Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy 5: Meaning, Intention, and Truth. In my last post, I criticized the Objectivist theory of meaning for being both quasi-Platonist and quasi-positivist. However, that only skims the surface of what is wrong with the theory. There is a much more serious problem with the Objectivist theory of meaning, which is this: it is not true. As a theory of meaning, it is inextricably incoherent. It confuses meaning and truth. If taken to its ultimate, logical conclusion, it would assert that all meaning is true, which would imply that no one could ever mean something that was false. In practical terms, it encourages Rand's followers to become obssessed with how conclusions are made, rather than with whether such conclusions can be tested. Such are the fruits of Rand's attempt to build a theory of definitions and concepts on the out-moded and anti-scientific views of Plato and Aristotle.
Peikoff declares that "a concept means the existents which it integrates." [IOTE, 98] Meaning, however, doesn't work like that. An individual, particularly an egotist, may presume he means, when using some word, all the "integrated" existents; but really he only means what he asserts of it. If a man believes that, in speaking of something, he means everything about it, he is obviously deluded; for he cannot possibly know everything about an object; nor would it be a cognitive ideal worth striving for, since most knowledge is trivial and not worth knowing at all. What people mean when they say something or think about something is merely their conception of the things they are speaking or thinking about. Such a conception, to the extent that it contains true information about matters of fact, is always partial and inadequate. Knowledge is not a mirror: it does not exhaustively describe, or minutely characterize, its objects. It doesn't have to. Human beings only require enough information to survive and procreate.
There are Objectivists who, while admiting that knowledge is not a mirror, nevertheless refuse to accept the inevitable consequences of this premise. They are caught up in Rand's conspiratorial theories about the history of philosophy. Rand contended that philosophers were engaged (whether wittingly or not) in a "concerted" attack on man's mind. To prove this absurd contention, Rand, like any birther of 9ll truther, began hunting for "evidence." This she achieved by maliciously misinterpreting the views of various philosophers concerning words and definitions. Since the Middle Ages, philosophers had grown tired of arguing about words. In scholastic philosphy, words had meanings independent of the speaker's or thinker's intentions. Since words actually don't have meanings independent of what people intend by them, this led to senseless arguments about the "true" meanings of words.
Rand tried to revive the old scholastic tradition. She thought she could avoid the worst implications of this doctrine by suggesting that only concepts have "true" meanings, while words are merely symbols. But in practice this turns out to be a one of those "distinctions without a difference." A concept is a meaning. Declaring that some concepts have "true" meanings while others have false is to engage in senseless patter. I've covered all this in a previous post; but since Rand's followers and apologists seem incapable of understanding it, it bears repeating: a concept expresses whatever meaning it was meant to express. There are no "true" or "false" meanings, there is only the meaning that the individual is in fact trying to express.
Since concepts are meanings, they don't need definitions. Indeed, for a concept, a definition is redundant. Definitions define word usage, and therefore apply only to words. Meanings are what they are regardless of whether a word exists to express them. It is believed that human beings deal with as many as two million distinct meanings; yet the vocabularly of the average individual is less than 10,000 words. Therefore there are meanings (and ipso facto concepts) that are not attached to words or verbal definitions (and all defintions are verbal!). Words merely express meanings in a form that can be communicated and dealt with consciously. Definitions merely express those meanings in other words. The actual meanings (or concepts) exist independently of the words and their verbal definitions, and would exist whether there were any words to express them.
Having decided that every concept has a true meaning, Rand now had at her disposal a powerful verbal cudgel with which to beat her adversaries. Instead of trying to establish her assertions about matters of fact on the basis of peer reviewed research and experimentation, Rand chose to base her philosophy on her rather eccentric definitions, which were arbitrarily declared as "true." While such a procedure failed to establish the veracity of any of Rand's doctrines, it did have a powerful effect in another, more sinister direction. Being under the illusion that truth is determined by the accuracy and precision of one's definitions and (what perhaps amounts to the same thing) on "proper" concept formation, Rand's followers adopted the practice of defending Objectivism, not with scientific evidence or peer reviewed research, but with long and futile arguments about words. The Objectivist assumes that only he has access to the "true" meanings of words, and that everyone else is using words (and the concepts the words represent) "improperly." According to Objectivism, without "true" meanings and "proper" definitions, no assertion of the truth is "valid." False meanings lead to false propositions, which in turn lead to false conclusions.
The practical consequence of this theory of meaning is that it leads Objectivists to waste time attempting to evaluate the cognitive process leading to a given conclusion, rather than merely testing it against reality. If you're primarily concerned with rationalizing your beliefs, there is much to be said for the Objectivist way of evaluating conclusions. If you're engaged in rationalization, the last thing you want is to have your conclusions tested against reality. Much better to argue about whether one's definitions are "true" or whether one's concepts were formed "properly." But if you care more about truth than rationalization, then you will find arguments about words and concepts to be a waste time. It's not words or concepts that are important, but the things they represent. Nor is it important how a conclusion is reached, but rather, whether the conclusion can be corroborated via empirical evidence. If someone declares that there is a naked woman in his apartment, the best way to test this claim it is to go to the individual's apartment and see if there is in fact a naked woman lounging therein. Very little can be discovered by examining whether the claim is based on concepts that were formed "properly" or whether the individual's definitions are "true," "precise, " and "accurate."
56 comments:
let's try this with a concrete example. when you say "ungtss," what are you referring to?
a person, of unknown name, gender, location, race, and sexual orientation.
let's now say you learned my real name and where i'm from.
from that point on, whenever you said "ungtss," would you be mean something else, because of your greater knowledge about me?
under your theory, you would. this would create a discontinuity in meaning with every increase in knowledge.
but under the objectivist theory, you would mean the same thing -- me. you would just have added to your knowledge about me. thus while your knowledge about me has increased, your meaning is exactly the same.
the objectivist theory does not lead to the parade of horribles you describe. it does not mean "all meaning is right." on the contrary, it differentiates between your meaning and your knowledge about the object of your meaning.
you may mean "ungtss" but be completely wrong in everything you believe about me. someone else may mean "ungtss" and know much more about me than you do.
they mean the same thing. they both refer to the same entity. it's just that one knows things about me that the other does not.
contrast to your theory of meaning. in your theory of meaning, if one person has a lot of wrong ideas about me, and another person has a lot of right ideas about me, they both refer to a different entity when they say "ungtss." even though there's only one of me.
If they mean different things, how can anyone determine which set of beliefs about the thing is right? No one can. Because they mean different things.
this is why your theory of meaning leads down a long, grey road to crazy.
in the example of the apartment, how would you know what to look for or if you found it? what is a naked lady?
^ Exactly. ^
I always suspected many Objectivists don't know what naked ladies look like.
I look forward to endless discussions on the fallacy of the stolen naked lady.
The comment was more pointed than that, I used the word 'lady' in referring to the example's 'woman', how is it we both know what idea was being referenced?
"The comment was more pointed than that, I used the word 'lady' in referring to the example's 'woman', how is it we both know what idea was being referenced? "
Is this an example of Objectivists being obsessed with "how conclusions are made"?
Anonymous Anonymous said...
"The comment was more pointed than that, I used the word 'lady' in referring to the example's 'woman', how is it we both know what idea was being referenced? "
Is this an example of Objectivists being obsessed with "how conclusions are made"?
Nope it was an honest question. What is the commonality between lady and woman that we both apprehended?
Other Anonymous said...
I always suspected many Objectivists don't know what naked ladies look like.
Since someone opened the psychologizing door, this could be taken in a slightly sexist way, no?
oh tad, don't you know:)? rules only apply to one's opponents. if you say it, it's sexist. if they say it, it's hilarious. it's the double standard that keeps the whole charade alive:).
let's now say you learned my real name and where i'm from.
from that point on, whenever you said "ungtss," would you be mean something else, because of your greater knowledge about me?
You're confusing meaning with reference. Meaning involves the conception I have of something. If I gather more information about ungtss, my conception of ungtss, and therefore my meaning does change, even though both these conceptions reference the same object.
The problem with assuming that we mean everything about an object when we make assertions about it is that it becomes extremely difficult to account for errors and rough approxtimations that may exist in our conception of things. If someone asserts "Dogs meow," what does he mean by dog? Does he mean "everything" about dogs? How can he? His conception of dogs contains an error; and it should be obvious that when he talks of dogs, he means his conception of dogs, not "everything" about dogs.
If a person claimed, "By 'dog,' I mean everything about dogs," he would be guilty of a pretence of knowledge. Our conceptions are representations. They describe the objects of our knowledge; they don't duplicate them. Knowledge is fundamentally transative. It's an awareness of objects lying outside of consciousness, existing in its own sphere of reality. Reality is seen through a veil of symbols, because that's the only way consciousness can know what is outside of it's own perview (and awareness of the contents of consciousness is not knowledge, but solipsism and revery). A literal, non-symbolic knowledge would be a contradiction in terms.
It is not necessary for people to use the exact same symbols in order to refer to the same objects. Followers of Rand seem to be guilty here of the fallacy of misplaced literalness. They seem to be under the misapprehension that knowledge, in order to be valid, must be the same for everyone. If my concept of dog is different from ungtss' concept, it is suggested or implied that we can't be refering to the same thing. But a concept is simply a representation; and representations do not have to be identical to fulfill their function as descriptions of the grosser objects lying outside the plane of consciousness. If many painters, each with his own unique style, painted the same woman, each of the paintings could reference the same object, even though none of the paintings would be identical. Some of the paintings might be truer or more apt as representations than others; but they would all represent the same woman. Actual meaning is like a unique painting of a referent. It may contain both insights and flaws, both truth and error. This helps explain why people can identify and name an object(which is generally no great accomplishment) and yet entertain mistaken notions about it. To insist that meaning includes (even if only potentially) everything about an object is to exclude what people do in fact mean by their conceptions of things, including the inadequacy, the flaws, and the errors embedded in those conceptions.
"You're confusing meaning with reference."
that's true -- that's exactly the issue -- i am using them to mean the same thing. thanks for clarifying that. it helps me think more clearly.
the question then is whether i'm "confusing" them so much as "equating" them. to answer that question, we need to know whether "meaning" and "reference" should or should not be the same thing.
it's clear that peikoff is equating them as well. and perhaps that equation is the root of this issue.
Say there's a fact about ungtss. he has prostate cancer and 1 month to live. if you know this, when you say "ungtss," do you mean to convey specifically that he has this disease?
i don't. when i say "ungtss," i mean only the object to which i'm referring. i'm not saying anything about him. i'm just referring to him. and that reference to him is all i'm attempting to convey, and therefore all i "mean."
that's why in the context of a single word, i'm using "meaning" and "reference" as equivalent. and i'm not sure why they should be distinct. perhaps you can open my eyes to why they should be different.
if i want to say something _about_ ungtss -- to convey a particular fact -- i say other things. like "ungtss has prostate cancer is 1 month to live." then my "meaning" includes the specific fact about him that i'm conveying.
but when i just say "ungtss," without any facts about him, i "mean" or "refer" only the object to which i'm referring. and in meaning or referring to the object alone, i include by reference every characteristic of the object of my meaning -- whether i know it or not.
"Since someone opened the psychologizing door, this could be taken in a slightly sexist way, no?"'
Only if you take "many" to mean "all". Which wouldn't surprise me too much, but anyway.
"Nope it was an honest question. What is the commonality between lady and woman that we both apprehended?"
No, it wasn't an honest question. You're fishing, hoping someone will say something about the terms "lady" and "woman" that will provide you with some kind of "gotcha moment" so you can swoop in and say, "so! you admit to stealing this concept in such and such a way etcetera and so forth" - or whatever point it is you're angling for. I'm just not playing that game with that question, since frankly, I fail to see what your question has to do with either the original post here or anything in the subsequent comments. If you have a point, perhaps you could spit it out instead of trying to be coy about it.
I'm just a layperson, not an academic, from my reading and understanding of ITOE it seems your criticisms of it are misplaced. Rand explains what concepts are, and shows how they are developed by a volitional consciousness. The explanations are about concepts qua concepts. A concept is developed by an individual based on that particular individuals perceptions of existents, the abstractions made about the characteristics of those existents are mental constructs based on the attributes of the existents.
When you use the example of the concept dog and how that may differ from individual to individual , that concept still is referring to the same existent , yes? O'ism doesn't say that there is only one platonic concept 'dog' and apprehension of that concept brings all possible knowledge of the existent, or referent , with it, just that that concept is referring to a specific kind of existent. The word 'dog' , the name, is a social convention in the way a parent will point to a dog and say the word so a child will learn to utter that sound when they want to communicate that idea to another. But the child to utter the sound that represents the idea(concept) of dog , has to have formed even a rudimentary understanding or recognition of the existent, dog, in order to think about it as a separate or specific entity isolated from the rest of the content of his/her consciousness(apprehension of the gross reality). A valid concept is one whose entire content is based on the referent. Meowing does not apply to dogs, either barking has been misnamed or the holder of the concept of a meowing dog is.. well I don't really have words to describe what the mental content of such an individual would be like.
To disparage the whole epistemology because forming a concept does not automatically give one all possible information about the referent, is to disparage it for something it does claim.
does not claim.
anon
What of 'lady' and 'woman' , how is it we both what I mean? Since we can use either word interchangeably, does it mean that the referent is not dependent on their definitions? Is there something essential about the referent as an existent? Which holds primacy the existence of the referent or is the definition of the existent the only thing that matters?
"What of 'lady' and 'woman' , how is it we both what I mean?"
Assuming you meant to put a "know" in that sentence, we know because as you say, the words are (almost) interchangeable ("lady" having some added connotations of class).
But I see no way that this has any bearing on the rest of your comment. So two words have nearly identical meanings. So what? This is the dog/chien argument all over again, and it didn't work then.
The problem with searching for some "essential" nature of something is that what is "essential" can be entirely a matter of preference. The Objectivist error seems (to me) to be that since we as a species have had a long habit of categorizing things in certain ways and then sticking with many of these categories, that somehow these are "essentials", and are somehow not just as arbitrary a social convention as anything else.
Consider birds. Most of us have a pretty good idea what constitutes a "bird". Feathers, beaks, egg-laying, and so forth. Flying? Well, no, since we do consider penguins and ostriches birds. But we humans make this classification. Back in the beginnings of history, we could have said, "well, let's just say that anything that flies is a bird", and that could have been the "essential" nature of "birds", which would include bats and insects of all sorts.
We didn't do this, of course, and we decided to do a lot of classifying of animals on the basis of appearance and evolution and genes and such-like. The point is, we didn't HAVE to do it like this. Nothing about the nature of what we now call "birds" demands it. We are accustomed to it, and have been taking it for granted for quite some time. But that's something we did, not something that arose just because birds as we know them exist as they do.
"The problem with searching for some "essential" nature of something is that what is "essential" can be entirely a matter of preference."
You're mixing up whether characteristics are essential with which essential characteristics one chooses.
You can choose any essential characteristics you like -- so long as they're essential. thus if you want to create a word that refers to all flying things, the essential characteristic would be "flies." maybe the word would be "flyer." this is a different word from "bird." it has a different essential characteristic.
there's nothing wrong with a single entity falling under a different category of entities, as a "robin" is both a "bird" and a "flyer."
in fact, you might call it a "flying bird."
oh wait. that's what we do:).
bad definitions arise from defining things from non-essential characteristics. for instance, you might define an "Irishman" as a "heavy drinker." Then if you meet a person who is ethnically Irish and a citizen of Ireland, who does not drink, you'd say "Well, he's not Irish."
You might say that sort of definition by non-essentials is absurd, and doesn't happen. But it happens all the time. For instance, the concept of "American Values." talk about definition by non-essentials.
"for instance, you might define an "Irishman" as a "heavy drinker." Then if you meet a person who is ethnically Irish and a citizen of Ireland, who does not drink, you'd say "Well, he's not Irish.""
And you would be right, if that is indeed how you defined "Irishman". You want to use what we currently accept as the definition of "Irishman" as some kind of marker for what an Irishman really is, but if it had been agreed upon that a heavy drinker was "an Irishman", that's what an Irishman would be - unaffected by what we actually call an Irishman today. It wouldn't be a bad definition, just one that arose in a far different way than the definition we actually use.
"You might say that sort of definition by non-essentials is absurd, and doesn't happen. But it happens all the time. For instance, the concept of "American Values." talk about definition by non-essentials."
Now, why in the world, if I have been saying that your "essentials" are arbitrary, would I even suggest that there is some kind of absurdity in defining by non-essentials?
YOU might want to say that, or at least imply that it SHOULD not happen that way, but that's all your cross to deal with, not mine.
Oh, wait, I see now - you just wanted to make a bon mot about the phrase "American Values". Wow. That's sure some comedy right there.
But you've undermined your whole argument just for the sake of a weak chuckle. "American Values" doesn't have a "bad definition" - most folks who use it know pretty much what they're talking about. It's only the person who insists that what people call "American Values" are somehow bad values that has some kind of bone to pick with the phrase. And that's just personal dislike at work, not any objective analysis of a definition.
Incidentally, "he's not Irish" is the kind of thinking used to justify Rand's opinions on things - faced with the idea of a man who lives in a dependent (or "parasitic") way, the Objectivist says something like "oh, but he's not actually living as a human, but as a beast!" - thereby trying to define "human" and/or "living" by Objectivist terms instead of more commonly-used definitions. The only thing that makes such definitions bad, though, is trying to impose them on others, to insist that the O-ist definition is proper and everybody else doesn't know what the definition really is - mostly for rhetorical purposes. I would be a fool to insist on using the "heavy drinker" version of "Irishman" as a valid definition *in a world where the other definition was almost universally accepted*.
"You want to use what we currently accept as the definition of "Irishman" as some kind of marker for what an Irishman really is, but if it had been agreed upon that a heavy drinker was "an Irishman", that's what an Irishman would be - unaffected by what we actually call an Irishman today."
If you redefined "Irish" to mean what we currently call "drinking," then you wouldn't define an Irishman as a heavy drinker -- you'd define him as a heavy Irisher.
That's why it's definition by non-essentials. "Irish" still refers to national origin. "Drinking" still refers to beverage. But you've defined a term related to national origin by one's propensity to drink.
To straighten it out, you'd need to redefine "Irish" entirely. Which means that an Irishman is a heavy Irisher.
You'd also need to call every heavy drinker in the world Irish. Even a south african bushman. You'd have to define irish in terms of the "Essential characteristic" of drinking, and strip it entirely of the non-essential characteristic of national origin.
Definition by non-essentials is when you blend the two. It's when Irish means national origin to you, and then you define it in terms of drinking.
Hitler did this with his "German thinking." He defined "German thinking" as his thinking. Therefore any thinking that he disagreed with wasn't German. But a type of thinking is not an essential characteristic of a nationality. Germans can think all types of ways. He defined by non-essentials by retaining the ethnic meaning of "Germans," while defining it by the non-essential characteristic "holds a particular philosophy."
"cidentally, "he's not Irish" is the kind of thinking used to justify Rand's opinions on things - faced with the idea of a man who lives in a dependent (or "parasitic") way, the Objectivist says something like "oh, but he's not actually living as a human, but as a beast!""
Who here as ever claimed that every objectivist on earth -- including rand and including me -- fully practice what they preach all the time?
rand herself said dagny taggart was "me without my flaws."
aren't all moralities hypothecticals, by necessesity
what do you mean by hypotheticals in this context?
"That's why it's definition by non-essentials. "Irish" still refers to national origin. "Drinking" still refers to beverage. But you've defined a term related to national origin by one's propensity to drink.
To straighten it out, you'd need to redefine "Irish" entirely. Which means that an Irishman is a heavy Irisher."
Well, you wouldn't NEED to. Why? Just to keep "Irish" and "Irishman" related? That's aesthetics at work. You'd only need to "straighten" it out as much as it bothered you to use terms that are spelled similarly to mean unrelated concepts.
We don't, as we decided to relate the terms closely, one deriving from the other. But that doesn't mean we couldn't, or that it would be invalid somehow - as long as everyone was on the same page about what was meant, it would be as valid a definition as any.
"Who here as ever claimed that every objectivist on earth -- including rand and including me -- fully practice what they preach all the time?"
That's not at all related to the point.
the question then is whether i'm "confusing" them so much as "equating" them. to answer that question, we need to know whether "meaning" and "reference" should or should not be the same thing.
Meaning and reference are not the same thing, for several reasons. In the first place, not all meanings refer to anything. Some meanings are fanciful, erroneous, or even nonsensical. But they are meanings nonetheless, and can only be judged fanciful, erroneous or nonsensical because we understand them as such. Understanding someone's meaning is a separate matter from determining what thing or class of things a specific name refers to.
Part of my objection to confusing meaning and reference stems from my objection to the Objectivist view that knowledge is conceptual and that the unit of knowledge is the concept. A concept, however, by itself, conveys neither knowledge nor even meaning. If someone shouted at me, "Dogs!" I would have no idea what he meant. I might turn to him ask, "What are you saying about dogs?" Words become relevant and meaningful when they are placed in propositions that assert something about dogs. Even then, I'm doubtful that they mean everything about dogs. They may mean dogs as a class or dogs in general or a specific dog. They may be trying to warm me about an individual dog they have seen but know hardly anything about except that he struck them as "dangerous." People mean whatever sort of information they are trying to convey. That may involve reference; but it usually involves a great deal more.
The point of insisting on this distinction between meaning and reference is to criticize a very unfortunate tendency in Rand and some of her followers of reading meanings into people's words that were not originally intended. Once meaning is divorced from intent, communication becomes impossible. Rand constantly misinterpreted, usually maliciously, what other people would say or write. Despite her intelligence, she was literally quite incapable of understanding points of view that differed from her own. Now part of this may be due to the fact that people tend to be rather defensive about their own ideas. They instinctively rationalize when threatened. But if one wants to counter-act this human-all-too-human tendency toward rationalization, one cannot persist in distorting what other people are trying to communicate. First, one needs to understand what another person is saying; then one can criticize.
Definitions only define words. If you don't know what someone means by a specific word (and can't figure it out by the context), a definition might be of some use (assuming you understand the basic idea that the word is trying to communicate). But otherwise, definitions don't add anything at all to meaning. A "true" definition merely expresses what I mean by the word that is defined. It adds nothing else. If, however, I follow common usage, defining my terms becomes mostly unnecessary, because most people will be able to get at least a rough idea of what I mean.
"Well, you wouldn't NEED to. Why? Just to keep "Irish" and "Irishman" related? That's aesthetics at work."
I'm afraid it's more than aesthetics -- it's the way we signify a particular logical relationship between two parts of the compound word. In this case, "Irish" modifies man.
When you put those two words together, within the context of the english language, you're signifying a logical relationship between the words.
Therefore if "Irish" means "drinker," and you put it next to "man," you're now saying "drinkerman."
Do we have to signify this logical relationship between words by placing them next to each other? No. We could place one word on top or on bottom of the other, or diagonal, or whatever we like. but in english, that's how we do it. when you put an adjective next to a noun, the adjective modifies the noun. To get around the logical relationship signified by a compound word, you need to break apart English grammar.
"Meaning and reference are not the same thing, for several reasons. In the first place, not all meanings refer to anything. Some meanings are fanciful, erroneous, or even nonsensical. But they are meanings nonetheless, and can only be judged fanciful, erroneous or nonsensical because we understand them as such."
I agree with you that meanings can be fanciful or erroneous, but i'm not sure why references cannot likewise be fanciful or erroneous. can i not "refer" to an entity that does not exist?
Perhaps i say "There's a Flying Spaghetti Monster atop the Bank of Albuquerque building." it's fanciful and erroneous, certainly. but why is it not "reference?"
i agree with you about the dangers of failing to understand other people's meaning, and even that rand was guilty of it at times, but i'm not sure that error stems from a person's decision not to distinguish between "meaning" and "reference.
I'm just a layperson, not an academic, from my reading and understanding of ITOE it seems your criticisms of it are misplaced.
What is meant by the term "misplaced"? If I were following the Objectivist theory of meaning, I should be hunting for the referent of misplaced. Doing so, I might concluded that I had quite literally lost my criticisms, placed them somewhere and then forgot. But is this what is meant? No. Meaning is determined not by the word or the concept, but by how the word is used in a proposition. Nor is the meaning always literal; quite often its metaphorical, as it is here.
A valid concept is one whose entire content is based on the referent.
I don't think it's useful to describe concepts as being "valid" or "invalid." Concepts are simply meanings which can be used to describe or communicate a variety of things. Only when concepts are combined into assertions about matters of fact can their truth (and that what Rand usually means by the term "validity") can be evaluated. Describing truth, however, is hardly their only function. They can be used to tell fanciful stories, or to deceive, or to describe emotional states, or signal for help. If there's something that is misplaced here, it's not my criticism, but rather Rand and her followers over-emphasis on reference and validity. You don't place knowledge on a footing any more sound by insisting that concepts must be accurate referents of their objects. That's not their function. Whatever accuracy of knowledge that mere words can attain (and there's great limitations in verbalized knowledge) can only be achieved when they are used in propositions (and even propositions can't be trusted as knowledge unless they are trivial or have been thoroughly tested). Most single words commuicate no information, and the few that do, such as "help!" are signals or calls for attention rather than explicit knowledge.
Words (along with the concepts they are supposed to represent) are not used exclusively to transmit knowledge about matters of fact. Any theory of concepts and meaning must take account of this.
ungtss said...
what do you mean by hypotheticals in this context?
In the context of the purpose of morality(ies) to help guide man's nonomnicient fallible nature. And this specific context of critics of O'ism that claim that since there are no perfect adherents to morality to point to and prove empirilistaclly therefore morality or ethics do not exist.
gregnyquist said
You don't place knowledge on a footing any more sound by insisting that concepts must be accurate referents of their objects.
Isn't this different from what is said in ITOE? I understand that according to O'ism, concepts refer to existents. Your statement seems to say that objects(existents)refer to concepts.
My layperson understandiing of O'ist epistemology and how it concerns concepts/words , is contained in the file folder analogy in ITOE. The concept dog 'inside' my head is like a file where I store all the knowledge I have of dogs and I really only understand the content of that folder if I can , or to what degree I have , integrated the contents of that folder with all the other 'folders' I have 'inside' my head. To help with the task of calling to attention any specific folder and its contents to my awareness at any one time I assign tags to the folders. One folder is called 'dog' , the fact that this folder has that tag is a social convention, when I was younger everytime I pointed at what the content of that folder refered to my mother would utter 'dog' and I learned that was the verbal tag associated with my mental folder so I chose that tag, no big deal (I just had to remember to not change the tag verbally else my mom wouldn't know what I was referencing)... As far as this simplistic explanation goes , is this what Rand was saying in ITOE? Because if this is wrong than my whole understanding is incorrect.
"Therefore if "Irish" means "drinker," and you put it next to "man," you're now saying "drinkerman.""
But nobody SAID Irish meant "drinker". Well, nobody except you.
The idea put forth was, "Irishman" - the entire word - means heavy drinker. That's all. Reverse-engineering that into making "Irish" mean "drinker" was not in the original proposition. You didn't state it when you came up with the notion, though you tried to make a similar leap in a later post. But just because you're used to the normal connection between "Irish" and "Irishman" doesn't mean that we couldn't set things up so that the terms were mostly unrelated. Just because it's a compound word doesn't require it to relate to its component words. Cf. hamburger, coldcock...
What's more, some ethnically-derived derogatory terms have become somewhat unmoored from their original ethnic origins. "Gypped" and "welched" (or "welshed") don't commonly bring up thoughts of Gypsies or the Welsh. Gypsies had to begin protesting the usage of the word before I ever made the connection back in my youth.
So while it's unlikely that "Irishman" will ever mean JUST "heavy drinker" here in the real world, the idea of it - and the idea of it happening without affecting the word "Irish" in any way - isn't entirely implausible.
"Just because it's a compound word doesn't require it to relate to its component words. Cf. hamburger, coldcock..."
Hamburger is not a compound word. It derives from the city of "Hamburg." Adding the suffix "-er" makes it mean "native of hamburg." It was originally marketed as a "Hamburg steak."
"coldcock" is a compound word -- it originates from the word "Cock," for which one of the meaning is "to draw or bend back in preparation for throwing or hitting." It is modified by the word "cold" to indicate that the person is knocked out.
""Gypped" and "welched" (or "welshed") don't commonly bring up thoughts of Gypsies or the Welsh. Gypsies had to begin protesting the usage of the word before I ever made the connection back in my youth."
Your definition of "Gypped" (to steal) and the original definition of "Gypped" ("To treat one as a gypsy would") are different definitions. you've adopted the symbol, without the original definition. But the original definition was by non-essentials, and that's why it was -- and is -- offensive to gypsies.
"Hamburger is not a compound word. It derives from the city of "Hamburg." Adding the suffix "-er" makes it mean "native of hamburg." It was originally marketed as a "Hamburg steak.""
Funny thing about Hamburg: "Burg" is a word meaning fort or castle. Hamburg derives historically from "Hammaburg", or Hamma Castle. If Hamma had a meaning besides being a name it seems lost. So it is still a compound word, of sorts.
But even if it weren't, picking at that elides the main point, being that most folks don't think about Hamburg at all when they order a "Hamburg steak" these days. Only trivia buffs and etymologists give it any consideration.
""coldcock" is a compound word -- it originates from the word "Cock," for which one of the meaning is "to draw or bend back in preparation for throwing or hitting." It is modified by the word "cold" to indicate that the person is knocked out."
Nice try. But improbable.
For one thing, "cold" by itself rarely if ever means knocked out. We use "out cold" for that, so one would expect the phrase to be "outcoldcocked" or "cockedoutcold", or at least that there would be evidence of these as preceding forms from which "coldcock" was derived. Since a quick Google search seems to reveal that there's a lot of uncertainty as to the word's origin, it seems unlikely that we'll uncover any etymology to support this theory, at least not with the resources devoted to messageboard debates.
As for "cock" meaning to pull back, preparing for a strike, the problem with that is that "coldcock" refers to the strike itself, or the direct effect of the strike.
One source listed a definition of "cold cock" as a noun, a thing one would hold in a hand to make a blow more powerful. That would more likely derive from "cold" as temperature - like "cold steel" - and "cock" as a short length of pipe. (Archaic)
If that is the case, then the current meaning of coldcock is quite removed from its original forms. But even if we were to stipulate to your definitions, they still would show significant drifts from the original terms, and it's hard to see how either of your quotes does anything to contradict the idea that such a term can become separated from the definitions of its component words. At best they might prove I used poor examples, though as I explain above, I don't think so.
" But the original definition was by non-essentials, and that's why it was -- and is -- offensive to gypsies."
I defy anyone to find a Gypsy (or should I say Romani) that says they're offended by "gypped" because of the use of non-essentials in the definition.
The rest of that just makes my point. "Gypped" became, at least for a time, disconnected from its original meaning, and many people used it just as another term for cheated or swindled, without specifically thinking about Gypsies.
So by targeting these issues, you have done nothing to counter the main thrust of my preceding post.
"I defy anyone to find a Gypsy (or should I say Romani) that says they're offended by "gypped" because of the use of non-essentials in the definition."
Why do you think they're offended? Because in using "gypped" as a verb to mean "rip off," one is implying -- through language use -- that gypsies are thieves. gypsies realize that. and they're not wrong, at least as the word was originally used.
the question is, how is this implication taking place? and the _means_ of creating the implication -- from an analytical perspective -- is definition by non-essentials. "Gypsy" is being turned into a verb, and then the verb is being defined in terms of a non-essential characteristic of Gypsies -- "thievery."
of course, your average person isn't this anal about language use, so they don't put a label on it and drill down to the philosophical root of the issue. but they still know that in using a word that refers to Gypsies in a way that means "rip off," the user of the language is defining Gypsies in terms of stealing, and slipping that little piece of bigotry right into the use of the word. they know it vaguely, implicitly, but they know it.
As to Hamburger, if you want to analyze it from its origins as the german compound word "hamburg," then you've conceded your original point, that a compound word implies modification. in this case, "ham" modifies "burg."
As to coldcock, it's not so much a "nice try" as straight out of webster's dictionary, which refers to that definition of "cock" as the most likely origin of "coldcock." your criticism here seems to rest on the fact that it's not a perfectly precise use of the words -- that "cock" means to "pull back in preparation to punch," rather than the punch itself. but precision is not what slang is about. the point is that in this context, "cold" (in the sense of unconscious) modifies cock (in the sense of punching). you can quibble with the precision of the word use, certainly. maybe we should ask the 14 year old early 20th century street urchin who probably invented it:).
"As to Hamburger, if you want to analyze it from its origins as the german compound word "hamburg," then you've conceded your original point, that a compound word implies modification. in this case, "ham" modifies "burg.""
My original point wasn't somehow that no compound words ever implied modification, it's that a compound word doesn't HAVE to be linked to its components, whether by modification or otherwise. This doesn't concede that, since once again: Hardly anyone thinks about any of the root definitions of "Hamburg" when ordering a hamburger, be that the city, a castle, or whatever "ham" was derived from. You would have to establish that usage of the word commonly brings up thoughts of its roots, and I doubt even you would try to assert that. (But go ahead, prove me wrong.)
"straight out of webster's dictionary,"
Oh? Which edition?
" your criticism here seems to rest on the fact that it's not a perfectly precise use of the words -- that "cock" means to "pull back in preparation to punch," rather than the punch itself. but precision is not what slang is about."
Which only bolsters my point, as the word has drifted away from any common usage of the two compound words to mean something that you have to play loosely with those words to achieve. How does this not make the case that a word can become detached from its original meanings? That it is a slang term would seem irrelevant.
This dance is a sideshow - the larger point, that a word can be defined in an arbitrary manner and still have a valid definition, has not been affected. Your slang-using urchin only supports that claim.
"My original point wasn't somehow that no compound words ever implied modification, it's that a compound word doesn't HAVE to be linked to its components, whether by modification or otherwise. "
That point I agreed with you on. I agreed that there was no reason we couldn't indicate noun modification in some other way.
Where we disagreed was whether compound words _do_ operate that way, in english, today. such that if i put the words "fat" and "ass" together into "fatass," a definite logical relationship between the words is inferred, in which the former modifies the latter.
100 years from now, we may no longer recognize the roots of the word "fatass." but that doesn't change the fact that when you put two words together in that form, you're indicating a logical relationship.
that's how the word "fatass" came to be in the first place.
that was the point. at least it was my point. and both hamburger and coldcock support it.
"Where we disagreed was whether compound words _do_ operate that way, in english, today."
No.
That may be how you interpreted things, but that's not where we disagreed.
ungtss:
3/21/2013 12:58:00 PM
"Do we have to signify this logical relationship between words by placing them next to each other? No. We could place one word on top or on bottom of the other, or diagonal, or whatever we like. but in english, that's how we do it. when you put an adjective next to a noun, the adjective modifies the noun. To get around the logical relationship signified by a compound word, you need to break apart English grammar."
Are you just trying for non-sequiturs, now?
no, i'm quoting the part of our discussion where i agreed with you that we don't have to signify noun-modification through the creation of compound words, but that the point was that in english, we _do_.
in response, you brought up hamburgers and coldcocking, to show we don't.
then i showed that hamburgers and coldcocking show that we do.
then you pretended we weren't discussing whether we do in english.
"in response, you brought up hamburgers and coldcocking, to show we don't."
No, to show that the definition of words CAN become detached from their origins. The above quote is what you inferred on your own, not what I actually said.
"Just because it's a compound word doesn't require it to relate to its component words. Cf. hamburger, coldcock..."
cf of course means "compare." indicating that in your opinion, hamburger and coldcock are not related to their component words. not that they became detached.
"cf of course means "compare." indicating that in your opinion, hamburger and coldcock are not related to their component words. not that they became detached."
Hairsplitting.
I also said this:
"My original point wasn't somehow that no compound words ever implied modification, it's that a compound word doesn't HAVE to be linked to its components, whether by modification or otherwise. This doesn't concede that, since once again: Hardly anyone thinks about any of the root definitions of "Hamburg" when ordering a hamburger, be that the city, a castle, or whatever "ham" was derived from. You would have to establish that usage of the word commonly brings up thoughts of its roots, and I doubt even you would try to assert that. (But go ahead, prove me wrong.)"
Not related or detached, what's the difference? I didn't claim that the words were NEVER related to their components. But hamburger definitely is now, with coldcock possibly less so - but still somewhat removed.
So are you telling me that half of this go-round is you just assuming I meant something I did not say?
the issue here is whether combining words into a compound word indicates a particular logical relationship. in that context, the issue is what is intended when a word is created, and not what happens generations later, when people forget the original intent of the compound word. therefore distinguishing between those two contexts is not hairsplitting, but essential to the issue under discussion.
"Not related or detached, what's the difference?"
the difference is one of time and context. detached is something that happens over time, as (some) people forget the original intent of the word. not everybody forgets the original intent of the word, of course. i for one think of "hamburger" in terms of "hamburg." you may not. but whether or not you've forgotten where the word comes from, the point is that the word was _created_ with a particular purpose in mind.
"the issue here is whether combining words into a compound word indicates a particular logical relationship."
No - it's whether that relationship is necessary. It isn't. You may want to argue the above quote, but you can do that with yourself, apparently.
The fact that we mostly do indicate logical relationships does not mean that such a thing is demanded, only that it is generally more convenient.
As I said before, regarding your "Irishman" example:
"Well, you wouldn't NEED to. Why? Just to keep "Irish" and "Irishman" related? That's aesthetics at work. You'd only need to "straighten" it out as much as it bothered you to use terms that are spelled similarly to mean unrelated concepts.
We don't, as we decided to relate the terms closely, one deriving from the other. But that doesn't mean we couldn't, or that it would be invalid somehow - as long as everyone was on the same page about what was meant, it would be as valid a definition as any."
None of the later round-robin in any way disproves that assertion.
And what is now the conclusion, how many angels can really dance on the head of a pin?
"No - it's whether that relationship is necessary. It isn't."
Since I told you -- at the beginning -- that I agreed with you on that point, then i guess the real issue is reading comprehension. you apparently interpreted "i agree with you" as "i disagree with you."
i interpreted your continued disagreement with me as disagreement on the other points i was making.
but evidently you decided to continue to argue about the point i agreed with you on. not sure why, but there is it.
"Since I told you -- at the beginning -- that I agreed with you on that point, then i guess the real issue is reading comprehension. you apparently interpreted "i agree with you" as "i disagree with you." "
But you did not tell me you agreed with me. The quote that you say DOES imply that does not agree with what I said, it goes off on some tangent about tossing words hither and yon and then ends with "but you're breaking English apart if you do what you say!"
The issue isn't reading comprehension, it's that you either do not clearly express yourself OR you're trying for some verbal tap-dance to "win" the argument or something.
Either way, we've reached the part where we're speaking two entirely different languages OR you've abandoned any honesty in the debate, so we can call this quits.
Ungtss wrote, 3/21/2013 12:58:00 PM:
"Do we have to signify this logical relationship between words by placing them next to each other? No."
I don't know how much clearer a human being could be.
""Do we have to signify this logical relationship between words by placing them next to each other? No."
I don't know how much clearer a human being could be."
Except THAT IS NOT ANYTHING I WAS TALKING ABOUT. What *I* was saying was that just because you place two existing words with their own meanings next to each other, that does not require the resulting compound word to have anything to do with the meanings of the component words. That it commonly does is not in dispute - that it MUST is where I disagree.
So you DIDN'T agree with me, or you have completely misinterpreted what *I* was talking about, in which case it's your reading comprehension that needs work, not mine.
The only thing I don't know for sure now is whether this is an honest misreading on your part or intentional obfuscation.
Either way, whether you actually agreed with me or not, it's clear this debate was wasted time. If we were both arguing the same things, then there's too much of a language disconnect for there to be any meaningful exchange. And if not, then everything you say is now questionable, and who knows what you'll claim next.
I give up.
"What *I* was saying was that just because you place two existing words with their own meanings next to each other, that does not require the resulting compound word to have anything to do with the meanings of the component words."
Yes, and I was agreeing with you on that:). But i'm pointing out that in English, even though it doesn't have to mean that in any absolute sense, it does mean exactly that, within the structure of the english language.
Even my three-year old daughter knows it. Nobody sat her down and gave her a grammar lesson. She picked it up implicitly just by listening to people talk. She creates her own compound words all the time. And she interprets ours. I'll use a compound word in conversation with her, and she'll break it apart, apply the appropriate logical relationship, and figure out what i'm talking about.
Does she have to? No. But she speaks English. So she does.
Greg,
By what standard/criteria does Rand use to establish a true meaning or definition?
Also, does her notion of concept formation differ from Aristotle's? If so, how?
Thanks in advance for your thoughts on this, Bokata
By what standard/criteria does Rand use to establish a true meaning or definition?
As far as I can determine, "true" meaning for Rand means everything potentially knowable about the referent of the concept in question. "True" definitions, on the other hand, are determined by grasping the essential characteristics of a concepts referent, with essential being defined as those which best help one distinguish one class of referents from other, related classes of referents.
If this sounds a bit vague, well it is. Rand actually does not provide any practical technology for determining either true meaning or true definitions. Her theories may have a grain of sense in them if taken very broadly. Although there is no such thing as a "true" definition, words will tend to be defined by "essential" characteristics (i.e., the most important characteristics for forming and naming the category in the first place). But Rand doesn't provide a step-by-step method by which one can decisively determine what those essential characteristics might be. Rand is like the person who gives directions to a faraway place by pointing. "You want to got to Yellowstone? Why, it's east of here about 1,000 miles." While such directions might be true in a vague general sense, no one would be able to get to Yellowstone by following them.
Also, does her notion of concept formation differ from Aristotle's? If so, how?
I'm not enough of an expert in Aristotle to fully answer that. As far as I know, Rand's actual theory of concept formation is unique to her alone, although her emphasis on definitions seems to have been inspired by Aristotle (and also, perhaps, by Isabel Paterson).
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