell you that a lot of that rigorous training is about getting a clear conscious and forming your premise. That's why a modern military will spend a lot of time teaching ethics, especially to officers. This is not just so troops won't start capping prisoners for a bit of entertainment in the slow periods, but it's also to establish moral resolve, especially in leaders, such that the motivation to win can be fully grasped when the pressure is on.

Furthermore, modern western militaries maintain a Chaplaincy Corps. They fill a number of roles in terms of soldier welfare and even liaison with the local civilians, but this wouldn't be enough to keep the funding going for what they do. They're a force multiplier and that's why they remain today even in a largely secular military. They maintain an ethical basis that assists in providing moral resolve and maintaining combat power.

Even in formal teaching since the Napoleonic Wars, the elements of combat power are defined as firepower, manoeuvre and morale. If you haven't got the morale it doesn't matter how effort you've put into 'rigorous boot camp/training', to maintain your firepower and manoeuvre, you don't have the resolve to win.

I don't see how this contradicts anything I've written. If a so-called "mild-mannered" individual is nonetheless strong (for "mild-mannered" does not necessarily equal "weak"!), then moral resolve and personal conviction may help him use his strength for good. But if he is weak, no amount of moral conviction will help him in any great crisis.

You don't believe that 'where there's a will, there's a way'? That's a pity, because many meek and mild people, dare I say even weak ones, have achieved greatness from just that belief, and gone on to shape history.

Indeed, if anything, the shakier the premise, the more certain the holder of it!

I know what you're saying, and you're right. But every religious person can't help but ask themselves 'is there really a god?' from time to time. Which is why in the cases of people like suicide bombers, there is a massive effort by the religious hierarchy to ensure that these questions aren't asked before the bomb is detonated. The way this is achieved through brutal treatment of people who ask questions and don't accept the faith blindly. In other words a massive suppression of the self. This is why you get the phenomena like you're describing above. Of course, this type of power is illusionary. Christianity was once enforced in this fashion, but it no longer has that kind of grip on society and people are much more willing to question openly on a basis of reason.

Michael Prescott said...

Willpower combined with a change of intellectual perspective can indeed work miracles. Here's an excerpt from an online bio of William James:

====
For almost three years after graduation [from medical school], James lived in the family home. His bouts of depression increased after a young woman whom he had befriended died following a prolonged illness. He would later describe his depression as a descent into a profound crisis — of spirituality, of being, of meaning, of will. He suffered panic attacks and even hallucinations that left him mentally crippled. His father had suffered similar attacks and had sought refuge from them in spiritual quests. William feared that his infirmity was rooted in a biological destiny he would be unable to overcome. He also shrouded his angst with secrecy and used only his reading and journal writing to deal with the mental anguish. One day in April of 1870, the psychological fever began to brake. He recorded in his journal that, after reading an essay by Charles Renouvier, he had come to believe that free will was no illusion and that he could use his will to alter his mental state. He need not be a slave to a presumed biological destiny. "My first act of free will," he wrote, "shall be to believe in free will."

http://snipurl.com/sytfg
=====

James went on to become one of the most celebrated thinkers of his day, living a full and active life.

Daniel Barnes said...

This seems to be the nub of the problem:
MS:
>A person in a position of uncertainty, living by a moral code built on a shaky premise, can never be certain if any risk or course of action he may choose is worth it. Hence he is unable to summon the drive to achieve great deeds. By changing this situation and building his life on a solid moral premise - solid eventually must end up meaning rational - he can summon this drive.

This short para is chock-a-block with non-sequiturs and assorted Objectivist muddles. Let's try to unpick them and see where you're going wrong.

1) "A person in a position of uncertainty..."

All people live in a position of uncertainty, as human knowledge is always incomplete. This is the standard skeptical position, which Rand unwittingly adopted and misleadingly rebranded as "contextual certainty", thus sowing the deep confusion that persists throughout her moment.

The epistemological fact of uncertainty is not to be confused, as MS, following Rand, seems to above with the emotional feelings of "certainty" and "uncertainty" which as we all have discovered from time to time can be misleading guides.

2)".. living by a moral code built on a shaky premise.."

Normally Objectivists, in their confused epistemological state thanks to the muddle created by Rand's "contextual certainty", refer to skepticism when they talk about a "shaky premise." Actually, the idea that human knowledge is always incomplete, and that we are always acting in such a state, is probably one of the soundest premises around - so sound that Rand adopted it herself whilst of course denouncing the same idea under a competing brand name. "Absolute certainty", overwhelming conviction, etc, all the emotional states that Rand advocates in her fiction are thus forms of irrationalism usually found to increase, as Greg wittily remarked earlier, in ironic proportion to the shakiness of the premises.

So, if you are living by a moral code that requires "absolute certainty" in order to operate, as Rand rhetorically rather than realistically suggests, that moral code is irrational, and that "absolute certainty" can only be an emotional state - albeit a comforting and enjoyable one. And sure enough, that is the creed of every dangerous fanaticism.

3)"...can never be certain if any risk or course of action he may choose is worth it."

Observe that with "be certain" we again see the rhetorical confusion Rand creates, and MS repeats, between epistemological fact and emotional state. Humans must act, must choose, as Rand was hardly the first to tell us, and even playing Hamlet represents an action and a choice. Any strategist will tell you that sometimes it pays to dither! Other times you act with the best plan or theory you have on hand, which might include the theory that you have to pursue this course of action strongly in order for it to be successful.

4) "Hence he is unable to summon the drive to achieve great deeds."

"The drive" is clearly an emotional state, once again. All that needs to be said to this contention is to point out that it often takes great drive to achieve evil deeds too - say, massacring a population - hence "the drive" itself cannot be dependent on "proper" premises. Indeed the passionate effort behind so many evil and misguided deeds tends to confirm Greg's earlier witticism.

>By changing this situation and building his life on a solid moral premise - solid eventually must end up meaning rational - he can summon this drive.

As we have seen now, unless you mean by "solid moral premise the fact of epistemological uncertainty, every part of this argument is fallacious

Xtra Laj said...

Daniel and Greg,

Great points, but what I find really sad is that is that these muddles confuse obviously intelligent people.

Laj

Anonymous said...

Cheers for Michael Prescott for at least giving us an example of how willpower combined with a change of intellectual perspective can indeed work miracles. Though it does date back to 1870...jeers for Michael Sutcliffe for not giving us any...

gregnyquist said...

Well, Greg, let me tell you that a lot of that rigorous training is about getting a clear conscious and forming your premise. That's why a modern military will spend a lot of time teaching ethics, especially to officers. This is not just so troops won't start capping prisoners for a bit of entertainment in the slow periods, but it's also to establish moral resolve, especially in leaders, such that the motivation to win can be fully grasped when the pressure is on.

I appreciate the criticism, Michael, but I don't find it convincing. I'm not sure what is meant by "getting a clear conscious." The most important knowledge learned in training is often unconscious and tacit. Soldiers have to react quickly on the battlefield. They don't have time to stop and think things out. Hence the training. But such training does not involve, as Rand might have suggested, programming premises. Drill sergeants don't program premises into recruits; they merely accustom them to responding to orders. This involves verbal abuse, intimidation, and even punishment—not preaching.

If you haven't got the morale it doesn't matter how effort you've put into 'rigorous boot camp/training'

Yes, but you still need the rigorous boot camp; and that appears to me the decisive point. Keep in mind: I'm merely trying to refute Rand's contention that the character of human beings is the product of their premises. The fact that boot camp is necessary to make soldiers demonstrates the weakness of Rand's position.

Even in formal teaching since the Napoleonic Wars, the elements of combat power are defined as firepower, manoeuvre and morale.

Yes, but what is more important, the training/conditioning or the formal teaching? Obviously, it's preferable to have both. But if you could only have one, which would prove more critical? Could you make a soldier with minimal formal teaching? Yes. Could you do so without boot camp drilling? No. Soldiers that have been only taught ideas could not be relied on to fight in combat. To repeat what I said in the original post: courage does not come from an individual's premises.

You don't believe that 'where there's a will, there's a way'? That's a pity, because many meek and mild people, dare I say even weak ones, have achieved greatness from just that belief, and gone on to shape history.

I don't agree that weak people shape history. A will may lead to a way if that will is strong. But if the will is weak, believing that "Where there's a will, there's a way" is not likely to bear much fruit. What weak person ever achieved great things merely through belief in a cliche? I can't think of a single example. If a weak person achieves great things, it is because he has been forced by circumstances to become strong. Hence, what happens to people tends to have a much stronger effect on them than merely being exposed to ideas. 911 had a stronger effect on Americans and caused more people to question and perhaps change their ideas than did any amount of preaching. Human beings are wired to respond to what happens to them; and ideas don't happen to people.

Michael Sutcliffe said...

Daniel, yes, philosophical scepticism - the idea that human knowledge is constantly evolving hence we can't ever really know anything for sure. You forgot to tack onto the end that knowledge is often found by accident hence reason is not all that it's cracked up to be, and that we can never really know anything means we can never really have an absolute idea of right or wrong, hence moral relativism naturally follows.

Let's have a look at the idea of absolutes. Is 1+1=2 absolute? Will the growth in human knowledge ever prove this wrong? What about the laws of thermodynamics? If I claim to have invented a perpetual motion machine with no nuclear reactor involved, and claim I'm going to use it to generate power and I want you to invest, is it worth your while to investigate it? What about if I intend to drop you off in the desert for a week without water but tell you it's going to be OK? Is that always going to be a problem? What about the notion that you are alive and you intend to use your faculties to stay alive? Is that absolute?

Greg, Drill Sergeants certainly exist to instill instinctive obedience to a familiar command. This is very useful in an assault line at times and an essential part of soldiering, but how many commands are familiar? This also conflicts with the idea of a lawful general order, because that implies the receiver has the ability to identify the lawful, or otherwise, nature of the order and is held accountable under law for that perception.

The fact that boot camp is necessary to make soldiers demonstrates the weakness of Rand's position.

This couldn't be more wrong.

I've trained a platoon and taken them on operations. The way I put it is that I'd never want a soldier who doesn't think that officers are superfluous, and that if you just put him in there he'd get the job done. It's the moral resolve that makes the solider; it's more important than the training. This is proven by Iraq and Afghanistan, where non-professional fighters with little or no training, but a hell of a lot of moral resolve, can hold up a multi-billion dollar military with the best training in the world.

Anonymous said...

So if the US military starts teaching objectivism to it's troops it will win the war in Afghanistan?

Michael Sutcliffe said...

So if the US military starts teaching objectivism to it's troops it will win the war in Afghanistan?

If it was down to the level of every soldier and supporting citizen, and this was the philosophy they chose to guide their actions, then yes. Afghanistan is a good example - it's a war of resolve. The real victory to be had here is a victory against western values.

If the US, which is the greatest nation on earth to this point, had a second revolution of Objectivist values, there would be another century (at least) of US hegemony and western dominance in general, whereas due to it's fall from grace and internal confusion, especially with regard to values, we'll almost certainly see this century as Asia's rise. And that's got nothing to do with any judgement of the superiority of either culture, simply that certain values provide a higher level of wealth creation, international influence, creativity, productivity and general standard of living than others.

Anonymous said...

So do you have a time line for Americas fall from grace, due to internal confusion and for Asia's rise to grace?

Good to see the Asian countries are not suffering from internal confusion though.

How can countries that aren't objectivist win wars?
What is France became an objectivist country before the US, would it then become the greatest nation on the planet and help secure western dominance?

Anonymous said...

Nothing to do with the poppy fields then, this war in Afghanistan?

Also, how do you know that the resolve of an objectivist is stronger than the resolve of a Muslim?

Andrew said...

MS:

"If the US, which is the greatest nation on earth to this point, had a second revolution of Objectivist values, there would be another century (at least) of US hegemony and western dominance in general, whereas due to it's fall from grace and internal confusion, especially with regard to values, we'll almost certainly see this century as Asia's rise."

I'm sorry, I missed the first revolution of Objectivist values, when did this happen?

Or did you simply mean 'a' revolution of Objectivist values?

In the case of the latter, if America became the most powerful nation on earth without a wholesale adoption of Objectivism, why is it needed now?

It seems impressive that Objectivism can guarantee us another 100 years or more of Wesetern dominance. How was this number formulated? What happens after a 100 years (or more)? How much more?

Have you ever condsidered why big firms, businesses, fail to maintain growth? After periods of explosive growth based on new disruptive technology, large firms emerge who dominate markets. They tend to focus on maintaining that dominance through sustainable innovation. Improving their current products and focusing on their customers needs.

This always leaves the door open for the low margin more speculative market entrant, bringing a new technology to market and rapidly growing until they themselves become large, mature and less able to effectively develop new disruptive technology that will enable them to rapidly gain market share as they did in their growth phase.

Technology isnt just whats 'hi-tech' its any advantage in processes that use capital, labor and materials in a more effective way.

China certainly uses labour to its advantage and America will have to focus on new disruptive technological change to spur new growth. As long as America continues to simply sustain its position the emerging competitors will rapidly gain ground.

Maintaining a free-market and fostering a culture of innovation will most certainly help Western innovation.

Is Objectivism the only way to do this? Probably not...

gregnyquist said...

It's the moral resolve that makes the solider; it's more important than the training.

But where does that so-called "moral resolve" come from? Does it come from moral theory, or an inner toughness derived from the development of innate faculties through adversity, suffering, and/or training? If we consult experience, rather than wishful thinking, for the answer, we find that moral resolve is primarily a kind of skill that is developed, rather than a "premise" or idea that is "programmed" into the mind.

If ideas were more important in the development of moral resolve than adversity, discipline, training, etc., then intellectuals would tend to manifest greater moral resolve than soldiers and other men of action. But is that what we find experientially? Generally speaking, no.

This is proven by Iraq and Afghanistan, where non-professional fighters with little or no training, but a hell of a lot of moral resolve, can hold up a multi-billion dollar military with the best training in the world.

There is a bit of confusion here. When I talk of "training," I mean the sort of drill sergeant, make-life-very-unpleasant type of training, not just training in using weapons and battlefield tactics. My contention is that strength is developed through adversity, which is what boot camp creates. The non-professional fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan have other sources of strength, such as coming from Third World livings, where soft living is either impossible or socially discouraged.

Also, whatever "moral resolve" issues that affect the American military have nothing to do with our soldiers or their military commanders: they have to do with the civilian leadership—in other words, with people haven't had the soft living of America rubbed out of them by boot camp and military discipline.

Daniel Barnes said...

MS:
>Let's have a look at the idea of absolutes. Is 1+1=2 absolute? Will the growth in human knowledge ever prove this wrong?

I of course greatly respect logic and mathematics as useful guides to the world. I am a Critical Rationalist, in the school of Karl Popper.

However, it is easy enough to show you how even systems as useful as these are not absolutely reliable as you rhetorically insist. For example, put 1+1 drops of water into a test tube. How many drops do you have? Put 1+1 rabbits into a sack. How many rabbits will you have?

>What about the laws of thermodynamics?

Once again, there is nothing "absolute" about these. Newton's laws were considered infallible for hundreds of years until they were upset by Einstein. There is nothing about these laws that might not be similarly so. And further, new laws are being proposed all the time. Some "absolute"! They are well tested theories that might be true. But we'll never know for sure, not even in a million years.

>If I claim to have invented a perpetual motion machine with no nuclear reactor involved, and claim I'm going to use it to generate power and I want you to invest, is it worth your while to investigate it?

I will be skeptical, of course...;-)

>What about if I intend to drop you off in the desert for a week without water but tell you it's going to be OK?

It's ok, I watch Bear Grylls...;-)

>What about the notion that you are alive and you intend to use your faculties to stay alive? Is that absolute?

Plenty of people have mistakenly thought they've been dead when they've been alive. Many people have had dreams so realistic they thought they were living them. So sorry - no absolutes there.
Likewise at some point I may decide not to keep living, for whatever reason. What's your point?

So many standard, obvious replies to your questions I seriously wonder if you've seriously thought these things through, or are just bluffing thru with the standard defunct Randian talking points. Have you ever really honestly thought this palaver through critically?

Rand bluffed all the time with "absolute", especially with my favourite, her oxymoronic "contextual absolute". Have you been faked out by this too?

Oh, and moral relativism doesn't logically follow from skepticism.

In fact relativism doesn't follow from skepticism full stop. It's a common enough error, but get with the program, MS.

I'm going to suggest you've got a number of basic errors baked into your thinking here. Here's one I will invite you to ponder:

1) The world
2) Our knowledge of the world

Do you think these two are the same thing?

Dragonfly said...

Daniel Barnes: "However, it is easy enough to show you how even systems as useful as these are not absolutely reliable as you rhetorically insist. For example, put 1+1 drops of water into a test tube. How many drops do you have? Put 1+1 rabbits into a sack. How many rabbits will you have?"

The mathematical statement 1+1=2 is absolute, as it is an analytical truth: the result follows logically from the axioms used (in this case Peano's axioms). Whether we can apply such analytical truths to real-world problems is a different question. Such statements can only be verified experimentally, and lead to synthetic truths. These are not absolute, as we never can know that later empirical research will not falsify them.

So, as long as you understand the difference between analytic and synthetic truths, there is no problem at all: the first are absolute, the second not. It's not surprising that Objectivists try to obfuscate the essential difference between the two. The weaselterm "contextual certainty" is one of the results of that confusion.

Michael Sutcliffe said...

Greg - If we consult experience, rather than wishful thinking, for the answer, we find that moral resolve is primarily a kind of skill that is developed, rather than a "premise" or idea that is "programmed" into the mind.

Moral resolve is a skill that is developed? I really don't know what to do with this. Skills are applied techniques to achieve a desired outcome. I suppose you could define moral resolve as the skill of determining what the desired outcome is (which an objectivist would say is the skill of reasoning). But I still don't see how this is formed from arduous boot camp style training or other hardship? Boot camp style training is the learning of techniques, and the conditioning of the tool i.e. the soldier's body, to permit the soldier to achieve the aim that he has morally resolved to achieve. That's why conscript forces are less effective than volunteer ones even when they've had exactly the same training and been subjected to the same hardships.

Anyway, I don't see any value in your perspective so knock yourself out. I can't be bothered replying any further on this issue.

Daniel - I'm happy to stand corrected, but I don't think moral relativism is the same thing as 'epistemological' relativism or the relativism discussed in the article you linked to.

Interesting article, but so what? There's plenty of it out there and scepticism/relativism/nihilism is easy. Using your previous examples it's kind of like you proving to me that one plus one doesn't really equal two, by picking up an egg in each hand and saying 'see, one egg, plus one egg........' then smashing them both on the ground and going '......see, no eggs! Your statement does not hold true'. Kind of an entertaining tangent but nothing really helpful or of value.

As for your invitation, I'll take you up on that.

Firstly, as I believe in objective reality I'm never going to say the world is the same thing as our knowledge of the world, am I?

The universe is infinite (or if not, so big it's beyond our minds to comprehend), so we can't know it all. There is no limit to knowledge. However, we can know discrete subsets of that infinite set with absolute certainty. We have absolute certainty when we observe a specific phenomenon and deduce the rationale behind it. Hence, the laws of thermodynamics are still absolute regardless of Einsteins work, and regardless of his work we still use them and employ them with great effect. If we take a discrete element - for example, copper - the characteristics we know about it such as melting point etc are absolute even though we don't know everything about it.

Unfortunately I don't have time for this at the moment - I've only stopped by again to see what was going on. I'll read your reply but I'm only going to respond if I think there is a likelihood of something insightful coming from it! Failing that I'll drop by in another 6-12 months to see if you and Greg are still hanging out in this lonely corner of the interwebs and have actually found something exciting to say!

Anonymous said...

It's a shame that the above chappie wont be back for another 6 months. As I was oping he would give us all a time line for the objectivist revolution. I estimate that if, the population of the USA stays static at 270 million AND objectivism grows at a rate of 10 000 converts a week...it will take another 260 years before the majority are objectivists and by then they should be able to bring about this objectivist revolution. A big if though eh?

Michael Prescott said...

"We have absolute certainty when we observe a specific phenomenon and deduce the rationale behind it."

I'd have to disagree with that. We can only make an inference to the best explanation. Our inferences are never absolutely certain, but always provisional. Of course, some inferences are better tested than others, and some may approach absolute certainty. Approach ... but not quite reach.

As for the laws of thermodynamics, some physicists believe the zero point field (if it exists) could offer a way around them:

"There is growing interest concerning the possibility of tapping zero-point energy, and many claims exist of 'over unity devices' (gadgets yielding a greater output than the required input for operation) driven by zero-point energy. In spite of the dubious nature of these claims (to date no such device has passed a rigorous, objective test), the concept of converting some amount of zero-point energy to usable energy cannot be ruled out in principle. Zero-point energy is not a thermal reservoir, and therefore does not suffer from the thermodynamic injunction against extracting energy from a lower temperature reservoir."

http://www.calphysics.org/zpe.html

If there really is a zero point field, and if its energy can be tapped (two big ifs, especially the latter), then something like a perpetual motion machine would not be impossible, after all.

I do agree with Michael Sutcliffe about the power of belief, though. For example, a conversion experience (which can be religious or secular) can change someone's personality in profound ways.

Daniel Barnes said...

Anon:
>As I was hoping he would give us all a time line for the objectivist revolution.

HI Anon

As it happens your helpful ARCHNblog has already done some back of the envelope maths on this much mooted Objectivist "cultural change" project, which they see as a necessary precondition to the widespread acceptance of Rand's ideas. In short, 240 years looks optimistic...

Xtra Laj said...

All Michael Sutcliffe's noise-making has ducked the essential point made by Greg and Dan - that emotional certainty is what moral conviction is about, and emotional certainty for one person can be tied to what are considered the most stupid, illogical and shaky premises for another person.

In the end, moral conviction says next-to-nothing about the truth of the premises upon which the conviction was founded - all it says is something about the person's state of mind. And this was probably more important in the case of, for example, William James. It's also a part of the reason why I don't debate religion as seriously as I used to.

proudfootz said...

"911 had a stronger effect on Americans and caused more people to question and perhaps change their ideas than did any amount of preaching. Human beings are wired to respond to what happens to them; and ideas don't happen to people."

True 9/11 had a big effect on people. A lot of folks got hyped up about joining the armed services for one.

Sadly so many were fooled into thinking that Iraq had anything to do with it. Maybe that explains why that military adventure is going nowhere.

Daniel Barnes said...

DF:
>The mathematical statement 1+1=2 is absolute, as it is an analytical truth: the result follows logically from the axioms used (in this case Peano's axioms).

Well, yes I agree with you DF re: the analytic/synthetic dichotomy which is a useful distinction (Peikoff, like Rand, rather than dissolving supposed "false" dichotomies left right and centre in fact merely fudged useful distinctions!). But the distinction I think is more to do with whether experience is required to draw the conclusion or whether its a priori, as they say, and less to do with supposed "absoluteness".

Not for nothing am I a Critical Rationalist, and I greatly respect such analytic systems and regard them as as close to an "absolute" as we are likely to get. However there is also the Critical as well as the Rationalis part, and I interpret "absolute" in this sense as being something that is beyond or impervious to all criticism, a position I of course reject. Hence this incompatibility with reality presents at least one line of critique.

Daniel Barnes said...

MS:
>Interesting article, but so what? There's plenty of it out there and scepticism/relativism/nihilism is easy.

No, you're package-dealing. Skepticism is not the same as relativism/nihilism. Miller explains clearly why. And further:

"The commonest position combines forthright realism with an ambivalent justificationism that longs wistfully for the day when Hume's skeptical attack will be meticulously outflanked."

This is indeed the commonest position, and Randians fall exactly into this category: wistful for the day when Hume's problem of induction will be outflanked. They have no valid arguments of course, but they do feel wistful about the situation, and try to make up for this absence by maligning those who do..;-)

More Miller:

"Like Bertrand Russell before them, they associate unflinching skepticism with insincerity (whereas Hume, a shrewder psychologist, realized that insincerity, or at least laziness, is the only remedy for skepticism)."

Absolutely true!...;-)

Daniel Barnes said...

MS:
>Daniel - I'm happy to stand corrected, but I don't think moral relativism is the same thing as 'epistemological' relativism or the relativism discussed in the article you linked to.

Sorry, I thought I made the distinction that I was talking about not just moral relativism, but "relativism full stop." Epistemology is prior to ethics etc, so I thought you might as well get the straight dope from the git go.

There are a lot of points I could make, but I think it's better to focus on just one, as it's central to a lot of issues. Let's look at this issue of "absolutes"

I think Rand has faked you out with her use of "absolute." I know that you have a lot of confidence in her, but seriously, you need to think this through for yourself. Do you think "contextual absolutes" are possible? Or is this really just an oxymoronic word-game designed to give Rand the ability to claim "absolutes" on the one hand, yet wriggle out of it by adding a qualifier that renders it worthless. For example, what if I tried to sell you an insurance policy that provided "absolute" cover, but then added a clause that said this policy's cover was also "contextual". Would you think I was a straight talking insurance salesman? Or a lawyer who said he was giving you "absolutely" sound advice, but then added that this soundness was also "contextual"...? And if you wouldn't take it from lawyers or insurance salesmen, why should you take it from philosophers?

Here's the way I often put it to clarify the issue. "Absolute" usually refers something that is invariant in any place in space or time.(It doesn't need to be Platonic, tho it might be). For example, an absolute law of physics is something that is true anywhere at any time in the universe. And indeed it is this search for such laws that science is preoccupied with.

Yet what happens when we apply "contextual" to this "absolute"? We get something that changes according to different contexts ie that varies in different places and times.

In other words, if we cut out the double talk, with "contextual absolute" Rand is really offering a "varying invariant."

How can these be reconciled? Well they obviously can't be - or at least, not honestly. They can always be fudged however by word games, and while many Objectivists prefer to evade such dilemmas, that's hardly what I'd expect from you. You seem somewhat more tough minded than many we get around here. So I'd be interested in what you thought of this issue, once you've thought it thru for yourself.

Michael Prescott said...

One online dictionary offers this definition (among others) for "absolute": "positive, clear, certain, not doubtful." This particular definition would seem to offer an epistemological, not ontological, meaning.

Couldn't the term "contextual absolute" make sense if used in accordance with this definition? Some things are (epistemologically) "certain, not doubtful" within a particular context. For instance, it is certain, not doubtful, that pure water boils at 100 degrees Centigrade - in the context of a location at sea level.

If the term "absolute" is taken metaphysically, to mean "something that is not contingent on anything," then there are no absolutes in the physical world; everything is contingent on other things. To be absolute in this sense would be to exist without any cause - to be "necessary," not contingent, in Thomistic terms. But I doubt this was Rand's intended meaning.

I think she was talking in epistemological terms. She was saying that contextual certainty is possible. Or am I wrong?

Daniel Barnes said...

MP:
>She was saying that contextual certainty is possible.

Yes but this is the equivalent of skepticism, which is my main point.

We can summarise the skeptical theory of knowledge as follows:

We may know P, but P may be false.

That is the same as saying you can be "contextual certain" ie in another time and place we may discover what we thought we know was false. Rand scholar Fred Seddon even used exactly the same summary for Rand as I have done above.

The more you look into Rand's theory it gets even more problematic. Faced with the implications above, she retreats by weaseling about how new knowledge doesn't undo the old, but instead "subsumes" it. But this is a disaster. For example the morning star and the evening star were thought to be two different stars. That was the entire "context" of human knowledge at the time, so Objectivists back then would have had to say that it was "absolutely contextually certain" that this was true, and that any theory that it was just one star was therefore false. Then it was discovered that they were both just one star, so the context of human knowledge changed. So now Objectivists have to say that they are now "absolutely contextually certain" that it's just one star, and that any theory that its really two stars is false! Thus true and false become in the eye of the beholder; that is, subjectivist standards. Or worse, we do away with them altogether for the Orwellian subsuming of truth. Either way, it's not good.

gregnyquist said...

MS: "Moral resolve is a skill that is developed? I really don't know what to do with this."

First, a correction: I said moral resolve is a "kind of" skill. That little phrase "kind of" is actually rather important. Moral resolve (or those qualities of character in the absence of which moral resolve is impossible), are developed like skills are developed—i.e., through practice, training, apprenticeship. Now the reason, I suspect, why Michael S. doesn't "know what to do with this" is because he doesn't understand the intuitive, tacit, unconscious form of knowledge illuminated by Polanyi, Hayek, and Oakeshott and which cognitive science is in the process of discovering and elucidating. Michael thinks skills are merely "applied techniques to achieve a desired outcome." Only the most rudimentary skills can be achieved via "applied technique." An individual doesn't develop the skills of a master chef by following cooking techniques and spelled out in textbooks or in cookbook. A sort of apprenticeship requiring a great deal of trial and error is involved. Now strength, courage, and moral resolve, are developed in analogous manner. It's an adoption of premise or a change of premise that leads to this kind of strength; rather it's this kind of strength that makes an adoption or a change of premise possible.

"But I still don't see how this is formed from arduous boot camp style training or other hardship?"
It's really quite simple: because hardship tends to strengthen character. Somehow, a great many people nowadays seem to be denial about this. But it was well understood in the ancient world. The ancients believed, for example, that liberty and prosperity were not (over the long run) compatible, because prosperity made people soft, and a soft people cannot long remain free. No premises can change this, because not enough soft people are inclined towards socialistic wishful thinking and inclined against such necessary virtues of a free market order as self-responsibility and delayed gratification. The Objectivist obsession with changing people through premises misses the point because it ignores the issue of motivation. A person has to be motived to change their premises. Where is that motivation to come from? If a person is weak and doesn't want to face up to the hard facts about life, how are you going to get him to accept premises that go against the grain of his character?

gregnyquist said...

Michael P: "I do agree with Michael Sutcliffe about the power of belief, though. For example, a conversion experience (which can be religious or secular) can change someone's personality in profound ways."

I think the question at the heart of the debate is whether these conversion experiences are primarily intellectual or psychological. That is, can a person change just by thinking, coming up with a new idea, or do they have to be motivated to make that change by some kind of psychological stress. Now my contention is that if there is such as human nature in the traditional sense of the term, if there exist innate characteristics which differ from individual to individual which impose parameters confining the scope of psychological and intellectual developing, if all human behavior has to be motivated by some kind of desire or emotion or sentiment, then so-called changes in personality is largely a psychological phenomenon in which the changes of premises is more an effect than a cause. Human beings have the capability to pretend to be something they are not. They may, in their youth, act against their innate proclivities to curry favor with their peers. When approval of their peers becomes less important later in life, they may have a psychological crisis which leads to a change in outward personality. But the change isn't primarily (though not necessarily entirely!) caused by the "power of thought"; rather, the change of ideas was caused by the (tacit) discovery that they were living a lie. The point is, that individuals cannot change into anything they please just by changing their ideas. A truly profound change, a change that is self-fulfilling and long lasting, is likely merely the case of individual becoming what he really is.

Dragonfly said...

Daniel Barnes: "However there is also the Critical as well as the Rationalis part, and I interpret "absolute" in this sense as being something that is beyond or impervious to all criticism, a position I of course reject."

But the point of analytical truths is that they are impervious to all criticism. (Of course someone can make an error in a mathematical proof, but when the logic of the proof is impeccable, so is the result.) This does of course not hold for synthetic truths, which can be falsified by empirical evidence.

From the fact that analytical truths are absolute, follows that they don't tell us anything about the real world. Take for example different geometries: Euclidean, elliptic, hyperbolic or the more general Riemannean. They are all perfect and absolute mathematical theories. Which one will describe a given physical system is a different question however, and there your Critical part may get the free rein... This question can only be solved by empirical verification. That may for example indicate that elliptic geometry gives a good description and hyperbolic not. That doesn't mean that elliptic geometry is somehow superior to hyperbolic geometry, they are both true in the analytic sense. But the first one is a better application in that case than the second one and leads to a better physical theory.

In the example of 2+2=4, this statement will as a mathematical statement always be true, it is in that sense absolute. Whether you can apply it to real-life situations is an empirical question, and then we can for example observe that it doesn't always work for drops or rabbits (it does work on all kinds of subjects as long as these remain invariant, but when those can change all bets are off).