From the previews of the forthcoming bio by Anne Heller, "Ayn Rand And The World She Made" the basic thesis seems to be that Rand gradually invented her own reality; that she came to live in a kind of solipsistic world of her own.
If this is the case, I would agree. This solipsism is a natural consequence of her theories combining egoism and introspection, despite the lipservice Objectivism pays to attending to reality. What's interesting is tracking down some of the mechanisms by which she gradually erodes the real world and replaces it with one of her own making, as this replacement of reality with a novelised fantasy as a superior reality is one of what I've dubbed the "cultic incitements" in her work.
Here's one very subtle, but very telling example, from her second interview with Phil Donahue. At about 1:58 in the clip above he quizzes her about what she means by a "sacrifice" and here's what she says:
Rand: What I mean by "sacrifice"... and what is generally meant (DB emphasis)...is to give up some value that is important to you for something else that is a lesser value...or a non-value...Now, ARCHNblog readers may be familiar with our Understanding Objectivist Jargon series, where we explain the odd and often highly twisted meanings that Rand attached to many common terms. In fact, Rand's version of "sacrifice" is the exact opposite of the general meaning of "sacrifice", which is giving up some lesser value for a greater value.
Yet in the version of reality Rand lived in her own, invented meaning was the one that was "generally meant".
Like her crucial falsification of the dictionary definition of "selfishness" in her introduction to "The Virtue of Selfishness", Rand seems to be not so much dishonest as semi-delusional. Like a kind of postmodernist, the words make up her world.
56 comments:
Speaking of solopsism, this reminds me of the quip by Bertrand Russell that he received a letter from a woman saying that solopsism was such a persuasive idea that she was wondered why no one had embraced it.
-Neil Parille
And what could be more solipsistic than Rand's statement: "I will not die, it's the world that will end"?
Giving up a lesser value for a greater value sounds like profit to me, yet people do not generally consider a sacrifice to be a profit.
It the bible, Abraham is asked by God to sacrifice his first born son just because God asks it. Abraham's son is something of great value. In return Abraham gets nothing.
She certainly did not like the idea of the disabled getting the bus. What did she expect the 'handicapped' to do? I'm glad we have disabled access to a lot of areas now, in the past disabled people were treated like lepers and kept outta sight.
I think "sacrifice," as it is customarily used, is a rather ambiguous term, but it is usually understood as giving up an immediate value for a longer-term value, or giving up a purely personal value for the sake of a more general value.
Example of the first type: "We wanted to go to Bermuda, but we're sacrificing the trip so we can put more money away for retirement."
Example of the second type: A baseball player would like the personal glory of hitting a home run, but intentionally hits a sacrifice fly so another player can score, improving the team's chances of winning.
Human and animal sacrifices in a religious context are probably not too relevant to the way the term is ordinarily used today. However, some of those sacrifices seem to have been examples of giving up a lesser value for a greater one. The Aztecs, for instance, believed that sacrificial victims fed the gods and allowed the sun to rise. If the flow of victims stopped, the gods would starve and the sun would stop rising. From their point of view, keeping the sun in motion was worth any number of human lives.
Zardos: "Abraham's son is something of great value. In return Abraham gets nothing."
Abraham thinks he'll get God's approval, which is even more important to him (in other words: a greater value) than the life of his son. Otherwise he wouldn't even think about sacrificing his son.
That the outcome of a sacrifice may not be really better for the person making that sacrifice is not relevant. The crux is that he thinks that he gets a greater value, even if he has to surrender something that is another great value to him.
To clarify the difference between what is usually meant by "sacrifice", and what Rand seems to think it means, consider a sacrifice in chess.
These are *always* made in order to either win greater pieces, or more pieces, or a better position, or even to win the game.
Giving a queen away for a mere pawn is, in most games, not a "sacrifice" but simply a blunder!
Gee, I was leafing through the dictionary when I came across this:
sacrifice
a loss entailed by giving up or selling something at less than its value; "he had to sell his car at a considerable sacrifice"
What were you saying about Rand making up definitions for words?
"She certainly did not like the idea of the disabled getting the bus."
I don't think Rand understood what "kneeling buses" are. If I recall correctly, somewhere in her writings she complains that kneeling buses require non-handicapped passengers to kneel, a state of affairs she considered an affront -- an attempt to reduce everyone to the level of the disabled. In fact, however, a kneeling bus is one that can "kneel" at the curb, getting low enough to allow wheelchair access. Non-handicapped passengers board normally.
Someone in a newsgroup made this same point:
=======
The "kneeling buses" she referred to in the speech ... was Rand's mis-impression that the non-handicapped would be forced to
kneel while entering the buses, because the bus door was restructured to support handicapped students.
In fact, that's not even the situation with those buses. Rand was wrong again.... [quotation from Wikipedia:] 'A "kneeling bus" is a bus equipped with an accessibility feature that lowers the entrance of the bus to curb-side-level, so that a person in a wheelchair may smoothly board the bus. These buses are often
equipped with lifts that help the disabled get on the bus' raised
platform.'
http://snipurl.com/siq35
====
To me, the interesting thing about this diatribe from Rand is her obvious disgust at the mentally retarded, whom she refers to as "subnormal" and "half idiot" in a scathing, sneering tone. Similar references (in the same tone) are found in her writings -- for instance, the Hopton Stoddard School for Subnormal Children in "The Fountainhead."
It shows a certain insensitivity to talk this way in public, when it is a safe bet that some members of your audience will have family members who are developmentally disabled.
Rand would no doubt excuse herself by saying she was motivated by love for human beings at their best, but is it really necessary to denigrate the handicapped in order to celebrate excellence? I think this is yet another example of the "vulgar Nietzschean" tendencies in Rand's thinking, which she never really outgrew.
I also think it makes her look creepy and mean.
"A loss entailed by giving up or selling something at less than its value" is certainly not the same as "giving up a greater value for a lesser value", so Rand was making up her own definition. The first expression is given as a synonym for "loss", referring to the value of the thing itself and it's mentioned as a separate meaning of "sacrifice", after the usual meaning of giving up some value for another and higher value. Example:
Collins English Dictionary:
Sacrifice: 1 a surrender of something of value as a means of gaining something more desirable or of preventing some evil. [2, 3, 4, 5] 6. loss entailed by giving up or selling something at less than its value.
"A loss entailed by giving up or selling something at less than its value" is certainly not the same as "giving up a greater value for a lesser value", so Rand was making up her own definition. The first expression is given as a synonym for "loss", referring to the value of the thing itself and it's mentioned as a separate meaning of "sacrifice", after the usual meaning of giving up some value for another and higher value."
No, you're wrong. Obviously, values have to exist in some sort of context, whereby they are compared to other entities. If one were to sacrifice something, (in Rand's interpretation), they would be giving something up at less than what the value of it, (according to them), is, doing so for the achievement a lesser values or a non-value. Thus, to sacrifice a greater value for a lesser value is giving up something at less than its value, as the (non-)value you are achieving is less in value than the one you are giving up.
Herb,
If I have to travel out of the country quickly and I cannot find a buyer for my car at the market value of $25,000 and sell it for $15,000, I sold the car at a considerable sacrifice. Does this mean that I gave up a greater value for a lesser value?
The use of the word "sacrifice" as synonymous with "blunder" is probably not unique to Rand, but it is just another example of her inability to see things from other people's points of view (a common Objectivist trait).
@Herb Sewell: You're confusing the economical or monetary value of an object with value in Rand's meaning "that which one acts to gain or keep".
Why does someone sell something for less than "its" value (i.e. its economical value)? For example because he wants to get rid of it, or to get enough money for another purpose and for some reason (not enough time, demands too much effort, wrong place/moment, etc.) he cannot obtain its "official" value, in other words, for creating a situation that is more desirable (has a higher value for him in the Randian sense) than not selling that object, even if that means that he doesn't obtain the optimum price for that object.
"If I have to travel out of the country quickly and I cannot find a buyer for my car at the market value of $25,000 and sell it for $15,000, I sold the car at a considerable sacrifice. Does this mean that I gave up a greater value for a lesser value?"
Economically, yes, it was a sacrifice. Philosophically/ethically, (qua value-judgments), no, you didn't. The standard used by Ayn Rand is that of value qua moral evaluation,(with the morality being that of the preservation of one's life), not that of monetary worth being the standard of value.
"You're confusing the economical or monetary value of an object with value in Rand's meaning "that which one acts to gain or keep".
No, you're wrong. It is you who are confusing the economical or monetary value of an object with value in Rand's meaning "that which one acts to gain or keep". She simply uses the same definition, only instead assuming the standard of value to be that of monetary worth, she uses that of rational desire of an acquisition of an entity or state as necessitated by a morality.
Herb Sewell: "She simply uses the same definition, only instead assuming the standard of value to be that of monetary worth, she uses that of rational desire of an acquisition of an entity or state as necessitated by a morality."
That means in fact that she uses an entirely different definition than the dictionary. All the dictionaries I've consulted give for "sacrifice" (apart from the meaning "religious offering") the meaning "giving up a lower value to gain a higher value" (quite the opposite of Rand's definition!) and as a secondary meaning "economic loss", which has no relation to the Randian definition of value.
Therefore her claim that her definition was the definition that was "generally meant" is false, and that was the original point of this discussion.
"That means in fact that she uses an entirely different definition than the dictionary."
Incorrect. To put it in Objectivist epistemological terms, the distinguishing characteristic of the concept of sacrifice which Rand uses is that of a loss which entails giving up or selling something at less than its value, with the particular standard of value being the omitted measurement. The standard of value here is the achievement of the ultimate value specified by the morality of rational egoism, (i.e., life.)
Dragonfly,
I hope you are not one of those people who think that your arguments are only right when the other person is convinced by the irrefutable logic of what you are saying.
Suppose someone says, "I appreciate the sacrifice you made by visiting grandma in the nursing home when you would have preferred to play softball."
Has the person in question actually performed an act of sacrifice? An Objectivist would probably say, "No, if his grandma is a higher value to him than softball."
This answer assumes that Rand was right in believing that, for a rational person, there are no conflicts of interest and no clash between intellect and emotion.
I would say that Rand's view of human nature is naive, and that everyone has such conflicts. In this case, there is a clear conflict between intellect and feeling. Intellectually, the person would probably agree that he values his grandma more than softball. Emotionally, however, he would rather play softball than spend a dreary afternoon in a nursing home. The abstraction "grandma is a higher value" is hard-pressed to compete with the immediate emotional appeal of playing softball.
From a purely intellectual standpoint, the person has not performed a sacrifice in the Objectivist sense. From an emotional standpoint, he has.
This is why I say the term "sacrifice" is often ambiguous in its everyday use. It frequently refers to doing something that we feel we would rather not do, but think we should do.
This is surrendering a higher (emotional) value for a lesser one. But it is also honoring a higher (intellectual) value over a lesser one. Hence the ambiguity.
Rand's unwillingness to draw this distinction is at the heart of her confusion on this issue, in my opinion.
Meanwhile back at the ranch...I tried to enter a debate on the meaning of sacrifice with the checkout operator and she just smiled and said "that'll be $79.80 honey".
Makes me mad, why don't people in the real world care about nailing down this meaning of the word sacrifice?
Wow, yeah her talk about the mentally disabled at 'sub-human' is that how objectivists view the mentally disabled? What would they do with the mentally disabled? I mean, if they need full time care, who will look after them as you can bet your bottom dollar mom and pop will be working their asses off in the objectivist world...yet how many couples would earn enough to pay for full-time care. What about the ones that can't afford it?
"I hope you are not one of those people who think that your arguments are only right when the other person is convinced by the irrefutable logic of what you are saying"
I just love it when people effectively concede a debate by resorting to an argument from intimidation.
Something no objectivist would ever do? Right Herb? Everyoneis guilty of that, sheesh, get off the moral highground.
Suppose someone says, "I appreciate the sacrifice you made by visiting grandma in the nursing home when you would have preferred to play softball."
Has the person in question actually performed an act of sacrifice? An Objectivist would probably say, "No, if his grandma is a higher value to him than softball."
I would personally say that it was a sacrifice, assuming that his preference is based on a rational integration of the hierarchy of his values, (and that said values are indeed are based on a rational standard of value). If he honestly sees more worth in playing softball than seeing his grandma, and that would in the end make him happier, it is only the fear of guilt that impels him to do otherwise.
This answer assumes that Rand was right in believing that, for a rational person, there are no conflicts of interest and no clash between intellect and emotion.
Again, if the person in question has already a conscious understanding of why he prefers to play softball than to visit his grandmother and it is a rational decision based on the hierarchy of his values, there’s no reason he should feel any guilt or irritability for choosing to play softball. At most, he should feel disappointment that there is no way he could do both at the same time, (or dejection at the fact that his grandmother is in a nursing home.)
I would say that Rand's view of human nature is naive, and that everyone has such conflicts.
This is due to the fact that people have conflicting values.
In this case, there is a clear conflict between intellect and feeling.
I would phrase it more as principle vs. feeling/emotion. The feelings are automated, triggered, and programmed by ones thoughts and value judgments, which, (in this case), results in him preferring softball. At the same time, a more conscious notion of the supposed proper set of behavior and values, (i.e., a morality), directs him to visit his grandmother. The guilt is the integrated, automotive aspect of the morality, the internal contradiction between what he wants to do and what an arbitrary, (in metaphysical and ethical sense), moral principle states he should do. Thus, the issue here to the person with the conflict of interests is, (assuming the paradox of a rational hierarchy of values but false moral principles), guilt vs. resentment.
Intellectually, the person would probably agree that he values his grandma more than softball.
This is based on false principles, (possibly even suppositions), of moral conduct.
Emotionally, however, he would rather play softball than spend a dreary afternoon in a nursing home.
The emotions are based on his metaphysical value-judgments.
The abstraction "grandma is a higher value" is hard-pressed to compete with the immediate emotional appeal of playing softball.
This is because he either has not fully integrated the reasons why grandma is a higher value so it is a floating abstraction, or it is the case that he truly values playing softball more, and there is no rational basis to place grandmas as a higher value.
From a purely intellectual standpoint, the person has not performed a sacrifice in the Objectivist sense. From an emotional standpoint, he has.
From a purely intellectual standpoint, he has a conflict of value-judgments and ethical principles. Ethics, (to be complete), necessitates a proper psycho-epistemology. If he has non-contradictory values, then it is his ethics that needs to be rectified. The fact that he would feel resentment if he sees his grandmother and guilt if he does not is indicative of the fact that he does have contradictory value-judgments.
Something no objectivist would ever do? Right Herb? Everyoneis guilty of that, sheesh, get off the moral highground.
I only discontinue a debate with someone when I consciously see that they are outright irrational on the issue and any further persuasive effort is futile. To offer that as an justification for disregarding for their opinion would be an argument from intimidation, so I keep that assessment to myself.
Herb:
>I would personally say that it was a sacrifice...
And indeed Herb, you personally are free to do just that!
We here at the ARCHNblog fully support your Galt-given right - and indeed Rand's - to have your own, non-collectivised, anti-conventional, strictly personalised meanings for commonly used words; just as we support both yours and Rand's right to go out and thoroughly confuse yourselves and everyone else with the aforesaid.
Far be it from us to demand in some kind of Orwellian manner that words should only have "proper" meanings specially determined by us due to our philosophical superiority, and that our main role as philosophers would be to tell people in other disciplines - scientists, engineers etc - what words and meanings they should and should not use! That would be an attempt at intellectual authoritarianism in its most basic form, and what kind of thinker would advocate that?...;-)
We can, however, suggest that if - and only if - you want communicate more effectively with other people it's probably better not to have your own private language...
Daniel, you completely missed the point of me specifying that I personally would hold that particular opinion.
When Micheal said, "An Objectivist would probably say, "No, if his grandma is a higher value to him than softball," this would be apparently contradicted if an Objectivist were to actually hold a different opinion and then relate said opinion back to Objectivist principles. I think it's safe to say that my collected positions of matters here are considered "apologetic" to Objectivist ideology, (if not fully embracing it). Were that the case, in objection to Micheal's notions of Objectivists' opinions, I would wanted to emphasize that I, (within the context of the popular opinion held of me by people who have read what I have written on this blog), hold an opinion that is different from a belief that would understandably be attributed to me based on Micheal's conjecture.
We can, however, suggest that if - and only if - you want communicate more effectively with other people it's probably better not to have your own private language...
Oh, please. The mistakes I make grammatically are negligible, and the lexicon and locution I use are basic Objectivist jargon. To be an editor of a website dedicated to any aspect of Ayn Rand and not be able to understand even the gist of what I say is fantastic.
"Therefore her claim that her definition was the definition that was "generally meant" is false, and that was the original point of this discussion."
Consider how many times people use phrases such as, "Make a sacrifice to others," "Sacrifice yourself to others," "Self-sacrifice is the noblest act you can do," and other examples of the infinite variations that compose the argot of altruist bromides. While I do agree that people generally consider sacrifice qua sacrifice to be that of relinquishing a lower value for a higher one, philosophically, (and possibly even in colloquialism and non-philosophical formal idiom), it is used more often to denote the relinquishing of values held by one for the well-being of something supposedly greater, (God, others, race, etc.) Obviously, since the origin of this standard of value is taken as a moral default, people generally develop a value/nobility dichotomy, as they don't question the notion there is some higher purpose than their own interests. Thus, the term (self-)"sacrifice", (ethically), subsumes the act of giving up what you value to serve an arbitrary moral standard. Because the value-oriented/moral dichotomy exists in the vast majority of people, the notion of there being a contradictory division between what one values and the moral principle behind people's actions exists. The driving reason people would choose a state less valuable to them as opposed to a more valuable one is due to the belief that one's interests, (values), must be sacrificed for a greater cause.
Herb:
>Daniel, you completely missed the point of me specifying that I personally would hold that particular opinion.
Honestly Herb, it's hard to tell.
>...the lexicon and locution I use are basic Objectivist jargon
Now you've missed my point, which was not about you in particular but in Objectivism in general, which claims its own language and lately even its own logic!
Now you've missed my point, which was not about you in particular but in Objectivism in general, which claims its own language and lately even its own logic!
I've yet to hear any Objectivists claim that they have a set of logic that only applicable to their aesthetic. Also, I at least make the effort to understand the average hack you quote in order to refute some straw man argument of Objectivism.
Fellas, who is winning this round then? The objectvists or the non-objectivists?
Me I can even understand what you guys are going on about! Let alone comprehend the implications of this debate for my life.
To be fair, I can at least understand part of what Herb is saying, but you have to accept his dogmatic assertoins for his comments to make sense. He must be a very clever man to know all this. But the worry is if this dogmatic assertions are false what are you left with? Not much. It's all "since most people accept this" and "the majority hold the view due blah blah blah" and the "moral dichotomy that the masses hold" etc. etc.
Though he never tells us why "most people", presumably he is not included? Think/feel/act this way? Other than its the "driving force in our society".
I'd just like to point out that he'd like me, as I'm selfish and greedy and in a union. Yeah, even though there is a receission on I'm making sure the union brothers and sisters get 8% next year. Union greed is good greed.
If Rand's definition of sacrifice were simply wrong, nobody would accept it. For instance, suppose she said, "What I mean by 'justice' ... and what is generally meant ... is doing whatever will make you popular." No one would accept this as a correct definition, as it is obviously contrary to common usage.
But when she defines sacrifice the way she does, people's reaction is generally more ambiguous. I think people sorta-kinda know what she's saying, yet it doesn't feel quite right, but they can't put their finger on why it's not right.
The explanation, in my opinion, is that sacrifice usually involves doing something you would emotionally prefer not to do, but which is rationally necessary.
Objectivism cannot accept this distinction, since it holds (as Herb Sewell posits above) that all emotions come from value judgments and that there need be no conflicts between the two. If your mind tells you that something is rationally necessary, your emotions should fall in line and lodge no objection.
In real life, however, human psychology doesn't work this way. It is entirely possible, and even commonplace, to know that something is necessary but still wish you didn't have to do it. For instance, you may know that you have to get up for work at 7 AM, but that doesn't mean you enjoy rising at that hour. Quite possibly you resent having to do it, even while knowing (intellectually) that it's necessary. You may curse your alarm clock even while obeying its dictates. Part of you (the emotional, immediate-gratification part) wants to roll over and go back to sleep, while another part of you (the rational, long-range-thinking part) knows that if you miss work, you'll be fired, and there will be no money to pay the rent.
This kind of inner conflict is what gives rise to the idea of sacrifice as it is commonly understood. Rand's definition is half right, half wrong. It is right when applied to the emotional side, wrong when applied to the reasoning side.
Because it's half right, people do not reject it automatically. But because it's half wrong, it serves as a poor basis for an ethical argument.
If your mind tells you that something is rationally necessary, your emotions should fall in line and lodge no objection.
If you're saying that as a categorical assertion, that is certainly not the Objectivist position.
"that is certainly not the Objectivist position"
As I understand it, it is the Objectivist position. Rand believed that if you were rationally convinced of something, your emotions would naturally follow suit. Emotions, she thought, are the direct result of cognitive processes. This is how she could claim there are no conflicts between reason and emotion in a properly "integrated" human being.
Of course, there are many obvious objections to her position. For one thing, it ignores irrational fears -- say, a fear of spiders. Even if someone with this phobia is rationally convinced that a given spider is harmless, he will still fear it. He knows the fear is groundless, but feels the fear anyway.
The reason is that emotions are connected with a more primitive part of the brain -- the amygdala, if I recall correctly -- while cognition is associated with the most advanced part of the brain, the cerebral cortex. So even if the cerebral cortex is convinced that the spider is harmless, the amygdala is still sending out distress signals.
Rand would have argued that irrational fears are generated by subconscious thoughts, and this is probably true in many cases. But even when these subconscious thoughts are brought into the light, fully understood, and soundly refuted, the fears may still remain, because by now they are hardwired into the responses of the "lower" brain, and the lower brain does not respond to rational arguments.
Besides, it is impossible, as a practical matter, to unearth and examine all of one's subconscious thoughts. Much of this material is just not very accessible, and we are constantly acquiring more of it. So on a practical level we cannot achieve the perfect "integration" Rand advocated. Some degree of conflict between reason and emotion, or thoughts and feelings, seems to be part of the human condition.
Prescott: "The explanation, in my opinion, is that sacrifice usually involves doing something you would emotionally prefer not to do, but which is rationally necessary."
I think Objecties get confused when they hear "give up a lesser value for a greater value" because they're kinda thinking that "lesser value" means "of little or no value" when it really means "not as valuable as the greater value." Maybe the way to get through to Objecties is to define sacrifice as "giving up a great value for a greater value."
Miche
Miche,
You just defined sacrifice in a way that I think the dictionary should accept (once its writers know what Ayn Rand has done with the word).
But honestly, I think your definition is better than the dictionary definition and captures the intended meaning of the sacrifice in common usage better.
Besides, it is impossible, as a practical matter, to unearth and examine all of one's subconscious thoughts. Much of this material is just not very accessible, and we are constantly acquiring more of it. So on a practical level we cannot achieve the perfect "integration" Rand advocated. Some degree of conflict between reason and emotion, or thoughts and feelings, seems to be part of the human condition.
Prescott's entire post on this is correct. It would seem then that Rand gave an excellent basis for psychoanalysis because that is what occurs in analysis. The fear of the spider is tied to irrational emotions going maybe way back in infancy where they cannot be accessed easily. Through Freud's talking cure they can surface. The case of Anna O (conducted by Breuer a better clinician than Freud) is worth reading to understand the disappearance of symptoms through talking. (Anna O called it and thus named it her talking cure and told Breuer to please be quiet and just listen.) Behavior therapy will also work for spiders and much faster using either desensitization or flooding and may have to be repeated later on once again.
But for a full understanding the person will want to experience psychoanalysis. In reading NB he seems never to have investigated various therapies in any depth. He seems only to have the buzz words memorized, (as was Rand's way) with no real understanding. I can't help but wonder what his psychology work at NYU was comprised of. The great Sidney Hook was there, whom Rand and BB and NB and LP hated and made fun of in lectures, but he seems to be more of a theoretical psychologist from his writings (and an excellent one) than a researcher or clinician. NB was, and is what I call a pop psychologist and they are by far the most successful and financially rewarded in the business.
Hook once wrote an essay on economics using a French peasant who was illiterate to make his point. The peasant knows at the end of a year if the economy is sound and growing because if it is he can buy a new pair of shoes. If not, then he cannot. And even though the newspapers (which he can't read) are telling everyone everything is good and OK, he knows what is true.
Ring a bell anyone? Make fun of someone who can write an article like this in a respected journal?
And what could be more solipsistic than Rand's statement: "I will not die, it's the world that will end"?
This is very much a Hebrew idea. Each person is a world and the death of a person is the death of a world. What I think is that she felt she would live on to be immortal, through her philosophical work and her novels. And as usual she expressed is in a convoluted way showing her poor understanding of English.
HerbSewell: "Again, if the person in question has already a conscious understanding of why he prefers to play softball than to visit his grandmother and it is a rational decision based on the hierarchy of his values, there’s no reason he should feel any guilt or irritability for choosing to play softball."
This completely misrepresents the psychology of the circumstance. To expect that many people can attain a "conscious understanding" of why they prefer softball to their grandmother is simply to encourage rationalization of short-term over long-term interests. Rand greatly over-rates the capabilities of "conscious understanding," as a growing body of psychological evidence is making clear (see Timothy Wilson's Strangers to Ourselves). The conflict between softball versus grandma involves short-term versus longer-term interests. In the short-term, the individual would prefer playing softball to spending time with his grandmother. But in the long-term, he fears he will end up regretting prefering softball to grandma. Human beings are not infrequently motivated by avoiding future regret. The individual may feel regret, for example, when his grandmother dies and he reflects that he should have spent more time. Or he may regret his decision in favor of softball when it lowers him in the estimation of his other relatives, who begin regard him as a callous person with the concern for the feelings of others. Or he may regret his decision late in life when his own grandchildren are ignoring him and he feels he is merely getting what he deserves. This feelings are not, as Rand and Herb would have it, " programmed by ones thoughts and value judgments" (where is the scientific, peer-reviewed evidence for that?). Nor is all the patter about "hierarchy of values" and "rational integration" at all to the point; for they both fail to acknowledge the basic reality at the core of all so-called decisions based on values, which is: that all such values are conjectural, based, as they must be, on educated guesses about what in fact will satisfy the individual at a future time. Our decisions are based on what we imagine will give us satisfaction, but of which we can never be entirely certain, precisely because they involve future contigencies, and how we in fact will react to them, and the future carries much in its womb the delivery of which is uncertain. The individual does not know (cannot know) for certain how much he will regret not spending the afternoon with his grandmother; but he also cannot know for certain whether he will enjoy his afternoon at softball as much as he expects to. What if he tears up a knee or suffers a concussion? If so, he clearly would have been better off with his grandmother.
In short, it is pointless to talk about hierarchy of values when comparing values that are close to each other in the hierarchy, because one does not know for certain which value is ranked higher and lower, because that decision would depend on how the values played out in real life, and these issues are clouded in uncertainty about the future.
“Rand believed that if you were rationally convinced of something, your emotions would naturally follow suit.”
No, she didn’t.
”Emotions, she thought, are the direct result of cognitive processes.”
Define cognitive process. Most likely, (in the way that you mean it), that is not what she thought.
”Rand would have argued that irrational fears are generated by subconscious thoughts, and this is probably true in many cases.”
As a categorical statement, she would have not argued that either.
”So on a practical level we cannot achieve the perfect "integration" Rand advocated.”
She didn’t advocate that either. If you think she did, provide evidence saying so. Otherwise, you are using straw man positions of her beliefs.
This is very much a Hebrew idea. Each person is a world and the death of a person is the death of a world. What I think is that she felt she would live on to be immortal, through her philosophical work and her novels. And as usual she expressed is in a convoluted way showing her poor understanding of English.
Wrong. Firstly, this was not a statement of hers. It was from a Greek philosopher which she can not remember. Secondly, even if it was from her, it's quite clear to any imbecile that it is poetic in nature, (as Rand interprets it), and not to be taken literally.
Secondly, even if it was from her, it's quite clear to any imbecile that it is poetic in nature, (as Rand interprets it), and not to be taken literally.
Let us just call this the argument from intimation (not to be confused with the similarly named "argument from intimidation". As in,
a) Herb intimates what any imbecile will know.
b) Rather than intimidate, Herb, deciding that anyone who doesn't know what an imbecile knows, is not being irrational, and rather than quietly cease discussion, convinces them with overwhelming logic, not by calling them names or suggesting their likeness to imbeciles.
All of this would be funny if it wasn't for the real havoc I have seen this kind of nonsense wreak on families and otherwise sensible individuals.
"She didn’t advocate that either. If you think she did, provide evidence saying so."
I'm surprised I would have to provide evidence, since this is boilerplate Rand. But it's a rainy night and I have nothing to do, so ...
Some quotes from the Ayn Rand Lexicon (all quotations are from Rand herself):
"Emotions are the automatic results of man’s value judgments integrated by his subconscious."
"Your subconscious is like a computer — more complex a computer than men can build — and its main function is the integration of your ideas. Who programs it? Your conscious mind. If you default, if you don’t reach any firm convictions, your subconscious is programmed by chance — and you deliver yourself into the power of ideas you do not know you have accepted. But one way or the other, your computer gives you print-outs, daily and hourly, in the form of emotions — which are lightning-like estimates of the things around you, calculated according to your values."
"An emotion is an automatic response, an automatic effect of man’s value premises. An effect, not a cause. There is no necessary clash, no dichotomy between man’s reason and his emotions — provided he observes their proper relationship. A rational man knows — or makes it a point to discover — the source of his emotions, the basic premises from which they come; if his premises are wrong, he corrects them. He never acts on emotions for which he cannot account, the meaning of which he does not understand. In appraising a situation, he knows why he reacts as he does and whether he is right. He has no inner conflicts, his mind and his emotions are integrated, his consciousness is in perfect harmony."
"An emotion is a response to a fact of reality, an estimate dictated by your standards."
"An emotion that clashes with your reason, an emotion that you cannot explain or control, is only the carcass of that stale thinking which you forbade your mind to revise."
"The quality of a computer’s output is determined by the quality of its input. If your subconscious is programmed by chance, its output will have a corresponding character. You have probably heard the computer operators’ eloquent term 'gigo' — which means: 'Garbage in, garbage out.' The same formula applies to the relationship between a man’s thinking and his emotions."
Source: http://snipurl.com/skmzc
I didn't bother to look further. Rand's view of emotions and reasons is well known, and there are many more such quotes online.
"To expect that many people can attain a "conscious understanding" of why they prefer softball to their grandmother is simply to encourage rationalization of short-term over long-term interests."
Here, we have an equivocation of rationalization and knowing the rational behind all one's value-judgments. Needless to say, just because the people Graig Nyquist refers to are so utterly irrational that they have absolutely no understanding of why they choose one thing over another, (i.e., a “conscious understanding” of value-judgments), that does not mean the people in general do not have an ability to situationally understand the source of your value-judgments.
Let’s take this scenario: Suppose I have come from the bank after I have cashed my paycheck and am off to the hospital to pay for an operation my daughter needs, (who I love very much), or she will die a very painful death. On the way, a man offers me heroin, something I have not tried, but I have heard is very pleasurable. The price just happens to be the same as the amount of money from my paycheck, which I just cashed. At first, I am absolutely disgusted by the offering and tell the man, (rather curtly), that I will decline his offer. I then walk towards the hospital. While I am walking, I try to understand why I chose to not buy the heroin and instead, use the money for my daughter’s operation. I understand that I love my daughter far more than any short-term pleasure and that the heroin would probably have a negative long-term impact on my life. Here, not only was there no conflict between my emotions and my values, but I was able to understand the rationale behind them.
In the short-term, the individual would prefer playing softball to spending time with his grandmother. But in the long-term, he fears he will end up regretting prefering softball to grandma.
Of course, this description completely ignores whether or not he actually values grandma or softball more. It also assumes the individual won’t introspectively understand why he would feel in such a way, (which is not the same as rationalization of emotions.)
Human beings are not infrequently motivated by avoiding future regret.
Of course, because emotions are not means of cognition, these particular human beings are taking their emotions as irreducible primaries, not to be questioned or understood. “I want to play softball now, but I will regret doing so because I did not see my grandmother.” “Why?”
The individual may feel regret, for example, when his grandmother dies and he reflects that he should have spent more time. Or he may regret his decision in favor of softball when it lowers him in the estimation of his other relatives, who begin regard him as a callous person with the concern for the feelings of others. Or he may regret his decision late in life when his own grandchildren are ignoring him and he feels he is merely getting what he deserves.
All of which are value-judgments.
This feelings are not, as Rand and Herb would have it, " programmed by ones thoughts and value judgments" (where is the scientific, peer-reviewed evidence for that?).
I am speaking of emotion in a philosophical context, I do not need to empirical evidence to prove it. It is necessitated, (analytically), by the very definition of emotion. http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Epistemology_Emotions.html, sums it up rather nicely.
Our decisions are based on what we imagine will give us satisfaction, but of which we can never be entirely certain, precisely because they involve future contigencies, and how we in fact will react to them, and the future carries much in its womb the delivery of which is uncertain.
Funny, I’m not seeing the contradiction, seeing as Rand’s ethics is based on an epistemology that states that all knowledge is contextual. Therefore, all values and value-judgments would be contextual as well, (within the context of man’s knowledge,)
a) Herb intimates what any imbecile will know.
If by "know", you mean "have knowledge of", then clearly, by the very nature of an imbecility, I am likely to know that they know are more.
b) Rather than intimidate, Herb, deciding that anyone who doesn't know what an imbecile knows, is not being irrational, and rather than quietly cease discussion, convinces them with overwhelming logic, not by calling them names or suggesting their likeness to imbeciles.
Actually,(assuming a sarcastic tone to that possibility), if my statement were to be taken literally, I am asserting that they have a level of rationality that is less than an imbecile. Also, I only cease discussion when I am convinced they are irrational to the extreme that all persuasive effort is futile. Clearly they must be irrational in some manner to post such a ridiculously obtuse interpretation, but there is a possibility that with overwhelming logic, they might right themselves intellectually and be able to make intelligible statements without the premise that all people's reading it would generally agree with the intention, (not necessarily the content), of any particular proposal.
Fair enough. None of those quotes state that Rand believed that if you were rationally convinced of something, your emotions would naturally follow suit, or that irrational fears are generated by subconscious thoughts. Also, I'm not seeing a reference to a "perfect" integration. In addition, you have not defined "cognitive process".
Herb: "None of those quotes state that Rand believed that if you were rationally convinced of something, your emotions would naturally follow suit ..."
Rand: "Emotions are the automatic results of man’s value judgments integrated by his subconscious."
If they are automatic, then they must follow ineluctably from one's thinking (whether conscious or subconscious).
Herb: " ... or that irrational fears are generated by subconscious thoughts."
Rand: "If you default, if you don’t reach any firm convictions, your subconscious is programmed by chance — and you deliver yourself into the power of ideas you do not know you have accepted."
Rand again: "An emotion that clashes with your reason, an emotion that you cannot explain or control, is only the carcass of that stale thinking which you forbade your mind to revise."
I don't see how this is any different from saying that irrational fears (or any other rationally unjustified emotions) are the product of subconscious thoughts, or "the carcass of stale thinking," in Rand's colorful phrase.
Herb: "Also, I'm not seeing a reference to a 'perfect' integration."
Rand: "There is no necessary clash, no dichotomy between man’s reason and his emotions — provided he observes their proper relationship. A rational man knows — or makes it a point to discover — the source of his emotions, the basic premises from which they come; if his premises are wrong, he corrects them. He never acts on emotions for which he cannot account, the meaning of which he does not understand. In appraising a situation, he knows why he reacts as he does and whether he is right. He has no inner conflicts, his mind and his emotions are integrated, his consciousness is in perfect harmony."
Is there a difference between being "integrated" in "perfect harmony," and "perfect integration"?
Herb: "In addition, you have not defined 'cognitive process'."
I define it as "thinking" (which can be conscious or subconscious).
Herb: "Of course, this description completely ignores whether or not he actually values grandma or softball more. It also assumes the individual won’t introspectively understand why he would feel in such a way, (which is not the same as rationalization of emotions.)"
But this misses the entire point (as does Herb's example comparing heroin with the daughter in the hospital), which is: the individual does not know for certain which will give him more satisfaction, because (1) the satisfaction occurs in the future, and, when estimating it's value, one can, at best, only make an educated guess at what that satisfaction will actually be and how much he will come to value it; and (2) since he can only pursue one of the values, he will never know for certain how much satisfaction he will have gained if he had chosen the other. No amount of introspection or rationality can surmount these uncertainty obstacled, because one cannot know, by "reason" or any other method, precisely how much satisfaction one will receive when a particular course of action is taken. So if there is not a clear difference between two conflicting sources of satisfaction as they are judged in reflection, it is impossible to determine which one the individual truly values more. All values are judged and compared as they appear in reflection: first as they appear in reflection as the memory of previous satisfactions, and as they appear as projections into the future as imagined satisfactions.
Now the heroin versus the sick daughter case doesn't apply in this instance at all because the sick daughter is so obviously the more important value that issues of uncertainty don't matter. It's only when the values are close in the so-called hierarchy of values that issues of uncertainty cloud judgment and render all the fine words Rand and Co. have to say about introspection and rationality moot.
Herb: "I am speaking of emotion in a philosophical context, I do not need to empirical evidence to prove it. It is necessitated, (analytically), by the very definition of emotion. "
This is not only bad philosophy, it is bad Objectivism. Objectivism denies the validity of the so-called analytic-synthetic dichotomy. In Objectivism, there are no truths that are merely analytical. And despite the tendency of Rand and her orthodox associates to attempt to determine matters of fact through logical constructions and "definitions," I doubt that Rand would ever claim that her theory of emotion is necessitated by the definition of emotion. As even Peikoff admits, "No proposition can be validated merely by "conceptual analysis"; the content of a concept ... must be discovered and validated by observation, before any "analysis" is possible." If so, where are the "observations" that leads to the Objectivist view that emotions are the product of "automatized" value judgments? Can these "observations" reproduced by scientific psychologists conducting experiments in the field?
Greg,
Your post on uncertainty was pretty good and valuable and I think its thrust should be expanded (you might have done so already) into a larger criticism of the problems with explicit rationalization/verbalization/logical thinking as a means of arguing against customary behavior. It's hard to verbally defend some traditions given that the experience is not clearly positive until it is had - that's why some supposed feminists rail against marriage and childraising, for example, but are surprised the degree to which they enjoy being in such relationships after they are in them or have children. Again, not saying that there isn't a case for/against tradition, but that uncertainty does play a role in why people can get away with verbalistic denunciations of the unfamiliar by linking it to the unliked but familiar (comparing childbearing to "slavery" or "carrying a burden", for example).
LAJ,
I have done some posts on the whole rationalization/verbalization/logical thinking issue, though none that tied it into the issue of values be mere estimates in reflection. You're right that it deserves expansion: after Rand's theory of human nature, it is the most important issue in Objectivism, since it deals with the whole issue of "reason" and consciousness and what really happens when people think and estimate and value (as opposed to what Rand imagined they thought). But it's a very difficult topic to discuss. Michael Polanyi wrote about it Personal Knowledge and that is the most difficult philosophy book I have ever read. It's very hard to express in words, to verbalize the non-verbal and tacit. Moreover, although the weight of scientific evidence favors the view supported by Polanyi, Hayek, Oakeshott (among others) that sees limitations in conscious "reason" and appreciates the cognitive importance of experience and "tradition" (which is a kind of experience), there is still much that needs be learned in this area and it is difficult to determine, precisely, the relative importance of experience/tradition versus rationalization/verbalization/logical thinking.
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