Objectivist Roundup November

Neil Parille heads 'em out and rounds 'em up:

Sean Haylock in Crisis Magazine has an interesting essay, Contra Rand

Isaac Lewis reviews Leonard Peikoff’s The DIM Hypothesis

The long-awaited Salmieri and Gotthelef,  A Companion to Ayn Rand will be out in January.  You can read an excerpt here.

Philosophy In Action Becomes Inactive.

Diana Brickell (Hsieh) has announced her intention "to withdraw from the very public online life that I’ve lead for so many years" and is mothballing her Philosophy In Action site, where she was developing a kind of Ayn Rand Agony Aunt service.

Brickell (Hsieh) has been a human weathervane for the various political currents blowing through Objectivism over the years,her position fluctuating wildly between apparatchik orthodoxy and so called "open" Objectivism. Perhaps this is another signal that the movement is, as it has appeared to be for the past few years, in the doldrums.

Tara Smith: Reality Is Not Objective

Hilarious. John Allison forked out $2m for Tara Smith to sit around playing word games like this all day.

Objectivist Roundup October

A whole lot of not a lot happening in Objectivism right now. Neil Parille rounds it up:

1.         Objectivist philosopher Tara Smith recently published Judicial Review in an Objective Legal System.  Here is an interview with Smith

2.         The Ayn Rand Institute has an extensive You Tube channel.  For those of you who have trouble sleeping, here are some videos from previous Objectivism Conferences.

3.         Dustin Byrd recently published A Critique of Ayn Rand’s Philosophy of Religion: The Gospel According to John Galt.  The book is expensive ($85) but there is a generous preview available on Amazon.
- Neil Parille

Objectivist Roundup

Courtesy of occasional contributor Neil Parille, here's a handy roundup of Objectivism-related doings.

1.  Ayn Rand biographer Anne Heller will shortly be publishing a small biography of Hanna Arendt.

2. Ayn Rand’s novel Ideal was recently published.  Here is Heller’s review (note: paywall)

3. Harry Binswanger recently published his “conversion” story

4. Objectivist philosopher Greg Salmieri was interviewed about Rand’s ethical theory.

5. Peter Schwartz published In Defense of Selfishness.  Ex-Objectivist philosopher Bryan Register critiques it on his new blog here and here and here.

Open thread 2015

As per Gordon's suggestion. Comment away as the spirit moves you.

Open thread

As per Lloyd's suggestion. Comment away.

Nathaniel Branden has died, aged 84.

Reason and the Huffington Post provide obituaries.

Here's his essay "The Benefits and Hazards of Ayn Rand" to mark his passing.

Update: Neil Parille points me to Chris Sciabarra's memorial post.

A Little Ancient History

In response to a commenter who claims that ARCHNbloggers like myself are too "cowardly" to go on Objectivist sites and debate their philosophy first hand, here's a couple of screenshots of my user activity on a couple of O-ist sites from a few years back - Rebirth of Reason (formerly SoloHQ), and Objectivist Living.

There's nearly 2,000 posts there, covering a period of around a decade,  all under my own name - which is more than can be said for this particular fellow, who in a totally non-cowardly way prefers a pseudonym. 

So, so much for that. Will I now rise to his challenge of going on and doing it all over again on Objectivist Answers? Well, clearly I hardly need to, and for now I have better things to do. I'm not even spending that much time in the last few years on the ARCHNblog. It was fun while it lasted, but there isn't that much that interests me about Objectivism these days - I've heard it all before.

But never say never...

The Biggest Bomb Yet.

Box Office Mojo reports on Atlas Shrugged III's opening weekend:

The three-part adaptation of Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged ended with a whimper this weekend. Opening at 242 theaters, Atlas Shrugged Part III: Who Is John Galt? bombed with just $461,179*. In comparison, the first two movies each opened above $1.68 million. To be fair, the second outing opened at over 1,000 theaters, and both previous movies had more marketing/publicity ahead of their launches.
Ultimately, the entire three-part endeavor will likely wind up with less than $10 million at the domestic box office (and not a whole lot overseas as well). The troubled production history is surely to blame for some of this—the cast changed with each installment—though it does call in to question whether the novel is as popular as it's perceived to be.

Never fear, the business masterplan will be to cream it on the merch!

Getting Amped.

Just 9 more sleeps to go. 

Surprise Defection from the Peikoff and ARI

This is actually somewhat old news (several months old), but apparently there's been a rather startling defection from the ARI/Peikoff/Orthodox wing of Objectivism. This isn't so much as an excommunication as a pure defection, and from an entirely unexpected source. Dave Harriman, Peikoff's most prominent philosophical protege and virtual co-author of The Logical Leap, has defected from the ARI to TAS, from Peikoff to David Kelley. I have no idea why Harriman defected. Usually, there are personal reasons for splits of this sort, which are masked with philosophical ones. Apparantly, Harriman and Peikoff have not been on speaking terms for last year or so. Beyond that we know nothing and are not likely ever knowing much more than that, as it looks Peikoff and ARI are going to be silent on this one, since it's obviously a defection that places them in a very awkward position. They cannot, after all, turn Harriman into a complete non-person, since Harriman, rather than Peikoff himself, wrote the book which introduced Peikoff's theory of induction to the world. That book won't be disappearing from ARI book shelves any time soon, regardless of what Peikoff may privately think of Harriman. My guess is that this weakens the orthodox faction over at ARI, and makes Peikoff and the old guard look out of touch and even irrelevant to many within the Objectivist movement.

Those of us who are outsiders and critics of Objectivism have always regarded Harriman some suspicion, not only for his close ties with Peikoffian orthodoxy, but for his rather eccentric views on physics. Kelley's version of Objectivism has always sought to make Rand's ideas as intellectual respectable as possible. Will Harriman's views on modern physics soften now that he has thrown over the incubus of Peikofian orthodoxy? Hard to say. But his first scheduled talks for the Atlas Society have nothing to do with physics.

Attack of the Overzealous Spam Filter!

Apologies are due to a number of commenters here. Looking back on the blog's spam filter I see a number of comments from genuine writers have been caught inadvertently. 

There's not huge numbers - maybe 10-15 over the past couple of years. I've reverted them back, probably too late now, however. Once again, my apologies.

Future of Objectivism 8

Peikoff's Legacy. How will Leonard Peikoff be remembered by future Objectivists? Will even the orthodox remember him all that fondly? Will he continue to be influential? Rand's most steadfast and controversial protoge casts a long shadow over orthodox followers of Ayn Rand. His legacy is definitely of the questionable, perhaps even dubious, variety. While he exhibited some skills as a teacher, lecturer, and expositor of Objectivist orthodoxy, whenever he attempted to stray from the Randian straight and narrow, and take flight on his own intellectual steam, the consequences were often deeply embarrasing. The man simply has very little in the way of independent judgment. Couple this with an over-sensitivity to criticism and a deep-seated distrust of anyone who refuses to defer to even his most outlandish ideas, and you have the perfect recipe for the paranoid idealogue, seperated from the world by his own political and moral delusions. His apologists describe him as a man who does not well suffer fools; which is an overly kind way of saying that Peikoff is not a nice man.

Peikoff's legacy consists of four parts: the intellectual, the institutional, the personal, and the cultural. Let's examine each in turn.

Future of Objectivism 7

John McCaskey, the candid Objectivist. Whereas many Objectivists, especially from the older generation, come off as a bit insular and even paranoid, McCaskey seems more open and engaging. He teaches part time at Stanford, and is well-liked by his students. He writes a blog, where he invites comments and even (sometimes) responds in a civil manner. There can be little doubt that evangelizing for the Objectivist cause means a big deal to McCaskey. He's a true believer in the Randian cause. But the way he goes about evangelizing his ideological preferences seems far more reasonable and inoffensive than what we've been accustomed to at the hands of Peikoff, Schwartz, Binswanger, and even Rand herself. Unlike those Objectivist luminaries, McCaskey is not offended when people disagree with him; nor does he automatically equate criticism with a personal attack. He seems to understand, what so many older orthodox Objectivists fail to grasp, that you don't win converts by displaying contempt for the people you disagree with.

McCaskey made a good deal money in the computer business. He then went back to school to get a Ph.D. in history. Presumably, he should have been perfect ARI board member. He had money, he had the credentials, he shared an obvious passion for Rand and her ideas, and he wanted to teach. What more could be wanted by the folks over at the institute? Well, there was a fly in the ointment; a tragic flaw, if you will, that would lead to McCaskey's fall from grace over at ARI. And I suspect it goes well beyond merely disagreeing with Harriman and Peikoff over a few points of historical scholarship. When Peikoff described McCaskey as "an obnoxious braggart" and "pretentious ignoramus," Ayn Rand's heir clearly exaggerated. But if you read McCaskey's blog, you  may detect an element of truth behind Peikoff's exaggerations. Peikoff likely had reasons beyond McCaskey's criticisms of Harriman for his histrionic denunciations of the former ARI board member. Indeed, I would not be surprised if the McCaskey's Harriman criticisms were merely the proverbial straw that breaks the camel's back. While calling McCaskey an obnoxious braggart and pretentious ignoramus is clearly over the top, McCaskey does exhibit just that sort of breezy self-confidence as an expositor of Randian ideology that could easily exasperate the over-protective, thin-skinned Peikoff. In his infamous "ultimatum" letter, Peikoff described McCaskey's criticism as saying, "in essence, Peikoff is misguided , Harriman is misguided, [McCaskey] knows Objectivism better than either." At the time, Peikoff's criticism struck many ARI critics as unjustifiable hyperbole stemming from an over-sensitivity to criticism. But if, as I suspect, McCaskey had, during his tenure on the ARI board, been riffing on Objectivism like he riffs on his blog, I can see how that would get on Peikoff's nerves. Riffing has always been a problem for orthodox Objectivism. Objectivism mostly appeals to high school and college students. While some of these students are content to follow an orthodox path, the more bolder nascent Objectivists often irrepressible desire to "improve" Objectivism in some way or another. It is likely that Peikoff, over the years, has received scores of emails from pretentious, sometimes even belligerent and nasty college students offering "improved" versions of the Randian creed. This sort of thing was never welcomed by Rand, and it certainly would not have been welcomed by Peikoff. McCaskey's riffs may seem, to those of us who are outsiders, as mild and inoffensive. They most deal with semantic issues (i.e, with how Objectivist arguments are worded) rather than posing any serious challenge to orthodoxy. But any sort of changes, even if merely to the phrasing of arguments, would constitute a challenge to Peikoff's authority as the most qualified interpreter of Objectivism. Over the years, Peikoff has guarded his position as the supreme authority on Randian doctrine with an intense, paranoid jealousy.

Future of Objectivism 6

John Allison IV, the sociable Objectivist. Although Yaron Brook is generally seen as a protege of Leonard Peikoff, there is another man who, I suspect, has also exercised a great influence on Brook: namely, John Allison. If Brook's energy hearkens back to Nathaniel Branden, Allison's practicality and business success suggests parallels to Alan Greenspan. In terms of basic disposition, Greenspan and Allison are poles apart. Greenspan is introverted, reserved, enigmatic; Allison affable, charming, gregarious. What they share is an ability, not all that common among hard core Objectivists, to get on in the world of business. They have social skills that other prominent Objectivists lack. They come off as having a real understanding of other people as autonomous individuals, with sentiments, points-of-view, and ideals uniquely their own. Leonard Peikoff, along with many of other orthodox Objectivist luminaries over at ARI, seem completely oblivious, even indifferent, to the social world around them. They are unable to relate in any meaningful way to the non-Objectivist world. They are insular, narrow-minded, aloof, narcissistic. It can be uncomfortable watching them engage in interviews with non-Objectivists. In terms of social awareness, they can seem, at times, semi-autistic.

Last year I heard Allison pump his book, The Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure, on the Dennis Prager show. While Allison didn't say anything particularly new, striking or original, he nonetheless made a good impression. He was warm and friendly, and he tailored his message to Prager's audience, emphasizing points of agreement and skillfully avoiding anything that might arouse hostility. When Prager challenged him on Rand's atheism, he merely acknowledged that Rand didn't believe in God and left it at that, thereby avoiding a fight which would only have served to alienate his audience and entangle him in a debate with a skillful adversary.
I suspect that his years in business encouraged Alison to learn how to seek points of agreement with other people. That's how one succeeds in business and politics. That's not, however, how Objectivists have typical strived to succeed. Instead of finding points in common, Objectivists, following Rand's example, often seek for points of disagreement. Rand was the model for this sort of behavior. She was constantly ferreting out sources of disagreement, particularly among potential allies. She had a penchant for taking positions that alienated other free market advocates on the right. She antagonized and/or quarrelled with Leonard Read, Rose Wilder Lane, Ludwig von Mises, Whitaker Chambers, John Hospers and Murray Rothbard among others; and she maintained a lifelong contempt for Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, because neither were quite "pure" enough in their advocacy of the free market. Her shrill denouncements of libertarianism were much too broad, sweeping, and unfair. The consequence of this approach is that, while Rand's ideas remained broadly (if rather vaguely) influential, neither she nor her orthodox disciples have played a significant role in the development of the free market advocacy movement.

Future of Objectivism 5

Yaron Brook, orthodox reformer. Viewed from afar, Yaron Brook seems little more than a narrow, sectarian shill for a Peikoffian version of orthodox Objectivism. While his speaking and writing usually rise to a level of competence, there is nothing in what he has said or written that even suggests or hints at an original or deep mind. To those of us not in tune with Objectivist paplum, he may come across as a bit stiff and unyielding. His evident enthusiasm for laissez-faire capitalism and war against Iran obviously raise questions as to his judgment. One wonders if he has any real understanding of the subjects he talks about. There's ideology, and then there's reality, and the two rarely have much to do with one another.

If we look a little closer and, instead of comparing him to other pundits spouting less unreasonable ideologies, we compare him with other orthodox Objectivists, Brook cuts a more compelling figure. While he remains steadfastly orthodox and thoroughly Peikoffian in his official outlook, he has quietly, behind scenes, been hard at work trying to give orthodox Objectivism a public make-over. Without challenging any of the core principles of Objectivism or questioning Peikoff's ultimate authority as an interpreter of Ayn Rand's philosophy, Brook seems intent on focusing the core of ARI's intellectual activism on the issue of morality and politics. Rand's epistemology and philosophy of history will remain untouched and unchallenged; they may even be cited ocassionally; but they will no longer be front and center, or even close to front and center. ARI's principle mission will be to preach the morality of capitalism and war on radical Islam.

A Commenter Unpacks Some Randian Errors

Darren in comments points us to his careful dissection of some Randian shell games typical of her epistemology. Not a lot to disagree with, particularly this intro para:

Alisa Rosenbaum's brief "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" has too many errors, contradictions, non-sequiturs, and loose ends to critique concisely in a single post. 

For that reason, see also ARCHNblog's extended series on Rand's epistemology.

Stay Classy, Harry.

Barbara Branden, May 14, 1929 – December 11, 2013

Barbara Branden has died. The Los Angeles Times obit is here.

Future of Objectivism 4

Preservation of Orthodoxy. Some Objectivists, following Leonard Peikoff's example, wish to preserve orthodoxy. They desire to prevent other individuals from introducing innovations into Objectivist doctrine. This fear of innovation does not merely stem from a mania for preserving Rand's doctrine in its immaculate, unpolluted form. There may be other motives in the business that intensify the (essentially non-rational) need for doctrinal purity. One important but underrated motive involves competition for status and resources. Most Objectivists would like to believe that many, if not all, schisms are motivated by genuine "philosophical" differences. This is hardly likely. The schism with Kelley, for instance, is often framed as developing over issues of doctrine. Kelley, it was argued, wavered from "true" doctrine. He was guilty, essentially, of heresy. He was not a "true" Objectivist, but an enemy of Objectivism.

Although the official reason for Kelley's dismissal was for speaking in front of a libertarian group, some have suggested that the real reason had more to do with Kelley sanctioning a positive review of Barabara Branden's Passion of Ayn Rand. However, there's probably more to it than that. The positive review of Branden's book, written by Robert Bindinotto, was published in 1986. The Peikoff-Kelley schism didn't take place until three years later. The official reasons for the schism are surprisingly flimsy. Late in 1988, Kelley gave a speech at the Laissez-Faire Supper Club in Manhattan. In 1982, Peikoff had been involved in two book signings with Laissez-Faire books. So why is it okay to have book signings with libertarians, and not speeches? Is there really a significant difference between a book signing and a speech?

Future of Objectivism 3

Danger of Charismatic Leader. In my last post, I explored some of the difficulties which will arise with the weakening of a "legitimate" authority. At some point, no one will be alive who knew Rand personally. No one will be able to say, "I spent X amount of years with Rand; I'm therefore the foremost living expert on Rand's philosophy." Like the Protestant churches on Christendom, there will only be The Word; and whether for good or bad, The Word is not entirely unambiguous. Most of Rand's philosophical writings are broad and abstract, crafted as facile rationalizations for various positions, rather than detailed and exhaustive analysis of specific problems. Many of her more topical essays are clearly dated, and will only become more so as time passes. Worse, Rand's own penchant for rationalizing preconceived conclusions set a bad example for her followers, who have become even worse in this regard, which in turn sets a bad example for future Objectivists. For way too many high ranking Objectivists, philosophy becomes a screen through which personal conflicts are fought and rationalized. Taking the longer, more distant, "objective" view is sneered at among some within the Objectivist community as constituting a false ideal of knowledge. The personal and subjective is conflated with the "objective," and followers of Rand, although ostensibly committed to an "objective" rationality, are in fact merely pursing their private, personal agendas. As long as Peikoff has been around, there existed someone who step in and decide which personal agendas would be regarded as "rational" and "objective," and which as mere whims. When Peikoff is gone, adjudication will require an authority figure (or figures). Since groups are naturally hierarchical (authority being necessary to run any organized effort), the task of leadership and authority would naturally fall to either the ARI board and/or ARI's director. Since committees don't always make good leaders (as individual members of the committee sometimes disagree), ARI's director will be the natural seat of authority, assuming the person occupying that position is a strong, rather than a weak, leader. I would contend that there exist institutional incentives in favor of ARI selecting strong, rather than weak leaders, for the ARI's directorship position. Weak leaders tend to be ineffective. In practical terms, a weak leader at the head of ARI could mean: (1) more unresolvable internal conflicts; (2) loss of fund-raising revenue; and (3) less influence among free market advocacy groups.

Future of Objectivism 2

Authority in Objectivism. One of the challenges for ARI moving forward is to deal with the problem of authority. In any organization there are bound to be conflicts between various individuals. Many, if not most, of these conflicts cannot be resolved by "reason" (i.e., rational argumentation). Rational thinking, at best, can only resolve differences about matters of fact. It cannot resolve differences arising from moral preferences (and all moral ends are preferences). Consequently, conflict is inevitable, even between people pretending to be "rational." Inevitably, Objectivists will disagree with one another. If the disagreements involve competition for resources and/or status, they may become quite heated. How are these conflicts to be resolved?

In the past, routine conflicts could be resolved via ARI's board. But when major conflicts have broken out among board members, only one source of authority could be relied upon: Leonard Peikoff. Peikoff himself, in his apologia for having McCaskey removed from the ARI board, explained how this all works:

An organization devoted to spreading an ideology is not compatible with “freedom” for its leadership to contradict or undermine that ideology. In theory. the best judge of such contradiction would be the person(s) , if he exists, who best understands and upholds the ideology, as evidenced objectively by his lifelong intellectual consistency, philosophic attainments, and practical results. In practice, the best judge would be the person, if he is still alive, who founded the organization and defined its purpose, in this case as a step in carrying out a mandate given him by Ayn Rand. On both counts, only one individual qualifies: me.

The logic of this argument could be extended to cover any conflict, not just ones arising from intellectual criticism of one of Peikoff's pet projects. Because of Peikoff's unique position as the heir of Rand's estate and the individual who, among the living, "best understands" Rand's ideology, he was the obvious choice to occupy the role of Objectivist pope. Peikoff, however, will not be around forever. After Peikoff leaves the scene, who will be "best qualified" to fill the necessary role of authority at ARI (and, by implication at least, of the orthodox Objectivist movement)?

Future of Objectivism 1

Intro. Having gone through most of the official philosophy of Objectivism, we can now turn our attention to some of the cultural and sociological aspects of the Objectivism movements. There are two major challenges to making prognostications about the future of Objectivism: (1) the future is inherently unpredictable; and (2) lack of sociological data about Objectivism. For these two reasons what is put forth in this series will be highly conjectural. We'll be dealing with possibilities, not facts, questions, not answers.

Throughout I will be operating on several assumptions:

(1) That Objectivism does not exist in a vacuum. What goes on in society and the world will affect the future course of Objectivism. We saw this on a small scale in 2008, with the financial meltdown followed by Obama's election. These events caused sales of Atlas Shrugged to increase. One can imagine scenarios which could potentially decrease interest in Ayn Rand: for example, major attacks on USA involving weapons of mass destruction, catastrophic climate change, collapse of democratic government in America.

(2) That the political allegiances are rarely made based on purely "rational" reasons. Nearly everyone has ingrained biases, some of them rooted in genetics, others in life experiences, which influences political beliefs. Consequently, it is very difficult to get people to change their political beliefs via argumentation. It rarely happens.

(3) That factionalism is a built-in feature of society. The elites of society are involved in a battle for status and pre-eminence. Non-elites will tend to attach themselves to whichever party of elites best furthers their interests and satisfies their sentiments. The competitive nature of society means that people have no choice but to join forces with like-minded individuals. The few mavericks who refuse join one of the major factions remain isolated and powerless, without a voice within the governing factions.

(4) That the Objectivist movement requires an authority figure to settle inevitable disputes. Since Ayn Rand's "reason" is a myth (there's no such method), and since the Objectivist ethics is a bit vague (lacking, as Nathanial Branden has noted, a "technology"), there exists no sure-fire way of settling the inevitable disputes that arise among various Objectivists in a rational, "objective" manner. Only by having an authority respected by all members of the group can meddlesome issues be arbitrated.

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 49

Conclusion. Many years ago someone handed me a copy of Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology and said, "This will help you think better." That sounded kind of intriguing, so I gave it a try. The experiment proved a failure. ITOE did not improve my thinking; nor have I run across any evidence that ITOE has improved anyone else's thinking. Leonard Peikoff, for example, probably knows ITOE better than any person living. Has it improved his thinking? This is a man who, in 2006, wrote:

Socialism–a fad of the last few centuries–has had its day; it has been almost universally rejected for decades. Leftists are no longer the passionate collectivists of the 30s, but usually avowed anti-ideologists, who bewail the futility of all systems. Religion, by contrast–the destroyer of man since time immemorial–is not fading; on the contrary, it is now the only philosophic movement rapidly and righteously rising to take over the government.

Six years later, Peikoff entirely changed his tune:

As I have explained in The DIM Hypothesis, Obama is in essence a destroyer for the sake of destruction, a nihilist, the first such to become President. The object to be destroyed is America....

Many evils are in store for us if Obama wins a second term, ranging from crippling taxation and Obamacare to the war on energy and the imminence of economic collapse....

I intend to vote for whatever Republicans in my district are running for the House and the Senate. Republican control of at least one of these bodies, however weakened they have become, is still some restraint on Obama if he wins.

How did the Democrats go so quickly from being "avowed anti-ideologists" to supporters of "a destroyer for the sake of destruction"? How have the Republicans been transformed from a "philosophic movement rapidly and righteously rising to take over the government" to the only force capable of exercising "some restraint" on Obama and the Left?

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 48

The rationalist core of the Objectivist Epistemology. Ayn Rand defined rationalists as "those who claimed that man obtains his knowledge of the world by deducing it exclusively from concepts, which come from inside his head and are not derived from the perception of physical facts." Since Objectivist theory rejects this approach, Objectivists have always believed that they were free from the rationalist taint. However, there is a problem with the Objectivist approach to this issue. If we go by the Objectivist definition, who actually qualifies as a rationalist? Which philosopher, thinker, ideologue obtains all his knowledge of the world exclusively via deduction from concepts, entirely free from the perception of physical facts? In practice, no one does this. It would be impossible. So, practically speaking, who is in fact guilty of rationalism? What, specifically, do those of us who dislike rationalism and criticize it at every opportunity object to?

The critics of rationalism object to the practice of determing complex matters of fact through "logical" deductions from over-generalized descriptions of facts. Use of over-generalized facts is often a symptom of insufficient knowledge. People who lack mastery (i.e., relevant factual knowledge) of a given subject don't realize the extent of their ignorance. They are therefore incapable of appreciating why their conclusions are false. The problem with rationalism, therefore, is not that the rationalist derives conclusions without factual evidence, but that he derives conclusions without sufficient evidence. The rationalist suffers from empirical irresponsibility.

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 47

Meaning, precision, and vagueness. In the final chapter of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Rand introduces some rather peculiar speculations on "further problems of epistemology." She begins by applying her mathematics metaphor, which she used in her "solution" to the problem of universals, to propositions:

Since concepts, in the field of cognition, perform a function similar to that of numbers in the field of mathematics, the function of a proposition is similar to that of an equation: it applies conceptual abstractions to a specific problem.

A proposition, however, can perform this function only if the concepts of which it is composed have precisely defined meanings. If, in the field of mathematics, numbers had no fixed, firm values, if they were mere approximations determined by the mood of their users ... there would be no such thing as the science of mathematics. [IOTE, 75]

I have already noted Rand's conflation of identity with understanding. In this passage Rand is guilty of conflating meaning with reference. This conflation is hardwired into the very warp and woof of the Objectivist epistemology. It is implicit in Rand's mania for establishing the "validity" of concepts. Remember, for Rand, concepts are knowledge; which means they must have a reference in reality (for if they did not "stand" for something in reality, they could not be regarded as knowledge.) If we follow the (implicit) logic in the Objectivist epistemology, unicorn is an "invalid" concept because it has no referent. For Rand a "valid" concept must have both a meaning and a reference.

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 46

Cognitive Role of Concepts. In her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Rand sought to solve the "problem" of universals, which she decided involved the issue of what concepts refer to in the real world. This issue is inextricably connected to the issue of classification. Concepts, for Rand, refer to classes of "units." Rand's "problem of universals" resolves ultimately into the issue of how the data of sense is classified under various concepts.

Essentially, Rand provides a two part answer to this question. Concepts are classified (1) by their distinguishing characteristic(s), with their "measurements omitted"; and (2) concepts are classified in terms of "essential characteristics," which renders them cognitively efficient. In my last two posts, I refuted the first part of this answer. In this post, I will examine the second part.

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 45

Measurement Omission 2: In my last post, I introduced Merlin Jetton's criticism of Rand's measurement omission theory. In this post, I will introduce what I consider an even more devestating criticism.

The number one issue with Rand's measurement omission hypothesis is that it attempts to solve an entirely irrelevant problem. It's a false solution to a false problem. Rand's "problem of universals" is a misnomer. Historically, the problem of universals dealt with whether universals were "real" (in the metaphysical sense). Rand deals with what might be called "the problem of Objectivist concepts." Rand introduces this issue as follows:

When we refer to three persons as "men," what do we designate by that term? The three persons are three individuals who differ in every particular respect and may not possess a single identical characteristic (not even their fingerprints). If you list all their particular characteristics, you will not find one representing manness. Where is the "manness" in men? What, in reality, corresponds to the concept "man" in our mind? [IOTE, 2]

Since Rand regards concept as the principle unit of human knowledge, the issue of how concepts "correspond" to reality becomes a problem. But what if we don't regard concepts as the principal unit of knowledge? What if we regard them merely as symbols conveying meanings? If a concept merely means what it means, then there's no issue of "validity" or correspondence at all. These meanings can be used to make assertions about anything, real or unreal, truth or lies.  The merit of this approach is that it nips in the bud futile arguments about the meanings of words. What a word (or "concept") means is immaterial. It's the meaning of the statement that is important, and that meaning is whatever is intended by the individual who presents the statement. Once we understand the intended meaning of the statement, we can go about testing it to determine whether its true or false, plausible or implausible. By regarding concepts merely as meanings, rather than knowledge, we overstep altogether Rand's problem of universals and concepts. Instead of worrying about the relation of concepts to reality, we focus on the relation of our statements and theories to the real world. The problem of universals is replaced by the far more fruitful problem of theories. Testing and criticizing theories becomes our primary objective; while concepts merely become the vehicle for expressing our theories.

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 44

Measurement Omission 1. Having finished our slow, tedious slog through Peikoff's essay on the Analytic-Sythethic Dichotomy, we can return to the Rand's IOTE and finish out this series on the Objectivist Epistemology.

While much of IOTE is clearly agenda driven (the agenda being Rand's theory of history), there is a portion of Rand's epistemology which, although not entirely free of agenda-based thinking, at least is intermixed with some level of genuine truth-seeking. For example, Rand seems to have sincerely believed that her measurement-omission theory solved the "problem of universals." The question confronting the critic is to determine whether her measurement-omission theory actually delivers the goods.

Rand claimed that  “A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted.” [13, italics added] This theory has been decisively refuted by Merlin Jetton in a paper he wrote for Kelley's Objectivist Center (now known as the Atlas Society):

Ayn Rand & Epistemology 43

Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy 16: Falsifibility. Toward the end of his essay on the Anayltic-Synthetic Dichotomy, Peikoff tackles falsifiability:

Those who claim to distinguish a posteriori and a priori propositions commonly maintain that certain truths (the synthetic, factual ones) are "empirically falsifiable," whereas others (the analytic, logical ones) are not. In the former case, it is said, once can specify experiences which, if they occurred, would invalidate the proposition; in the latter, one cannot. For instance, the proposition "Cats give birth only to kittens" is empirically falsifiable" because one can invent experiences that would refute it such as the spectacle of tiny elephants emerging from a cat's womb. But the proposition "Cats are animals" is not "empirically falsifiable" because "cat" is defined as a species of animal....

Observe the inversion propounded by this argument: a proposition can qualify as a factual, empirical truth only if man is able to evade the facts of experience and arbitrarily ... invent a set of impossible circumstances that contradict these facts; but a truth whose opposite is beyond man's power of invention, is regarded as independent of and irrelevant to the nature of reality, i.e., as an arbitrary product of human "convention." [IOTE, 117-118]

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Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy 15: Concepts as Theories. In a previous post, I criticized the Objectivist view that concepts constitute the principle unit of knowledge. Although Rand argued that concepts contain an "implicit" proposition indicating that the referents of the concept exist, she is not on record as endorsing the view that there may be many implicit propositions lurking inside concepts. Yet the doctrine that concepts contain many propositions is strongly implied by what Peikoff writes in his essay on the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy:

The epistemological basis of [the logical-factual dichotomy] is the view that a concept consists only of its definition. According to the dichotomy, it is logically impermissible to contradict the definition of a concept; what one asserts by this means is "logically" impossible. But to contradict any of the non-defining characteristics of a concept's referents, is regarded as logically permissible; what one asserts in such a case is merely "empirically" impossible.

Thus, a "married bachelor" contradicts the definition of "bachelor" and hence is regarded as "logically" impossible. But a "bachelor who can fly to the moon by means of flapping his arms" is regarded a "logically" possible, because the definition of "bachelor" ("an unmarried man") does not specify his means of locomotion. [IOTE, 115]

Implicit in this criticism is the view that concepts include all the characteristics of a concept's referent. In practical terms, that means all proposotions about a concept, including theories, would presumably be included in the concept. For Objectivism, a concept is not a symbolic meaning used to represent something outside itself; it is, rather, a container which includes everything known (or potentially knowable) about the concept's referent. As Peikoff puts it, "the concept 'man' ... includes all the characteristics of the 'man.'" [115]

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Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy 14: Peikoff on Logic and Experience. After discussing contigency and necessity, Peikoff moves on the logic and experience. He repeats his favorite charge against the analytic-sythetic dichotomy:

Any theory that propounds an opposition between the logical and empirical, represents a failure to grasp the nature of logic and its role in human cognition. [IOTE, 112]

Do advocates of the ASD really propound an "opposition" between logic and experience? Perhaps some do; but without giving examples, Peikoff is merely issuing an unsubstantiated assertion. The ASD grew out of distinctions generated by Hume and Kant. These philosophers were attacking rationalistic speculation (what Kant called "pure" reason). They were not, however, banishing logic from human cognition.

Peikoff goes on the present a brief one-paragraph digest of the Objectivist theory of knowledge:

Man is born tabula rasa; all his knowledge is based on and derived from the evidence of the senses. To reach the distinctively human level of cognition, man must conceptualize his perceptual data --- and conceptualization is a process which is neither automatic nor infallible. Man needs to discover a method to guide this process, if it is to yield conclusions which correspond to the facts of reality --- i.e., which represent knowledge. The principle at the base of the proper method is the fundamental principle of metaphysics: the Law of Identity. In reality, contradiction is the proof of an error. Hence the method man must follow: to identify the facts he observes, in a non-contradictory manner. This method is logic --- "the art of non-contradictory identification." Logic must be employed at every step of a man's conceptual development, from the formulation of his first concepts to the discovery of the most complex scientific laws and theories. Only when a conclusion is based on a noncontradictory identification and integration of all the evidence at a given time, can it qualify as knowledge. [IOTE, 112-113]

Let's examine this paragraph sentence by sentence.

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Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy 13: Is contingency necessary? Objectivists tend to be overly fond of accusing their philosophical opponents of the "stolen concept" fallacy. If some philosophers insists "Nobody can be certain!" an Objectivist is bound to retort: "Can you be certain of that!" What is lost is such facile refutations are the nuances and depth of rigorous philosophical discourse. Stolen-concept "refutations" constitute a philosophical short-cut that fails to do justice to either side in the debate.

If, in opposing the Peikoffian view of necessity, we were to declare the contingency of truth, we must be prepared for stereotypical Objectivist refutation, namely: Is this declared contingency of truth itself a necessary truth? The philosopher George Santayana answered this charge in his book The Realm of Truth as follows:

The Best Living Philosopher Reviews ARCHN

"Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature" and the ARCHNblog have their critics. Some have the decided advantage of having read the book. Some have not, but following in the footsteps of Ayn Rand herself do not see this as much of a obstacle to voicing a strong opinion. A recent critic, Elliot Temple, happily falls into the former category. He has reviewed the book here at his blog, and has also posted it in various Objectivist-friendly corners of the internet. While his review is somewhat lengthy and more than somewhat unfavourable both to the book and to us personally, we are happy to link to it here and let readers make up their own minds as to its merits.

All we would note is that Temple is a rare and interesting bird in the Objectivist aviary in that he is both a fan of Objectivism and Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism, two philosophies that are ostensibly opposed. We also advise readers in advance that Temple bills himself as "the best living philosopher", so perhaps we should be flattered to get his attention.

Because It Really Can't Be Said Often Enough.

"The doctrinal structure of Randism is bluff, buttressed by abuse of all critics."
- David Ramsay Steele.