Ayn Rand & Epistemology 27

Definitions: postscript. Many Objectivists and even some non-Objectivists have difficulty understanding what is wrong with Rand's view of definitions. They remain hung up on several myths which Rand uses to give an aura of credence to her view. These myths are:

1. Precision in words is extremely important
2. Denials of the importance of word precision are motivated by a dishonest desire to attack human knowledge
3. Misuse of language (e.g., through equivocation) demonstrates the need of precise definitions 

Let's examine each of these myths:

  

1. This is the myth that people hold on most tenaciously, because it intuitively seems correct and even irrefragible. To deny that word precision is important seems tantamount to an endorsement of imprecision and sloppy thinking. But this misses the whole point of the criticism of definitions. The precision allegedly emerging from definitions is spurious. Words are imprecise not because they are ill-defined, but because speech is representative and symbolic. Language is loose because it is significant. It covers many instances indiscriminately, without necessarily making finer distinctions. In other words, "imprecision" derives from Rand's "unit-economy."

  

Such precision and detail that language is capable of achieving does not derive from definitions, but rather from the more exhaustive use of language. A murder can be described in one sentence or 100 sentences. Assuming that both descriptions are accurate, which is going to be more "precise"? Obviously, the longer, more detailed description! Precision therefore emerges from descriptive detail, not from definitions. Where quantification is possible, precision can be achieved with much greater economy. But since most human judgments are qualitative, rather than quantitative in nature, precision requires large amounts of detail.

If Objectivists were better at recognizing and applying the insight embedded in Rand's "unit-economy," perhaps they wouldn't be so quick to make such a fuss about precision. In practical matters, precision is not always necessary. If a guest in my house is looking for butter and I say "The butter's in the refrigerator," that may not be all that precise (where exactly is the butter?), but it is precise enough for practical purposes. If I am sending someone to the moon, the instructions will have to be much more precise -- so much so that they won't be entirely conveyable by means of language, but will inevitably require exhaustive training and repetition in order to be conveyed.

2. Rand blithely assumes that anyone who challenges her view of definitions and language must be motivated by a desire to attack man's conceptual faculty. Since such individuals are, by definition as it were, evil, there is no point in trying to understand, let alone refute them. Rand and her followers have yet to display any evidence that they understand Wittgenstein or Popper or Pareto or anyone else who might attack the essentialist account of definitions. They are incapable of stating the views of their opponents without grossly distorting them. There are powerful motivations behind this. Rand required a cognitive scapegoat in order to explain why most people refuse to agree with her moral and political philosophy. Rand would not for a moment have even considered the very real possibility that she might be wrong in her ethics and politics or that others may have different preferences which, based on their own unique proclivities, might be "right." Rand wanted to believe, in defiance of Hume's is-ought gap, that her preferences were absolutely "right" and "true." Unfortunately, most arguments on behalf of moral ends, however circuitous they may be, resolve in the final analysis to some form or variety of ad hominem. Rand's attempt to argue morality through epistemology terminates in the same ad hominem conclusions that characterize most, if not all, of Rand's moral arguments.

  

3. As was noted by the sociologist Pareto and empirically corroborated by social psychologists such as Jonathan Haidt, human beings tend to act accept ideologies for largely unconscious reasons and only provide "reasons" and "arguments" to provide an illusion of logical rigor for what actually has a non-rational source. In other words, the conscious mind, as Jonathan Haidt puts it, is often little more than a press secretary engaged in spin. The most common tactic individuals resort to when engaged in spinning is equivocation. The rationalizer leverages the vagueness most words suffer from (because of unit-economy) to attain his end. Rand herself provides an apposite example of the process. Objectivism is largely spin: a rationalization of Rand's personal preferences, formed (unwittingly) largely via unconscious cerebrations. This explains why the logic of Rand's arguments are so poor and unconvincing to those who hold different preferences (or are more fastidious about the logic of their beliefs).

Because so many ideologues are engaged in rationalization via equivocation, it leaves the impression that many individuals don't know the meanings of terms. But this is a false impression. People play fast and loose with the meanings of words not because they don't know the "correct" definitions; rather, they do so because they're more interested in justifying their preferences then discovering mundane, uninspiring truth. It's a problem, not of "improper" definitions or "improper" concept formation, but of a pretence of knowledge combined with a human-all-too-human desire to avoid having our preferences and ideologies subjected to effective criticism.

In any case, you're not going to stop ideologues from rationalizing by insisting that they define their terms "precisely" and "correctly." You'll only make their rationalizations more long-winded and absurd.