Saturday, May 30, 2009

Objectivism & Politics, Part 13

An Objectivist fairy tale. In previous posts, I have brought forth compelling evidence for the the view that neither "reason" nor abstract thought plays much of a role in politics. Leonard Peikoff's contention that “philosophy shapes a nation’s political system” must therefore be regarded as a gross exaggeration. Yet Objectivism has one more arrow in its quiver. In Peikoff’s Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, we find the following extraordinary assertion:

As long as men remain ignorant of their basic mental process, they have no answer to the charge, leveled by mysticism and skepticism alike, that their mental content is some form of revelation or invention detached from reality. This kind of viewpoint can go into remission for a while,…however if it is not burned out of men’s souls completely by an explicit philosophical theory, it becomes the most virulent of cancers; it metastasizes to every branch of philosophy and every department of culture, as is now evident throughout the world. Then the best among men become paralyzed by doubt; while the others turn into mindless hordes that march in any irrationalist era looking for someone to rule them. [88]

In other words, the reason why people allow themselves to be directed by their sentiments and interests, rather than by “reason” and “reality,” is because they are ignorant of their basic mental processes. In particular, they are ignorant of a “full answer to the problem [of universals].” “Most philosophers did not intend to invalidate conceptual knowledge,” contended Rand, “but its defenders did more to destroy it than did its enemies. They were unable to offer a solution to the ‘problem of universals,’ that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data—and to prove the validity of scientific induction.” [FTNI, 30]

So our knowledge, according to Rand, must be “validated.” We must actually know how we know. Our beliefs, our knowledge claims must have a foundation or justification. And not just any kind of justification will do. We can’t just assume that we are right, on the basis of a kind of pragmatic feeling or intuitive sense, based on experience and tradition. We must know the precise reasons why we know what we know. Nothing less will do.

What we are confronted with here is a particularly extreme and intense version of foundationalism, coupled with an equally extreme version of justificationism. All beliefs must be “validated” (which in Objectivism seems to mean: justified on the basis of “self-evident” axioms). Everything not proved is dismissed as “arbitrary”; and any protests that this demand is itself arbitrary are dismissed as the most hateful and nihilistic skepticism.

Ayn Rand is not alone in having this mania for proving impossible and unnecessary contentions. Many other philosophers throughout civilized human history (most of them, thankfully, forgotten) have been afflicted by various forms of this sickness. Charles Augustus Strong, an American philosopher (remembered today, if he is remembered at all, as the son-in-law of the great monopolist, John D. Rockerfeller), was obsessed with demonstrating how consciousness could originate within an unconscious world, and made himself unpleasant to anyone who, like his friend George Santayana, were never troubled by such trivialities. Another obscure philosopher, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, once famous for formulating the “principle of least action,” was obsessed with explaining the darker mysteries of Motion. The historian Thomas Carlyle has some trenchant criticisms to make concerning Maupertuis’ unfortunate obsession with Motion:

It is well known there have been, to the metaphysical head, difficulties almost insuperable as to How, in the System of Nature, Motion is? How, in the name of wonder, it can be; and even, Whether it is at all? Difficulties to the metaphysical head, sticking its nose into the gutter there;—not difficult to my readers and me, who can at all times walk across the room, and triumphantly get over them. But stick your nose into any gutter, entity, or object, this of Motion or another, with obstinacy,—you will easily drown, if that be your determination!

Carlyle here gets it exactly right. It is not in the least important for us to “solve” the metaphysical or epistemological difficulties presented by these so-call “problems,” whether of Maupertuis’ motion, Strong’s origin of consciousness, or Rand’s universals. Each and every one of us triumphs over the problem of motion when we go to the bathroom; we triumph over the problem of the origin of consciousness when we wake up in the morning; and we triumph over the problem of universals every time we use a general term to cover multiple instances. These problems, in short, are entirely contrived and artificial, arising out of false ideals concerning knowledge and propagated by philosophers suffering from being far too anal about trivial matters.

Yet in Rand, it is even worse. She is attempting to use the problem of universals as a kind of scapegoat to blame everything she dislikes in the world. I suppose we can give Rand credit for not choosing a race or an ethnicity or a religious culture for her scapegoat. This shows in improvement and refinement in scapegoat theorizing, just as rearing of domestic animals is an improvement and refinement on hunting wild animals. But that’s all that can be said for it. For in the end, Rand’s contention that most of the moral, political, and social problems of the world ultimately stem from the failure to solve the problem of universals is mere wishful thinking on an epic scale. It places Rand in the role of the great heroine who, in the words of Peikoff, “overturn[s] the reign of the evil and save[s] the world.” Anyone who could actually believe such a fairy tale clearly has no head for reality.

18 comments:

Anonymous said...

"and not just any kind of justification will do. We can’t just assume that we are right, on the basis of a kind of pragmatic feeling or intuitive sense, based on experience and tradition. We must know the precise reasons why we know what we know. Nothing less will do.

What we are confronted with here is a particularly extreme and intense version of foundationalism, coupled with an equally extreme version of justificationism. All beliefs must be “validated” (which in Objectivism seems to mean: justified on the basis of “self-evident” axioms). Everything not proved is dismissed as “arbitrary”; and any protests that this demand is itself arbitrary are dismissed as the most hateful and nihilistic skepticism.

...

Ayn Rand is not alone in having this mania for proving impossible and unnecessary contentions. Many other philosophers throughout civilized human history (most of them, thankfully, forgotten) have been afflicted by various forms of this sickness."

Well, you basically just described the idea behind Due Process in the American Legal Tradition, which is certainly not forgotten.

I'd be careful of going to far with promoting "pragmatic feeling or intuitive sense, based on experience and tradition" when that was argument of those on the losing side of every civil rights battle from Brown v. Board of Education to Lawrence v. Texas.

"Carlyle here gets it exactly right. It is not in the least important for us to “solve” the metaphysical or epistemological difficulties presented by these so-call “problems,” whether of Maupertuis’ motion, Strong’s origin of consciousness, or Rand’s universals. Each and every one of us triumphs over the problem of motion when we go to the bathroom; we triumph over the problem of the origin of consciousness when we wake up in the morning; and we triumph over the problem of universals every time we use a general term to cover multiple instances. These problems, in short, are entirely contrived and artificial, arising out of false ideals concerning knowledge and propagated by philosophers suffering from being far too anal about trivial matters."

I don't think that when it comes to politics--the series this post is a part of--that the problem was justifying going to the bathroom or waking up in the morning. I think it's more about solving the problem of universals regarding, say, whether the general term "marriage" covers only heterosexual instances, or both heterosexual and homosexual instances.

Cavewight said...

Greg,

There is room for debate over whether or not Rand thought the Problem of Universals was a true or false problem. Is it not, in her opinion, perhaps a false problem of ontology useful only to add more confusion and increase skepticism? The issue for her, therefore, is not any ontological problem of Being, but only epistemology. And on those grounds, the Problem of Universals indeed vanishes into the void of her Conceptualism and empty axioms.

Cavewight said...

"They were unable to offer a solution to the ‘problem of universals,’ that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data—and to prove the validity of scientific induction."

I just read this again, and find Rand's circularity amusing. She is saying, in effect, that philosophers who failed did not play the game her way. They did not define the nature and the source of abstractions - as if this was the whole Problem anyway, and it relates to the part of ITOE where she stated that a universal is a concept is an abstraction - assuming they are identical.

gregnyquist said...

Anon: "I don't think that when it comes to politics--the series this post is a part of--that the problem was justifying going to the bathroom or waking up in the morning."

Those are examples simply brought up to show the emptiness of claiming that one has to explain, in a foundationalist sense, how one has to do X in order to do X. It's only related politics because Rand and co. use a similar form of reasoning in claiming that people are irrational about politics.

"I think it's more about solving the problem of universals regarding, say, whether the general term 'marriage' covers only heterosexual instances, or both heterosexual and homosexual instances."

Will solving the problem of universals allow us to find a solution to the issue of homosexual marriage? I find it grossly implausible to think so. Marriage is a social convention: it's what "society" makes of it. Americans are having a debate over marriage, not because of any problem of universals, but because society is divided as to the definition of this social convention.

Daniel Barnes said...

Rand:"[Other philosophers] were unable to offer a solution to the ‘problem of universals,’ that is: to define the nature and source of abstractions, to determine the relationship of concepts to perceptual data—and to prove the validity of scientific induction." (FTNI p30)

Err...but Ayn...you didn't prove the validity of scientific induction either. You admitted so yourself:

Rand:"...the big question of induction...Which I couldn't even begin to discuss - because...I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it..." - (Introduction To Objectivist Epistemology p304, DB emphasis)

Note that FTNI was published in 1961, and the ITOE quote is from the Q&A sessions conducted 1969-71. So in effect in 1961 Rand is clearly giving the false impression that her theory solves the problem of induction, despite the fact that, as she lets slip in conversation many years later, she doesn't know enough about the problem to even "begin to discuss" it.

I think "fairy tale" is an excellent description of the Objectivist narrative, and faced with situations like the above we should seriously ask the question as to whether Rand was somewhat delusional; a kind of serial fantasist.

Cavewight said...

But Daniel, did you expect Rand to solve the problem of induction in an introductory work to epistemology?

Cavewight said...

I should add that I always hesitate to label ITOE as a work on epistemology. Concept-formation is not the same as theory of knowledge, or at least is not introductory to it. A theory of concept-formation, in the hierarchy of these matters, comes after the theory of knowledge.

Daniel Barnes said...

Cavewight:
>But Daniel, did you expect Rand to solve the problem of induction in an introductory work to epistemology?

Hi Cavewight

If she made out she had, then I would expect so. The point being that she obviously implied in the '61 comment that her theory solved what prior philosophers had been unable to eg induction. Yet she was putting about a false implication. This situation is like her theory of ethics, where she claimed to have overcome the is/ought gap where she in fact hadn't at all.

Cavewight said...

She didn't obviously imply that she had solved the problem of induction. And besides, there are more interesting problems found in that quote besides some possible braggadocio on her part.

Does the problem of universals seek to define the nature and source of abstractions?

Does the problem of universals seek to determine the relationship between concepts and perceptual data?

Does the problem of universals seek to prove the validity of scientific induction?

Does the problem of universals have anything to do with problems of epistemology?

Cavewight said...

Greg wrote:
In other words, the reason why people allow themselves to be directed by their sentiments and interests, rather than by “reason” and “reality,” is because they are ignorant of their basic mental processes. In particular, they are ignorant of a “full answer to the problem [of universals].”Or in other words, people allow themselves to be directed by their sentiments because they haven't read ITOE and learned from the goddess how concepts are properly formed.

Her answer to the problem of universals, however, is to show that it was mistakenly formulated.
It is not, according to Rand, a problem of whether or not universals really exist, but whether and how they, regarded as mental abstractions or concepts, conform to reality. Rand does not prove that universals are really only types concepts or abstractions, her solution to the problem is to merely assert it.

Amazingly enough, however, I don't think Rand would have disagreed with either you or Carlyle when you write "we triumph over the problem of the origin of consciousness when we wake up in the morning." Consciousness, for Rand, was axiomatic.

Cavewight said...

I found this interesting quote regarding your comment that the problem of universals is solved in our every day lives.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/ I will first motivate the problem by showing how naturally the questions concerning universals emerge if we consider how we come to know a universal claim, i.e., one that concerns a potentially infinite number of particulars of a given kind, in a simple geometrical demonstration.In other words, the author of this article intends to demonstrate to you how the problem of universals arises using a simple geometrical explanation.

Now you can always ignore such demonstrations and thus make the problem "vanish," as I have seen Objectivists use the same method of "solving" it. However, A is A, and it won't go away by producing hand-waving types of comments.

Michael Prescott said...

"Charles Augustus Strong ... was obsessed with demonstrating how consciousness could originate within an unconscious world, and made himself unpleasant to anyone who, like his friend George Santayana, were never troubled by such trivialities."

I know nothing about Strong, but the question of how consciousness arises from insentient matter is hardly trivial. It's the so-called "hard problem" of neuroscience, widely considered the most important and most vexing scientific-philosophical problem of all.

A solution to this problem would have enormous implications for our whole view of human nature and the nature of reality.

I'm sure most people are not troubled by such questions while they go about their daily routines, but their indifference doesn't mean the questions are trivial. After all, most people are unconcerned about any intellectual questions.

Cavewight said...

The only reference to a "hard problem of consciousness" that I have ever read is located at this link.

Michael Prescott said...

"The only reference to a 'hard problem of consciousness' that I have ever read ..."

If you want more links, Google "hard problem" + "neuroscience." You'll get 54,000 hits.

Cavewight said...

Yes, but I am looking for something other than references to Chalmers' essay, so I would have to -Chalmers.
Doing this eliminates over 13,000 hits.

Cavewight said...

Greg wrote:
An Objectivist fairy tale. In previous posts, I have brought forth compelling evidence for the the view that neither "reason" nor abstract thought plays much of a role in politics. Leonard Peikoff's contention that “philosophy shapes a nation’s political system” must therefore be regarded as a gross exaggeration.

I would certainly agree that people don't use much in the way of abstract thought when it comes to politics. And then you could argue that even the abstract thinkers are only engaged in derivation, and not empirical reasoning.

But Peikoff's claim is only based on the idea that everybody has a philosophy, at least subconsciously and probably inconsistently. And that their subconscious premises (a set of philosophical principles which can be changed) dictate their every action and emotional state.

And so Peikoff's claim subsumes Pareto's theory of residues. Because if it is the case that your every thought, action, and emotion is the result of subconscious premises serving as your philosophy, then your residues are also the result of your philosophy. Even if one's explicit political philosophy is completely emotionally grounded, it is still the case for Peikoff that those emotions are grounded in reasonings, not residues, which may or may not be held in conscious form.

gregnyquist said...

Michael: "I know nothing about Strong, but the question of how consciousness arises from insentient matter is hardly trivial."

Fair enough, maybe trivial is a bit strong. Perhaps it would be better to say: With very little practical import, or something along those lines. Remember, the whole point of this post is to point out how implausible it is to suppose that the social and political order can be changed by "solving" some abstruse question of philosophy that has no bearing on the practical affairs of human beings.

What Santayana writes about poor Strong seems to me to the very core of the issue: "[Strong] found ... a most grave problem in what never has troubled me, namely, in the origin of consciousness within an unconcious world. And in the end he had the satisfaction of thinking that he had solved this problem scientifically, and discovered the true and necessary derivation of mind from an unconscious substance.... Unfortunately my ... willingness to entertain some such solution for the problem of mind in nature could not be of much technical use to him, because I could seldom accept the arguments by which he supported his theory. These arguments were based on presuppositions that I was inclined to question. They were rationalistic arguments applied to matters of fact, and involved a conceptual dogmatism like that of Leibniz; whereas it seemed to me that, since nature has found some means of eliciting mind out of matter, this mind may live content without dictating, out of its own resources, how nature could or could not have done it. The miracle recurs in us every morning and at the birth of every child; and the difficulties we find in conceiving it arise from our prejudices, not from the miracle itself. Everything is a miracle, until we call it natural, and everything is equally natural that actually happens."

The sort of explanation that is sought is such problems as the "origin of consciousness," particularly by philosophers, involves a false ideal of explanation. The most that could be found, by way of explanation, for the "problem" of consciousness, would be a scientific description of some of the process and/or conditions by which the flame of consciousness original sprung forth. But why that particularly set of process and conditions rather than some other brings consciousness forth would remain a mystery. At its very core, everything that happens is a mystery and existence is a surd. And so when confronted with some philosopher who demands "How is X possible?" or "How does X arise?" sometimes the best answer is: "It just does—get over it."

gregnyquist said...

Cavewight: "But Peikoff's claim is only based on the idea that everybody has a philosophy, at least subconsciously and probably inconsistently. And that their subconscious premises (a set of philosophical principles which can be changed) dictate their every action and emotional state."

Just to prevent any confusion on this issue: this is precisely the point that this post is meant to question. I didn't go deep into the theory of emotions of Objectivism because that's covered elsewhere on this blog. It is grossly implausible to assume (without a shred of clinical evidence, no less) that subconscious premises arising out of the issue of the problem of universals have any effect on an individual's emotional character. It is fairy tale constructed with no other purpose than to convince the Objectivist faithful, against all the evidence of history and everyday life, that Objectivism will win in the end. It is wishful thinking of the most pathetic sort; and even the most rabid Objectivist shrinks from defending it.