Objectivism and Transgenderism

Charlotte Kushner over at the americanthinker.com has written a harsh critique of ARI's attack of Matt Walsh's documentary "What is a Woman?" While Kushner's article makes some interesting points and lands a few well aimed blows at Onkar Ghate, Chief Philosophy Officer at ARI (what a title!), what interests me more is the general view taken by ARI on this contentious issue. The position of ARI, as far as I can make out, is that there is nothing wrong with transgenderism and that there is no reason to object to individuals transitioning from one gender to another. This is notable if for no reason then it's not likely  that Rand would have agreed with this. But it's also interesting in that there are reasons to doubt that Rand herself could have provided a cogent argument against the morality of transitioning based on the principles of her own philosophy.

There are four basic positions on the trans-issue:

1. Gender dysphoria is both a real and a dire condition which can be successfully treated through a surgical intervention by which the individual is turned into a kind of replica of the gender he/she identifies with. This treatment is so effective at curing the individual's suffering that it can and should be used on minors. Transgenders are often to brutally treated by society that they deserve to have their medical expenses compensated by the state (i.e., taxpayers) and/or insurance companies.
2. Gender dysphoria is likely real and a dire condition, but to "cure" it by surgical intervention is so radical and invasive that only adults should be allowed to make use of it. Minors should not be allowed to transition because it's just too risky. What if they live to regret the irreversible changes inflicted upon them?
3. Whether gender dysphoria is real or not is besides the point. Transitioning is just too extreme a cure for the condition. That such procedures should be allowed against children is a scandal. Psychologists who manipulate minors into transitioning and the surgeons who perform the operation deserve prison sentences. Adults, however, because they are adults and hence free and sovereign citizens, should be allowed to transition, but they must bear all their medical expenses and not become a burden on tax payers (or insurance companies).
4. Any kind of transitioning or puberty blockers should be illegal, because it's against the laws of God and/or the universe. Gender dysphoria, to the extent that it is real, is a mental illness that needs to be treated with psychology-based interventions, not physical mutilation. Those who transition become perpetual patients (i.e., they need constant medical care and access to hormones), and this means they'll likely become a burden on an already over-burdened medical system.

Now one of the claims of Objectivism is that it can determine questions of morality through "reason." But how would "reason" determine which of these four positions is, from an ethical point of view, most correct or valid?  It seems like whenever people talk about this issue, whether it is Yaron Brook, Matt Walsh, or Joe Biden, the main issues at stake are assumed as kind of moral axiom that cannot be questioned or denied.  And no wonder---because, as George Santayana reminds us, "The ultimate intuitions on which ethics rests are not debatable, for they are not opinions we hazard but preferences we feel; and it can be neither correct nor incorrect to feel them." If you are horrified by the sufferings of gender dysphoria and are convinced that radical surgical interventions can bring an end to all this suffering, then it's hard not to conclude that either the first or the second position is the morally "right" one. But if on the other hand you find yourself horrified at the idea of genital mutilation and creating permanent wounds that have to be kept in an unhealed state, you'll be hard pressed to regard gender assignment surgeries as anything but an abomination that needs to be put down by the force of law. But in either instance, where is the "reason"? It is certainly not found in the mere feeling of horror.

Objectivists have failed to add anything to this controversy through their so-called "reason." They have merely expressed their various preferences, and then quibbled in bad faith about the rationalizations used to justify rival positions. Ghate and company have it out for Matt Walsh. So they put the worst possible interpretation on everything he says and act like this somehow makes them "rational." Ghate contends, for example, that because Walsh went to Africa to ask some tribesman what they thought of men trying to become women, this constitutes evidence of a desire to return to a more primitive state---as if Walsh is eager to give up all his wealth and access to modern conveniences in order to live in a grass hut in Africa. Walsh of course has no desire to live in a grass hut and Ghate's inuenndo is just another of the usual smears that Objectivists of the more orthodox stripe often specialize in. 

Now the irony in all of this is that Rand herself would have almost certainly not agreed with Ghate and other ARI Objectivists about the morality of transgenderism. Rand entertained very strong ideals about gender roles that likely would have clashed with the views put forward by her current disciples at ARI. But even if Rand would have likely condemned transgenderism as a revolt against reality and "reason,"  her philosophy nonetheless adopts principles which could easily be marshaled on behalf of transgender cause. For Rand believed in the blank-slate. Nobody was born as they are, but were, on the contrary, self-made in some fashion or another. Now it's not clear that Rand believed the blank slate extended to gender. But since she never got around to providing a detailed account of her position on this issue, she left plenty of wiggle room for her disciples to derive from her blank slatism whatever they damn please. And so one could easily argue (following Rand) that if human beings are blank slates at birth, this means they can't possibly be born with a fixed and determined gender. Their gender, under the Randian view, is a product of their premises. Which means it could be anything they want it to be. 

Now it could be argued that, even if the individual has the free will to more or less choose their gender (irrespective of their biological sex), this does not mean that all choices in this regard are equal. Some choices might be deemed "better" (i.e., more "moral") than others. It could even be argued  that choosing a gender that conflicts with your biological sex is somehow "unnatural" or "irrational." At the very least this is a position which Rand herself, if pressed, could have safely retreated to. But it is a position made, not so much in defiance of reason, but without reason's support or aid. For how would one justify such a contention (or it's opposite) by reason alone? Neither Rand nor any of her disciples have sought to make a reason-based defense of any of their moral preferences. So why should we expect them to provide one in this case? The "reason" of Objectivism can do nothing to enlighten us as to which of the aforementioned transgender positions is, from an ethical point of view, most correct. Such questions, it would seem, cannot in fact be settled by "reason," but must ultimately depend on the moral foundations of each individual seeking to grapple with them. And since we don't all have the same moral foundations, we're not all going to come to the same conclusions regarding the morality, or lack thereof, of transgenderism.