I see that Daniel Barnes is still doing his dishonest blathering.Here at the ARCHNblog we have become accustomed to being called liars, dishonest etc by boldly anonymous Randians. We are also equally accustomed to said Objectivists drying up and blowing away when challenged to provide proof of our supposed four-flushing malfeasances.
He writes: “On p26, Harriman claims that, using this unique Randian inductive method, from a single observation of paper burning in a fireplace, we can conclude that the statement "Fire burns paper" is "a universal truth".”
Other than Harriman writing "Fire burns paper" on p. 26, Barnes is a liar. Harriman uses "fire burns paper" to describe a child learning this generalization for the first time. He describes it as a “statement of a concrete observation”. He does not say it is a single instance nor present it as a universal truth or “Every S is P”. Children at that age don’t think in terms such as “some”, “every” or “all.” Eventually most children, even ones as stupid as Barnes, will learn there are exceptions, for example, paper that is water-soaked. This is such common knowledge there was no need for Harriman to say so, except to foil a dishonest critic like Barnes.
As I'm traveling and don't have the book handy, I've nonetheless googled it and found the passage I was referring to reproduced over at the Objectivist Living forum:
In utilizing concepts as his cognitive tools, [the first-level inducer] is thereby omitting the measurements of the particular causal connection he perceives. "Fire" relates the yellow-orange flames he perceives to all such, regardless of their varying measurements; the same applies to "paper" and the process of "burning." Hence the first statement of his concrete observation: "Fire burns paper." This statement is simply a conceptualization of the perceived data--which is what makes it a generalization.
Notice that when our first-level inducer identifies a perceived causal connection in words, he does not do it as a description of unique concretes, even though that is all he perceives; he at once states a universal truth.
- David Harriman, p26, The Logical Leap.Readers can compare our Anon's claim with the actual passage themselves. But to me it's obvious not only that what Anon doesn't know about the problem of induction could be written in 6 point type over Fenway Park, but that these "New Intellectuals" seem to lack some basic reading skills.
Children at that age don’t think in terms such as “some”, “every” or “all.”
ReplyDeleteObvious question... is that statement based on evidence, or is it just another assertion?
Dan,
ReplyDeleteWhile I think anonymous was not charitable, I can understand why he is up in arms and that you might not have interpreted Harriman charitably. It is not clear whether Harriman means a "universal truth" from the perspective of the child (fallible generalization) or from the scientific perspective. There might be more to this in the book, but I can't conclude on the basis of the excerpt.
Is not the entire point of a universal truth is that it is in fact universal? A universal truth, by its very definition, can not be fallible. In fact, it seems to me that it is a universal truth that universal truths can not be dependent on perspective or context.
ReplyDeleteIf by stating "he at once states a universal truth." Harriman meant fallible generalization, he was at the least amazingly sloppy in his language.
@Laj,
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, there is a serious difference between uncharitable interpretation and dishonest lying. Do you agree?
Secondly, let's look at the lie that Anon accuses me of telling. According to Anon, Harriman "does not say ["Fire burns paper"] is a single instance nor present it as a universal truth...”(my emphasis). He is claiming that the evil Barnes has invented this.
Now the passage I have supplied clearly shows that Harriman does indeed present it as a universal truth. Now this is established, we can argue over interpretation, sure, but misinterpretation isn't what I'm being accused of. Also note Anon's own reluctance to produce the passage in question once challenged, or even to respond in any way so far. This is because, well, Anon is plain factually wrong. And I think he probably knows it. I suspect he's written in haste and is regretting at his leisure - a more charitable interpretation that any he's offered me...;-)
Now we've established what is and isn't actually in the text, we'll turn to the issue of whether I've uncharitably read it. Well, as it happens, the phrase "universal truth" is not just any old throwaway turn of phrase in a discussion of the problem of induction - especially when you're supposedly presenting an all new, "revolutionary" way of arriving at the aforesaid. It's a crucial term in this debate - the very point at issue, in fact. So if Harriman going to use it loosely, and needed to attach some major qualifications such as you suggest, the place to do so was right then and there and avoid the obvious potential confusion. (If he had done, and I'd obviously elided it, then Anon might have had a point).
But Harriman didn't. Even Anon admits Harriman offers no such qualifications. Why? Is it because, as Anon claims, it's "common knowledge" that universal truths have exceptions? That only "dishonest critics" would suggest otherwise? But if that's so why is there any debate over induction in the first place if every honest person agrees that this is so?
Actually, I think it's because the whole Harrikoffrand method is to sow just such potential confusion. Their claims can really only succeed by a combination of innuendo, cult jargon, and obfuscation. They'll drop the standard, highly loaded terms of this debate like "universal truth", "certainty" etc in here and there to create an particular impression - such as that arriving at universal truths is somehow native to proper human consciousness (only evil anti-mind philosophers could foil it!). Yet as with most Randian arguments, the bold impressions are always up the front, the vague, jargony disclaimers are always around the back - or even assumed, as Anon amusingly tries to argue. And of course, Harriman has made a shameful speciality of deliberately creating misleading impressions. For the same reason, despite the bold impression the book's title is designed to create, you will not find within the pages of The Logical Leap a single formal logical expression of the Objectivist solution to the problem of induction (just like you won't find such an expression of the "is/ought" solution in The Virtue of Selfishness!). What you will find is Harriman exercising his ham-fisted dissembling to the utmost, as my brief note now hopefully illustrates.
My point from the start in discussing this book has not been to seriously debate the arguments in the book - though I will discuss them at some point - but to note the ways the cultic nature of Objectivism is sustained. The stupidest thing of all is not so much Harriman's claims, but that he seems to think nobody will notice what he's doing.
@Andrew, I agree. And as I say above, I think Harriman is "amazingly sloppy" with a purpose.
ReplyDelete@Andrew: Perhaps, then, the solution to the problem of induction in philosophy is to drop the phrase "universal truth." Just drop the idea that humans can produce accurate mental models of reality - as far as I can tell, we have no counterexamples, so no reason to assume that humans are indeed capable of this.
ReplyDeleteInstead you say something like "provisional theory subject to modification as further observations are made." It works pretty well for science.
The subject of whether external reality could be described by universal truths (even if humans cannot do so) would still be fertile philosophical ground.
Ken:
ReplyDelete>Perhaps, then, the solution to the problem of induction in philosophy is to drop the phrase "universal truth."
Are you familiar with the work of Karl Popper? His solution to the problem of induction is simply to make our knowledge conjectural - then the logical problem disappears.
Incidentally, this doesn't destroy the possibility of universal truths. We can indeed still happen upon them. It just means we can never know that we know them, if you see what I mean.
Dan,
ReplyDeleteI agree with everything you have written (again, reading Objectivism charitably is pretty difficult when it doesn't take seriously the distinction between *connotative* and *denotative* language and is pretty uncharitable itself). Anon's comments were pretty silly, but I did want to point out that there is a charitable interpretation for Harriman's comments, though I agree with you that it is hard to take seriously if you assume that Harriaman is familiar with the philosophic literature surrounding this subject.
Andrew,
"Universal truth" might just have been "generalization" - the fallibility, for an Objectivist, would lie in their theory of contextual knowledge. The problem is that Objectivists refuse to accept the true (Popperian) spirit of contextuality and only pay lip service to it.
Instead you say something like "provisional theory subject to modification as further observations are made." It works pretty well for science.
Ken, Dan has pointed out on many occasions that this is the proper implication that Objectivists did draw in the theory of contextual knowledge. Peikoff went into detail in OPAR but using the linguistic tricks that he likes to use, he refused to accept the related skepticism and continued to trumpet his support of "closed systems" and "contextual absolutes".
I see my comment sent the cockroach Daniel Barnes scurrying.
ReplyDeleteHis smart-alecky "rebuttal" linking to fire-proof paper is mere ridicule and has no teeth. Harriman wrote about a child learning that fire burns paper. A charitable or neutral reader would not imply the child and Harriman meant alum-treated paper in addition to ordinary paper. DB's retort is as silly as him saying 'water is a liquid' and somebody responding 'you are wrong, f*cking stupid, because water put in the freezer for enough time is not a liquid'. By the way, alum is flame-retardant, not absolutely fire-proof, so DB is wrong by the same standard he uses against Harriman. Splat!
ECE saw no dishonesty by DB. Ha. DB said Harriman said on page 26 the generalization "fire burns paper" is made from a single observation. Try finding that or any reference to alum-treated paper on page 26. You won't because DB was dishonest. He misrepresented what Harriman said in other ways, too. Note that in all his scurrying since my first post DB has evaded his injecting 'a single observation' and alum-treated paper into Harriman's scenario. That is not mere uncharitable interpretation. He even twisted my saying it is common knowledge there are exceptions to fire burns paper into "it's common knowledge that universal truths have exceptions." His dishonesty continues. Splat!
He says, "Harriman has made a shameful speciality of deliberately creating misleading impressions." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pot_calling_the_kettle_black
What DB knows about induction would fit on a can of Raid in 16 point type. Psssst!
People partial to Objectivism are used to dishonest critters like DB. They are also used to their evasion (see above), blanking out, or more blather when challenged. Splat!
Daniel, Xtra Laj, I am horribly confused. If Objectivists accept the provisional nature of knowledge, then what is the point of The Logical Leap? I may have misunderstood, but I thought that a large chunk of the book was devoted to proving that Rand solved the problem of induction; but there really isn't a problem of induction if you accept that human induction is not infallible.
ReplyDeleteThe pot calling the kettle black? Eh? Where is Barnes delebirately creating misleading impressions? I fail to see the difference between Harriman's "unique concretes" and Barne's "single observation". They both refer to the same thought experiment Harriman brings up, and both describe it accurately. So where is the dishonesty? Please let's avoid Objectivist word games here...
ReplyDeleteAlso, alum is flame-retardant, not absolutely fire-proof, so DB is wrong by the same standard he uses against Harriman That's missing the point. Harriman should be more specific; the child is learning that ordinary paper will burn quickly in fire. Alum-treated paper may burn eventually, and thus the preimse "fire burns paper" would be valid, but if this is the cild's first experience with fire and paper, such excpetions would not occur to him, and he may well form an erronous induction. If we add excpetions such as "fire burns paper eventually after enough exposure" or "fire burns paper quickly unless it's been treated with alum", that would make it a vaild induction, but the child's induction will be too broad without knowledge of alum, and thus he might not reach universal truth.
What DB knows about induction would fit on a can of Raid in 16 point type.
ReplyDeleteOkay, granted Barnes drew first blood with his insult, but still there's no reason to believe that he knows effectively nothing about induction. There's a difference between uncharitably interpreting an Objectivist book about induction and knowing noting about it. In fact, if Barnes has manged to read to page 26, one would think he would know enough, from this one book alone, to exceed 16 point font on a can of Raid.
Anon, I think we are missing the point by getting so riled up about one example from TLL. If you think the folks at ARCHN misinterpret Harriman's/Peikoff's/Rand's theory of induction, please tell us how. Complaining that Barnes lies about page 26 of TLL does not make for enlightening discourse.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteHe even twisted my saying it is common knowledge there are exceptions to fire burns paper into "it's common knowledge that universal truths have exceptions." His dishonesty continues. Splat!
ReplyDeleteWhat Harriman is claiming-falsely, I believe, though I haven't read the book-is that in his thought experiment, the child induces "fire burns paper". If fire burns paper is a univeral truth, and there are exceptions to "fire burns paper", then there are exceptions to universal truths. Barnes is in no way dishonest.
Anon, you can't have it both ways. Alum is merely an exapmle. If fire burns paper eventually, then this is a caveat to "fire burns paper" that does not disquaify it, but the child may also induce "fire burns paper quickly always" which would not be correct. If there are excpetions to "fire burns paper", it is not a univeral truth. Either "fire burns paper" is not a universal truth, or it is at the expense of making "fire burns paper quickly always" not a universal truth. You can't have it both ways, and either way Harriman is in a bit of trouble.
But again, arguing so much over one brick in Harriman's house of induction is not productive. Anon, if Barnes is a dishonest blatherer, then why don't you take him to task for his criticisms of the book writ large, rather than dwell on one example he gave?
If Objectivists accept the provisional nature of knowledge, then what is the point of The Logical Leap? I may have misunderstood, but I thought that a large chunk of the book was devoted to proving that Rand solved the problem of induction; but there really isn't a problem of induction if you accept that human induction is not infallible.
ReplyDeleteThe confusion arises out of the fact that all the attempts of Rand and her followers to "validate" this or that aspect of human cognition is largely histrionic. They don't really give a fig about such matters; it's just a form of ritualism, designed to make them feel better about the meaninglessness of existence. Rand wanted to believe that she could change the world by talking and arguing; but when she tried to talk and argue Wendell Wilkie into office in 1940, it didn't work out so well. So instead of accepting the fact that you can't change people's minds through mere patter, Rand devised an elaborate rationalization to explain why people wouldn't accept her cavilings. Philosophers had failed in their attempt to "validate" human cognition, which caused widespread suspicion of arguments based on "reason." This philosophical myth inspired Rand and her followers with a mania for validating various aspects of cognition, such as concepts, logic, and (with Harriman/Peikoff) induction. Deep down, I think they all dimly realize it's just a dog and pony show. But as a show, it has real importance; for it lends to them the comforting illusion that they aren't just spinning useless philosophical webs, but are actually working toward a better future, when "reason" (i.e., Objectivism) will prevail, and a good time will be had by all.
@Anon,
ReplyDeleteI admit it is rather hard to take seriously accusations that I'm a dishonest, scuttling cockroach from someone who prefers the dark corners of anonymity themselves. After all, I sign my name to my name to my criticism, and provide the actual text in support for my position; something that you for some reason have failed to do so far.But perhaps you will improve.
I suspect from what you've said to date that you're not very au fait with the problem of induction - even at a pretty unsophisticated level. So before we get to anything too tricky, let's see if we can get you to acknowledge a simple fact.
You originally wrote:
>Barnes is a liar. Harriman uses "fire burns paper" to describe a child learning this generalization for the first time. He describes it as a “statement of a concrete observation”. He does not say it is a single instance nor present it as a universal truth or “Every S is P”(DB emphasis)
In reply, I quoted Harriman, p26:
"Hence the first statement of his concrete observation: "Fire burns paper." This statement is simply a conceptualization of the perceived data--which is what makes it a generalization.
Notice that when our first-level inducer identifies a perceived causal connection in words, he does not do it as a description of unique concretes, even though that is all he perceives; he at once states a universal truth." (DB emphasis)
So clearly Harriman does present the statement "Fire burns paper" as a universal truth, just as I said. I haven't "lied" about this - you are simply mistaken.
Now, let's test your honesty. Even under cover of darkness, will you own up to your mistake?
@Ken
ReplyDelete>If Objectivists accept the provisional nature of knowledge, then what is the point of The Logical Leap?
They accept it for them, but not for anyone else...;-)
The point of The Logical Leap is perpetuation of the Rand cult, albeit in a timorous, clearly conflicted way.
Ken,
ReplyDeleteTo what Greg (Objectivist eschatology and the ludicrous view of human nature) and Dan (the Objectivist's inability to be as critical as self as he is of others) have said, I would like to add some color and something related to Greg's point: the need for argument-driven certainty so that the Objectivist can feel he or she is more than just the smartest person in the room. If Objectivists took a more limited (and realistic) view of the power of arguments, then the Objectivist individual would not feel that they were doing much more than wasting their time discussing trivial stuff. However, by making induction (which is really rationalistic, self-confirmation bias writ large) more powerful than it really is, it allows them to find more value in their speculation than a practically minded person would.
Nice try, Danny Boy, but Anon clearly has outed you as the skittering water-bug that you are. Though you tried to blank out reality and evade the facts of logic and the logic of facts, you have been trod under the heel of Objectivist super-logic. Crunch!
ReplyDeleteIt's hardly surprising that a smarty-pants know-it-all like you would creepy-crawl out of your bug hole under cover of darkness to spin a web of deceitful lies and lying deceit. But like the brown recluse spider, you cannot stand up to the sting of the scorpion's tail. Zot!
Now you drag your crumpled multi-legged carcass across a garbage-littered floor of despair, fitfully waving your antennae as you wriggle in protest against the tautological imperative of "A is A." And down comes my fist. Blart!
Dan the Man, everything you know about philosophy would fit on the head of a pin in Times New Roman 28 font with bold formatting. Like a head-louse desperately clinging to a dandruff-flecked scalp, you mash your mandibles against the implacable certainty of your own doom. And out comes my hairspray. Zap!
"I suspect from what you've said to date that you're not very au fait with the problem of induction," you wrote, unaware that I could crush your feeble anti-logic with this carefully reasoned, linked rebuttal:
http://tinyurl.com/6bp856y
Suck on that, Dan-o, as you circle the drain like a millipede in the toilet. And here comes my hand. Flush!
(This message brought to you by the Department of Objectivist Philosophical Education, or D.O.P.E.)
Perhaps we shouldn't laugh, Mr. Prescott, I'm sure anon is busy saving the world from the ghost of Kant, David Kelly, and Nathanial Branden. Heaven forbid he tire of our opposition, go on strike, and leave us to face these terrors alone!
ReplyDeleteDaniel Barnes wrote: “Now, let's test your honesty. Even under cover of darkness, will you own up to your mistake?”
ReplyDeleteAfter you, cockroach. I await your satisfactory confession to each of your shenanigans I identified, probably until death. You testing my honesty is laughable, like a drunken sot wanting to give the cop a sobriety test. Splat!
LOL, Mr. Prescott. "Holding a mirror up to truth" - motto of Satire V.
Anon:
ReplyDelete>After you, cockroach. I await your satisfactory confession to each of your shenanigans I identified, probably until death.
I'll take that as a "no"...;-) Hardly a surprise.
What's interesting, however, is the sheer degree of denial Anon has loaded up on.
He claimed a statement wasn't in Harriman's text, that I had "lied" about it.
But I showed him that he was simply wrong; there it was, in black and white. This wasn't an issue of interpretation, this was a matter of fact - a "fact of reality", in Objectivese.
Yet Anon can't bring himself to accept it, even though accepting such facts are supposedly fundamental to his philosophy. Now, this is hardly unusual; it is embarrassing to launch a rather overwrought attack only to find that you've misread the text in question. Even though he's Anon, this blunder will still sting, from a pure self-respect point of view. He seems to have some history with me from what I can detect. That's why rather than simply admitting his factual mistake, then going on to discuss Harriman's actual statement, he just ups the toxicity and evades the issue.
But of course if your interlocutor in a debate simply refuses to accept the simple facts of a situation, there for all to see, what hope a productive discussion about more complex issues? If he's going to evade this, what next? Hence, as I suspected, there's not much point in engaging with Anon at any higher level.
As well as denying simple facts, Anon also seems to heavily rely on the Objectivist's favourite line of argument, also known as The PeeWee Herman Defense.
ReplyDeleteCome on, feel the New Intellectualism!...;-)
Ay Ay Ay I hope this guy isn't serious...
ReplyDeleteHe's probably just trolling us. I say ignore him from now on on this posting and wait and see if he has anything good (or ripe to mock)to say on subseqant discussions of the book writ large.
This has become a showplace of the cockroach's ineptness, dishonesty, and evasion. He misread my last reply, which was a conditional yes, as a definite no. The definite no was his reply: No, he won't 'fess up to being wrong or dishonest about anything. This shows how much a hypocrite he is, expecting me to 'fess up while he 'fesses up to nothing. He accuses me of evasion, while he has again and again evaded every charge I've made but one. His method is like a scumbag politician's, to admit nothing, accuse, divert, deceive, and evade. It's all on record here for anybody to see.
ReplyDeleteAccused of lying about P, he responds saying Q is true and ignores P or tries to deceive the reader into believing P is true.
DB > He claimed a statement wasn't in Harriman's text, that I had "lied" about it. But I showed him that he was simply wrong; there it was, in black and white. This wasn't an issue of interpretation, this was a matter of fact - a "fact of reality", in Objectivese.
You lied about Harriman saying we can conclude fire always burns paper based on a single observation. It's in black and white, a matter of fact.
http://aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com/2011/06/notes-on-cultism-in-logical-leap-3.html
It has never been my point simply whether or not Harriman used the term "universal truth." Yet that is the only leg DB has tried to stand on. Ever seen a cockroach stand on one leg? ;-)
Like a cockroach, DB can't sting me. On the other hand, a scorpion, how Mr. Prescott portrayed me, can and has fatally stung the cockroach. Mr. Prescott more or less accurately portrayed the matchup.
Since the internet allows it, the cockroach will prattle on with his usual methods despite his shameful defeat. Like in cartoons, death doesn't always mean the end. However, I will stop buggin' him for now. He ain't worth it, and too much work and study to do. Sorta echoing Arnold, "I might be back." With my stinger and a can of Raid, maybe as an Ampulex wasp. ;-)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cockroach#Role_as_pests
@Anon
ReplyDeleteNever mind Harriman's fudges for now; I agree they are confused, we'll sort them out later. Let's just see if we can get a straight yes or no out of you on the simple fact of what is or isn't in the text.
Re the statement "Fire burns paper", you claimed that Harriman "does not...present it as a universal truth..."
On the contrary, here's Harriman:
"Notice that when our first-level inducer identifies a perceived causal connection in words...he at once states a universal truth." -TLL, p26
Once again: do you now agree that he does to use your own words, "present it as a universal truth"?
It seems like you're starting to move, grudgingly and with great caviling, in that direction...;-)
A simple yes or no, please. If yes, we can then take the next step in the discussion.
BTW, if Anon responds, I will say in advance that I intend to take a rather plodding, but hopefully thorough, step-by -step approach to the discussion.
ReplyDelete@Daniel Barnes (link):
ReplyDeleteThe point of The Logical Leap is perpetuation of the Rand cult, albeit in a timorous, clearly conflicted way.
The "point" of The Logical Leap is to let Leonard Peikoff bask in credit for having solved the problem of induction under cover of David Harriman's being listed as sole author (albeit with acknowledgment that the core of the proposed solution is "nearly verbatim" from Peikoff's taped lectures "Induction in Physics and Philosophy"). I.e., Peikoff gets the bow in case of kudos without the direct responsibility in case of flak.
Although Rand is credited with "provid[ing] the key to [the solution]" with her theory of concepts (Introduction, pg. xi), I expect that Rand would have had a fit at the proposed solution, since I doubt that she'd have had any difficulty seeing that said "solution" has quite abandoned the correspondence theory of truth.
Among the many disservices Leonard Peikoff has done to Rand, I think I'd rank The Logical Leap as the worst.
Ellen:
ReplyDelete>I.e., Peikoff gets the bow in case of kudos without the direct responsibility in case of flak.
Yes, exactly. Plausible deniability, as they say.
It creates a book which is positively aquiver with inner conflicts, starting with the title. Even its authorship requires a decoder ring to interpret.
Though I will add I think the situation is a little bit more complex in that I don't see Peikoff as "basking in credit". It seems to have triggered a personal crisis of confidence instead.
ReplyDeleteEllen:
ReplyDelete>I doubt that she'd have had any difficulty seeing that said "solution" has quite abandoned the correspondence theory of truth.
Yes, but I suspect that epistemological relativism, if that's what you have in mind, was baked in with Rand's original true-within-the-context-of-existing-knowledge formulation, which Harriman basically photocopies.
Doesn't Anon sound just like that foe of insects everywhere, the Ultimate Philosopher?
ReplyDeletecaroljane
@caroljane,
ReplyDeleteThey all sound the same.
Daniel, lol. True, but some sound samier than others. From the obsession with bug-squashing to the folksy g-dropping, to the hurrying away to important work and study, I am convinced that the latest Anon is our old favourite Mr C. Cathcart.By their works shall ye know them!
ReplyDeletecaroljane.
Daniel, lol. True, but some sound samier than others. From the obsession with bug-squashing to the folksy g-dropping, to the hurrying away to important work and study, I am convinced that the latest Anon is our old favourite Mr C. Cathcart.By their works shall ye know them!
ReplyDeletecaroljane.
Daniel link:
ReplyDeleteYes, but I suspect that epistemological relativism, if that's what you have in mind, was baked in with Rand's original true-within-the-context-of-existing-knowledge formulation, which Harriman basically photocopies.
No, epistemological relativism isn't what I have in mind. Relativism about truth is.
The book makes a major switch from the former "contextual certainty" (which, as you and I have talked about many times, is scientific skepticism under a different name) to contextual *truth* (though without using that label). First-level inductions are universally true, despite exceptions. Newton's theory of gravity is still true, though it's been found in error.
Re the "basking in credit" point, I suppose I should have used past tense -- i.e., the point was...
You're right it didn't pan out too well. ;-)
Edit to previous post:
ReplyDeleteI meant to write:
Newton's theory of gravity was true and is still true, though it's been found in error.
Hi Ellen,
ReplyDeleteI agree that TLL takes a clearly relativistic position re truth - and I also agree that it's a major embarrassment. The "arguments", where they exist, are either old hat (just assume induction!), naive (proof via whole context of knowledge, LOL), or rest on obvious word-games (as you say, universal truths that nonetheless have exceptions...!)
All hopeless, and boring with it. That's why I thought it would be more interesting to ask what this folly tries to accomplish (and how it tries to accomplish it), rather than discuss its purported arguments in much detail. Which I will gradually work through in my usual snail like pace.
Where we disagree is how much Rand's original designs remain in Peikoff/Harriman's Rube Goldberg contraption. I conjecture that's it's more rather than less. In the ITOE's discussion of Scientific Methodology (301-3) I agree that she briefly wanders close to the hypothetico-deductive position. But then she falls back upon a typical false assumption of induction's validity at the last moment (when she claims that Newton's theory can be finally accepted as fact only after "a great many other observations").
Because this brief departure must be considered among the rest of her writings ( I think her "certainty" relates directly to "truth" value - she wouldn't be referring merely to an emotional state I don't think) I can't see it as central to her theory - it's accidental, which as I recall we also agreed on?
At any rate, no doubt you are also as scandalous a liar as I am for your terrible misrepresentation of first level inductions as universal truths. Every honest person knows they are except when they aren't....;-)
I can afford a couple minutes.
ReplyDeleteDB>A simple yes or no, please. If yes, we can then take the next step in the discussion
You said Harriman said we can conclude fire always burns paper based on a single observation.
Did you lie or not? A simple yes or no, please.
When you "refuted" Harriman by pointing to alum-treated paper, were you wrong by the same standard you used against him?
A simple yes or no, please.
If you answer 'yes' twice, we can then take the next step in the discussion.
I won't help you succeed as a hypocrite.
DB>They all sound the same.
The Popper cultist abandons his guru's infamous repudiation of induction when it's convenient. After observing a few Objectivists(?) he illogically leaps to the conclusion that they are all the same by induction!
Anon:
ReplyDelete>You said Harriman said we can conclude fire always burns paper based on a single observation.Did you lie or not? A simple yes or no, please.
No,I didn't lie. Harriman writes that the "first level inducer"'s single concrete observation of a fire burning paper results in him stating a universal truth: "Fire burns paper."
This is all clearly in the text. Further, another reader, Ellen Stuttle, who's no fan of myself or this blog, agrees that Harriman presents such "first level inductions" as universal truths.
Your problem, Anon, as I've said right from the start, is that you obviously can't read. Or, you don't seem to know what a universal truth is. Or most likely both.
But it's not too late - here at the ARCHNblog we can help with some remedial training. Go back and read the Harriman passage again, v-e-r-y slowly, and see if you can detect the words "universal truth" presented within - a fact you formerly denied, claiming Harriman does not present it as a universal truth.
So does he or doesn't he, Anon? Yes or no?
Anon:
ReplyDelete>The Popper cultist abandons his guru's infamous repudiation of induction when it's convenient. After observing a few Objectivists(?) he illogically leaps to the conclusion that they are all the same by induction!
LOL Anon! Does this mean that, using Harriman's method instead, I should conclude that it is universally true that Objectivists are utter twits just from observing you?
Part 1 of 2-part post.
ReplyDeleteDaniel (link):
Because this brief departure [in the ITOE Workshop notes] must be considered among the rest of her writings ( I think her "certainty" relates directly to "truth" value - she wouldn't be referring merely to an emotional state I don't think) I can't see it as central to her theory - it's accidental, which as I recall we also agreed on?
I'm not following. Perhaps you've forgotten that it was always Peikoff, not Rand, who presented the idea of the contextual nature of certainty (meaning by "certainty," as you surmise, status as a knowledge claim, not emotional conviction).
We can assume that Peikoff's explication of "certainty" had Rand's approval as of Peikoff's 1976 course titled "The Philosophy of Objectivism," since Rand was in attendance at that course. However, as of the time OPAR was published, nine years after Rand died, Peikoff was exhibiting a trend toward making the truth of a statement contingent on the method of arriving at the statement, and even, in his discussion of the "arbitrary," on *who* is doing the arriving.
Now, as of TLL, we have first-level generalizations, such as "Pushing a ball causes it to roll" (pg. 16), being formed, according to Peikoff, by perception of causality and thus being "to induction what sense perception is to knowledge in general; [i.e.,] the 'axioms of induction'" (pg. 18). By "generalization," Peikoff has said on pg. 7, is meant "a proposition that ascribes a characteristic to every member of an unlimited class, however it is positioned in space or time. In formal terms, [a statement that]: All S is P."
Well, then, what of cases where pushing a ball doesn't cause it to roll? Peikoff acknowledges that a child discovers that a pushed ball won't roll if it "reaches a certain weight, or if it is glued to the floor, or if it is made of iron and sitting on a magnet" (pg. 20). However, he calls such exceptions to the "All S is P" statement (the generalization) "qualifications" which have "no negative significance" (pg. 20) for the unassailable universality of the generalization arrived at by the method "Look and see" (pg. 19).
Part 2 of 2-part post.
ReplyDelete"Similarly," Peikoff says, "Newton's laws are not contradicted by Einstein's discovery of relativity theory" but instead "Newton's science remains absolute within Newton's context" and "alone is what makes possible the later expansion of this context" (pg. 20). (Never mind that Einstein's theory is a whole different theory from Newton's!)
Further on in the book, in the science discussion written by Harriman but undoubtedly vetted for philosophical correctness by Peikoff, we have this statement:
"If, at the end, Newton had been asked, 'Now that you have this theory, how are you going to prove it?' he could answer simply by pointing to the discovery process itself. The step-by-step logical sequence by which he arrived at this theory is the proof. Each step was the grasp of a causal connection by the mathematical processing of observational data. Since there were no arbitrary leaps, there is no problem of justifying them." (pg. 145)
Contra Peikoff's claim in the Introduction that "[The Logical Leap] represents the first major application of Ayn Rand's epistemology to a field other than philosophy" (pg. xi), it's this sort of reasoning which leads me to say that the book instead represents a radical departure from Objectivism's supposed acceptance of the correspondence theory of truth.
Supposing Ayn Rand could be re-materialized from the grave and were to read this book, I believe that she would see the departure also. Since she knew little about physics and the history of physics, she might be misled by parts of the book. For example, just in the material I've quoted, she might think the claim of no contradiction between Newton's and Einstein's theories of gravity is true. However, I think she could see (if re-materialized) the wider problem of purportedly true universal statements which aren't universally true.
There are lots of other problems with the book -- strongly among them is the spin-doctoring of the history of physics to fit the desired story -- but I think the problem I've pointed out is devastating.
An additional problem, one not addressed in the book but of particular interest to me, is this: How do the Peikoff/Harriman team reconcile their extolling Newtonian mechanics as the very model of proper science with Objectivism's adoption of the Aristotelean entity->action model of causality? 'Tis a puzzlement.
However, as of the time OPAR was published, nine years after Rand died, Peikoff was exhibiting a trend toward making the truth of a statement contingent on the method of arriving at the statement, and even, in his discussion of the "arbitrary," on *who* is doing the arriving.
ReplyDeleteWhile perhaps it could be said that Peikoff emphasizes the "method of arriving" at truth more than Rand did, I don't see any major difference between the two. After all, "reason" is a method of arriving at truth, and for Rand, everything came down to whether people had enough confidence in "reason" to use it. If they did, they would come to agree with her. If not, they wouldn't. Out of all this flows Rand's foundationalism, i.e., her mania for validating everything (so the culture would begin to trust "reason"), and her scorn for "just knowing." Emphasis on validation implies taking logic as a kind of standard of knowledge; and logical validation is all about the "method of arriving" at one's conclusions.
To be sure, it is likely that Rand never worked out all the implications of her theories of cognitive development and historical sociology, out of which her mania for "validating" knowledge flows. They are the most poorly defended of all her theories; I doubt she ever allowed herself to come to grips with any serious criticism of them (assuming she was ever confronted with such criticsm), and she seems to have handed off to Peikoff the principle job of defending them.
So, Greg, it's your opinion that Rand would have accepted "All S are P except when they aren't"? Is that what you're saying?
ReplyDeleteI think you're more fanciful -- and empirically irresponsible as well (pots and kettles) -- in "discerning" Rand's thought process than she was in her most fanciful "analyses" (e.g., her "the soul of the mystic" segment of Galt's Speech).
Like, where is your evidence for the process you attribute to her re the Wilkie campaign? Etc., etc.
The Shadow and Greg know...
I remain of the opinion that Rand wouldn't have been enamored of TLL -- on the supposition that she could be re-materialized to read it, minus the stuff about ARI (the establishment and name of which went against her explicit wishes) and any knowledge of Peikoff's having designated himself her "intellectual heir," etc. VERY contra-factual. An experiment which can't be conducted.
So, Greg, it's your opinion that Rand would have accepted "All S are P except when they aren't"? Is that what you're saying?
ReplyDeleteWhere did I ever say such a thing? I would expect Rand, if confronted with such a statement, to reject it, probably angrily. But indeed, if phrased that way, neither Peikoff nor Harriman would accept it, either, even though their theory implies it.
I think you're more fanciful -- and empirically irresponsible as well (pots and kettles) -- in "discerning" Rand's thought process than she was in her most fanciful "analyses"
This is hardly a fair comparison. My speculations on Rand's motivational logic are, at the very least, based on plausible inference from known facts. That can't be said in regard to Rand's theories about human nature and history, which, unlike my theories, are presented as certainly true. If Rand had presented her theories (as she presented her theory about music) as mere hypotheses, I would not criticize her for being empirically irresponsible. I would merely say that her hypotheses about man and history are highly implausible and leave it at that.
I suspect the real bone of contention here stems from my claim that Rand's philosophy is largely unwitting rationalization. That's not an empirically irresponsible claim. Pareto, in his Mind and Society, showed how pervasive rationalization is among intellectuals; and Pareto's arguments have been strengthened from scientific research about the cognitive unconscious. Rationalization is often an important component in human thought; and whenever one finds a very intelligent person presenting inept arguments for both the true and false things he or she believes, that individual is probably rationalizing.
Ellen Stuttle quotes Peikoff: "Newton's science remains absolute within Newton's context"
ReplyDeleteThis is sort of true, provided you remember that "Newton's context" means absolute Euclidean space, absolute time unlinked with the spatial dimensions, invariant masses, no upper limit on velocity, simultaneity independent of observer position and velocity, and so forth. Unfortunately none of these are true of the actual universe.
In a way, Newtonian physics is similar to the use of frictionless planes, or perhaps better, models of gravity in five-dimensional space. It is a thought experiment that might provide some insights or useful approximations, but ultimately it is not truly descriptive of, or grounded in, the real universe.
This makes the later quotes regarding the "proof" of Newton's theories rather odd. Actually what it provides is an example of how the logic can be impeccable, but if it starts from invalid premises (and, in this case, some insufficiently-precise measurements) the conclusions can still be nonsense.
I find all this particularly bizarre in light of the rejection of relativity and QM by some Objectivists (e.g. see http://aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com/2007/11/objectivist-quote-of-week.html).
A correction.
ReplyDeleteIn this post, I asked if it was Greg's opinion "that Rand would have accepted 'All S are P except when they aren't.'"
I need to correct the formulation, which isn't what I meant. "All S are P except when they aren't" could be restated as: All S that are P are P, and all S that aren't P aren't P. Which statement is true whether or not any S are P.
I had a nagging feeling after I'd posted that something was wrong in the S/P statement, but it was awhile later before I realized what. The error is the word "except." What I meant was "even."
I.e., the statement should read, "All S are P even when they aren't."
Greg, re bones of contention.
ReplyDeleteYou write (link):
I suspect the real bone of contention here stems from my claim that Rand's philosophy is largely unwitting rationalization.
That's one bone of contention which I have with you, but far from the only one.
The currently uppermost bone is what I took to be your agreement -- in this post -- with Peikoff's claim that "[The Logical Leap] represents the first major application of Ayn Rand's epistemology to a field other than philosophy" (pg. xi) as against my claim "that the book instead represents a radical departure from Objectivism's supposed acceptance of the correspondence theory of truth" (link).
Judging from your asking where you said any such thing as that Rand might accept the S/P statement (which you appear to have interpreted as I meant it, instead of as I wrote it -- see the above post), maybe you weren't suggesting that Rand would be pleased by The Logical Leap. As is typical, I found what you wrote incomprehensible with the intertwined mind-reading, assumptions, assertions and conclusions drawn therefrom, so basically I guessed.
Ellen:
ReplyDelete>I'm not following. Perhaps you've forgotten that it was always Peikoff, not Rand, who presented the idea of the contextual nature of certainty (meaning by "certainty," as you surmise, status as a knowledge claim, not emotional conviction).
I don't see how the apple has fallen all that far from the tree.
AFAICS Rand regarded knowledge and truth to be equivalent. She rules out hypotheses, which could be true or false, as counting as knowledge on p302 of the ITOE ("...a hypothesis...cannot be taken as knowledge"). And I seriously doubt she would have accepted a false statement as "knowledge".
So when she uses the term "contextual knowledge" (ibid) this seems to me it can only mean contextual truth. As a result, we can see clearly the trajectory is set for a relativistic theory of truth, which is exactly where Harrikoff ends up (and of course many other philosophers who wrestled with the various problems of truth). This formulation renders "certainty" a bit beside the point, but obviously just to drive Rand's position home we have her comment on the aforesaid (my emphasis):
'“Don’t be so sure—nobody can be certain of anything.” Bertrand Russell’s gibberish to the contrary notwithstanding, that pronouncement includes itself; therefore, one cannot be sure that one cannot be sure of anything. The pronouncement means that no knowledge of any kind is possible to man, i.e., that man is not conscious.'
Combining the above, it's clear that only certain truth counts as knowledge (she even flies off into typical absurdity by implying that it is consciousness itself).
As to the point that elsewhere she claims to support the correspondence theory of truth, the reply to that is: so what? It's highly unlikely she understood the traditional problems around that particular theory, nor its renovation via Tarski which might have provided her a decent defense of it. So I'm guessing that for her it just sounded like the sort of thing she would be in favour of - not much more than a slogan really. And given her highly uncritical approach to her own work she simply wouldn't have seen how the two approaches to truth fundamentally clash.
As my fundamental premise in approaching Rand is that she was an unclear and inconsistent thinker and writer - just like many other philosophers! - this clash comes as no surprise.
I quite agree with your other points about TLL; it's obvious to even to me, who has not spent a decade being paid to research the history of science, that Harriman's history is cockamamie. Um, Dave, just because Newton sez he brooks no hypotheses, doesn't mean that he doesn't hypothesise in fact. And leaving the history aside, the arguments are just terrible; just as bad as you say. As for how Harrikoff reconciles Newton with Aristotle, I would hazard with about as much concern for consistency as anything else they've done. (Even worse for the Objectivist narrative, it turns out Renaissance thinkers abandoned Aristotle and "substance" for Plato's favourite, geometry...)
The currently uppermost bone is what I took to be your agreement -- in this post -- with Peikoff's claim...[etc.]
ReplyDeleteThis is definitely based on a misreading of my comments. I was responding solely to Ellen's claim that "Peikoff was exhibiting a trend toward making the truth of a statement contingent on the method of arriving at the statement." Since I find this co-called trend to be an important aspect of Objectivism right from the start (one which, moreover, involves a false demand of knowledge), I objected to Ellen implying that it was largley an invention of Peikoff, rather than a central plank of Rand's philosophy.
I found what you wrote incomprehensible with the intertwined mind-reading, assumptions, assertions and conclusions drawn therefrom...
I don't find the complaints about "mind-reading" compelling or even fair. The fact is, any attempt to understand a philosophy is going to involve a certain element of "mind reading," in that one must guess the intended meanings of the words in which that philosophy is expressed. Moreover, Ellen herself engages in such mind reading when she writes "I remain of the opinion that Rand wouldn't have been enamored of TLL -- on the supposition that she could be re-materialized to read it." Here Ellen is trying to guess what Rand might have thought about the Peikoff-Harriman theory of induction.
BTW, I have no issues with Ellen's "mind reading" and, indeed, am inclined to agree with her in this one instance (i.e., that Rand wouldn't have approved of the Peikoff-Harriman theory). Nor would I describe Ellens' mind-reading as empirically irresponsible, since, as far as I can tell, Ellen seems to know enough about Rand to justify her in making such educated guesses. The problem is that Ellen does not extend the same courtesy toward myself, presumably because I sometimes reach conclusions with which she is not in agreement.
Greg, you go well beyond "guess[ing] the intended meanings of the words in which [a] philosophy is expressed" or forming an educated guess as to what Rand might have thought on the basis of what Rand actually wrote or said. Your mind-reading includes presuming motivations, as you just did with me btw in the above post. With Rand you presume wholesale. You describe your own method here:
ReplyDelete[...] my [GN's] claim that Rand's philosophy is largely unwitting rationalization [is] not an empirically irresponsible claim. Pareto, in his *Mind and Society*, showed how pervasive rationalization is among intellectuals; and Pareto's arguments have been strengthened from scientific research about the cognitive unconscious. Rationalization is often an important component in human thought; and whenever one finds a very intelligent person presenting inept arguments for both the true and false things he or she believes, that individual is probably rationalizing.
I consider the method not much more sound than that of a Freudian analyst discerning an Oedipal complex -- overt, latent, reversed, or repressed -- in every male client. You have it sewn up. If you consider a person's arguments inept, then you think you're justified in starting to speculate about what the person is rationalizing. How could someone answer your speculations? What evidence could be offered to counter them?
Daniel, regarding the distance the TLL apple has fallen from the tree, you write (link):
ReplyDeleteAFAICS Rand regarded *knowledge* and *truth* to be equivalent.
Although I don't think Rand did regard "knowledge" and "truth" as equivalent, I'd agree that she wasn't pellucid on the difference. Compare the wording of the Lexicon entry for "Knowledge" (there's only one entry, which I quote in full) and excerpts from the entries for "Truth":
~~~ Lexicon Quote
Knowledge
“Knowledge” is . . . a mental grasp of a fact(s) of reality, reached either by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation.
Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 35
Truth
Truth is the recognition of reality; reason, man’s only means of knowledge, is his only standard of truth.
Galt’s Speech, For the New Intellectual, 126.
Truth is the product of the recognition (i.e., identification) of the facts of reality. [....]
Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 48.
[....] Truth is the recognition of reality. (This is known as the correspondence theory of truth.) [....]
“Philosophical Detection,”
Philosophy: Who Needs It, 14.
~~~ End Lexicon Quote
Rand's own non-pellucidity re truth as distinguished from knowledge is one reason why I wrote "Objectivism's *supposed* [emphasis added] acceptance of the correspondence theory of truth" (link).
Nevertheless, I think that TLL's "apple" falls so far from the tree as to become a different species altogether from the parent theory. Whereas Rand does make truth dependent on reality, Peikoff/Harriman, as illustrated in the quotes I provided, reverse the order of dependence by saying (in effect) that the process of forming a (proper) generalization *confers* universal truth on the result of the process (even when the result isn't universally true).
I'll come back to the rest of your post when I have time to check out some quotes in context.
Meanwhile, a quick comment on the Russell quote:
You mean I can't so much as be sure that I'm not a tree frog?
How about you? Are you sure that you aren't a tree frog? A scrap of blue algae? A slime mold? An amoeba?
Although I think that some of Rand's aphoristic rejoinders are screwy, I agree with her that the Russell statement is self-including. Also I think that I understand what she means about its denying that man is conscious. If one is conscious, one can be sure that something exists, since consciousness is always relational, always consciousness OF. (This is the point Brentano made using what I think was the very confusing term the "intentionality" of consciousness.)
Ellen:
ReplyDelete>Although I don't think Rand did regard "knowledge" and "truth" as equivalent, I'd agree that she wasn't pellucid on the difference.
Well, we agree Rand employed the phrase "contextual knowledge".
Fortunately while she might not have been very clear, we can help her out here as there are three basic settings:
Knowledge=
a) Truth
b) Possible Truth/Possible Falsity (ie a hypothetical)
c) Falsity
AFAICS we have good reason to eliminate b) and c) thus leaving a) as the best of the three options. Add "contextual", the rest follows.
Or we could go more classical, a la Plato and Aristotle, and distinguish between a) certain truth (or episteme, and b) mere opinion (or doxa. Once again, I would struggle to find a quote suggesting that Rand believed mere opinion counted as knowledge. If so, the rest follows.
We also have the following on p28 ITOE as you will know: "The process of observing facts of reality and of integrating them into concepts is, in essence, a process of induction."
As the logical strength of all this dang fancy integratin' and inductifyin' is unfortunately nil, a fact Rand seems blissfully unaware of, it was inevitable some kind of subjectivist/relativist mumbo-jumbo would be whipped up to plug the gap. As logical strength is the only point at issue in the problem of induction, whether Rand would be embarrassed by the particular mumbo-jumbo provided by Harrikoff, or whether she would have come up with mumbo-jumbo of her own that she found less embarrassing, I frankly do not consider a very interesting topic. All we need to establish is that the essentials of TLL (contextual knowledge and illogical inductive "integration") are already in Rand; and they are.
>Meanwhile, a quick comment on the Russell quote:
You mean I can't so much as be sure that I'm not a tree frog? How about you? Are you sure that you aren't a tree frog? A scrap of blue algae? A slime mold? An amoeba?
I think you know (I hope!) my reply to this kind of question, so you can answer this one yourself and save me some typing...;-)
> I agree with her that the Russell statement is self-including.
But that wasn't the question, which was, would Russell disagree with you and Rand? If so, why? If not (as I think) why does Rand try to make out otherwise?
>Also I think that I understand what she means about its denying that man is conscious. If one is conscious, one can be sure that something exists, since consciousness is always relational, always consciousness OF.
I understand it too, but that's not the question either, which was: does it follow?
Greg wrote:
ReplyDelete>I have no issues with Ellen's "mind reading"...The problem is that Ellen does not extend the same courtesy toward myself, presumably because I sometimes reach conclusions with which she is not in agreement.
Ellen replied:
>Your [Greg N's] mind-reading includes presuming motivations, as you just did with me btw in the above post.
Ok, then why do you grant yourself permission to mind-read the spectre of Ayn Rand whilst admonishing Greg for the same? Tell us the reason, then we won't have to make such presumptions...;-)
I consider the method not much more sound than that of a Freudian analyst discerning an Oedipal complex -- overt, latent, reversed, or repressed -- in every male client.
ReplyDeleteThis strikes me as a palpably unfair comparison, and I have doubts as to whether Ellen fully believes this; for in another place she writes:
There are lots of other problems with the [Harriman] book -- strongly among them is the spin-doctoring of the history of physics to fit the desired story...
What is "spin-doctoring" but rationalization? So, in other words, it's okay to ascribe rationalization to Peikoff-Harriman (even though doing so is not "much more sound" than ascribing to men an oedipal complex), but not to Rand.
I agree with Ellen that Peikoff and Harriman are probably engaged in at least some form or level of rationalization in TLL. In that work, we are confronted with inept arguments placed in the service of predetermined conclusions. That strongly suggests rationalization. The McCaskey imbroglio strengthens the case.
So what really is the difference between Peikoff-Harriman and Rand?
In Rand, we frequently find inept arguments placed in the service of predetermined conclusions. We also find an individual who is hostile to criticism, who is not interesting in debating, and is closed to evidence that challenges her conclusions. This is all strong evidence in favor of the rationalization hypothesis. Does it prove it beyond a reasonable doubt? No. But it does give a strong presumption in its favor.
How could someone answer your speculations? What evidence could be offered to counter them?
By countering them with evidence in the other direction (supposing such evidence existed). My claims are not entirely speculative, but are plausible inferences from known facts. If, for example, one finds evidence that a given thinker is open to contrary facts, welcomes criticism, regards knowledge as conjectural, actively seeks falsification, is willing to accept conclusions that go against his deepest preferences, has actually changed his mind when trying to prove some hypothesis (because his attempt to prove it has brought up unforseen problems) -- all this is strong evidence against the hypothesis that the individual in question is engaged in large-scale rationalization.
"If one is conscious, one can be sure that something exists, since consciousness is always relational, always consciousness OF."
ReplyDeleteWhat does "exist" mean here? If it means physical existence independent of consciousness, that doesn't follow (even if it is of course a very useful hypothesis). A solipsist would deny it without committing the error of a logical contradiction. Stating that consciousness is always relational is begging the question.
I see here references to "a Russell quote". What Russell quote? The sentence "nobody can be certain of anything"? I can't find this phrase anywhere described as a Russell quote, except by Objectivists.
ReplyDeleteThe closest thing I found is:
"Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good."
However, that is of course something quite different, and certainly no gibberish.
By countering them with evidence in the other direction (supposing such evidence existed). My claims are not entirely speculative, but are plausible inferences from known facts. If, for example, one finds evidence that a given thinker is open to contrary facts, welcomes criticism, regards knowledge as conjectural, actively seeks falsification, is willing to accept conclusions that go against his deepest preferences, has actually changed his mind when trying to prove some hypothesis (because his attempt to prove it has brought up unforseen problems) -- all this is strong evidence against the hypothesis that the individual in question is engaged in large-scale rationalization.
ReplyDeleteBy the way, this brings to mind something interesting about Russell - Blanshard wrote that after Lovejoy's Revolt Against Dualism came out, Russell abandoned many of the positions that he (Russell) had most recently defended in that book. One could make the point that Russell's statement was borne of the experience of years of hard earned debate, where he replaced certainty about the truth of one position with doubt as to its veracity and over time, took the conjectural, skeptical approach to knowledge. Of course, Rand, had no such qualms, given that she had never had to change her core positions since the age of 3 (I believe).
Dragonfly, the Russell quote might be called gibberish by someone who disagreed with it. I sometimes do this myself, though I tend to use "nonsense", not "gibberish."
ReplyDeleteIn that light, there are a couple of things in that quote which Rand and other Objectivists would disagree with. His view of the purpose of philosophy, for example; Rand's modern followers think that philosophy is the basis of all knowledge, so anything that contradicts that philosophy is wrong.
Recall your own examples (http://aynrandcontrahumannature.blogspot.com/2007/05/hoisted-from-comments-peikoffs-weird.html ) where Peikoff attempts to veto Godel, relativity, quantum mechanics, and other math and science on the grounds that they contradict his philosophical premises of consistency, certainty, causality, and common sense.
@Ken: my question is: is this really a quote from Russell?
ReplyDeleteHI DF, no it isn't, have a look at the passage in the main post.
ReplyDeletecheers
D
@Daniel: then statements like "..I agree with her that the Russell statement is self-including" and "the Russel quote" are misleading if Russell himself never said that. Further some Objectivists explicitly claim that it is a quote by Russell.
ReplyDeletestatements like "..I agree with her that the Russell statement is self-including" and "the Russell, quote" are misleading if Russell himself never said that.
ReplyDeleteTrue; but even if (per implausible) Russell did say such a thing, it's self-inclusion is irrelevant. If one can't be certain of anything, including whether one can be certain, so what? Unless one assumes that the only alternative to certainty is complete ignorance, there are no logical difficulties in the position. Knowledge claims may have degrees of reliability; and the claim that nothing is certain may, even though it is not certain, have a very high degree of reliability.
Objections based on self-inclusion are superficial and often rely on the fact that the imaginary skeptic one is arguing against can't argue back. A real skeptic, assuming he was intelligent and philosophically literate, would not be so easy to vanquish.
That so-called Russell argument is a Randian strawman anyway. This statement is far too general to be interesting and I doubt that any serious philosopher would use it. It treats all statements on the same footing, ignoring for example the difference between analytic and synthetic statements. People can be certain of analytic statements as these follow logically from the definitions.
ReplyDeleteFor example we can be certain that 2 + 2 = 4, as this follows from the definitions of integers and addition (for example Peano's axioms). In the same way we can be certain that there is an infinite number of prime numbers.
On the other hand it is easy to show that denying the truth of the statement "nobody can be certain of the truth of universally quantified statements about the physical world" implies that man is omniscient, a position that few people would be willing to defend, I think. So when a Randian accepts the statement that man is not omniscient, he must also accept the truth of "nobody can be certain of the truth of universally quantified statements about the physical world".
Note how resentful Rand's remarks about Russell are: here she refers to his "gibberish", elsewhere she wrote "As an illustration, observe what Bertrand Russell was able to perpetrate because people thought they 'kinda knew' the meaning of the concept of 'number'."
ReplyDeleteNowhere she tells us what Russell's gibberish was or what he was able to "perpetrate", she hasn't any argument, the statements are just dripping with hate and resentment but don't give any information about the reason of her criticism.
I suspect the reason is that she wasn't intelligent enough to understand Russell's arguments, but only felt that his conclusions were contrary to her philosophy, so there had to be something very wrong with the arguments, although they just went over her head. Rand gave Kant and Emerson a similar treatment.
No wonder that she didn't want to discuss her philosophy with knowledgeable opponents, only with sympathizers and impressionable young admirers or unsophisticated tv-presentators. She must - consciously or subconsciously - have realized that she didn't stand a chance against a real opponent.
Good God, to think I used to consider Rand's statements like this to be profound. Now I see she didn't even know what she was talking about.
ReplyDeleteMy problem was that "Philosophy: who needs it" was the first book on philosophy I read (not counting Atlas). So as far as I could tell, Rand was right. The good news was that at least it got me interested in the field writ large. The bad news is now I see that philosophy is much more boring than Rand made it out to be in her "us against the world/Immanual Kant" rants!
Jeffrey,
ReplyDeleteNot sure if I'd agree with you on how interesting philosophy is (though I think its practical utility is not as great as Rand would suggest).
"The trouble with philosophy has been that most philosophers have been the sort of men who fall in love with an idea at first sight."
- Arthur Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism. The quote comes from a fantastic 3 page discussion of what a more scientific approach to philosophy would resemble. He also writes, "But the haste of many philosophers to settle what appear to be the more fundamental issues first, and their consequent reluctance to discuss in a spirit of scientific detachment questions of the mere congruity of suppositions, has been highly detrimental to philosophy."
The inability to suspend judgement is what I think hurts people like Rand. If she was a business woman, that would have been fine. For a philosopher, it is terrible.
Well I may not like Rand much anymore but the least I can do is give her a fair shake. I think we've all been taking her quote somewhat out of context. In the title essay of "Philosophy: who needs it", she mentions "no one can be certain of anything" (p.5) as one of many examples of how everyone picks up on philosophy through cultural osmosis. She attributes the "notion" to David Hume, which isn't too far from the truth, I guess. But when she discusses it again in the next chapter, in addition to adding a swipe at Russell, she all of a sudden starts calling it a "pronouncement", as if Hume actually said something it. A little bit of bait-and-switch there. But anywho, I think what she's getting at in that "gibberish" in the second half of Barne's quote is that skepticism is a tool used by statists to silence opponents, because how can the lowly citizenry disprove the state's edicts?
ReplyDeleteThat's the Objectivist position, but I think evil rulers would much prefer Rand's version of "objectivity" so that they could "prove" their edicts rather than worry about people coming up and saying "sez who?"
Jeffrey,
ReplyDeleteSince we all know that many popular ideas are often bastardized versions of the complex and nuanced ideas put forth by their originators, do you think it is giving Rand "a fair shake" to take a complicated idea (which she likely never engaged with), strip it of all its nuance (which is probably the form in which she actually engaged the idea, either in discussion or with her horrible intellectual filter), and then push it as if that was what the expert originator said?
She even misquoted Emerson on "consistency" and misrepresented the dictionary definition of "selfishness".
When you want to give her a "fair shake", remember these things, because they are part of the problem. Rand was more about propaganda than realism.
DF,
ReplyDeleteRand and Objectivists have something of a love/hate relationship with the intellectual world.
On the one hand they want to be respected and also employed by universities. On the other hand they have such contempt for academics that all they can do is sneer - and then they wonder why they aren't taken seriously.
Rand once said that a professional journal wouldn't publish and Objectivist work. That probably wasn't true when she said it and it certainly isn't true today.
Neil,
ReplyDeleteI actually think Rand was right about professional journals. Objectivist scholarship is quite shoddy, but Rand, unable to see this, wore it as a badge of honor.
Laj
Laj,
ReplyDeleteTara Smith and Darryl Wright have published extensively on Rand's ethics.
David Kelley used to publish stuff as well.
I don't know how good all this is, but it can't be all that bad.
-Neil Parille
Neil,
ReplyDeleteWe are approaching this question from different standpoints. Ayn Rand wasn't asking whether a journal would publish a qualified academic philosopher who spoke the language of academic philosophy and defended Objectivist positions and called themselves an Objectivist.
She was asking whether an academic journal would publish one of her (or her minions') caricatures of great philosophers, with shoddy quotes and bad arguments.
There are no indefensible positions in philosophy because philosophy is about the quality of reasoning and good reasoning can be highly educational even if it leads to flawed conclusions. Misrepresentations and caricatures would not have passed peer review and that was Rand's real problem.
Laj,
ReplyDeleteFrom the context of the quote it appears that Rand's contention that a academic journal wouldn't publish an Objectivist essay out of dislike for the distinctive doctrines of Objectivism.
-Neil Parille
Neil,
ReplyDeleteI get that part. I am saying she was right, but not for the reason she gave. The quality of objectivist scholarship resented by Tara Smith and Darryl Wright, even if still blindly partisan in its choice of opponents to take seriously, is of much higher quality than that of Peikoff. If Objectivism had such academics in the past, I would have said she was wrong.
@Neil: that was Rand's rationalization. I don't know the other writers, but the philosophical standards of articles by Rand and Peikoff are just too low.
ReplyDeleteFor example, unsubstantiated swipes at other philosophers (Rand) or dismissing them on the basis of highly selective cherrypicking of quotes (Peikoff) are not the way to write a serious article for an academic journal, not to mention the very elementary logical errors both make.
Daniel (link):
ReplyDeleteOk, then why *do* you grant yourself permission to mind-read the spectre of Ayn Rand whilst admonishing Greg for the same? Tell us the reason, then we won't have to make such presumptions...;-)
Daniel, are you seriously claiming not to see the difference between reasonable extrapolations from what a person actually wrote or said and such depth-psychology excursions as this by Greg? (Even the historical claims aren't supported by textual evidence, let alone the motive ascription.)
I recall a long, and ultimately futile, discussion on OL in which (amongst many other issues) I said that I didn't know if Popper had ever read Rand but, whether or not, if he did, he'd classify her as an "essentialist" by his meaning of "essentialist" in "Two Definitions." And MSK accused me of "mind-reading," whereas all I was doing was extrapolating a logical conclusion from Popper's discussion, and you supported the extrapolation.
Same process operative here.
(Side comment to Greg (link): I don't mean "rationalizing" by "spin-doctoring." I mean consciously tailoring to suit. I'll grant that I made an accusation which I can't prove. Having heard Harriman's progression over 10 years, however, and knowing of the objections he received in process, I believe he deliberately tailored.)
Daniel link:
ReplyDeleteWell, we agree Rand employed the phrase "contextual knowledge".
Did she? Haven't had time to re-read her remarks in ITOE Expanded. Will re-read soon.
---
Fortunately while she might not have been very clear, we can help her out here as there are three basic settings:
Knowledge=
a) Truth
b) Possible Truth/Possible Falsity (ie a hypothetical)
c) Falsity
AFAICS we have good reason to eliminate b) and c) thus leaving a) as the best of the three options. Add "contextual", the rest follows.
Whoa.
These are the possibilities in the traditional "correspondence theory of truth":
1) Justified true belief (= knowledge)
2) Unjustified true belief
3) Justified false belief
4) Unjustified false belief.
"Truth" here pertains to the relationship of a statement to reality, "knowledge" to the process of arriving at a belief.
As I recall, this was the way the distinction was presented (though not expressed with that formal breakdown) up through Peikoff's 1976 course which had Rand's ok.
I'm in process of trying to track where the divergence, and by what steps, possibility #3 became dicey.
I ordered the book of NB's "Basic Principles" course, and have decided to acquire -- though I resent the expenditure -- the CD's of Peikoff's 1976 course, the last presentation Rand approved.
Stay tuned.
---
We also have the following on p28 ITOE as you will know: "The process of observing facts of reality and of integrating them into concepts is, in essence, a process of induction."
Yes, I know that passage. It's one of two I'd most like to black pencil (the other being the unclear passage about is/ought). What she meant by "induction" and "deduction," I think is unclear. Was she merely meaning learning from and then applying experience? Or did she mean the formal sense?
Either way, the passage -- combined with her comment about the joint efforts of a philosopher and a scientist in ITOE Expanded -- most unfortunately provides a plausible green light to the Peikoff/Harriman attempt.
---
>Meanwhile, a quick comment on the Russell quote:
You mean I can't so much as be sure that I'm not a tree frog? How about you? Are you sure that you aren't a tree frog? A scrap of blue algae? A slime mold? An amoeba?
I think you know (I hope!) my reply to this kind of question, so you can answer this one yourself and save me some typing...;-)
No, I don't know. You appear to me to be indicating that, no, you can't be sure you aren't a tree frog. Is my interpretation correct? (Fortunately, you're still alive to ask.)
Dragonfly (link):
ReplyDelete"If one is conscious, one can be sure that something exists, since consciousness is always relational, always consciousness OF."
What does "exist" mean here? If it means physical existence independent of consciousness, that doesn't follow (even if it is of course a very useful hypothesis). A solipsist would deny it without committing the error of a logical contradiction. Stating that consciousness is always relational is begging the question.
I recall your making that claim before, on OL. I don't recall if I expressed disagreement there or just let the issue go past, not wanting to get into it. Either way, I don't agree -- and don't want to get into it, at least not here and now. All I was saying here is that I think I understand what Rand's point was (based on plenty she said about the relationship between consciousness and "existence").
--
link:
@Ken: my question is: is this really a quote from *Russel*l?
Posthumous apologies to Russell if the quote isn't a quote (I missed Daniel's indication that it wasn't if Daniel thus indicated) and glad to hear it wasn't if it wasn't, since I consider the comment really dumb.
I don't mean "rationalizing" by "spin-doctoring." I mean consciously tailoring to suit. I'll grant that I made an accusation which I can't prove.
ReplyDeleteBut I do regard spin-doctoring as a form of rationalization, and therefore recognize no difference. I don't, however, believe that Harriman (or Rand or Peikoff) were fully, consciously aware that they were tailoring their research to suit their conclusions, even though that is what they were doing. Most rationalization is unconscious (psychological experiments offer a great deal of corroboration for this). Generally speaking, rationalization occurs whenever the mind seeks to justify some belief formed from largely tacit and unconscious cognitive processes (which happens to be
the source of most of what people believe). It matters little whether these conclusions are true or
false, "justified"or "unjustified"; what matters is whether the reasons provided actually have anything to do with the beliefs they attempt to justify. It is highly plausible, for example, that Rand's stated
reasons for believing in an external reality are rationalizations, even though that belief happens to be true. To paraphrase Bradley, Rand's metaphysics constitutes bad reasons for what she believed on instinct (i.e., via the cognitive unconscious).
Experimental evidence in psychology demonstrates the pervasiveness of rationalization in human thought. Rand's failing is not so much that she rationalized (we all do), but that she took little, if any, counter-measures against it (such as openness to criticism, to new evidence, recognition that she might be rationalizing, etc.). We
need such institutions in science and scholarship as peer review precisely because of the ubiquity of rationalization in human thought.
Daniel, are you seriously claiming not to see the difference between reasonable extrapolations from what a person actually wrote or said and such depth-psychology excursions as this by Greg?
ReplyDeleteAre you so sure, Ellen, that the differences between our methods are really so great, or is it possible you simply don't understand what you caricaturize as "depth-psychology excursions"? As a matter of fact, my methods aren't really any different than yours. They rely on no occult process or "depth" psychology (whatever that means). They involve the same reasonable extrapolations as you engage in, except that they add an additional component: conduct. I don't just extrapolate from what people write and say, but also from how they behave. If inconsistencies arise, that suggests that at some deeper level, they don't entirely believe what they say. Rand, for example, made a great deal of virtuous noise about validating human cognition. The "concerted" attack against "man's mind" was, according to Rand, placing Western Civilization at risk. In FTNI, Rand outlines her broad plan for taking back the culture. But Rand herself always seemed to be somewhat diffident about spreading her philosophy, or engaging in the great "duel" with the Plato-Kant axis. She wouldn't debate, or try to get published in philosophical journals, or seek exposure in any venue in which she didn't have complete control. She even appears to have had grave doubts about the NBI project, and killed it after her break with the Brandens. Nor could she ever muster enough motivation to write a full length book on Objectivism. All this (along with many other considerations) raises doubts as to how deep Rand's convictions about history and the importance of justifying human cognition really go (along with her concomitant interst in spreading her philosophy). She seems more interested in making sure that no one, either in public or private, could effectively challenge her. In any case, she doesn't act like someone sincerely and passionately interested in Objective truth; nor does she act like someone passionately interested in spreading her ideas. (Other more personal factors have more sway with her, such as exacting revenge against Nathaniel Branden.) So what does her behavior, her conduct suggest about the relation between her ideas and her motivation? That is the sort of question that piques my interest, because it leads to insights about the relation of ideas to conduct, which is much more complex than Rand or her disciples often assumed.
Ellen,
ReplyDeleteBy the way, have you read any of the recent books on Rand?
Thanks,
Laj
Ellen
ReplyDelete>Did she [ use the term "contextual knowledge"] ? Haven't had time to re-read her remarks in ITOE Expanded. Will re-read soon.
On p302.
>Yes, I know that passage. It's one of two I'd most like to black pencil...
Do you mean "edit out" or "correct" (ie what's usually called "blue pencil")? If so, why would you want to do that?
>You appear to me to be indicating that, no, you can't be sure you aren't a tree frog. Is my interpretation correct?
I'm surprised that you consider this Randian gotcha - one of their many Fool's Mate type openings that, once learned, somehow lead Objectivists to believe themselves to be Grand Masters - to have any weight.
Let's step back. The situation from a Critical Rationalist point of view is: what/who is the final source of authority when it comes to knowledge?
CR's answer is: there is no such thing. Not you, not me, not science, not introspection, not God, not intuition, not Plato, not the President, not the people, nothing. We conjecture - and this belief may turn out to be false one day itself, of course - there is no final authority that stamps eternal, unassailable truth on any belief, or any statement of belief.
Turning then from this to whether I think I am a tree frog or not, I certainly firmly believe I am not. Further, I can muster all manner of excellent arguments to the contrary as well; that tree frogs don't use the internet, for example, or read Ayn Rand; or that I'm not very good at catching flies with my tongue. These and a thousand other reasons lead me to proclaim with complete sincerity and conviction my belief that I am not a tree frog, but a human being. And I'm sure you, the people, the President, scientists, our intuitions etc would resoundingly agree.
But in acknowledging the sincerity of my belief, my feelings of absolute confidence regarding its truth, along with all those other sources of knowledge, do I attribute to any of them the power of ultimate authority in determining the truth of this belief? The answer is no - no more than I would give them such authority over the truth of any other belief.
After all, there are always strange possibilities. If Nick Bostrom's well known conjecture turns out to be true, I don't exist at all - I'm just a simulation running on some future megacomputer somewhere. If we accept this is possible, then I can't see why we can't accept that it's also possible that I'm actually a tree frog too.That doesn't mean I spend all day worrying about whether I'm a tree frog, any more than I worry about the sun rising tomorrow or a comet striking the earth in the next two minutes.(But of course I acknowledge these things are all possibilities).
Or, turn this around. Let's say it is ultimately, unassailably true that I'm not a tree frog because I say so. Isn't that setting me up as a source of ultimate, unassailable truth? Well yes it is. And if I'm going to be the source of one such ultimate truth...why not more? Why not as many as I like? And if I firmly believe, based on my own study of logic, judgement, science and introspection that I am not a tree frog but am in fact Napoleon, or Jesus, or the one true interpreter of Ayn Rand's real philosophy, how true does that make my claims?
Hopefully that answers your question..;-)
Ellen:
ReplyDelete>Daniel, are you seriously claiming not to see the difference between reasonable extrapolations from what a person actually wrote or said and such depth-psychology excursions as this by Greg?
Well ok, if what Greg wrote in this particular comment is vastly contrary to the facts and can be easily shot down as tendentious and unfounded, my advice is to then...shoot him down! Just say: Greg, you're clearly wrong because of x, y, and z. He's a big boy, I'm sure he can take it...;-) In fact I think he'd relish a change from the vague, anonymous ad hominems that characterise the typical Objectivist responses we get around here!
Greg,
ReplyDeleteAs far as Rand's rationalizing goes, I find it somewhat similar to what happened with Stephen Gould, particularly in his book The Mismeasure of Man.
Gould had an optimistic view of human nature (from what I recall of the book) and he apparently distorted the facts for propaganda purposes. He even accused an anthropologist of fudging his data on brain sizes to make him out as a racist.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/science/14skull.html?_r=1&ref=intelligence
-Neil Parille
Laj, thanks for the "fell in love with an idea at first sight" quote - it ties in with Daniel's comment on Rand's pusillanimous performance as a serious philosopher. I think she was a skilled and unique novelist, a great fantasist who fell in love with her own ideas and heroes - she has attested to this in a way. pronouncing that her convictions were fixed by age 7 or so - without fans and readers, what would she have done?Pursued philosophy in noble solitude? Having achieved philo-nirvana, with Atlas Shrugged, how dare she write any more novels? She was blocked every which way really, by her own human nature, as continues to be revealed on this great site.
ReplyDeletecaroljane
As far as Rand's rationalizing goes, I find it somewhat similar to what happened with Stephen Gould, particularly in his book The Mismeasure of Man.
ReplyDeleteI don't know enough about Gould to say one way or the other, but, given the pervasiveness of rationalizing in human thought, it's not surprising that he would engage in it at some level.
But at least there was a check of sorts on Gould's rationalizing, as he wished to be taken seriously by the broader intellectual community of her peers. No such desire served as a check against Rand. No such consideration seems to have had sway over Rand. She does not seem to have much cared what the broader intellectual community thought of her, and rarely, if ever, allowed their criticisms to affect her.
Curiously, early in Rand's career she did have some critical interaction with individuals who could be regarded as her peers. She received criticism, some of it fairly apt and pointed, from Isabel Paterson, Rose Wilder Lane, and people associated with Leonard Read. She does not seem to have taken any of this criticism very well, particularly the criticism from some of Read's supporters, who complained that Rand, in a paper on rights, had been too dogmatic. In later life, she refused to countenance anything that smacked of criticism at all; and I can't imagine her ever engaging in anything like peer review (even assuming, per implausible, that she could have gotten some of her articles published in an academic journal).
Greg,
ReplyDeleteThe discussion between you and me has gotten farther and farther afield from the logic of the point I was trying to make with my contra-factual of Rand re-materialized and confronted by TLL. I was merely attempting to indicate that I think there are obvious inconsistencies between Rand's stated views and material in TLL. Suppose for the moment that I agreed with your übertheory of the rationalization origins of philosophies and with your specific theory of Rand-the-rationalizer, I would still say that Rand's stated views are inconsistent with material in TLL. I'd say the same if Rand acquired her views ready-made from the corner drug store. Origins are irrelevant to the logical disparity -- to which issue I'd like to return.
However... Just out of justice to Rand as a human being, I feel that I must enter a passing objection to the argument you make in your latest reply to the effect that Rand didn't entirely believe what she said. Amongst your "evidence" is the statement "Nor could she ever muster enough motivation to write a full length book on Objectivism." You ignore such factors as: She was old, tired, and (according to some accounts) dispirited (accounts vary on the dispiritedness). She wasn't in robust health, and in early 1975 she had major surgery from which she never fully recuperated. Her husband was becoming progressively senile and required hired nursing in the last years of his life. She only lived less than two and a half years herself after her husband died -- and she was doing some studying toward the projected book in those years.
Daniel,
ReplyDeleteI hope to get back to you in the next few days. I'm having trouble finding time for typing in quotes. However, I came across something I'd forgotten and think is very pertinent to whether or not Rand recognized the logical impossibility of arriving at certainty regarding scientific theories. This is a quick type. It's on pg. 297 of ITOE:
[Rand] When you simply boil water, you do not know that it has molecules, nor what happens to those molecules. When you arrive at that later stage of knowledge, you've discovered something about water and the conditions of its boiling which you didn't know before. And, therefore, within your present context, this is a sufficient explanation, even though it's not the exclusive and final explanation. To reach that you would have to have omniscience [i.e., you couldn't reach that] [emphasis added].
Compare to the last paragraph of this post by Dragonfly.
Regarding pg. 302 of ITOE, which you've now referenced twice: I think you must be reading her reply to "Prof. M" quite backward. She is saying a strong NO, not Yes, to Prof. M's suggestion -- and thus by extension to Leonard Peikoff's claim about the contextual absoluteness of Newton's theories on pg. 20 of TLL and to Harriman's similar claims in the "Discovery Is Proof" section.
Ellen,
ReplyDeleteBy the way, have you read any of the recent books on Rand?
Thanks,
Laj
If you mean the two recent biographies, yes, more than twice each, in minute detail, including careful study of the end notes.
100 Voices is also recent. I've only read a few of the interviews in that.
Hi Ellen,
ReplyDeleteIt is obvious that Rand did not claim that human omniscience was possible. I agree she might have been dimly aware of consequences of this, i.e. final certainty is impossible, hence her fudge into the "contexual" . As I mentioned in an earlier comment, she approaches this issue in the passages mentioned on p302 before reverting to a standard naiive inductivist position on p303. Her position is simply inconsistent; the inconsistency of ignorance, as she asserts she actually knows nothing about the issue. She just wants to have her "absolutes" and eat her "non-omniscience" too. However, had she really sat down and worked on the problem, she would then have had to walk back a lot her prior rhetoric which had already positioned her as the champion of intellectual certainty against an evil army of dishonest skeptics/relativists. She might have even recognised the relativistic implications in her own approach.
But who knows such whimsical counterfactuals? Only The Shadow. So we have to take her as read: a typical, bog standard naiive inductivist with their typical, bog standard inconsistencies, and with relativistic tendencies.
As for whether I've got something or other "backwards" you're going to have to be a bit more specific - I don't really see what you're driving at. What did I say that was wrong?
@Ellen
ReplyDeleteRe: your comment above, here are the key quotes:
p303
Rand: "After [Newton's theory of universal gravitation] has been verified by a great many other observations, not merely the verification of one prediction, then at a certain time one can accept it as fact. But taking your example as an illustration of what you are asking, if the sole validation for Newton's principle was that it predicted that orbits would be elliptical - that wouldn't be sufficient proof. Epistemologically, it wouldn't be enough. You would have to have other observations, from different aspects of the same issue, all of which support the hypothesis."
Prof M: "...When does one decide that enough confirming evidence exists?...
Rand: "...That's the big question of induction....it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process in that field."
Hey, if you want to know the answer to the problem of induction...just ask "an accomplished scientist"!
If this isn't naiive inductivism, I don't know what is. So what if she edges at some point a little closer to a skeptical point of view before veering back again? You're getting into broken clock territory.
I don't even know why anyone should bother discussing Rand's view on this, really.
Ellen:
ReplyDelete>[Greg] ignore[s] such factors as: [Rand] was old, tired, and (according to some accounts) dispirited ...
Yes, a fair point. But on the other hand we also can't just ignore Rand's famous pronouncements as to her philosophical precocity.
For example, she claims to have had the fundamental approach of her philosophy a the age of 2&1/2. She claimed she came up with her epistemology after 30 minutes introspection. And so forth. If it was all so clear, and she was so insightful, and it was so important for the fate of mankind, surely she could have put something together before dotage set in?
Now this would be quite different if Rand had claimed that her philosophical insights were hard-won, and had been gained over a great struggle and many great mistakes over a lifetime to finally arrive at Objectivism. But she says nothing of the sort. In fact she perpetuates the cultic notion that she was somehow imbued with Objectivism from birth, and that the most difficult philosophical problems were mere bagatelles to be solved with a few minutes thinking, then a bit of checking afterwards just to confirm how right she was.
So it seems hard to combine these claims of Rand's with a defense that she was too old to write a book on Objectivism, because obviously that implies that she really only figured it out very late in life. It really has to be one or the other. If the latter, then clearly if not dishonest, she is self-deluded as to the former.
I mean, the more you think about it, the more ridiculous this is.
ReplyDeleteWhy should anyone be interested in what Ayn Rand pronounces about "verifiying" Newton's law of gravitation? As far as I am aware she had only the vaguest idea about the subject, no more than the general reader. In fact, from this quote she seems to actually be referring to Kepler's first law, which Newton of course refined. She didn't even know algebra at this point.
By the same token, why should anyone be interested in Ayn Rand's views on a subject like induction which she herself admitted to know nothing about, an admission her every vague utterance entirely supports. Yet her followers write whole books about how Objectivism "solves" this problem, and her fans endlessly rake the cinders for the faintest glimmer of insight here. Why? Why?
The only answer I can think of is the ongoing attraction of her particular cult of personality. The only interesting area of investigation AFAICS is exploring the difference between the power of this cult over the minds of its adherents and the poverty of the actual philosophy.
It's a great shame that I seem to have mislaid my copy of TLL and will have to reorder, so I will have to pick up my series in a few weeks.
The only answer I can think of is the ongoing attraction of her particular cult of personality. The only interesting area of investigation AFAICS is exploring the difference between the power of this cult over the minds of its adherents and the poverty of the actual philosophy.
ReplyDeleteIsn't that Greg's primary focus on this blog, and what his responses to Ellen say (as much as she has refused to accept them)?
Daniel, sorry to hear you have mislaid TTL. But the poor thing - ill-begotten, of uncertain parentage and thrust into the world in scandalous circumstances, what chance would it have against a guy like you?
ReplyDelete@Daniel Barnes:
ReplyDeleteSo it seems hard to combine these claims of Rand's with a defense that she was too old to write a book on Objectivism, because obviously that implies that she really only figured it out very late in life. It really has to be one or the other.
Or... She lived most of her life in the absolute certainty she had found at an early age (2 and a half? really?). All problems and questions bowed before her insight within half an hour, or were dismissed as the product of wrong thinking and a malevolent view of life. All doubters were dismissed with a few scornful words, and the more persistent forbidden from the presence and never mentioned.
Then, the realization: memento mori. Her penetrating intellect will be lost; she must scramble to preserve as much as possible. Taking pen in hand, she begins to record her reasoning, the careful step-by-step progressions from "A is A" to the problem of induction, or the truth of Newtonian physics, or the refutation of Bishop Berkeley.
And it all comes crashing down. What was so easy to claim with a handwave and a well-placed insult turned out to be difficult - dare one say, impossible - when she had to actually show the work. The book is impossible, but this cannot be admitted to her followers, and perhaps not even to herself. Reasons must instead be found that make the writing impossible - just at this time, of course, and once these problems have been resolved, there will be time to devote for the book.
This is all wild speculation on my part, of course.
Ken:
ReplyDelete>The book is impossible, but this cannot be admitted to her followers, and perhaps not even to herself.
Ken, my wild guess is that your speculation is probably not far from the case. The book is impossible. As evidence for this, i suggest not only farcical attempts like The Logical Leap, but also the Atlas Society's "The Logical Structure of Objectivism" which has languished in beta form since 1999. Allegedly being revised, it is not clear when or whether it will even be released.
Kelley is a trained logician. If he has given up on this, as it appears, this may be further evidence that such a book is, in fact, impossible.
Daniel,
ReplyDeleteI took David Gordon's course on Objectivism at the Mises Institute.
David makes the point that Objectivists spend a lot of time on showing that Objectivism is coherent (eg, the title of Kelley's beta book) but not much effort in showing that the foundations are true.
I think this is an important observation.
Rand's theory of concept formation may follow from her epistemology, but what evidence is there that we form concepts the way she says?
-Neil Parille
Ken, I think you have a point there, she could never have written that book, as it was indeed an impossible book to begin with.
ReplyDeleteOut of curiosity I just read a part of Kelley's beta-book. Now Kelley may be known as a proponent of Objectivism as an open system, a system that is open to critique and change, but what struck me in the fragments I read is how slavishly he everywhere follows Rand's ideas and arguments, he just sounds like a hardcore orthodox Objectivist.
Nowhere I read any doubt about her statements, not even in the form that new scientific insights make it necessary to amend some of her ideas to make them compatible with current knowledge.
Granted, I only read a part of the book, but that part contained enough dubious or simply false statements to warrant at least some critical remarks. Perhaps he has now realized that this format won't work, that nobody is waiting for just another rehash of her work, even if it's this time embellished with a lot of diagrams with arrows to make it look more respectable (it's all logical, you know!). On the other hand, a more critical evaluation may be still just a bridge too far for him, hence the procrastination.
Daniel Barnes wrote:
ReplyDelete"As evidence for this, i suggest not only farcical attempts like The Logical Leap, but also the Atlas Society's "The Logical Structure of Objectivism" which has languished in beta form since 1999."
He'll need to finish the Big Diagram first!
Yes Anon 69, what's happening is that you're really just diagramming chaos.
ReplyDeleteThese are severe cases of arrowitis.
ReplyDeleteObvious basic problem with The Big Diagram, and therefore Objectivism.
ReplyDeleteWhat is the logical status of "integration"???
(and, consequently, "differentiation"?)
Wait, I've already got the answer! Just take whatever Harrikoffrand wrote in TLL and replace "induction" with "integration"!
ReplyDeleteWait, I've already got the answer! Just take whatever Harrikoffrand wrote in TLL and replace "induction" with "integration"!
ReplyDeleteShades of the {Sword, Elfstones, Runequest, Cellphone} of Shannara.
Snipe aside, which meaning of "integration" is intended? I'm guessing it's not really the inverse of differentiation, but that leaves several possibilities. The "big diagram" is a little too big for me to bother wading through, first to find the uses of integration and then to find the dependencies.
(Do you suppose they might consider updating it to hypertext? Or a simple dictionary. Heck, the Civilization advances tree would be a better format.)
@Ken,
ReplyDeleteIt's clear from The Big Diagram that a lot rests on "integration". Maybe everything.
But is "integration" itself a logically valid process?
If yes, Kelley needs to explain.
If not, the rest of the diagram is a waste of time.
I basically think Objectivists are about as clear in "integration" as they are on "induction".
@Daniel Barnes: I basically think Objectivists are about as clear in "integration" as they are on "induction".
ReplyDeleteWell, yes, they'd have to be equally clear. According to Rand, "[t]he process of observing the facts of reality and of integrating them into concepts is, in essence, a process of induction." (ITOE p. 28, quoted at the Lexicon site). So integration is an inductive process ... and that would seem to imply that the logical validity of integration depends on the logical validity of induction.
And by the way, I checked out what the Lexicon has to say about "integration (mental)". It's as clear as mud.
And by the way, I checked out what the Lexicon has to say about "integration (mental)". It's as clear as mud.
ReplyDeleteThis is my first time looking at the lexicon. Are all of the entries simply greps* for keywords in Rand's text, without any attempt to - well - integrate the several different quotes?
* Am I showing my age?
Shall I write David Kelley a "please explain" note?
ReplyDelete@Ken: Are all of the entries simply greps* for keywords in Rand's text, without any attempt to - well - integrate the several different quotes?
ReplyDeleteYep. The whole concept was to let Ayn Rand speak for herself -- for better or worse. No explanations, interpretations, or editorializing (not even to praise her brilliance). I think Harry Binswanger, who claims responsibility for putting the Lexicon together, actually believes that Rand was so clear that no further explanation is called for.
* Am I showing my age?
You're asking the wrong person. I'm old enough to grok grep, and too far removed from my programming days to know whether it's still common parlance.
Part 1 of 2-part post
ReplyDeleteDaniel,
First, apologies for the continued long gaps between my replies. I'm immersed this summer in various household-and-grounds improvement projects which I've wanted to get around to for several years, and I'm sometimes not so much as managing to wake my computer from sleep mode for days on end.
Second, here's an irony of unexpected consequences:
Your response (link) to my tree-frog query is arousing the same sort of suspicion in me regarding Popper which I fear that TLL might arouse regarding Rand in some scientists I know or know of.
The scientists I mean are ones who have formed a beginning interest in Rand, at least in her political views, and who also attend conferences where ARI puts up a display booth. I imagine them perusing TLL, copies of which are likely available at ARI display booths, and pursuing a loose modus-tollens-style train of thought: "A groundbreaking solution to the problem of induction, based on Ayn Rand's theory of concepts" (in all-caps on the back cover), "the first major application of Ayn Rand's epistemology to a field other than philosophy" (pg. xi), a solution developed by Leonard Peikoff, described in ARI advertising as the world's foremost living interpreter of Rand...some bonkers stuff in the book...hmm, looks bad for the merits of Rand's epistemology. I.e.: If theory X entails conclusion Y, and conclusion Y is dittsy, theory X is suspect.
The scientists of whom I'm thinking, having hardly any prior knowledge of Objectivism, aren't in an advantageous spot for questioning if TLL's thesis really is an "application of Ayn Rand's epistemology." I'm rather better off re Popper. I've read some selections from his work. But not a lot. I'm way far from being a Popper expert. You, on the other hand, I gather have read lots of Popper, and you've been studying and participating on a list (or lists?) devoted to his work for years. Thus if you tell me, in effect, that Popper -- re-materialized and assuming he was being consistent with his stated views -- would answer re the tree-frog as you answered, I'm left wondering if you're right. If you are, then I'm inclined to the belief that I've up till now misjudged (by overrating) Popper's merit as an epistemologist.
Part 2 of 2-part post
ReplyDeletePossibly, though, there are ways in which you misinterpret your own man. (I've suspected as much before, you might recall, about a different issue.)
For starters, Popper, as I understand him, was a metaphysical realist. On what basis *could* a metaphysical realist not be sure that he wasn't a tree frog?
You offer Popper's contention that there's no authoritative source for knowledge. One place where he presents arguments against the idea of an ultimate knowledge-authority is in the second chapter of his book titled Objective Knowledge. I acquired and started to read a copy of that book back in late 2007. I then became distracted by other disputes, and by other books, and haven't yet read Objective Knowledge beyond partway through Chapter 2. That amount is enough, though, to leave me feeling sure that Popper was *not* proposing that "objective knowledge" is an empty set.
What he was claiming "objective knowledge" is, I might, however, find problematic. I have reservations from what I glean on skimming. Spurred by this discussion, I'm now seriously eager to finish the book. I'm going to hold off on further comment about Popper until I've gotten at least through Chapter 3.
Daniel, re (link):
ReplyDelete>[ES] Yes, I know that passage. It's one of two I'd most like to black pencil...
[DB] Do you mean "edit out" or "correct" (ie what's usually called "blue pencil")? If so, why would you want to do that?
I mean edit out. Why I'd want to do that is because the passage is a throw-away comment, the meaning of which isn't clear. It adds nothing, imo, and only succeeds at confusing Objectivists.
Daniel, re pg. 303 ITOE (link):
ReplyDelete>Re: your [ES's] comment above, here are the key quotes:
p303
Rand: "After [Newton's theory of universal gravitation] has been verified by a great many other observations, not merely the verification of one prediction, then at a certain time one can accept it as fact. But taking your example as an illustration of what you are asking, if the sole validation for Newton's principle was that it predicted that orbits would be elliptical - that wouldn't be sufficient proof. Epistemologically, it wouldn't be enough. You would have to have other observations, from different aspects of the same issue, all of which support the hypothesis."
Prof M: "...When does one decide that enough confirming evidence exists?...
Rand: "...That's the big question of induction....it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process in that field."
I think you're misinterpreting the exchange. Prof. M wasn't asking about Newton's inverse-square law but about the existence of gravitation -- which proposed idea rapidly graduated from the status of hypothesis to accepted as fact. I think what she's answering about is circumstances in which such a graduation occurs. There have been a few such. I'd say that the existence of atoms and of evolution (as a process, not specifics of any particular theory) are a couple others. (But I also think that these are not precisely instances of "induction" -- reasoning from some to all -- but instead of convergent evidence from many directions pointing to a core phenomenon. Also, in those two cases, the graduation was hotly contested, the latter continuing to be contested by some people, most of those non-biologists.)
--
Re (link):
As for whether I've got something or other "backwards" you're going to have to be a bit more specific - I don't really see what you're driving at. What did I say that was wrong?
You claimed that she was supporting holding an hypothesis as a "contextual absolute," whereas her answer says No not Yes to Prof. M's query.
---
Incidental point, re (link) She didn't even know algebra at this point.
My bet is that it was advanced algebra she was studying toward the end of her life, not beginning algebra, which she probably had in school.
Daniel, re (link):
ReplyDelete>Rand's famous pronouncements as to her philosophical precocity.
For example, she claims to have had the fundamental approach of her philosophy a the age of 2&1/2. She claimed she came up with her epistemology after 30 minutes introspection. And so forth. If it was all so clear, and she was so insightful, and it was so important for the fate of mankind, surely she could have put something together before dotage set in?.
On the first, at least you stated that correctly: "fundamental approach," not details -- obviously.
On the second, the claim was that she came up with the unit-economy idea of her theory of concepts upon introspection, not "her epistemology." Do recall the title of the work on concepts: "Introduction to [...]."
Also that in a 1978 interview with Garth Lancier of Focus on Youth, quoted on pg. xii of The Vision of Ayn Rand,
Rand was asked: "Miss Rand, is there anything more to say about your philosophy that you haven't said already?"
[She replied]: I'm glad you are not acquainted with my philosophy, because if you were, you would know that I haven't nearly said everything yet. I do have a complete philosophical system, but the elaboration of a system is a job that no philosopher can finish in his lifetime. There is an awful lot of work yet to be done.
Where Peikoff gets that she thought the problem of induction was the only remaining problem to be solved, I don't know.
Ellen:
ReplyDelete>First, apologies for the continued long gaps between my replies.
No hurry.
>I'm going to hold off on further comment about Popper until I've gotten at least through Chapter 3.
That would certainly be my recommendation!...;-)
>Popper was *not* proposing that "objective knowledge" is an empty set.
It isn't - but follow me closely on this one. In Popper's epistemology, it is possible, if exceedingly unlikely, to have the unvarnished truth in our grasp. But - and here's the catch - even if we did, because of Hume's problem we can't finally know that we know it, if you see what I mean.
Also Popper does use the term "objective knowledge" differently from more traditional senses, for example Rand's, but I consider his sense rephrases the the traditional problem in a highly original way and that also means it can be better addressed. Veteran Popper defender Ken Hopf mentions this difference between Popper and Rand here - and he would know, being Objectivist himself as a young man.
Ellen:
ReplyDelete>Thus if you tell me, in effect, that Popper -- re-materialized and assuming he was being consistent with his stated views -- would answer re the tree-frog as you answered, I'm left wondering if you're right.
Well, it may be I've got it wrong. Tell you what: if you really care about the correct answer to the pressing philosophical question of my/Popper's treefrog-or-not-ness, why don't you put the question to other more expert Popperians over at www.criticalrationalism.com, or perhaps at the good old Critical Cafe.
On the other hand, if you don't actually take such feeble Randian "gotchas" seriously enough to invest in even such a 5 minute exercise, then I heartily agree with you. Given that the number of possible problems is infinite, and life is short, we here in Critical Rationalism make quite a big deal about what we call the check on the problem i.e. is this really a problem in the first place?
So is it? If so, I'll see you over at the Critical Cafe shortly...;-)
>On the second, the claim was that she came up with the unit-economy idea of her theory of concepts upon introspection, not "her epistemology."
I stand corrected. But in focussing on this detail you didn't actually address the issue I put to you re: Rand's alleged philosophical precociousness. Your argument implies that this has been significantly overstated. If so, I agree.
>Where Peikoff gets that she thought the problem of induction was the only remaining problem to be solved, I don't know.
I have a suggestion: look to your own quote.
Rand: "I do have a complete philosophical system, but the elaboration of a system is a job that no philosopher can finish in his lifetime."
Obviously one wouldn't say a system was "complete" if one believed there remained major philosophic problems still to be solved! Oh, sorry, I meant a few mere "elaborations" (*chuckle*). The basic difference in our point of view, I think Ellen, is that you seem to take this sort of statement seriously - perhaps like the treefrog gotcha(!) - whereas I just roll my eyes at what I see as this as a case of mere double-talk, perhaps so deeply imbued that she doesn't even see it.
I realise you blame Peikoff for a lot, and perhaps rightly, but it seems to me the apple don't fall far from the tree.
sorry, above should be www.criticalrationalism.net....
ReplyDeleteEllen:
ReplyDelete>I think you're misinterpreting the exchange.
Possibly, but I don't think so. I will re-examine when I get a moment.
Once more thing, Ellen.
ReplyDeleteIn the many years I've seen you discussing Rand, I don't think I've ever seen you explain exactly what problems you believe Rand to have solved.
My position, as you no doubt know, is quite simple: that her actual contribution to philosophy is in fact barren, and that the much-touted further development of her work by the next generation of New Intellectuals has not happened because it cannot happen. Her work offers no solutions to any important philosophical questions, including the problem of universals. Thus the book will not be written because the book is impossible. (Of course, this is quite different from her political contribution, which is largely driven by the usual naivete and inspirational rhetoric, much like Marxist movements). Almost anything useful you can extract from Rand you will find far better elsewhere, and the hazardous stuff is indeed quite hazardous. So these days I'm more interested in Objectivism as persistence of an error; in its various cultic insignias, and the grip it seems to have over the minds of its followers.
So that's me, in a nutshell. You, on the other hand, seem to view Rand has having made a very significant contribution to philosophy. You seem to blame mostly others, particularly Peikoff but also Branden, for the fact that her philosophy has failed to progress in the 50 years since Atlas Shrugged, and insist that Rand has been highly misrepresented by both followers and critics alike.
Ok, that's fine, but can you be a bit more specific? Can you step back for a moment and tell us, briefly, what important problems you think she solved and how she solved them? What, exactly, do you see as her intellectual contribution?
The scientists I mean are ones who have formed a beginning interest in Rand, at least in her political views, and who also attend conferences where ARI puts up a display booth. I imagine them perusing TLL, copies of which are likely available at ARI display booths...
ReplyDeletePerhaps for those who have a sentimental interest in Rand's reputation, this might be of importance; but otherwise, I don't see this as a big deal. It's not as if they are going to miss anything special by keeping their distance from Rand. If they are looking for polemical writing defending realism, objectivity, political liberty, capitalism, etc., there are far better advocates for these positions than Rand herself.
Moreover, even if TLL is as bad as bad can be, it's not as if Rand herself represents some kind of shining beacon of clear, pristine, scientific thinking. Quite the contrary, there's plenty in Rand that scientists would find objectionable. What cognitive scientist would have any use for Rand's epistemology, or her ultra-simplistic views of the relation between consciousness and unconsciousness? What would a biologist or geneticist think of Rand's blank slate view of human nature? What would any scientist who knows something about Kant or Hume or even Russell think of Rand's ravings about these philosophers? There's plenty in Rand herself to turn off the scientist, particularly if that scientist is capable of applying his scientific ways of thinking to philosophical subjects.
I realise you blame Peikoff for a lot, and perhaps rightly, but it seems to me the apple don't fall far from the tree.
ReplyDeleteTrue enough; but I would put it more strongly than that. It's not some mere accident, some mere bad stroke of luck, that Peikoff became the heir to Rand's estate, and thus her presumptive "intellectual" heir. For given Rand's philosophy, Peikoff was just the sort of man who would wind up becoming the chief representative of it after her death. After all, if Peikoff had been a man of greater philosophical insight and wisdom, he could never have remained an Objectivist. If he had been more magnanimous, more broad minded, more true to his own natural and vital needs and less servile to Rand herself, he could never have remained with Rand for 30 years, and thus been in place to seize the brass ring after her death. Peikoff was the required sort of man, which is why he became the chief advocate for Rand's philosophy after her death, rather than someone better. If Rand had been wiser and understood such matters with much greater insight, she might have made a better choice. But then, being wiser and more insightful, she would have preached a wiser and more insightful philosophy as well.
I would love to know how Rand meant "complete" in the quote ("I do have a complete philosophical system"). I know what that would mean in mathematics*, but what would it mean in philosophy?
ReplyDeleteWould it explain the nature of existence? Of consciousness and reasoning? Would it allow you to pose any moral or ethical situation, and derive the single correct action? Could it show the validity of human reasoning, or for that matter of itself?
* I also know that a complete system (capable of predicate logic and arithmetic yada-yada) is impossible in math, at least if you want consistency; which means that mathematicians and logicians don't go around saying things like "I have a complete system". So at the least it seems a complete philosophical system can't solve all logic problems involving arithmetic...
Ellen:
ReplyDelete>You claimed that she was supporting holding an hypothesis as a "contextual absolute," whereas her answer says No not Yes to Prof. M's query.
OK, I've looked into this, and it appears that rather than me misreading Rand, you have misread me.
Here's. where I discuss the passage in question:
'I conjecture that's it's more rather than less. In the ITOE's discussion of Scientific Methodology (301-3) I agree that she briefly wanders close to the hypothetico-deductive position. But then she falls back upon a typical false assumption of induction's validity at the last moment (when she claims that Newton's theory can be finally accepted as fact only after "a great many other observations"). '
Now, the part it seems you are referring to on p302 - the first reply to Prof M, starting near to top of the page - is precisely the part I am referring to when I say "she briefly wanders close to the hypothetico-deductive position", which is why she says No to Prof M (I didn'tsay she agreed with him. It's on the next page she wanders back into typical inductivism). So you have got quite the wrong end of the stick.
I also did not claim anything about "contextual absolutes" in this discussion, or even refer to them. I've gone back over this thread, and while at 125 or so comments I may have missed it, I could not find anywhere that I did so. Hence I suspect you might have possibly misread this comment about "contextual knowledge" and this might be the source of the confusion?
Likewise I think your comment about p303 might also reflect this misreading, as I think you must be still holding on to the wrong end of the stick.
I've read through Section 5 of Chapter 2 of Objective Knowledge, and I want to interject one comment:
ReplyDeletePopper has made a mistake which is costly in not seeing that "falsifiability" *presupposes* a realist metaphysics. If everything is imaginary, there's nothing to falsify.
Also, he goes to the edge of seeing, but doesn't cross over and use the argument with its full weight, that non-realist metaphysics are unintelligible. To the extent such a metaphysics is intelligible, intelligibility is produced by importing realist premises. I've decided to call the previous statement "The Moonshine Principle" -- the moon is not a source of light; it only "shines" by reflection from the sun. Similarly...
Daniel, I'm still thinking thus far that you poorly represent Popper with the tree-frog answer you gave. Though he doesn't understand that non-realist metaphysics can be ruled out, he clearly really, really, really believes that realist metaphysics is right. In a realist metaphysics, there are lots of tests, including ones similar to that proposed by Churchill and praised by Popper regarding the sun, for establishing that you have a human body. (In a non-realist metaphysics, there aren't grounds for claiming the existence of bodies, not even of brains, or even of such an entity as "you.")
I don't mean to imply that the two problems I've mentioned are the only problems I see in "the story so far," but I think that those two -- doubly so the first -- are especially important in working against Popper's achieving what I gather are his goals.
--
I'll get back to the accumulated posts when I can. Just one quick comment on looking through them.
You write link:
In Popper's epistemology, it *is* possible, if exceedingly unlikely, to have the unvarnished truth in our grasp. But - and here's the catch - even if we did, because of Hume's problem *we can't finally know that we know it*, if you see what I mean.
I agree with the statement pertaining to inductive laws. But if Popper is really saying that no knowledge whatsoever is possible, including of such a physical fact as that you aren't a tree frog (frankly, I think it's a very good example for raising issues), then I part company.
The thing that is falsified is not some object out in the world. Rather, it's the mental constructs we use to understand the world that are tested and possibly falsified. How does that presuppose anything about the world other than that we observe it?
ReplyDeleteIf the world is imaginary, what exactly prevents the imaginary contents of that world from being sufficiently consistent to be tested against theories? Or more extremely, if all memory is also false, what prevents the false memories from including ones of theories and falsification?
Popper has made a mistake which is costly in not seeing that "falsifiability" *presupposes* a realist metaphysics. If everything is imaginary, there's nothing to falsify.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Andrew's refutation of this. In any case, this assumes the realist view of truth, which the idealist, if he is consistent, must reject. What to the realist is imaginary the idealist regards as truth. Ellen, in brief, is guilty of assuming the very point at issue.
Also, he goes to the edge of seeing, but doesn't cross over and use the argument with its full weight, that non-realist metaphysics are unintelligible.
Even if we make the assumption that all non-realist metaphysics are in fact "unintelligible" (that assumption may be true if we assume that realism is true, but that would once again be assuming the very point at issue), that hardly constitutes a decisive proof that idealism is false. For the assumption that what is unintelligible is false can also easily be questioned. What is intelligible about quantum mechanics or kids dying of cancer?
Popper's whole point about knowledge is not that we don't know anything or that knowledge is impossible, but that what we know can't be entirely justified on rational grounds. Popper denies justified true belief, in short, foundationalism. He concentrated on knowledge that had previously been justified by induction (which accounts for a huge amount of knowledge claims, including the claim that idealist metaphysics are unintelligible). But knowledge claims rest on a great deal more than just assumptions about induction. They also rest on assumptions about memory, time, causation, discourse, and substance, none of which can be decisively proven.
I wrote:
ReplyDelete>In Popper's epistemology, it *is* possible, if exceedingly unlikely, to have the unvarnished truth in our grasp. But - and here's the catch - even if we did, because of Hume's problem *we can't finally know that we know it*, if you see what I mean.
Ellen:
>I agree with the statement pertaining to inductive laws. But if Popper is really saying that no knowledge whatsoever is possible, including of such a physical fact as that you aren't a tree frog (frankly, I think it's a very good example for raising issues), then I part company.
Some things are immediately evident from this exchange.
1) Ellen has not really grasped how Critical Rationalism works, which is hardly surprising as she hasn't really read much about it.
2) She nonetheless thinks she has identified a major philosophical flaw - which I will dub The Great Tree Frog Question - with either Critical Rationalism, or the way it's been presented here at the ARCHNblog by yours truly. Now this is fine, but if this is the case, I have already offered her a couple of expert CR forums (here, here) she can present The Great Tree Frog Question to. If she really thinks TGTFQ is a decisive refutation of either the ARCHNblog's presentation of CR, or CR itself, I politely suggest she takes it thereabouts. On the other hand if she doesn't really think it's that good, then I would have to agree...;-)
3) In fact I propose that Ellen is going through a fairly typical phase that occurs as you try to get your head around Critical Rationalism. That is, justificationist prejudices are deeply embedded in Western culture, as Bill Bartley pointed out, and it is often difficult to accept what reasoned argument is telling us when it runs up against our prejudices - much as it was very difficult for man to give up the idea that she was the centre of the universe..;-) I think Ellen's unwitting prejudice is quite obvious simply by comparing what I wrote in the quoted paragraph, and what she took it to mean.
I said that basically we can have true knowledge; we just can't finally justify it. She took this to mean knowledge is impossible(!!) This is where also I fear her long attachment to Rand and Objectivism, which far from being revolutionary is actually a concentration of such crude traditional fallacies, will not be helping.
Anyway, I encourage her in her further reading, and suggest if she doesn't trust the ARCHNblog interpretation of such matters she takes it to the venues I've suggested.
Just to expand on the above briefly; it can be true that I'm not a tree frog; and I can also believe that I'm not a tree frog; thus we can have true belief.
ReplyDeleteBut that does not mean that I can finally justify that true belief. Further, an important point is that you don't need final justifications anyway. (just as well, seeing as you can't have them...)
As Popper says, what's needed isn't stronger final justifications, but stronger standards of criticism instead. This is why Objectivism is so weak; it's chock full of overblown self-justifications, whilst simultaneously rejecting all but the weakest standards of criticism.
My first introduction was through a story, "Flux". It was set in a universe that was a chaos of particles coming together in random patterns. Sometimes this could briefly produce whole universes, complete with living things with memories of events that had never happened.
ReplyDeleteIt's quite irrefutable - in fact it could have just happened, and although you remember reading the words "memories of events that never happened" in the previous paragraph, it never happened.
Later I learned of the dreaming butterfly and tree frog, the brain in the bottle, the malicious demons, the dust universes, the Matrix, and the other variations on the theme. All show, one way or another, that you can't have final justifications, but as Daniel says, you don't need them to learn how the universe (apparently) works.
I am reminded of Leonard Peikoff's attempt to disprove the brain-in-a-vat conjecture:
ReplyDeleteI will quote from a recent skeptic, who asks: "How can I be sure that, every time I believe something, such as that there are rocks, I am not deceived into so believing by ... a mad scientist who, by means of electrodes implanted in my brain, manipulates my beliefs?" [citing W. Gerber's review of P. Unger's Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism]. According to this approach, we cannot be sure that there are rocks; such a belief is properly regarded as a complex matter open to doubt and discussion. But what we can properly take as our starting point in considering the matter and explaining our doubts is: there are scientists, there are electrodes, men have brains, scientists can go mad, electrodes can affect brain function. All of this, it seems, is self-evident information, which anyone can invoke whenever he feels like it. How is it possible to know such sophisticated facts, yet not know that there are rocks? The author, who is a professor of philosophy, feels no need to raise such a question. He feels free to begin philosophizing at random, treating advanced knowledge as a primary and using it to undercut the direct evidence of mans' eyes.
(Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, p.140)
Peikoff goes on to accuse the author of "conceptual grand larceny" for using advanced knowledge "to destroy its own roots."
At one time, I thought Peikoff's argument was completely convincing. But looking at it now, I have to say it isn't.
First, I don't think that holding the idea "rocks exist" is somehow logically required as a precondition of holding the idea "electrodes exist" or "mad scientists exist." Peikoff's argument requires this; otherwise the "advanced" concepts can't be said to be stolen (on the Objectivist definition of "stolen concept").
Second, even if rocks are logically prior to mad scientists, the fact that I hold the idea "rocks exist" doesn't prove that rocks actually exist, only that I believe they do. (You can't disprove solipsism; I'm pretty sure the best thing to do with a true solipsist is ignore her.)
Third, Peikoff's argument really amounts to an application of Occam's Razor: it is much simpler to just assume rocks exist than to assume they don't but some lunatic with electrodes is making me think they do. I would guess that, to the extent Peikoff's argument has any power to convince, this is the source. But Occam's Razor is not a proof of anything, just a pragmatic guide for selecting between competing theories that both explain the evidence.
So now I would say that no, I can't prove I'm not a brain in a vat (or a tree frog) -- but I'm satisfied that I don't need proof in order to proceed with my life. I will just invoke Occam's Razor and take it as a working assumption that I'm not, that rocks and electrodes and mad scientists and anything else I experience is really there, with the tacit recognition that I will reconsider this assumption if it ever stops working (if Samuel L. Jackson shows up with a red pill and a blue pill, I'm taking the red one).
Of course, on the Internet no one can tell you're a tree frog.
Of course, on the Internet no one can tell you're a tree frog.
ReplyDeleteThat reminds me of another of those deep philosophical issues that bugged me for a while. There's no way for me to be sure that anyone else has a mind - that is, has the same kind of sentience, self-awareness, consciousness, what-have-you that I can experience in myself.
I can't sense, in any way, what's going on in your alleged mind. I can hear what you say about it, but you could be a clever automaton passing the Turing Test. I can never know there's a mind in your skull. Of course the reverse is true.
As with the whole "is what we sense real" issue, I decided to ignore it in favor of the naive assumption. If you act like you have a mind, whether on the Internet or in real life, I'll accept that you have one (and yes that would include computer programs).
It does seem to me, though, that this is a more difficult question to address. Has Objectivism made any such attempt?
But Occam's Razor is not a proof of anything
ReplyDeleteNo, of course not. Even worse, Occam's razor cuts many ways. It could just as easily be used to lop off those conceptions necessary for a realist view of things, such as substance, matter, other people's minds, etc. What could be more economical, more simple than solipsism?
I can never know there's a mind in your skull.
Curiously enough, the intuitive sense of more primitive people does not make them conclude that other people don't have minds; on the contrary, they see mind like attributes (i.e., spirit, will, intention) scattered throughout the universe. Animism seems to be the more natural assumption of the instinctive mind; so that it's more difficult for the primitive mind to recognize the inanimate in nature than to doubt the distribution of spirit among living creatures altogether: and it takes a great deal of sophisticated self-conscious thinking to reach the point where begin doubting that anyone besides ourselves is conscious.
I think this desperate need for justification also drives Peikoff toward idiocies like his doctrine of "the arbitrary". It drives him nuts that, say, a parrot could be taught to say "2+2=4" without the justification of even understanding maths, yet that statement would still be true. Yet ironically the very idea that knowledge is objective entails that such a statement is true no matter who says it!
ReplyDeletePart 1 of 2-part post
ReplyDeleteDaniel (link):
OK, I've looked into this, and it appears that rather than me misreading Rand, *you* have misread me.
I could easily be misreading you, since I can't make sense out of what you wrote, which I'll repeat, adding an additional paragraph from (the original post) :
~~~ 'I [DB] conjecture that's it's more rather than less. In the ITOE's discussion of Scientific Methodology (301-3) I agree that she briefly wanders close to the hypothetico-deductive position. But then she falls back upon a typical false assumption of induction's validity at the last moment (when she claims that Newton's theory can be finally accepted as fact only after "a great many other observations").
'Because this brief departure [in the ITOE Workshop notes] must be considered among the rest of her writings ( I think her "certainty" relates directly to "truth" value - she wouldn't be referring merely to an emotional state I don't think) I can't see it as central to her theory - it's accidental, which as I recall we also agreed on?' ~~~
You say re the first paragraph:
Now, the part it seems you are referring to on p302 - the first reply to Prof M, starting near to top of the page - is precisely the part *I* am referring to when I say "she briefly wanders close to the hypothetico-deductive position", which is *why* she says No to Prof M (I *didn't*say she agreed with him. It's on the next page she wanders back into typical inductivism). So you have got quite the wrong end of the stick.
I don't know why you'd "agree" -- apparently with me -- about her "briefly wander[ing] close to the hypothetico-deductive position," which I think I hadn't mentioned and which I don't think she wanders close to. Or why you'd describe her as wandering close to it. On the other hand, what Prof. M describes IS "the hypothetico-deductive position," asking if she'd take the confirmation as "a contextual absolute." But she says no. So I'm left doubly mystified by your interpretation.
Likewise, I don't see where there's a "brief departure" -- or indeed *any* departure.
Part 2 of 2-part post
ReplyDeleteAs to her "fall[ing] back upon a typical false assumption of induction's validity at the last moment [...]":
For one thing, I think you don't allow for different meanings of "validity" from yours. A person could think that induction is legitimate without thinking that it provides "valid" argument forms in the sense logicians use "valid" in talking about deductive reasoning (i.e., forms in which true premises guarantee true conclusions when the form is correctly followed). (See Bob Kolker's posts on OL, for instance. He strongly insists about induction not being "valid," but he thinks it's legitimate.)
And, as I've said in another post (link), I don't think Rand's talking about a general solution but instead about cases where the existence of a phenomenon or process graduates from being theory to being taken as established fact.
There might be some further stuff in "Prof. M"s notes which could shed further light on her meaning in that final comment, but the project of digging out and looking through those notes will have to wait till later this year.
I also did *not* claim anything about "contextual absolutes" in this discussion, or even refer to them.
Right. You referred to "contextual knowledge." My miswrite.
Correction.
ReplyDeleteIn (this) post, I quoted a comment of Daniel's, viz:
[DB] In Popper's epistemology, it *is* possible, if exceedingly unlikely, to have the unvarnished truth in our grasp. But - and here's the catch - even if we did, because of Hume's problem *we can't finally know that we know it*, if you see what I mean. (link)
I then said, "I agree with the statement pertaining to inductive laws."
My agreement implied that "Hume's problem" is part of my reasoning (as it was of Popper's), but it isn't. My reasoning on induction doesn't derive from Hume (or from Popper). The reason I say we can't know if we have correct ultimate laws of nature is because we can't run an exhaustive test, or in some cases even an adequate test to place high confidence on our conclusions. (There are cases in which we can do enough of a test to have high confidence within boundary conditions. Examples which I think qualify, as best as I understand the situation with these, are Maxwell's equations, the ideal gas law, laws of planetary orbits at least within our solar system.)
Also, I don't see how one could assess how likely or unlikely it is "to have the unvarnished truth in our grasp."
---
I see that Daniel has picked up on the quoted post and gone charging off.......here.
A few comments:
No, I didn't say anything about TGTFQ being a major philosophical flaw in Critical Rationalism, or even that the problem I pointed out is a major flaw. It might not be, depends on the story to come (from where I've gotten to).
Ellen's unwitting prejudice is quite obvious simply by comparing what I wrote in the quoted paragraph, *and what she took it to mean*.
I said that basically *we can have true knowledge*; we just can't finally justify it. She took this to mean *knowledge is impossible*(!!)
No, I didn't take that particular paragraph to mean "knowledge is impossible." I took earlier remarks of yours to be indicating that Popper was saying that knowledge is impossible. Note I said IF....
I'm continuing to wonder, having read a bit further in Objective Knowledge, how well you're interpreting Popper.
As to your taunts about taking TGTFQ to one of the Popper lists, all in good time, Daniel, should such time be available. At this time, it is not. As I've said, I'm busy with projects which are keeping me away from the computer. Plus, as you know, even as a standard state, I'm limited in reading time and even more limited in computer-reading time. For now, just reading the book and, when I can, this site is all I can manage.
Correction.
ReplyDeleteIn (this) post, I quoted a comment of Daniel's, viz:
[DB] In Popper's epistemology, it *is* possible, if exceedingly unlikely, to have the unvarnished truth in our grasp. But - and here's the catch - even if we did, because of Hume's problem *we can't finally know that we know it*, if you see what I mean. (link)
I then said, "I agree with the statement pertaining to inductive laws."
My agreement implied that "Hume's problem" is part of my reasoning (as it was of Popper's), but it isn't. My reasoning on induction doesn't derive from Hume (or from Popper). The reason I say we can't know if we have correct ultimate laws of nature is because we can't run an exhaustive test, or in some cases even an adequate test to place high confidence on our conclusions. (There are cases in which we can do enough of a test to have high confidence within boundary conditions. Examples which I think qualify, as best as I understand the situation with these, are Maxwell's equations, the ideal gas law, laws of planetary orbits at least within our solar system.)
Also, I don't see how one could assess how likely or unlikely it is "to have the unvarnished truth in our grasp."
---
I see that Daniel has picked up on the quoted post and gone charging off....... here.
A few comments:
No, I didn't say anything about TGTFQ being a major philosophical flaw in Critical Rationalism, or even that the problem I pointed out is a major flaw. It might not be, depends on the story to come (from where I've gotten to).
Ellen's unwitting prejudice is quite obvious simply by comparing what I wrote in the quoted paragraph, *and what she took it to mean*.
I said that basically *we can have true knowledge*; we just can't finally justify it. She took this to mean *knowledge is impossible*(!!)
No, I didn't take that particular paragraph to mean "knowledge is impossible." I took earlier remarks of yours to be indicating that Popper was saying that knowledge is impossible. Note I said IF....
I'm continuing to wonder, having read a bit further in Objective Knowledge, how well you're interpreting Popper.
As to your taunts about taking TGTFQ to one of the Popper lists, all in good time, Daniel, should such time be available. At this time, it is not. As I've said, I'm busy with projects which are keeping me away from the computer. Plus, as you know, even as a standard state, I'm limited in reading time and even more limited in computer-reading time. For now, just reading the book and, when I can, this site is all I can manage.
Correction.
ReplyDeleteIn (this) post, I quoted a comment of Daniel's, viz:
[DB] In Popper's epistemology, it *is* possible, if exceedingly unlikely, to have the unvarnished truth in our grasp. But - and here's the catch - even if we did, because of Hume's problem *we can't finally know that we know it*, if you see what I mean. (link)
I then said, "I agree with the statement pertaining to inductive laws."
My agreement implied that "Hume's problem" is part of my reasoning (as it was of Popper's), but it isn't. My reasoning on induction doesn't derive from Hume (or from Popper). The reason I say we can't know if we have correct ultimate laws of nature is because we can't run an exhaustive test, or in some cases even an adequate test to place high confidence on our conclusions. (There are cases in which we can do enough of a test to have high confidence within boundary conditions. Examples which I think qualify, as best as I understand the situation with these, are Maxwell's equations, the ideal gas law, laws of planetary orbits at least within our solar system.)
Also, I don't see how one could assess how likely or unlikely it is "to have the unvarnished truth in our grasp."
I see that Daniel has picked up on the post I referenced above and has gone charging off....... here.
ReplyDeleteA few comments:
No, I didn't say anything about TGTFQ being a major philosophical flaw in Critical Rationalism, or even that the problem I pointed out is a major flaw. It might not be, depends on the story to come (from where I've gotten to).
Ellen's unwitting prejudice is quite obvious simply by comparing what I wrote in the quoted paragraph, *and what she took it to mean*.
I said that basically *we can have true knowledge*; we just can't finally justify it. She took this to mean *knowledge is impossible*(!!)
No, I didn't take that particular paragraph to mean "knowledge is impossible." I took earlier remarks of yours to be indicating that Popper was saying that knowledge is impossible. Note I said IF....
I'm continuing to wonder, having read a bit further in Objective Knowledge, how well you're interpreting Popper.
As to your taunts about taking TGTFQ to one of the Popper lists, all in good time, Daniel, should such time be available. At this time, it is not. As I've said, I'm busy with projects which are keeping me away from the computer. Plus, as you know, even as a standard state, I'm limited in reading time and even more limited in computer-reading time. For now, just reading the book and, when I can, this site is all I can manage.
Daniel, some miscellaneous points:
ReplyDeleteI think that Rand was precocious. However, I don't take her statement about having held the same philosophy since two or two-and-a-half, whichever she said, as pertaining to precocity; instead, to continuity of personhood.
Recall, Rand thought of "philosophy" as much more inclusive that any formally enunciated or necessarily consciously held beliefs, and she thought that everyone has a philosphy, even if only as implicit (and in many people's cases not consistent) beliefs. She also thought that everyone forms a "sense of life" as a pre-conceptual precursor to philosophic outlook.
Thus, I think that she was merely saying that she'd had the same attitude toward life since her earliest awareness of self -- and that she might more accurately in her own terms have said "sense of life" instead of "philosophy."
If my interpretation is correct, I think the statement she made is one a great many people could make, maybe more than not, i.e., maybe a majority of people. I would be one of those people; my husband would be another. We both feel that there's been continuity of attitude since our earliest recollections of self.
---
Regarding the "complete system," your and my interpretive divergence seems to me like the proverbial half-empty/half-full difference of perspective. I take her as emphasizing how much she thought was still to be done, not how much she thought had been done.
---
Re (link) Peikoff and the arbitrary:
[DB] I think this desperate need for *justification* also drives Peikoff toward idiocies like his doctrine of "the arbitrary".
PAR had nothing to do with it? The "doctrine" of the arbitrary underwent modification circa 1986. (See Robert Campbell's JARS article about the history.)
Peikoff taught, in courses I took with him, that "2+2=4" said by a parrot is true (though not knowledge).
Andrew (link):
ReplyDeleteThe thing that is falsified is not some object out in the world. Rather, it's the mental constructs we use to understand the world that are tested and possibly falsified. How does that presuppose anything about the world other than that we observe it?
If the world is imaginary, what exactly prevents the imaginary contents of that world from being sufficiently consistent to be tested against theories? Or more extremely, if all memory is also false, what prevents the false memories from including ones of theories and falsification?
How does one observe an imaginary world? And what does "consistent" mean in a world where there are no facts?
Ellen,
ReplyDeleteI've read your most recent comments. For the sake of brevity is there anything particularly important you'd like me to respond to that I haven't so far? If so please let me know.
If not, I suggest this may not be a good use of your limited reading/writing capacity as I do not want to put you under undue pressure over trivial misreadings etc. Best cut to the chase, perhaps?
@Ellen: How does one observe an imaginary world?
ReplyDeleteI once had a dream about a way to do it, but forgot it when I woke up. I tried to recapture it when I next slept, but I've never been any good at lucid dreaming.
Ellen: How does one observe an imaginary world?
ReplyDeleteSomeone who dreams, observes in his dream an imaginary world. Now when he awakes, he may say that he didn't observe anything, that he in his dream just created his own imaginary world, but logically his position is the same: he may be convinced that he now really observes a real world, but when he dreamed, he was equally convinced that his dreamworld was real (except in lucid dreams, which I myself have never had), so to be convinced doesn't in itself prove that the world is real.
There is no logical argument against the possibility that his experiencing reality is also a kind of dream. Sure, this world is far more coherent and consistent than his dreamworld seen from his viewpoint when awake, and it is of course the practical thing to do as if this world is a real, i.e. external reality, independent of his consciousness (as ECE remarked, apply Occam's razor).
Logically however it is possible that he may "awake" from this reality dream and laugh at the silly notion that this reality dream was real. There is nothing impossible in the notion that an abstract world (no external reality) is consistent. A good story creates also an abstract world that is consistent, in which no contradictions exist. Logic can't decide, only practical considerations.
Wait, what? Am I a frog? Well, of course not, because frogs can't comment on blogs. But wait? Can I prove that? Maybe I am a frog that can comment on blogs and just don't know it. I could be a "frog" that likes pizza, doesn't live in a pond, reads books, has a passport, and is married to a human. Oh shit! Maybe everyone is, in fact, a "frog" like me. I am going to write a paper and use this to prove that critical rationalism is the best for discovering this hitherto unrecognised fact.
ReplyDeleteRationality is a process or method, not a conclusion. There is nothing inherently irrational about any proposition, even that I am actually a frog. Philosophies that preemptively designate some propositions as "irrational" just eliminate possible truths from consideration without any real criticism; it also deligitimises disagreement should an opponent believe something "irrational." No, the responsibility of a rationalist is to take ideas of opponents seriously, even those which initially seem absurd. The best criticisms if such ideas normally come from people who take this attitude, as opposed to dismissing them as "irrational." And, occasionally, the absurd just turns out to be true after all.
*ribbit*
The question is not how one observes an imaginary world. The question is how one can observe a non-imaginary world!
ReplyDeleteIt's all in our heads. The world in our heads is just an elaborate virtual reality simulation tenuously connected to the real world by cackling electrical signals in our nervous system (ostensibly, if one is not of a solipsist bent).
The difference between the virtual reality simulation in our heads and one in an ordinary computer, is that if the virtual reality simulation in our heads does not roughly correspond to the real world, then it is possible that the body which our virtual reality simulation exists in will get itself dead.
Ellen:
ReplyDelete>PAR had nothing to do with it?
Did I say that it didn't? I'm familiar with Robert's article. It seems to be a case of Peikoff killing two birds (parrots?) with one stone...;-)
What Lee Kelly said.
ReplyDeleteOr as I sometimes say, the strict subjectivists have all been eaten...;-)
ReplyDeleteEver check out the Gathering for Gardner dragon? If not, check it out.
ReplyDeleteThis illusion, known as the hollow face illusion, is one of the most striking I know. Consider: Does one not observe the dragon's head turning as the camera moves? This movement is not imaginary exactly, but it is the product of the brain's visual interpretation and not the paper dragon itself.
Dreams have the down side of seeming unreal upon awaking, and even in the dream is one is cognizant enough to catch it. However, consider the experiences people have under the drug DMT. The book "DMT: The Spirit Molecule" by Dr. Rick Strassman is a very interesting work that includes a great many examples. When asked, the people in the DMT trials insisted the experiences were not like dreams. Rather, they were as seemingly real as the waking world.
More seriously, there are many interesting problems I like to think about, but me being a frog is no solution to any of them.
ReplyDeleteIn the justificationist account of knowledge, any belief that cannot be justified is problematic. Ultimately, that is all of them, because it is logically impossible to justify anything. But most justificationists do not realise that or like to pretend otherwise. In the meantime, questions like "are you a frog?" and infinite variations along those lines are each a potential problem if the answer cannot be justified. Critical rationalism just isn't like that. The question critical rationalists are likely to ask is not "can my belief that I am not a frog be justified?" but rather "does the conjecture that I am a frog solve any problems?" The answer to this second question is surely negative. In fact, the conjecture creates many many problems that do not exist with the alternative conjecture that I am a human.
Of course, the degree to which a proposition upsets the existing body of knowledge is no criterion of truth. It may be that I am just wrong about all that stuff, but taking an evolutionary approach to knowledge means at least waiting for problems to arise before pushing through a revolution.
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteIn the justificationist account of knowledge, any belief that cannot be justified is problematic. Ultimately, that is all of them, because it is logically impossible to justify anything.
ReplyDeleteThis is true; and the question whether I or anyone else is a tree frog is raised, not because any sane person believes they might be tree frogs, but because by raising the issue one can show that even the most obvious beliefs are not logically justifiable, and that therefore a mania for logical justifications, when applied to matters of fact, involves a false demand of knowledge.
But even the issue of justification is not of critical importance in the context of Rand and TLL. The crux of the matter with Rand and her orthodox disciples is their claim that justification is not only possible, but critically necessary, and that anyone who denies this is motivated by a nefarious desire to destroy man's mind and "fake" reality. This is both an argument ad hominem and in argument from intimidation, wrapped into a cognitively toxic bundle. Because it is made in the service of something all sane people believe (i.e, "I'm not a tree frog"), arguing for it lends a false credence to the method used in the argument, giving the whole thing an aura of rationality. By passionately arguing for things which all sane people believe (or at least act as if they believe), Rand and her disciples are able to portray themselves as virtually the sole defenders of "reason" and belief in "reality." They then turn around and use the same method to defend things which are contrary to reality (i.e., they "fake" reality), such as the Objectivist view of man and history, thus attempting to use the defense of something most people would regard as obvious to lend credence to beliefs that are dubious.
For one thing, I think you don't allow for different meanings of "validity" from yours. A person could think that induction is legitimate without thinking that it provides "valid" argument forms in the sense logicians use "valid" in talking about deductive reasoning (i.e., forms in which true premises guarantee true conclusions when the form is correctly followed).
ReplyDeleteThe fact that there are different meanings of the term "validity," far from getting Rand off the hook, merely involves her in even greater difficulties. The logical sense of validity is the one strong, meaningful sense (at least in terms of justificationism). If something is valid in the logical sense, one can prove it as so; and it can also be empirically falsified. Not so with other senses of validity, which are weaker and problematic. Indeed, one could argue that the other senses are misleading, because they seem to be using the prestige the term has in its stronger sense to defend something which can only be justified through one's say-so. In any case, if Rand is using the term in the weaker sense, she needed to come clean about it and explain precisely what she meant by the term. The fact that she remains quiet about the issue raises suspicions that she is either equivocating or is guilty of never having thought the issue all the way through.
One of my guiding premises is that Objectivism is sustained by simple double-talk (or equivocation, or bait-and-switch, or whatever you'd like to call it.)
ReplyDeleteTo continue from Greg above, Ellen's complaint that I don't consider what other people might mean induction's "validity" other than the strict logical sense is a typical example of such double-talk.
For the problem of induction is a problem of logical validity.
If you want to consider induction "valid" in some other, non-logical sense, that's absolutely fine, because then there is no problem.
Of course, it would be helpful if those who might appeal to such non-logical standards for "legitimacy" would tell us what exactly these standards are...;-)
ReplyDeleteDB: *For the problem of induction is a problem of logical validity.*
ReplyDeleteIf you want to consider induction "valid" in some other, non-logical sense, that's absolutely fine, *because then there is no problem*.
Sure there is, the problem Prof. M and AR were talking about on pp. 303-04, that of knowing when you have gotten a correct answer.
About the tree-frog question, which seems to have produced -- along with considerable pay-dirt -- a series of false presuppositions as to where I'm coming from:
The question was asked from an impulse of impishness inspired by a source far removed from Objectivism. I half expected Greg to identify the source.
Daniel really ought to know that I have never considered myself an Objectivist and that I've seen problems with Rand's epistemological theories since the first time I read Galt's Speech, the summer of 1961, following my freshman year of college (nearly two years before I even knew Objectivism as such existed). During my freshman year, I'd had the introductory course for psych majors. I had objections then to what was presented as the scientific theory -- on pg. 62-63 of Objective Knowledge, Popper provides a pretty good synopsis of those objections.
(Also, I was delighted to the point of chuckling out loud by Popper's recognizing, in a brief comment on pg. 61, that "information theory" is another verse of the same song. He doesn't use that metaphor. It's how I think of the sequence: First verse, associationism; second, psychophysics and S-R learning theory; the current verse is "information theory" and computationalism.)
On the other hand, I think Popper shares an error of Rand's -- the idea of an initial chaos. He thought we then actively learn to perceive; Rand thought the brain began automatically to integrate "percepts." I agree about learning being involved. I think perception continues to be an active -- and partly a volitionally directed -- process. I'm closer to Gibson than to Popper, and closer to Popper than to Rand.
However, re the learning, as of pg. 65, I see another incipient problem with Popper's views, one I've glimmered before from other things of his I've read -- a off-skew angle of approach on evolution, one which focuses on error-elimination instead of success-accumulation. More on that as I progress.
Dragonfly (link):
ReplyDeleteLogically however it is possible that he may "awake" from this reality dream and laugh at the silly notion that this reality dream was real. There is nothing impossible in the notion that an abstract world (no external reality) is consistent. A good story creates also an abstract world that is consistent, in which no contradictions exist. Logic can't decide, only practical considerations.
No contradictions by reference to what? You're exhibiting exactly the "Moonshine Principle" I described -- you're importing from a non-fully-imaginal world. Same with the very understanding of the idea "dream." A "dream" by reference to what?
A question for both you and Andrew:
How do you go about testing hypotheses concerning the life habits of unicorns?
@Ellen: No contradictions by reference to what?
ReplyDeleteTo itself. For example, Bram Stoker's Dracula has no contradictions.
It has consistency of underlying rules. In one chapter, Van Helsing explains what vampires can and can't do, and the Count never breaks those rules.
It has consistency of perception and memory. Events occur in one chapter, and in later chapters when characters recall and describe those events, their words tally with the original description.
It has consistency of objects, places, and people. Dracula's supply of caskets is numbered and destroyed one by one; Castle Dracula is in Transylvania in the first and the last chapters of the book; Dracula has three brides early in the book, and Van Helsing kills them late in the book.
Now obviously, you'll get many contradictions if you try to compare Stoker's world with the real one (or that of Beagle's The Last Unicorn). But that doesn't make Stoker's world inconsistent - or if it does, it also makes the real universe inconsistent, by symmetry.
(For that matter, our world is more inconsistent than most novels by at least one standard - people's memories of events are notoriously unreliable.)
How do you go about testing hypotheses concerning the life habits of unicorns?
ReplyDeleteIf you think justification is primarily about practicality with the hope of arriving at truth, vs. about infallibility with anything short of truth being not good enough, then the purpose for which the question is asked matters just as much as how you go about answering it.
I wrote:
ReplyDelete>If you want to consider induction "valid" in some other, non-logical sense, that's absolutely fine, *because then there is no problem*.
Ellen replied:
>Sure there is, the problem Prof. M and AR were talking about on pp. 303-04, that of knowing when you have gotten a correct answer.
Sorry but my brain just exploded...;-)