Friday, August 31, 2012

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 13

Universals, definitions, and morality. In the 1949 book Ideas Have Consequences, Richard Weaver advanced the following rather unusual argument:


Like MacBeth, Western man made an evil decision, which has become the efficient and final cause of other evil decisions. It occurred in the late fourteenth century, and what the witches said to the protagonist of this drama was that man could realize himself more fully if he would only abandon his belief in the existence of transcendentals. The powers of darkness were working subtly, as always, and they couched this proposition in the seemingly innocent form of an attack upon universals. The defeat of logical realism in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence. [2-3]
Although Weaver's argument is phrased in platonistic terminology, in practical terms, it is not much different from Rand's:

Most philosophers did not intend to invalidate conceptual knowledge, but its defenders did more to destroy it than did its enemies. They were unable to offer a solution to the ‘problem of universals,’ that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data—and to prove the validity of scientific induction.... The philosophers were unable to refute the witch-doctors claim that their concepts were as arbitrary as his whims and that their scientific knowledge had no greater metaphysical validity than his revelations.
The differences in these two arguments is mostly terminological. Weaver seems more focused on the relation between universals and what he calls "transcendentals," by which he means, moral law. Rand, on the other hand, stresses the link between universals and knowledge in general, particularly "scientific" knowledge, which she contrasts with religious revelation. However, when we examine IOTE more closely, we find that Rand shares Weaver's passion for moral universals. The attack on universals, for both Rand and Weaver, is primarily an attack on the moral foundations of Western society.

Monday, August 27, 2012

Ayn Rand & Epistemolgy 12

Essences as "epistemological." Rand explains this rather odd juxtaposition of terms as follows:


Let us note . . . the radical difference between Aristotle’s view of concepts and the Objectivist view, particularly in regard to the issue of essential characteristics.

It is Aristotle who first formulated the principles of correct definition. It is Aristotle who identified the fact that only concretes exist. But Aristotle held that definitions refer to metaphysical essences, which exist in concretes as a special element or formative power, and he held that the process of concept-formation depends on a kind of direct intuition by which man’s mind grasps these essences and forms concepts accordingly.

Aristotle regarded “essence” as metaphysical; Objectivism regards it as epistemological.

Objectivism holds that the essence of a concept is that fundamental characteristic(s) of its units on which the greatest number of other characteristics depend, and which distinguishes these units from all other existents within the field of man's knowledge. Thus the essence of a concept is determined contextually and may be altered with the growth of man's knowledge. [IOTE, 52]

Wednesday, August 22, 2012

Rand Cultist Quote of the Day

The ARI's Yaron Brook:
“Unless Ayn Rand changes the direction of the world, we are doomed to suffer another dark ages...the next renaissance will begin when her books are rediscovered after 1,000 years of darkness.”

Tuesday, August 21, 2012

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 11

Natural kinds. Rand claimed to have solved the "problem of universals." But it is not clear that she even understood this problem. Rand frames the problem as follows:
The issue of concepts (known as "the problem of universals") is philosophy's central issue. Since man's knowledge is gained and held in conceptual form, the validity of man's knowledge depends on the validity of concepts. But concepts are abstractions or universals, and everything that man perceives is particular, concrete. What is the relationship between abstractions and concretes? To what precisely do concepts refer in reality? Do they refer to something real, something that exist--or are they merely inventions of man's mind, arbitrary constructs or loose approximations that cannot claim to represent knowledge?

Now contrast that with how the issue is framed on Wikipedia:

The problem of universals is an ancient problem in metaphysics about whether universals exist. Universals are general or abstract qualities, characteristics, properties, kinds or relations, such as being male/female, solid/liquid/gas, or a certain colour,[1] that can be predicated of individuals or particulars, or that individuals or particulars can be regarded as sharing or participating in. For example, Scott, Pat, and Chris have in common the universal quality of being human or humanity. While many standard cases of universals are also typically regarded as abstract objects (such as humanity), abstract objects are not necessarily universals. For example, numbers can be held to be particular yet abstract objects.

Rand's version of the problem of universals is different from Wikipedia's. Now I have no interest in getting into an argument over which version is "correct." Wikipedia is merely relating how the mediavals originally framed the problem. Rand was far more interested in the epistemological side of the issue. In fact, she pretty much ignores the metaphysical issue — so much so that it is not always clear how to characterize Rand's position on universals. Without explicitly saying so, Rand seems to reject the view that universals exist in reality. Instead, she seems to adopt a version of conceptualism. Only particulars exist in reality; but concepts (which for Rand are identical with universals) correspond "objectively" to multiple instances of particulars in reality. But how do they do so? Rand replies: A concept refers to a group of particulars in reality possessing characteristics in common which differ only in their measurements. This, however, is rather vague. Rand attacked nominalism for regarding "abstractions" as mere "'names' which we give to arbitrary groupings of concretes on the basis of vague resemblances." [IOTE, 2] But why isn't Rand's own theory guilty of the same charge? What makes her theory "objective" and nominalism "arbitrary"? Rand never explains, she merely asserts.

Friday, August 17, 2012

Rand and Ryan

"The reason I got involved in public service, by and large, if I had to credit one thinker, one person, it would be Ayn Rand... " - Republican Vice Presidential Candidate Paul Ryan

This is quite an interesting quote. It's rather along the lines of saying:

"The reason I got involved in business, by and large, if I had to credit one thinker, one person, it would be Karl Marx..."

"The reason I got involved in warfare, by and large, if I had to credit one thinker, one person, it would be Mahatma Ghandi..."

"The reason I got involved in Judaism, by and large, if I had to credit one thinker, one person, it would be Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ..."


Monday, August 13, 2012

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 10

The Problem of Universals. Rand wrote (in an oft-quoted passage here at ARCHN):

To negate man's mind, it is the conceptual level of his consciousness that has to be invalidated. Most philosophers did not intend to invalidate conceptual knowledge, but its defenders did more to destroy it than did its enemies. They were unable to offer a solution to the ‘problem of universals,’ that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data—and to prove the validity of scientific induction.... The philosophers were unable to refute the witch-doctors claim that their concepts were as arbitrary as his whims and that their scientific knowledge had no greater metaphysical validity than his revelations. [FTNI, 30]

What evidence does Rand provide for this view? No relevant evidence. Only an obscure quote from an obscure historian of pragmatism:

All knowledge is in terms of concepts. If these concepts correspond to something that is to be found in reality they are real and man's knowledge has a foundation in fact; if they do not correspond to anything in reality they are not real and man's knowledge is of mere figments of his own imagination. [Edward C. Moore, quoted by Rand, IOTE, 1-2]

Note that Moore says nothing about the problem of universals and its relation to concepts. That connection Rand made on her own. I'm not aware of any major modern philosopher who has ever suggested that the failure to solve the problem of universals invalidates conceptual knowledge. Most modern philosophers ignore the whole issue. If they discuss the issue of universals at all, it is only in passing.

Wednesday, August 08, 2012

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 9

Necessary validity of the senses. Objectivism has a rather strange doctrine which could be summed up as "the senses never err." Percepts are "the given, the self-evident." [IOTE, 5] The validity of the senses is "axiomatic." Those that attempt to deny this validity commit the "fallacy of the stolen concept." As Peikoff explains:

The validity of the senses is not an independent axiom; it is a corollary of the fact of consciousness.... If man is conscious of that which is, then his means of awareness are means of awareness, i.e., are valid. One cannot affirm consciousness while denying its primary form, which makes all the others possible. Just as any attack on consciousness negates itself, so does any attack on the senses. If the senses are not valid, neither are any concepts, including the ones used in the attack. [OPAR, ch. 2]

This is a very poor argument. Indeed, most of Rand's "stolen concept" arguments, particularly those relating to epistemology, are very poor. All "attacks" on the senses are ultimately attacks against the view that knowledge refers to something "out there," in "reality." Such attacks cannot be regarded as claims of knowledge; rather, they are radical denials of all knowledge. Although such denials are not true, they are not self-contradictory. But even if they were self-contradictory, it would not help Rand's case. Merely because someone makes a bad argument against x does not prove that x is "necessarily valid." Bad arguments against the validity of the senses cannot be used to establish the validity of the senses!

Wednesday, August 01, 2012

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 8

Objectivist Theory of Perception. When it comes to the issue of perception, Rand tries to have it both ways. She seeks to be a direct realist while at the same time evading the charge of being naive or overly literal. She developed a theory that came suspiciously close to representationalism, but she fiercely denied being an indirect realist.

Rand left the exposition of her theory of perception to Leonard Peikoff and David Kelley. It is summed up on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as follows:

Our perceptual faculties place us in direct contact with reality. In this sense Rand's theory of perception is a version of direct realism, holding that the objects of perception are extramental entities (rather than, say, subjective experiences on the basis of which we infer entities as their causes)....  
Rand rejects the view that some perceptions are of the qualities of objects as they are independently of us (primary qualities), whereas others (secondary qualities) are caused by the primary qualities, and are entirely in the mind. Instead, she distinguishes between the content of a perception and its form; when we perceive an object as, e.g., square and red, what we perceive are its intrinsic features in a certain form, a form that is determined by the nature of the object, the nature of our perceptual organs, and the environment. Thus, we perceive the object's shape as square, and the reflectance properties of its surface as red; both are the result of the interaction of our perceptual organs with what is out there. Neither squareness nor redness belong either to the object apart from our mode of perception, or to our mode of perception apart from the object in its environment. Hence, these attributes are neither intrinsic nor subjective but relational and objective.
Thus while Rand is a direct realist in the sense explained above, she is not a naive realist in the sense of regarding all perceived attributes as enjoying equal extramental status. 

The point in dispute involves the term "extramental." As far as I know, that is not a term either Rand or Peikoff have ever used. Its use is required only because Objectivists have never told us whether percepts are mental or not. That is an issue they have artfully dodged, and here is why: if they were to admit that percepts are mental entities (as they admit, for example, that concepts are), they would be confessing that their realism is indirect and perhaps even representational. So when the Stanford Encylopedia decided to do a write-up on Ayn Rand (under the advisement of such Objectivist worthies as David Kelley and Gregory Salmieri), they had no choice but to describe percepts as "extra-mental."