To exist is to be something, as distinguished from the nothing of nonexistence, it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes. Centuries ago, the man who was—no matter what his errors—the greatest of your philosophers, has stated the formula defining the concept of existence and the rule of all knowledge: A is A. A thing is itself. You have never grasped the meaning of his statement. I am here to complete it: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification.
Identity is the most equivocal of Rand's axioms. The equivocation centers around the word is. The phrase A is A and A thing is itself do not necessarily use the term is in the same sense. A is A merely illustrates the identity of a term of thought with itself. It is unproblematical and obvious because it is tautological. If by a "thing" we mean an object in reality, the identity of thing to itself is not entirely unproblematic. In noting that a A is A, you are merely noting an obvious identity of an essence or a sense-datum with itself. In noting that a thing is itself, you are going beyond the simple identity of terms of thought to making assertion about both existence and the qualities of the existing thing. The phrase A is A is not equivalent to the phrase a thing is itself. They do not describe the same type of identity. A term of thought is always and eternally identical to itself. Not so with a thing, which exists in the flux of nature and is subject to changes in its material constitution, even to the point of destruction. When one asserts a thing is itself, one is not asserting pure identity; on the contrary, one is both asserting the existence of the thing and predicating its attributes. These are very different matters from asserting the identity of a term of thought with itself.
Rand's error stems from conflating various meanings of the word is. When former President Clinton noted "It depends on the meaning of the word is," people laughed, because he was obviously trying to equivocate his way to a dishonest end. But philosophically, his statement was not absurd. The philosopher George Santayana identified at least seven meanings of the word is, and assumed there might be many more. Santayana's seven meanings are as follows:
- Identity
- Equivalence
- Definition
- Predication
- Existence
- Actuality
- Derivation
Now it is my contention that Rand and her disciples confuse identity with predication and existence (in other words, Rand confuses A is A with A is B and A is). Consider the following statement, from Galt's speech:
Whatever you choose to consider, be it an object, an attribute or an action, the law of identity remains the same. A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be all red and all green at the same time, it cannot freeze and burn at the same time. A is A.
While it is true that a leaf cannot be a stone "at the same time," this truth is neither self-evident nor a consequence of A is A. The fact that a term of thought is equal to itself has nothing to do with whether a stone can be a leaf "at the same time." The judgment about stones and leaves involves several important presuppositions that, while true, are not logically irrefutable or "self-evident." To understand that a stone cannot be a leaf at the same time one needs to assume the existence of time and change, both of which rely on the trustworthiness of memory (which, of course, is not entirely unproblematic or "axiomatic"). Once time and change are understood, it is easy to infer that a stone cannot be a leaf at the same time, because the phrase at the same time precludes change of any sort, and freezes every object into an instant of eternity. Yet because the world of nature exists in time, this observation is rather trivial and not terribly useful. In the flux of nature, the material substance in a stone may become the material substance used in the constitution of a leaf, so that a stone may in fact become a leaf if enough time is allowed to effect the process. The process of change tends to be far more relevant to understanding the real world than do assertions about the identity of an object to itself at "any given instant in time."
The identity of a term of thought is simple and unproblematical. Not so the "identity" of an object like a leaf or a stone existing in the flux. When we "identify" a leaf or a stone as a leaf or a stone, we do so by noting the attributes of the leaf and stone, which are predicated of the object, and by presuming the object's existence. In other words, such "identification" involves predication and existence, rather than Rand's simple A is A identification.
Even more objectionable, in this context, is a statement by Leonard Peikoff. "A characteristic is an aspect of an existent," he writes. "It is not a disembodied, Platonic universal. Just as a concept cannot mean existents apart from their identity, so it cannot mean identities apart from that which exists. Existence is Identity." If by characteristic Peikoff means something like color or texture, his verbiage here is complete nonsense. A color or a texture is not an aspect of an existent: it is a mental datum that symbolizes a property of the existent. Mental data are "disembodied" (i.e., non-material), Platonic universals! (Of course, such universals don't have the metaphysical powers Plato ascribed to them, but that's a separate issue.) Since such datum can be used as descriptions of properties of other existents, they are indeed "apart" from that which exists. Yellow can be used by the mind to describe both the sun and a buttercup. It can even be contemplated as an object of the "mind's eye," as when we imagine a yellow patch. This yellow, while perfectly identical to itself, is not identical to the property it symbolizes in reality (which is the manner in which an object reflects light). Since knowledge is fundamentally representational, identity is largely irrelevant. Knowledge is not a mirror. A concept or a name is not identical to the object or property which it points to and represents. The concept of a cat is not identical to the existing cat, nor is the name Barack Obama identical to the 44th President. What we seek for in knowledge is not identity, but appropriate representation. Knowledge does not reduplicate existents, it describes them. This description assumes (1) the existence of the object and (2) the reality of the properties that are predicated of the object. Existence, therefore, is not Identity. When I acknowledge that an individual of my acquaintence is John Smith, I'm not claiming that either the name John Smith or my idea or concept of John Smith is identical to the real John Smith. I'm merely noting a naming convention that allows me to be understood when I state my opinion about John Smith to other people. That opinion, even if true down to the minutest detail, will nevertheless not be identical with the real John Smith in the A is A sense of identity. It will be a veracious description, nothing more.
Therefore, when Rand berates her ideological opponents for evading "the fact that A is A," she means something different from what is encaspulated in her axiom of identity. Her opponents, even when wrong, are not guilty of evading A is A. Who denies that a term of thought is equal to itself? If her opponents have evaded any facts of reality, they are guilty of two possible errors: (1) of denying the existence of something that really exists; or (2) denying that some existent has a specific property. In other words, they are guilty of evading, not identity, but either existence or predication (i.e., they are guilty of evading A is or A is B).
There is something wrong with the formating of this post on the main page. In Opera, the paragraph starting with "Rand's error" is missing and all text below that is tiny. In IE, starting with the above paragraph all text is missing. It does display normally when viewed via the 'Show Original Post' link in this comment section.
ReplyDeleteIt's a bit cheeky, but whenever I read that John Galt quote I can't help but wonder what he'd make of hot ice.
In Google Chrome, the text starting with "Rand's error" is microscopic. It kind of looks like ant trails.
ReplyDeleteAs Andrew said, the post is readable when "Show Original Post" is used.
I don't have the analytical/philosophical that Nyquist has, but "A is A" always struck me as a shallow piece of rhetoric meant to shut people up rather than foster inquiry. The important question isn't "Is A A?" It's "What is the nature of A?"
ReplyDeletehmmm not sure what's gone wrong here, Greg, you might have to repost?
ReplyDeleteThe important question isn't "Is A A?" It's "What is the nature of A?"
ReplyDeleteExactly. And what makes Objectivism even sillier is that it has this extremely deterministic way of thinking about everything except human beings. Of course, the reason for this exception is Rand's wishful projection of an ideal man is confused with real mean as they exist.
In other words, for everything else in the universe except human beings, "A is A", but for human beings, "A is A" really means that men have a nature that allows them to become John Galt if they choose the right philosophical ideas. Why such wishful thinking doesn't apply to dogs too is explained by calling man the rational animal.
Essentially the blogger's criticism is that Rand fails to understand that: "A term of thought is always and eternally identical to itself. Not so with a thing, which exists in the flux of nature and is subject to changes in its material constitution, even to the point of destruction."
ReplyDeleteOf course this is nonsense! The identity of a thing ("a thing in reality") takes into account the context of the reality in which it is a part. It incorporates the potential for change the blogger refers to as the "flux of nature." To hold that a thing is itself does not imply that it cannot undergo change and essentially become something else. But until it does, it most assuredly is what it is. "A is A" and "a thing is itself" are equivalent.
"There is something wrong with the formating of this post on the main page."
ReplyDeleteSorry for that. I made the mistake of entering the post on a PC with IE. Then I scheduled the post for Thursday, while I've been away on vacation in a remote location, far from civilization and the internet. I believe I've removed all the horrible html that got written by IE interfacing with blogger.
The important question isn't "Is A A?" It's "What is the nature of A?"
ReplyDeleteTrue. And the first question in determining the "nature of A" is ask whether A is some kind of mental object (an idea, percept, concept, datum, etc.) or is it a physical object. The kind of "identity" mental objects are capable of is considerably different than the problematical identity of physical objects.
" To hold that a thing is itself does not imply that it cannot undergo change and essentially become something else."
ReplyDeleteYou've completely missed the point, because you don't appreciate the difference between ideas and the things ideas represent in reality. "A is A" is not the same as "a thing is identical to itself." The first statement is obvious an unproblematical, because it's tautological. The second is problematical, precisely because things in reality do change.
"The identity of a thing ('a thing in reality') takes into account the context of the reality in which it is a part."
Yes, but taking "account of the context" makes it different from "A is A." In Objectivism, the "context" is a weasel word used to evade difficulties. Talking about context doesn't make the identity of physical objects self-evident and axiomatic. The fact that context has to be established introduces the possibility of error and makes the claims about the identity of physical objects conjectural (in Popper's sense) or items of animal faith (as Santayana would say).
While it seems obvious there's a difference between an idea and the object the idea represents in reality, I do wonder to what extent one can actually separate the two. How can one access the object in reality except through the idea that represents it?
ReplyDeleteAnyway, Galt's speech seems to demonstrate a definite misunderstanding of what the law of identity means. Consider: "[A leaf] cannot freeze and burn at the same time."
This can not be determined via the law of identity. The only way to know a leaf can not be frozen and burn at the same time is via empirical studies. If a leaf could be frozen and still burn, it would not violate the law of identity in any way.
Besides, a burning leaf is not far removed from hot ice. And while it may seems as though water could not both be frozen and be hot, such a thing does exist.
"While it seems obvious there's a difference between an idea and the object the idea represents in reality, I do wonder to what extent one can actually separate the two."
ReplyDeleteOne doesn't so much "separate" the two as one distinguishes one from the other.
"The only way to know a leaf can not be frozen and burn at the same time is via empirical studies. If a leaf could be frozen and still burn, it would not violate the law of identity in any way."
Exactly. And incidentally, a leaf could burn and freeze "at the same time," if one part of the leaf is frozen and the other is lit on fire. Yes, I know, the "context" of Rand's statement implies the entire leaf, and the entire leaf can't burn and freeze at the same time. But then why didn't Rand just say "entire leaf" and avoid the ambiguity of "context" altogether?
Moreover, there is a more sinister error in Rand's speculations here. Every intelligent adult knows that a leaf cannot entirely burn and freeze at the same time. Yet this knowledge does not come from "A is A," the "law of identity," or acquaintance with logic reasoning. It's a complex fruit of the long tutelage of interacting with reality. The knowledge is empirical rather than logical or speculative or "philosophical." The intelligent adult tends not to notice this, and might trick himself into thinking that the knowledge comes from, or at least is implicit in, the law of identity, because he has forgotten all the details of his tutelage (as much of it involves unconscious processes and/or took place in his earliest years).
The identity of physical objects is a very complex matter, very difficult to describe adequately in language. For example, in one sense, I am the same person as I was when I was born, but in another, I am very different. Claiming that the law of identity incorporates the change merely evades the difficulty in describing what personal identity is all about. It is problematical and difficult, and not the stuff of "self-evident" axioms.
"Claiming that the law of identity incorporates the change merely evades the difficulty in describing what personal identity is all about. It is problematical and difficult, and not the stuff of 'self-evident' axioms."
ReplyDeleteAnd this probably is why Objectivism seems to exact the psychological toll that it does on many of its adherents.
Rand used to claim that she could see fundamentally who (or what) somebody is based on an opinion they expressed, as if that was a window on some unchanging, essential self. (As if such a thing exists.)
I've seen objectivists tie themselves in knots over things they've said, fearing that they've outed themselves as non-Objectivist (qua non-human) charlatans.
This kind of thing is documented in Sid Greenberg's Ayn Rand and Alienation (an old book), which makes some good points about how Rand's philosophy is incompatible with the psychology and behavioral traits of real people.
- Chris
Hi Chris
ReplyDeleteYou're very right. This rationalistic quest to be "fully integrated" from first premises all the way up to choice of chewing gum is not only impossible, it also gives Objectivism its authoritarian turn. In Objectivism, every day is Judgement Day.
You could also think of that burning leaf like a chemist, where "burn" means to oxidize, and can take place at temperatures well below the freezing point of water. For that matter, "freeze" means to become solid, so there are probably substances out there that are liquids, but become solid as they oxidize - in other words, that "freeze" when they "burn".
ReplyDeleteBut this is really getting back to the point that one can only make statements of this sort by generalizing from empirical observations. The knowledge does not well up from within, through study of the Tao - sorry, I mean of "A is A".
Greg: 'The knowledge is empirical rather than logical or speculative or "philosophical."'
ReplyDeleteExactly, that's the point that Objectivists don't get. It's the same when Rand defines causality as the corollary of the law of identity. That is contrary to the usual definitions of causality, in which it is defined as an empirical datum. Rand writes "The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature". This raises of course immediately the question "how do we know what the nature of an entity is?". The only way to answer that question is by empirical observation, in other words, by observing how an entity "acts". So Rand's statement boils down to the triviality: "an entity acts according to the way we've observed that it acts".
Perhaps the underlying thought is that nature is not completely incomprehensible, there are regularities that can be described by physical laws. But that is not a consequence of the law of identity, but an empirical fact. Now it's probably true that if the behavior of entities in nature were completely unpredictable, we wouldn't be there to observe them, but that is a variant of the anthropic principle, not an a priori truth.
Objectivists also claim often that there cannot be acausal events, as is implied by quantum mechanics. They don't understand that they cannot just use their own idiosyncratic definition of causality instead of the common definition that is used in QM. They seem to think that "acausal" means that "anything" can happen, that such entities wouldn't follow any physical laws anymore. In other words, they use a different definition and claim then that according to that definition a statement that doesn't use that definition for that word is incorrect. The same people who claim that they are champions of logic...
Perhaps the underlying thought is that nature is not completely incomprehensible, there are regularities that can be described by physical laws. But that is not a consequence of the law of identity, but an empirical fact.
ReplyDeleteMore importantly, it's the empirical fact that Hume was probably the first great philosopher to honestly confront and address its limitations, which include that we can postulate it works everywhere, but we can't prove it and may even be wrong in claiming that it works everywhere. That's why Objectivists hate him so much.
The problem with Objectivist logic is that because it believes in a special foundational approach to knowledge, it doesn't believe that new facts can affect how one should think about the special foundations. While a scientist who studies QM might revise his understanding of what he considers causality, Objectivists cannot do this as easily because they are committed to a view of causality that they cannot revise in the light of new evidence. Same with the nature of man/free will etc.
(I'm posting on behalf of Dragonfly, who is having difficulty posting a comment for some reason.)
ReplyDeleteGreg: "Claiming that the law of identity incorporates the change merely evades the difficulty in describing what personal identity is all about. It is problematical and difficult, and not the stuff of "self-evident" axioms".
Everything changes sooner or later. Saying that the change is incorporated in the law of identity is an empty statement. What kind of changes are possible is a matter of empirical observation, the law of identity doesn't tell us anything about it. We may have created models on the basis of our observations and expect that those models work also in the future. But if we observe at a certain moment a deviation from our model, that an entity suddenly doesn't behave according to its supposed nature, then that doesn't mean that there is a contradiction in the sense that the law of identity is violated, only that there is a contradiction between the model that we had created and empirical observation, so that we have to revise or discard the model we used so far.
Anonymous wrote:
ReplyDeleteThe knowledge
does not well up from within, through study of the Tao - sorry, I mean of "A is A".
Just a quick point, this really mischaracterizes Daoism and it's various philosophies. Here are some decent general links:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/taoism/
I'd tackle the next two first, myself, but the philosophical Vs. religious issues in the introduciton might be very informative, they seem to imply that A is A is the exact opposite of Daoist thought.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/laozi/
Article on the Laozi, or Dao De Jing (Tao Te Ching) and it's philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zhuangzi/
Article on the other major Daoist text, which is a great read whether you're a Daoist as such or not.
@Nyquist
ReplyDelete"The equivocation centers around the word is"
There is no equivocation. This is one of the most amazingly obtuse posts I've ever seen.
That you would waste your time, and be thick enough to have to parse the word is into 7 possible meanings is unreal.
The word (is) in Existence is Identity simply means what it is by "standard", which is third person singular present of be.
Thus, Existence is Identity simply means that to exist is to have an identity.
Exactly similar to saying an apple is fruit.
This laughable post calls into serious question, the competency of this entire blog and its critiques against Objectivism, as it indicates that the refutations are based on strawmen, or misunderstandings, or obtuseness on the part of Nyquist, rather than genuine error or fatal flaws in Objectivism itself.